



National
Qualifications
SPECIMEN ONLY

S837/77/11

History

Date — Not applicable

Duration — 3 hours

Total marks — 90

Attempt ONE section only.

Attempt BOTH parts of your chosen section.

Write your answers clearly in the answer booklet provided. In the answer booklet you must clearly identify the question number you are attempting.

Use **blue** or **black** ink.

Before leaving the examination room you must give your answer booklet to the Invigilator; if you do not, you may lose all the marks for this paper.



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SECTION 1 — Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

Attempt **BOTH** parts

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

- | | |
|--|----|
| 1. To what extent did agriculture underpin all other elements of Iron Age society? | 25 |
| | |
| 2. 'Governor Agricola is no longer to be credited with the Flavian conquest of Northern Britain.' | |
| How justified is this view of Agricola's role in the Flavian conquest? | 25 |
| | |
| 3. How significant an impact did conversion to Christianity have on Northern Britons in the post-Roman period? | 25 |
| | |
| 4. 'Britain received a third tribe, namely the Irish (the Scotti).' | |
| How valid is this view of the origin of the Scots? | 25 |
| | |
| 5. To what extent was the creation of Alba a result of cultural domination by the Scots over the Picts? | 25 |

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SECTION 1 — Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *British Archaeology*, Issue 54, edited by Simon Denison (August 2000)

New discoveries at Vindolanda fort on Hadrian's Wall have reinforced the idea that the fort may have been used as a Roman POW (Prisoner of War) camp in the 3rd century. Back-to-back rows of native-style circular stone huts have been found in the south-western corner of the fort . . . about 300 huts could have existed, housing up to 2,000 prisoners. According to the Director of the Vindolanda Trust, the huts probably date to the reign of Emperor Septimius Severus, who brought an imperial force to quell a native uprising in northern Britain. Severus pushed well into Scotland during the campaign but progress was cut short by illness and Severus subsequently died at York in 211. The hut rows are unparalleled at any fort elsewhere in the Empire. Many contain hearths, but they are otherwise devoid of finds as they were regularly swept clean in antiquity.

Source B from *The Wall, Rome's Greatest Frontier* by Alistair Moffat (2009)

The imperial expedition into Scotland and the heartlands of the insurgent was to be primarily focused on the east coast. The fort at South Shields, at the mouth of the Tyne, was converted into a massive supply dump with no less than twenty-three granaries built to store food. It has been calculated that there was enough for an army of 40,000 men for three months in the field. The intended target was Tayside, the territory of the Maeatae. In 208 Septimius Severus arrived in Britain with detachments from several legions. In any event no pitched battles or decisive victories were recorded for the great army. Instead of glory in battle, the emphasis [for Severus and Caracalla] may have to have been on great engineering projects — like a bridge across the Tay — how the Roman army could tame the landscape, and its inhabitants with technology.

Source C from *Orkneyinga Saga* (c 1230)

One summer King Harald Finehair sailed west over the North Sea to Orkney and Shetland in order to teach a lesson to certain Vikings whose raiding he could no longer tolerate. These Vikings used to raid in Norway over the summer and had Shetland and Orkney as their winter base. King Harald subdued Shetland and the Orkneys and the Hebrides and sailed all the way down to the Isle of Man and destroyed all the settlements there. He fought many battles there and many died. One of those killed in battle was Ívarr, the son of Earl Rögnvaldr of Möer; so when King Harald set sail for Norway, he gave Earl Rögnvaldr the Orkneys and Shetland as compensation for his son. Earl Rögnvaldr in turn transferred both countries to his brother Sigurðr, who was King Harald's pro-woman. When the king sailed back to Norway he bestowed on Sigurðr the title of Jarl and Sigurðr stayed behind on the islands.

Source D from *Picts, Gaels and Scots* by Sally Foster (2004)

. . . in Pictland we find evidence that kings were placing increasing emphasis on organising themselves for war since there was a shift from plundering, pillaging and extortion to pitched battles, which required far greater military organisation and resources. For example, enormous effort went into the breeding and stabling of horses, and the groom seen accompanying the female figure on the Hilton of Cadboll cross-slab must have been an important member of the royal household . . . Further resources must also have been required to free warriors for either permanent or temporary duty. Military aggression could be — indeed, frequently was — used to decide which particular person inherited or acquired authority over any given area; kings had to be strong. This was presumably how Bridei son of Beli consolidated Pictish kingship and we must assume that this was how Cinead mac Ailpin rose to power . . . So military might was used to obtain and assert power. Such instances of internecine and apparent political instability are recurrent themes throughout this period.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

- | | |
|---|----|
| 6. How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of Severus' methods of control of Northern Britain? | 16 |
| 7. Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the extent of Viking control of the Northern and Western Isles. | 12 |
| 8. How fully does Source D explain the war-like nature of Pictish society? | 12 |

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SECTION 2 — Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

9. 'King Alexander III's success in consolidating the authority of the Scottish monarchy has been greatly exaggerated.'
How valid is this view? 25
10. 'The Scottish resistance of 1297 was caused by resentment of English mismanagement of Scotland.'
How justified is this view? 25
11. To what extent was the decision of John Comyn to submit in 1304 caused by the defection of Robert Bruce? 25
12. How far does the support of the Scottish Church explain Robert the Bruce's victory in the civil war between 1306 and 1309? 25
13. To what extent was the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton of 1328 made possible by the overthrow of Edward II in 1327? 25

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SECTION 2 — Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *The Wars of Scotland 1214–1271* by Michael Brown (2004)

In late September 1286, the Guardian James Stewart met with Robert Bruce and his son, the Earl of Carrick, at the latter's castle at Turnberry . . . They shared anxieties about instability of the Isles and Ireland. The gathering of the Bruces with Stewart and his uncle, Walter, Earl of Menteith, the Earl of Dunbar and Angus of Islay was a roll call of families, largely from the west, most of whom would later support the Bruce claim to the throne . . . The Guardians lacked the stature of a king in the vital job of managing flashpoints and rivalries within the nobility. Instead, they were often drawn into these incidents . . . The way out of these internal tensions lay outside the kingdom. It is likely that the Guardians actively sought Edward's support. Like his father in the 1250s, Edward was approached as a means of guaranteeing political stability in a Scottish realm which lacked a royal head.

Source B from *A Great and Terrible King: Edward I* by Marc Morris (2008)

It was Robert Wishart, Bishop of Glasgow and Guardian, who recovered himself sufficiently from the shock of Edward's demand of overlordship to respond on behalf of the startled Scots. He said it did not matter what they, as temporary custodians, might or might not concede: only a king of Scotland could answer such a momentous demand. The bishop took Edward to task over his reasoning: *they* were not obliged to prove him *wrong*; rather *he* should prove himself *right*. Wishart reminded the English king that he was supposed to be a crusader and observed that to threaten to unleash war on a defenceless people did him no credit. At this Edward was predictably enraged . . . the king, to be sure, had anticipated some opposition to his demands — hence the massive effort to prove his right by documentary means. But the scale and fervour of Scottish resistance had left him reeling, with no response other than angry threats of force . . . and force, as the bishop of St Andrews had discerned, was an inappropriate answer in present circumstances.

Source C from *Gesta Annalia II* appended to the *Chronicle of John of Fordun*, written in the late 14th century

Macduff managed to get John, king of Scotland, summoned to the English king's parliament held in London. In spite of the English king and his supporters, John appeared and decided, after consulting with his council of advisors, that he would answer through a representative [proxy]. When, therefore, the king was called and the representative appeared, the king of England, sitting in the judgement seat, would not in any way listen to the representative speak until the king of Scotland, who was sitting next to the king of England, should rise from his place and standing in court in front of him, convey his answers to his representative with his own lips. John fulfilled these commands and, having experienced innumerable insults and slights from all those assembled, contrary to his kingly rank and dignity, he eventually conveyed his answers to his representative; and after taking his leave, returned home greatly downcast.

Source D from *The Scottish Civil War* by Michael Penman (2002)

Bruce may have further antagonised his former enemies in Scotland by attempting to build up Sir James Douglas's lands as the Crown agent in the south-west (where Soules and some of his confederates had their lands). Many Scots must also have been angered by another round of seal abuse and coercion by the royal government in demanding that nobles approve the Declaration of Arbroath to send to the Papacy about 6 April 1320 . . . Robert I, however, was understandably anxious to play down the Balliol dynastic threat which the Soules conspiracy posed. At the so-called 'Black Parliament' in August 1320 in which the conspirators were tried, Robert made a cruel example of those involved. He jailed Soules, Umfraville and the Countess of Strathearn and executed Barclay of Brechin for being complicit with the plot but not warning the Crown. It was the Brucean propaganda version of the plot which reached later Scottish chroniclers who wrote about the events.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

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| 14. How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of the role of the Guardians in defending Scottish independence between 1286 and 1292? | 16 |
| 15. Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the difficulties faced by King John during his reign. | 12 |
| 16. How fully does Source D explain the methods used by Robert I to secure his government's authority between 1314 and 1320? | 12 |

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SECTION 3 — Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815**Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks**

Attempt **TWO** questions.

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|------------|--|-----------|
| 17. | How important were the methods of the tobacco lords in establishing Glasgow as the ‘tobacco metropolis of Western Europe’? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 18. | How far does the poor leadership of James Francis Stuart, the Old Pretender, explain why the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 failed? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 19. | ‘Urban areas had become the dominant presence in the society and economy of Scotland by 1800.’

How valid is this assessment of the growth of Scottish towns and cities during the 18 th century? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 20. | How important was the French Revolution in explaining political unrest in Scotland in the 1790s? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 21. | To what extent does John Cockburn of Ormiston deserve to be considered the most significant contributor to Scotland’s agricultural revolution? | 25 |

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SECTION 3 — Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *The Forty Five: Jacobite Tactics* by J.M. Hill (1986)

Prestonpanns illustrated the Gaels' tactical superiority over an opponent not sufficiently trained or led and unfamiliar with the Highland way of war. The performance of his troops so impressed Charles that thereafter he 'entertained a mighty notion of the Highlanders, and imagined they would beat four times their number of regular troops'. Charles, however, deceived himself in equating Cope's rabble with the best regular troops in the British army.

Though the clansmen executed a near perfect Highland charge, their victory was not based on tactical acumen. The cheap victory definitely left Charles over-confident, and gave him unrealistic expectations of their capabilities. This was to prove his undoing. Charles's strategy at Culloden was to place the clan regiments on an ill-chosen field that greatly favoured conventional British tactics and weaponry, but the performance of the individual Highlanders might have made up for this disadvantage if they had been effectively commanded during the battle. Indeed, Culloden moor was near perfect for the Hanoverian army's preferred method of combat.

Source B from a letter sent by George Murray to Charles Edward Stuart on 17th April 1746, Ruthven Barracks

Sir, now the fight has been lost and your rightful cause seems cast adrift you will, I hope, pardon me if I mention a few truths. It was wrong to have raised your royal standard without having a positive assurance from the French that they would support you with all force. I'm also convinced that Mr O'Sullivan, whom you trusted with most essential things, was exceedingly unfit and committed terrible blunders. I never saw him in time of action, neither at Gladsmuir, Falkirk or at the last and his orders were completely confused.

Of course the Hanoverian artillery and musket fire was deadly, but we may still have prevailed if it were not for the lack of provisions. This had fatal consequences. You trusted Mr Hay to order provisions, yet he served you very poorly. He told me provisions were ordered, but he neglected his duty. In the three days before battle your army was starved.

Source C from *Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland* by Samuel Johnson (1773)

We were now to cross the Highlands towards the western coast. The journey was not formidable, for it took only 2 days. We had gained the favour of our host so that when we left his house in the morning he walked with us a great way and entertained us with conversation on the condition of the Highlands. From him we first heard of the general dissatisfaction amongst the Highlanders.

The clan chiefs have turned their thoughts to the improvements of their finances and expect more rent. However, the tenant does not see why his industry is to be taxed more heavily than before. He refuses to pay the demand, and is ejected. It seems to be the general opinion amongst Highlanders that rents have been raised too much. The willingness to seek another country is clear from the behaviour of the Highlanders. Soon this beautiful land will be all but empty of the Highland people.

Source D from *The Scottish Nation 1700–2000* by T.M. Devine (1999)

The forces that resulted in changes to Scottish schools during the eighteenth century were both varied and powerful. Even in earlier decades there had been private fee-paying or ‘adventure’ schools outside the statutory system, because parishes were often too large for one master to satisfy demand. The system came under acute pressure after 1750 with the rising population and a significant increase in migration. The most dynamic feature of schooling in the large burghs was a response to the new needs of the expanding business and professional classes. As early as 1695, Glasgow appointed a teacher of navigation and book-keeping, and Edinburgh in 1705 hired a former merchant as ‘Professor of book-keeping to the city’. The other side of this coin was greater pressure on the living standards of schoolmasters. These very financial problems encouraged some rural schoolmasters to broaden their teaching to include ‘new’ subjects such as geography, French and book-keeping since they were permitted to charge a higher fee on these.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

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|-----|---|----|
| 22. | How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the failure of the Jacobite rising of 1745? | 16 |
| 23. | Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the nature of social change in the Highlands in the late 18 th century. | 12 |
| 24. | How fully does Source D explain the reasons for the changes in Scottish schooling in the 18 th century? | 12 |

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SECTION 4 — USA: 'a house divided', 1850–1865

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

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| 25. | To what extent was the Kansas–Nebraska Act the most significant reason for the emergence of the Republican Party by 1856? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 26. | ‘The role of the Western Theatre in the Civil War has been underestimated.’
How valid is this view? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 27. | To what extent have criticisms of Jefferson Davis as a wartime leader been exaggerated? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 28. | How justified is the view that the Civil War’s greatest impact on women was in the South? | 25 |
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 | | |
| 29. | ‘It seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected.’
How valid is this view of the difficulties Lincoln faced during the 1864 presidential campaign? | 25 |

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SECTION 4 — USA: 'a house divided', 1850–1865

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *The Blessings of Slavery* by George Fitzhugh, a Virginian lawyer (1857)

The negro slaves of the South are the happiest and freest people in the world. The free laborer must work or starve. He is more of a slave than the negro, because he works longer and harder for less allowance than the slave, and has no holiday, because the cares of life with him begin when his labors end. He has no liberty and not a single right. The negro men and stout boys work, on the average, in good weather, no more than nine hours a day. The negro children, the aged and infirm work not at all, and yet have all the comforts and necessities of life provided for them. They enjoy liberty, because they are oppressed neither by care or labor. They can sleep at any hour; and quiet sleep is the greatest of human enjoyments. 'Blessed be the man who invented sleep.' We do not know whether free laborers ever sleep. Our negroes are confessedly better off than any free laboring population in the world.

Source B from the *South Carolina Declaration of Causes of Secession*, 24th December 1860

For 25 years this agitation (against slavery) has been steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the power of the common Government, subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. This means he is to be entrusted with the administration of the common Government, a man who has declared that 'Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free', and that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction. On the 4th March next this party will take possession of the Government. It has announced that the South shall be excluded from the common territory and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.

Source C from *The Irrepressible Conflict* by Frank Owsley (1930)

The two sections, North and South, had joined together under the Constitution fully conscious that they united as two divergent economic and social systems. The two sections were evenly balanced in population and in the number of states, so that at the time there was no danger of either section encroaching upon the interests of the other. This balance was clearly understood. But equilibrium was impossible under expansion, and growth at one time or another became dominant and therefore controls the national government. Therein lies the irrepressible conflict; the eternal struggle between the agrarian South and the industrial North to control the government. The irrepressible conflict, then, was not between slavery and freedom, but between the industrial and commercial civilisation of the North and the agrarian civilisation of the South. The economic systems and interests of the sections clashed. Their social systems were hostile. Their political philosophies growing out of their economic and social systems were impossible to reconcile. What was food for one was poison for the other.

Source D from *Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation 1861–1865* by William K. Klingaman (2001)

The Emancipation Proclamation heightened the possibility of slave insurrection across the South, which distracted Confederate officials and lowered morale in the rebel armies. Once Lincoln publicly defined the war as a conflict between freedom and slavery, any chance of European aid to the Confederacy vanished. However, by emancipating the Confederacy's slaves as a war measure — and not as an act of justice toward the Negro — Lincoln subordinated the ideal of freedom to the preservation of the Union. Emancipation became the means to an end, a by-product of the war. The Proclamation consisted of legalistic language designed to stifle any challenges to the abolition of slavery, the sort of language one expected from a generation that devoted enormous time and energy to debates over the constitutional and legal rights of slave-owners. Lincoln left no noble words about liberty for Negroes, no eloquent phrases that could inspire subsequent generations to work toward equality.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

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| 30. Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the nature of the debate over slave conditions in antebellum Southern society. | 12 |
| 31. How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the causes of the Civil War? | 16 |
| 32. How fully does Source D explain the consequences of the Emancipation Proclamation? | 12 |

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SECTION 5 — Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

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| 33. | How far was the elimination of the Shoguns between 1868 and 1869 the decisive step towards achieving a centralised state? | 25 |
| 34. | How successful were the educational reforms of the Meiji era? | 25 |
| 35. | ‘Recent historians have drawn attention to the indispensable part played by the Zaibatsu in Japan’s economic advance.’
How valid is this view? | 25 |
| 36. | To what extent do the military reforms explain why Japan successfully defeated China by 1895? | 25 |
| 37. | How significant was the impact of the First World War on Japan? | 25 |

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SECTION 5 — Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *Meiji Revisited, The Sites of Victorian Japan* by Dallas Finn (1995)

Until the mid-19th century the Japanese continued to live and work in structures as predictable and carefully defined as their social rank: the samurai's mansion, the peasant's farm, the craftsman's workplace, and the merchant's shop. Prior to this Japan had been dominated by internal civil strife. Manufacturing consisted mainly of weaving, pottery and metalwork, performed skilfully but on a modest scale, using simple machinery powered sometimes by oxen or a waterwheel, but mainly by human muscle. People and their freight travelled by small sailing ships between coastal towns, or moved by palanquin, packhorse, or foot along the traditional highways. This was all in stark contrast with the late 19th century when social mobility became much more of a theoretical reality when the formal caste structure was abolished.

Source B from a memo sent by Iwakura Tomomi to Sanjo Sanetomi, a leading government statesman (1869)

This letter aims to discuss foreign affairs. When the Tokugawa opened relations with foreign countries, it was not addressed whether this was good for the country or bad and among their numerous failings was deceiving the Imperial Court and lying to the people. These treaties were concluded by three of four Great and Senior Councillors. However, treaties themselves are based on natural law and thus the good and bad of treaties must be decided in reason. We must defend our imperial country's independence by revising the unfair trade treaties we recently concluded with Great Britain, France, Holland, America, and other countries. Currently, foreign countries' troops have landed in our ports and they show no sign of leaving and these treaties are a mere cover for the use of imperialist force.

Source C from *Japan, A Documentary History, the Late Tokugawa Period to the Present* edited by David J. Lu (1996)

Since the time when the first Imperial Ancestor opened it, the country has not been free from occasional checks in its prosperity nor from frequent disturbances of its tranquillity. This commentary states the great principle of the Constitution of the country. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the Constitution. This Sacred Throne was established at the time long ago when the heavens and earth became separated. Now, all the different legislative as well as executive powers of state are united in this Most Exalted Personage. His Imperial Majesty has determined a Constitution, and has made it a fundamental law to be observed both by the Sovereign and by the People. Innumerable evil customs that have long been prevailing have been swept away. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet. The legislative power belongs to the sovereign power of the Emperor, but this power shall always be exercised with the consent of the Diet.

Source D from *Japan's Modern Myths* by C. Gluck (1985)

After his gracious bestowal of the constitution, the Emperor's relation to politics was maintained in public on a strictly ceremonial level. He opened the Diet, met with his ministers to hear of political matters, and spoke, as it were, in infrequent rescripts that expressed his government's will in lofty imperial terms. He was reported to read the provincial press. He was described as believing in the 'principles of progress, for only this principle can make the Japanese one of the great peoples of the world'. Nonetheless, he did not decide anything by himself and waited instead for the assistance of his ministers. In the period after the Russo-Japanese War, the emperor was turned towards social ends. As the patriarch of a family state he became the symbolic representation of harmony and as the descendent of the sun goddess, the deified evidence of the ancestral ethnicity of the Japanese.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

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|--|----|
| 38. How fully does Source A explain the traditional nature of Japanese society in 1850? | 12 |
| 39. Evaluate the usefulness of Source B as evidence of the significance of the part played by foreign forces in the downfall of the Tokugawa in 1868. | 12 |
| 40. How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations regarding the extent of the authority of the Emperor within the new Meiji Government? | 16 |

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SECTION 6 — Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

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| 41. | How valid is the view that there was nothing more than a revolutionary situation in Germany in 1918–1919? | 25 |
| 42. | ‘The Treaty of Versailles lay at the root of the instability faced by the German government between 1919 and 1923.’
How valid is this view? | 25 |
| 43. | To what extent does Stresemann’s foreign policy show him to be little more than a traditional German nationalist? | 25 |
| 44. | To what extent did industrialists gain most from Nazi economic policies between 1933 and 1939? | 25 |
| 45. | How far does Nazi oppression explain the ineffectiveness of opposition to the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1939? | 25 |

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SECTION 6 — Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from a newspaper article by Berlin journalist Friedrich Kroner (August 1923)

There is not much to add. Inflation pounds daily on the nerves: the insanity of the numbers, the uncertain future. Lines of shoppers form in front of shops and no disease is as contagious as this one. The lines always send the same signal: the city will be shopped empty yet again. Rice 80,000 marks yesterday costs 160,000 marks today, and tomorrow perhaps twice as much again. Everyone is buying frantically. The piece of paper, the spanking brand new banknote still moist from the printing presses, paid out today as a weekly wage shrinks in value on the way to the grocer's shop. The zeros, the multiplying zeros . . . The rising prices bring mockery and laughter. Someone shouts, 'Cheaper butter!' Instead of 1,600,000 marks just 1,400,000 marks.

Source B from Franz von Papen's *Memoirs* (1952)

Historical developments are the product of diverse forces . . . I am entitled to ask that my own actions be judged in the light of this fact. I have been represented as naïve and incapable of grasping the true implications of the political situation at the end of 1932. Yet not many people seem to realise the extent to which Hitler arose because of the harsh clauses of Versailles and the economic crisis caused by reparations. Hitler and his movement were in essence a reaction against hopelessness and for that sense of hopelessness the victorious powers must bear their full share of the blame. Hitler became Chancellor with the support of almost 40% of the German electorate. I have been accused of indecision and prevarication but the correct narrative of events shows that this is not true as these are delicate times.

Source C from *Hitler* by Ian Kershaw (1991)

The handover of power to Hitler on 30 January 1933 was the worst possible outcome to the irrecoverable crisis of Weimar democracy. It did not have to happen. It was at no stage a foregone conclusion. President Hindenburg was sceptical about the Nazi leadership and had refused Hitler the chancellorship in August 1932 with the Nazis on the crest of a wave. Five months later he changed his mind with the Nazi Party in crisis following the electoral setback of November 1932 . . . Hitler's appointment was technically constitutional. Few among the elite groups had Hitler down as their first choice, but by January 1933, with other options apparently exhausted, most were prepared to entertain a Hitler government. Had they opposed it, a Hitler government would have been inconceivable. Hitler needed the elites to attain power.

Source D from *Guidelines for Teaching History in Secondary Schools* (1938) issued by the German Central Institute of Education

The teaching of History is based on the natural bond of the child with his nation and has the particular task of educating young people to respect the great German past. The teaching of History must bring the past alive for the young German in such a way that it enables him to feel the responsibility of every individual for the nation as a whole . . . The great warriors of the past showed this with their glorious sacrifices. The teaching of History must come from this vital faith . . . The certainty of a great national existence . . . is for us based . . . at the same time on the clear recognition of the basic racial forces of the German nation, which are always active and indestructibly enduring. Praise to the German nation.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

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|--|----|
| 46. How fully does Source A explain the impact of hyperinflation on the lives of Germans in 1923? | 12 |
| 47. How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor of Germany? | 16 |
| 48. Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the aims of the Nazis' <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> . | 12 |

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SECTION 7 — South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

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| 49. | How important a part did the demand for cheap labour play in the development of segregationist policies in South Africa between 1910 and 1924? | 25 |
| 50. | How far was a unique sense of Afrikaner identity the main reason for the rise of Afrikaner Nationalism between 1924 and 1948? | 25 |
| 51. | To what extent was disunity among resistance groups the main factor in undermining the effectiveness of opposition to segregation between 1910 and 1948? | 25 |
| 52. | ‘The policy of Separate Development after 1960 was apartheid by another name.’
How valid is this view? | 25 |
| 53. | How significant was the United Nations in influencing the foreign policy of the South African government between 1960 and 1984? | 25 |

[Turn over

SECTION 7 — South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *South Africa in the Twentieth Century* by James Barber (1999)

Milner set out to use his position to reconstruct the economy and society and to reshape South Africa in an imperial mould. For him, reconstruction was not an end to itself — it was the means to achieve a ‘British’ South Africa. His plans involved major social and economic engineering, with the intention of creating a loyal dominion of the crown. Although his long term aim was a self-governing community Milner was in no hurry. He believed his job was to govern; that efficiency took precedent over representation. In practical terms, he believed that his aims could be achieved in a number of ways. The first was to increase the British population by a vigorous immigration policy to lessen the impact of British minority control in the region. Milner’s second route was through cultural imperialism; in particular the use of education to anglicise the Boers.

Source B from *The Afrikaners* by G.H.L. Le May (1995)

In the aftermath of the Boer War, Africans in the former Boer republics had reason to expect that their lives would improve under British administration, since British propaganda had repeatedly criticised the republican governments for their treatment of Africans. These hopes quickly subsided. In the rural areas, where Africans had carried out a rebellion from below during the war, the Milner regime re-established Afrikaner landowners and made Africans lives harsher than before the war. In the towns, too, Africans’ conditions worsened, especially in the gold-mining industry. Milner tightened pass laws to restrict the mobility of African labourers, while the mining companies cut Africans’ wages and stopped competing for their labour by combining to form a Witwatersrand native labour association (WNLA). In combination, the government, the WNLA and the Chinese labourers made the gold-mining industry profitable to the investors and the state by undermining the bargaining power of Africans.

Source C from *Long Walk to Freedom* by Nelson Mandela (1994)

The Nationalists were a party animated by bitterness — bitterness towards the English, who treated them as inferiors for decades, and bitterness towards the African, who the Nationalists believed was threatening the prosperity and purity of Afrikaner culture. Africans had no loyalty to General Smuts, but we had even less for the National Party after their victory in the 1948 election. Malan's platform in the run up to their victory had been one known as apartheid. Apartheid was a new term but an old idea and it represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position to whites for centuries. The often haphazard segregation of the past 300 years was to be consolidated into a system that was inescapable in its reach and overwhelming in its power. The premise of apartheid was that whites were superior to Africans, Coloureds and Indians.

Source D from *Sharpeville: An Apartheid Massacre and its Consequences* by Tom Lodge (2011)

For black South African leaders, the Sharpeville massacre of March 1961 and the nationwide tumult it engendered, as well as the subsequent suppression of their organisation, made violent strategies directed at regime overthrow seem very compelling. It was true that before Sharpeville both within Africanists and among the ANC there were influential people who already believed that a violent confrontation with the authorities was inevitable and that they should increasingly prepare for it. But if the Pan Africanist Congress's protests had not mobilised such a massive response, and if Robert Sobukwe's protest had been confined to the small numbers who had accompanied him to Orlando police station, then guerrilla warfare might have remained a minority view. Although Sobukwe was increasingly frustrated by the progress of the ANC's leadership, Sobukwe himself was ambivalent about the necessity for an armed insurgency and, within the ANC in 1960, Chief Luthuli's principled objections to violence were still widely shared.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

- | | |
|---|----|
| 54. How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of British policy in South Africa between 1902 and 1910? | 16 |
| 55. Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the reasons for the introduction of apartheid before 1959. | 12 |
| 56. How fully does Source D explain the decision to adopt militant tactics by some resistance groups in the 1960s? | 12 |

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SECTION 8 — Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

- | | |
|--|----|
| 57. To what extent did a one-party dictatorship emerge in Russia between October 1917 and March 1921? | 25 |
| 58. To what extent has the role of Trotsky in bringing about Red victory in the Civil War been exaggerated? | 25 |
| 59. ‘Stalin was very much in the right place at the right time, lucky — but the luck had to be used.’
How valid is this assessment of the reasons for Stalin’s emergence as leader? | 25 |
| 60. To what extent did collectivisation achieve its aims? | 25 |
| 61. How significant was the contribution of the Soviet generals to victory in the Great Patriotic War? | 25 |

[Turn over

SECTION 8 — Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *The Russian Revolution* by Sheila Fitzpatrick (2008)

In 1914, Russia's declaration of war produced a public surge of patriotic enthusiasm, much jingoistic flag-waving, and earnest attempts by respectable society to assist the government's war effort. But the mood quickly turned sour. There was suspicion of treason in high places, and one of the main targets was Nicholas's wife, Empress Alexandra, who had caused scandal by her relationship with Rasputin, a shady but charismatic character whom she trusted as a true man of God who could control her son's haemophilia . . . Then Nicholas assumed the responsibilities of commander-in-chief of the Russian army, which took him away from the capital for long periods. Alexandra and Rasputin began to exercise a disastrous influence over ministerial appointments with the 'ministerial leapfrog' of incompetent favourites in the Cabinet. Rasputin was murdered but even the epic story of his stubborn resistance to death by poison, bullets and drowning seemed to belong to another age, to be a bizarre accompaniment to the twentieth century realities of troop-trains, trench warfare and mass mobilisation.

Source B from *The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power* by Lenin, 12th September 1917

The Bolsheviks, having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, can and *must* take state power into their own hands. For the Bolsheviks, by immediately proposing a democratic peace, we will form a government which *nobody* will be able to overthrow. The majority of people are on *our side*. This was proved by the long and painful course of events from 6 May to 12 September. The majority gained in the Soviets of the metropolitan cities *resulted* from the people coming over to *our side* . . . Why must the Bolsheviks assume power *at this very moment*? The people are tired of the waverings of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. It is only our victory in the metropolitan cities that will carry the peasants with us.

We are concerned not with the 'day' or 'moment' of insurrection in the narrow sense of the word. That will only be decided by the common voice of those who are in contact with the workers and soldiers, with the masses.

Source C from *Stalin's Russia* by Chris Ward (1999)

But while Stalin berated his opponents and Ezhov struggled to discipline the provinces, dramatic events unfolded in Leningrad. These increased tension and soon pushed purging in a new lethal direction. At four o'clock in the afternoon of 1st December 1934, the young communist Leonid Nikolaev walked into the Smolny building, the local party headquarters, and shot Kirov in the back. The following day a special decree on terrorist offences gave the recently reorganised NKVD wide-ranging powers of trial and execution. Within a few weeks, 13 members of a supposed 'Leningrad centre' (including Nikolaev) and at least 98 others scattered across the country had been shot for preparing 'terrorist attacks against officials of the Soviet regime'. When the Central Committee circulated a letter instructing local organisations to hunt down 'Trotskyites' and 'Zinovievites' thousands more were arrested — including, of course, Kamenev and Zinoviev. 'I am guilty of nothing, nothing before the party, before the Central Committee and before you', pleaded Zinoviev to Stalin.

Source D from *Stalin* by Isaac Deutscher (1966)

But why did Stalin decide to Purge? It has been suggested that he sent the men of the old guard to their deaths as scapegoats for his economic failures. There is a grain of truth in this but no more. For one thing there was a very marked improvement in the economic conditions of the country in the years of the trials. He certainly had no need for so many scapegoats; and if he had needed them, penal servitude would have been enough — Stalin's real and much wider motive was to destroy the men who represented the potentiality of alternative government; perhaps not one but several alternative governments. There was also danger from abroad; only a few months before the first of the great trials took place, Hitler's army marched into the Rhineland; the last trial, that of Bukharin and Rykov, ended to the accompaniment of the trumpets that announced the Nazi occupation of Austria. German Imperialism was re-arming and testing its strength . . . Stalin had no illusions that war could altogether be avoided; and he pondered the alternative courses.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

- | | |
|---|----|
| 62. How fully does Source A explain why support for Tsarism collapsed in February 1917? | 12 |
| 63. Evaluate the usefulness of Source B as evidence of the extent of support for the Bolsheviks after July 1917. | 12 |
| 64. How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the Purges? | 16 |

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SECTION 9 — The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945**Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks**

Attempt **TWO** questions.

- | | | |
|------------|--|-----------|
| 65. | How far does the desire to protect the crown explain Miguel Primo de Rivera's attempts at social and economic reform in the 1920s? | 25 |
| 66. | To what extent was a lack of finance the main reason for the failure of Azaña's agrarian reforms? | 25 |
| 67. | How far can the Asturias Rising of 1934 be described as the 'first battle of the Civil War'? | 25 |
| 68. | To what extent was Franco's rise the result of his ability to manage potential rivals? | 25 |
| 69. | To what extent did Soviet aid make a positive contribution to the defence of the Spanish Republic between 1936 and 1939? | 25 |

[Turn over

SECTION 9 — The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from a speech made by Alfonso XIII of Spain in April 1931

The elections held on Sunday proved to me that I no longer hold the love and affection of my people. My conscience tells me this condition will not be permanent because I have always striven to serve Spain, and my people, with all my devotion.

A king may make mistakes. Without doubt I have done so on occasion, but I know our country has always shown herself generous towards the faults of others committed without malice . . . I could find ample means to maintain my royal prerogatives in effective resistance to those who assail them, but I prefer to stand resolutely aside rather than to provoke a conflict which might array my countrymen against one another in civil war and patricidal strife. I pray God that all other Spaniards may feel and fulfil their duty as sincerely as I do.

Source B from *The Spanish Civil War, Questions and Analysis in History*
by Andrew Forrest (2000)

As a reward for his role in the Asturias, Franco was made Commander-in-Chief of Spanish Armed Forces in Morocco . . . when Gil Robles became Minister for War in May 1935 he became Chief of General Staff. By the time the Popular Front came to power in February 1936, preparations for a military uprising had begun. The new government seemed obsessively biased against the right [as shown when] Prime Minister Azaña pardoned those workers and left-wing soldiers involved in the Asturias and other risings — Franco and Mola were redeployed, with the aim of neutralising their potential as plotters. The month of May began with a general strike invoked by the anarchist CNT. Prime Minister Casares Quiroga seemed blind to rumours that such a threat [of an uprising] was imminent.

Source C from *British Volunteers for Liberty* by Bill Alexander (1992)

Early in May 1937, news reached the front of the fighting in the streets of Barcelona between supporters of the POUM aided by some Anarchists, on the one hand, and Government forces on the other. The POUM, who had always been hostile to unity, talked of 'beginning the struggle for working-class power'.

The news of the fighting was greeted with incredulity, consternation and then extreme anger by the International Brigaders. No supporters of the Popular Front Government could conceive of raising the slogan of 'socialist revolution' when that Government was fighting for its life against international fascism, the power of whose war-machine was a harsh reality a couple of hundred yards across no-man's land. The anger in the Brigade against those who fought the Republic in the rear was sharpened by reports of weapons, even tanks, being kept from the front and hidden for treacherous purposes.

Source D from *We, the Anarchists* by Stuart Christie (2008)

The distance between the base and the leadership widened even further [for example] in May 1937 in Barcelona when the CNT and the FAI leadership ordered its own militants to lay down the arms they had taken up in the face of a campaign of provocation sustained by the PSUC and the Catalan Nationalists since early January. This proved the key event that brought down the government of Largo Caballero, the CNT-FAI leadership's sole ally in a predominantly pro-Communist cabinet. It finally broke the tremendous moral influence of the CNT-FAI on its main stronghold — Catalonia. The way was now open for the pro-Russian government of Juan Negrin to destroy what was perhaps the most positive achievement of the revolution — the anarchist-dominated Council of Aragón. The overt hostility of the new Negrin administration to the FAI led to a major crisis for the anarchist organisation in June 1937.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

- | | |
|--|----|
| 70. Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons for Alfonso's 'departure'. | 12 |
| 71. How fully does Source B explain the motives of those who rebelled against the Republic in 1936? | 12 |
| 72. How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of the role of the Barcelona rising in the growing disunity among Republican forces after 1937? | 16 |

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SECTION 10 — Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

Part A — HISTORICAL ISSUES — 50 marks

Attempt **TWO** questions.

- | | | |
|-----|---|----|
| 73. | To what extent was Chamberlain's resignation due to his inability to gear the economy effectively for 'total war'? | 25 |
| 74. | How far can the Allied bombing campaign against Germany between 1939 and 1945 be judged a success? | 25 |
| 75. | 'Only the Lend-Lease programme prevented the collapse of the British economy.'
How valid is this view of the impact of the war on the British economy? | 25 |
| 76. | To what extent did the Labour Governments of 1945–1951 deliver a 'New Jerusalem' to the British people? | 25 |
| 77. | To what extent did the war hasten Britain's imperial decline? | 25 |

[Turn over

SECTION 10 — Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

Part B — HISTORICAL SOURCES — 40 marks

Study the sources below and attempt the following three questions.

Source A from *The Smoke and the Fire* by John Terraine (1980)

At the *Arcadia* Conference in Washington in December 1941, during the happy, beaming honeymoon of Anglo-American relations, the two groups of Joint Chiefs were fused into a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee with a permanent apparatus. This body became the ultimate strategy-making institution for the two Western Allies; Supreme Commanders in their theatres of war received their orders through it and reported back formally to it. National differences [what often looked like the contest between American dogmatism and British pragmatism] inevitably caused disagreements. There were seemingly irresolvable conflicts between the American navy, chiefly interested in the war against Japan, and the American army, with its commitment to the European theatre. Above all, there were the personalities of the two great leaders, Roosevelt and Churchill, both of them liable, in the eyes of their military advisors, to take up far-fetched schemes and fly off at tangents.

Source B from *Enigma: The Battle for the Code* by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore (2000)

Until March 1943, Enigma decrypts were primarily used defensively, so that convoys could be diverted away from waiting wolf packs. By the end of March there were so many U-boats in the North Atlantic that, even when Enigma decrypts revealed their whereabouts, there were often other U-boats waiting on any diverted route. Admiral King of the US Navy, tried to convince the British to use Enigma offensively, particularly against German U-tankers, which extended the length of U-boat patrols by refuelling them at sea. Admiral King's proposals were strongly opposed by Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, on the grounds that aggressive use of Enigma would compromise its source. He cabled back to America saying 'If our Enigma information failed us at the present time it would result in our shipping losses going up by anything from 50 to 100%'.

Source C from *We Can Take It (Britain and the Memory of the Second World War)* by Mark Connelly (2004)

The myth of the Blitz was vital to British national identity; it provided proof of the distinct qualities of the island race. It was the moment when 'The Few' of Churchill's island stood shoulder to shoulder, regardless of class or creed, and withstood the full terror and might of the enemy. Instead of buckling, the people laughed and joked their way through it full of wonderful British self-control. The visual images of the Blitz imparted messages of defiance, solidarity and togetherness, and improvisation in the face of a powerful enemy. By surviving this experience, Britain bought the freedom of the world. Like most events of 1940, the Blitz was something the British people looked upon with pride; and the endurance and fortitude of the nation in the face of it is something the world should thank us for. In this way is the Blitz remembered and conceived.

Source D from *An Autobiography* by Herbert Morrison (1960)

When the Tories were defeated in 1945, Rab Butler was set to work in the research department of the Conservative Party, and he can be regarded as the architect of the policies which helped to produce victory in 1951. I was flattered to be told that Butler had carefully examined what I had done for the Labour Party prior to and during the 1945 election and told his staff that he wanted to do for the Conservative Party 'what Herbert Morrison had done for Labour'. He had certainly learned the lessons of the 1945 defeat. In 1945, the Tories had fought on a negative line of prophesying ruin under socialism and denouncing all the types of control that war had created.

Churchill's 'Gestapo' reference in the 1945 campaign was attacked by his own side after defeat. I can pay Butler the compliment of saying that his policy made Labour's fight more difficult. His more progressive attitude softened the contrasts of black and white; conflicts of principle diminished. And that was not good for us.

Attempt ALL of the following questions.

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 78. How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the extent of the challenges facing the leaders of Britain's naval and land forces during World War Two? | 16 |
| 79. How fully does Source C explain the impact of the Blitz? | 12 |
| 80. Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the reasons why the Labour Party lost the 1951 general election. | 12 |

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Section 1 Part B Source A

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History

Marking Instructions

These marking instructions have been provided to show how SQA would mark this specimen question paper.

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General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.

- (a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.
- (b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.
- (c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.
- (d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.
- (e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.
- (f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.
- (g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are
 - relevant to the issue in the question
 - developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
 - used to respond to the demands of the question (for example, evaluate, analyse).

Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions

To gain more than 12 marks in a 25 mark essay question, candidates must make a reference (however minor) to historiography. If candidates do not refer to or quote from historians, or show that they have considered historical schools of thought, they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marking scheme and so will not achieve more than 12 marks.

The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

Marking criteria grids

The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria

- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given in **bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

25 mark questions – mark ranges and individual marking criteria

		Mark ranges						
		0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
Marking criterion	STRUCTURE	No relevant functional introduction which relates to relevant factors.	<p>An attempt to structure the essay, including at least one of the following</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relevant functional introduction. 	<p>Structure displays a basic organisation but this may be loose. This includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relevant functional introduction. 	<p>Structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relevant functional introduction with main interpretations. 	<p>Clearly structured, perceptive presentation of issues. This includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument. 	<p>Well-defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question. This includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument. 	<p>Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout. This includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument.
		No conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separate sections which relate to relevant factors. • conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue; generally summative. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separate sections which relate to relevant factors. • conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue; generally a summation of the argument. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separate sections which relate to relevant factors. • conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separate sections which relate to relevant factors. • conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, evaluating the key issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separate sections which relate to relevant factors. • conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues and/or points. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • separate sections which relate to relevant factors. • conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues and/or points.

		Mark ranges						
Marking criteria	THOROUGHNESS AND/OR RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue shows some awareness, if superficial, of the narrative involved. For example, attempt to engage with two relevant factors in the issue; attempt to show links between the factors and the whole question.• Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue; attempt to show different views or interpretations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue, engaging with key or main narrative points.• Factual content links to the issue. Approach relates to analysis.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue.• Factual content links to the issue. Approach relates to analysis and evaluation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge.• Points of evidence link to points of analysis or evaluation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.• Points of evidence clearly link to points of analysis or evaluation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge.• Points of evidence clearly support and link to points of analysis and evaluation.

		Mark ranges						
Marking criteria	ANALYSIS, EVALUATION AND LINE OF ARGUMENT	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No evidence of analysis. OR Analysis is not relevant to the question.	Much narrative and description rather than analysis and evaluation. Weak sense of argument but an attempt to show the extent to which a factor is supported by the evidence.	Attempt to answer the evaluative aims of the question and analyse the issues involved, although this is possibly not deep or sustained, but includes the relevant isolated factor. There is a sense of the overall impact or significance of the factors when taken together. Argument is generally clear and accurate but there may be confusions.	Sound awareness of the evaluative aims of the question and the candidate tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis. Argument is clear and accurate, and comes to a suitable – largely summative – conclusion.	Secure grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues. Argument is clear and directed throughout the essay. Conclusions arise logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body, and attempts synthesis.	Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues. Firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues. Clarity in direction of argument linking to evaluation. Conclusions give a robust overview or synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.	Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues with a detailed and effective analysis and evaluation which advances the argument and considers various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones. Conclusions give a robust overview or synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.

		Mark ranges						
Marking criteria	HISTORICAL SOURCES AND INTERPRETATIONS	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No discernible reference to historical works.	General reference to historical works.	Some awareness of historians' interpretations in relation to the issue. May use historians as illustrative points of knowledge.	Awareness of historians' interpretations and arguments. May use historians as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation.	Sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments. Some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them.	Sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent. Some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them; may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.	Sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography. Note: the term 'current historiography' refers to the prevailing present thinking on the issue, not necessarily recent works. Consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.

Marking the source-handling questions

There are three standardised stems used in the source questions

- 'How fully . . .' or 'How much . . .'
- 'Evaluate the usefulness . . .'
- Interpretation of two sources

'How fully . . .' question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to add knowledge as exemplification of interpretation points to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source does not reveal about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Up to 3 marks

- interpretation of points from the source.

Up to 7 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the source with the candidate's own historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information such as omissions
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Candidates should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is. They can gain up to **3 marks** by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. Candidates cannot gain marks for simply quoting points from the source; they must paraphrase or interpret them to gain marks.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual development they give in their overall evaluation of the source's comprehensiveness. This should include the views of two relevant historians (**2 marks** are available for this). Where a candidate includes the views of additional historians, award marks for wider contextual development.

There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question, and therefore no marks awarded for this.

‘Evaluate the usefulness . . .’ question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- consider the provenance of the **entire** source in light of the topic being discussed. At all stages of the answer the provenance should underpin commentary which should include analysis and evaluation of the source
 - source rubric provenance – comment on authorship, purpose and timing of the source in light of the historical event or issue in the question
 - source content provenance – establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points which illustrate provenance, and analysing and evaluating them in light of the historical event or issue in the question
- contextualise those points with historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- use wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Award a **maximum of 6 marks** for provenance comments based on **3 marks** for the rubric and **3 marks** for source content interpretation.

3 marks

- source rubric provenance – comments on provenance regarding authorship, purpose and timing as seen in the rubric.

3 marks

- source content provenance – comments on provenance regarding the interpretation of the content of the source.

Up to 4 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the sources with the candidate’s own knowledge
- wider contextual development, for example other relevant information which provides more information about the historical issue, and significant omissions in the source
- other points of view, including additional historians’ interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Interpretation of two-sources question (16 marks)

Candidates must

- establish the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue within each source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use contextual development to assess what the sources reveal about different interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue
- comment on how the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue in the two sources relate to other possible interpretations with wider contextual development.

Award marks as follows

6 marks

- comments on interpretation (**3 marks** per source).

Up to 8 marks

- contextual development which develops points from the sources
- wider contextual development to assess what the source reveals about interpretations of a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information about other interpretations of a historical issue which have been omitted
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Marking instructions for each question

Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

Part A – Historical issues

Question 1 To what extent did agriculture underpin all other elements of Iron Age society?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the extent to which agriculture underpinned all parts of Celtic society. Candidates might discuss the importance of a range of alternative aspects of society – such as warfare, religion and hierarchy. This should allow candidates to make a fully informed argument as to which had the greatest significance in Iron Age society. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that agriculture underpinned society

Archaeological evidence indicative of agriculture's importance

- majority of land which was settled comprised undefended farmsteads – indicates universal importance of agriculture in Northern Britain
- agricultural success underpinned profusion of monumental roundhouses in late pre-Roman Iron Age – essential to show wealth and status
- increased agricultural settlement into the uplands – whole valleys in the Cheviots cleared of trees
- emergence of large semi-subterranean souterrains and 'four posters' (granary buildings) – indicative of intensification of arable production
- large number of souterrains reveals grain was used to serve small communities and villages
- widespread farming across Scotland – important to all late pre-Roman Iron Age (LPRIA) communities
- array of tools found in vicinity of hillforts, crannogs, brochs and open settlements
- extensive field systems such as at Drumturn, Perth and Kinross
- agriculture evidenced by scatters of small cairns, occasional banks and lynchets, fields of around a quarter of an acre
- cord rig cultivation visible in Border counties.

Other evidence suggesting agriculture underpinned the social system

- underpinned all other elements of society – ability to co-opt and redirect surplus production enabled social elite to maintain prominence
- production of agricultural surplus was essential to support the existence of specialised craft-workers
- production of prestige goods was dependent upon existence of agricultural surplus
- agricultural surplus production retained to serve and support the community
- agricultural surplus essential to enable the construction of homes and residences of power
- widespread farming across Scotland – important to all LPRIA communities
- agricultural cycle underpinned ritual and religion – sacrificial deposits of animal bones with human cremations suggests intimate links between agriculture and religion.

Evidence which suggests that other reasons or values underpinned Iron Age society

Warfare, need for defence

- warfare, feuding and raiding perceived as rife, especially on tribal fringes, and therefore underpinned society
- settlement seen to reveal instability – the purpose of forts, crannogs and brochs was seen as providing refuge; those in the immediate neighbourhood fled to these sites in times of danger
- enormous time, effort and material resources invested in warrior paraphernalia and on apparently military defences – suggests warfare was a significant force.

Religion, ritual and superstition

- religion, ritual and superstition would have permeated all aspects of life
- sacrifice of prestigious goods indicates the importance of religion – important enough to justify the creation and destruction of material wealth – Duddingston Loch
- religion an integral part in reinforcing the social hierarchy
- possibility of human offerings to an underworld God, as payment for a good harvest.

Hierarchy

- the desire or need to express status may have underpinned society
- the adoption of La Tène art reflects society's heroic interests
- emphasis on heroic pursuits such as drinking, warfare and feasting evidenced by artefacts such as Torrs pony cap and drinking horns
- the construction of majestic, elaborate monuments reveals importance of expressions of status
- social elite drew power from ability to show status – chronologically, status was gained from control over the production and circulation of prestige goods, to the construction of community works, to the construction of high-status undefended settlements – all hold in common the need to express status.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Kamm	Suggests war and fighting was inherent and integral to Celtic society.
Ian Armit	Claims that the agricultural economy underpinned all other elements of society.
Dennis Harding	Emphasises that Iron Age communities were capable of managing an economic regime above bare subsistence level.
Graham and Ann Ritchie	Maintain that farmers were socially prominent, hierarchically below an aristocratic class, controlling unfree farm labourers.

Question 2 'Governor Agricola is no longer to be credited with the Flavian conquest of Northern Britain.'

How justified is this view of Agricola's role in the Flavian conquest?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to examine arguments relating to Agricola's role in the Flavian conquest. The question invites candidates to challenge the traditional argument, that Agricola was responsible for the Flavian conquest, by examining the alternative arguments, including the view that his predecessors were largely responsible for the conquest. Candidates might also evaluate Agricola's actual achievements. The question invites debate as to Agricola's real role in the Flavian conquest. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Agricola should not be credited with the Flavian conquest of Northern Britain

Tacitus' *The Agricola* has exaggerated Agricola's achievements

- Tacitus' account of his father-in-law's life has been relied upon too heavily
- *The Agricola* is not an accurate history, more a eulogy to honour Tacitus' father-in-law
- inscriptions and other written sources confirm that Agricola served as governor of Britain. He may well have gained military achievements, but his role has been overstated
- Agricola was appointed primarily to put conquests gained by his predecessors on to a proper administrative footing and what military ability he may have had was merely a useful safety feature.

Agricola's predecessors achieved the most

- recent opinion suggests that Agricola's predecessors, Petillius Cerialis (governor from AD 71–74) and Julius Frontinus had undertaken the conquest of the Brigantes and the south-west Scottish Lowlands
- Petillius Cerialis established a fort at Carlisle in the very north of England and his activities may have extended north of Carlisle and even as far north as Strathmore
- the fort at Carlisle was founded five years before Agricola's tenure of office began
- Neronian and early Vespaian coins, which pre-date Agricola, have been found on a number of Scottish sites – Cerialian origins and activities prior to Agricola
- coloured and cast glass, which was fashionable in the early 70s AD in Rome, was found in sites including Newstead and Inchtuthil, indicating earlier occupation
- literary references support the view of an earlier occupation – the retired senior politician Silius Italicus wrote a poem which suggests that all of Britain was conquered before the time of Vespaian's death
- Pliny the Elder refers to campaigns against the Caledonians by the 70s AD
- the poet Statius refers to Cerialis' predecessor Vettius Bolanus as setting up 'watchtowers and strongholds' in Caledonia
- evidence from the Gask Ridge provides evidence for a more prolonged Flavian occupation, although how prolonged still remains open to question – suggests it pre-dates Agricola
- sites such as Greenloaning, Shieldhill South and Huntingtower along the Gask Ridge revealed signs of at least two and possibly three structural periods – does not fit with the view of Agricola's single phase of occupation.

Evidence which may support the view that Agricola should be credited with the Flavian conquest of Northern Britain

- Tacitus tells us that Agricola took over as governor late in AD 77 and immediately began a series of military campaigns, first in North Wales and then into what is now Northern England and Scotland
- by AD 79 Agricola had reached the Tay and then, after a few years of consolidation, he advanced further up Strathmore and on as far as the Moray Firth
- in AD 84 Agricola won a decisive victory against the Caledonians at an unknown place called Mons Graupius

- Agricola has been credited with establishing a Roman presence north of the Forth-Clyde line. This area has yielded a frontier, a collection of over 70 temporary camps, a legionary fortress and 14 auxiliary forts – all usually associated with Agricola
- Agricola was recalled to Rome by the Emperor Domitian at the end of an unusually long seven-year term of office: his length of service is taken to reflect his special expertise
- Tacitus claims that ‘all Britain was taken and then immediately thrown away’ – emphasising Agricola’s success in conquering the North
- a system of forts, fortlets and marching camps were established by Agricola, including the sizeable Inchtuthil, Strageath and Elginhaugh
- traditionally, Agricola has been credited with establishing a prop-frontier, the Task Ridge and the Glen Blocking forts
- Agricola was awarded a triumph upon his return to Rome.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Kamm	Suggests that Tacitus’ general outline of events stands up to scrutiny.
David Woolliscroft and Brigitta Hoffman	Highlight the problems with the traditional chronology and narrative and suggest that Agricola ‘was by no means a military figure’ and he had a career of ‘wall-to-wall administration’ – his role in the Flavian conquest was that of ‘creating the machinery of Roman provincial government’.
J G F Hind	Maintains that thanks to Agricola the Northern peoples had been subdued between AD 83–84 and 90.
David Shotter	Emphasises that there was some pre-Agricolan activity but we cannot argue that the majority of Flavian sites pre-dated Agricola.

Question 3	How significant an impact did conversion to Christianity have on Northern Britons in the post-Roman period?
Aim of the question	The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the impact of the conversion to Christianity and debate the extent of its influence on Northern Britons in the post-Roman period. Candidates might be expected to discuss the social, religious, political and cultural-linguistic differences brought about as a result of conversion. They might also consider the view that the impact of conversion was limited. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions about the extent of the impact of conversion to Christianity.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that conversion to Christianity had a significant impact on Northern Britons in the post-Roman period

Evidence suggesting a significant social impact

- local customs must have declined as society became more homogenous
- religion was socially unifying – Picts, Vikings, Gaels, Angles and Britons all shared common faith
- status was conveyed through religious association – Northumbrian kings, Pictish and Scottish nobles were taught to read and write as a way of guaranteeing status and authority
- society less reliant on oral rules – relied more on written laws.

Evidence suggesting a significant religious impact

- Christian monotheism replaced polytheism
- a Christian moral code circulated in the North
- decline in use of natural places such as groves, forest clearings and pools as a place of worship
- emergence of centralised places of worship.

Evidence suggesting a significant political impact

- St Columba wielded political influence over succession and style of kingship
- religious figures ordained kings – Áedán mac Gabráin was allegedly ordained by St Columba in 574
- kings used Christian faith to legitimise their reign and to seek political unity – Nechtan wrote to Northumbrian king seeking advice on how to make the Pictish church fall in line with the Northumbrian one – an attempt to increase control over the Picts
- majesty of kingship and nearness to God became intertwined
- nature of kingship redefined (Sally Foster) – kings acquired saintly attributes
- Christian clerics acted as ‘agents in areas’ beyond a leader’s physical reach – extended the distance over which authority was held
- common beliefs and values, lessened ethnic and linguistic differences aided political unity of the Kingdom of Scotland – Angles, Picts, Scots and Britons all became Christian.

Evidence suggesting a significant cultural or linguistic impact

- decline then total absence of pagan symbols on Pictish sculpture stones – demise of pagan artistic tradition
- Pictish stone carving reached a high point post-conversion – St Andrews Sarcophagus demonstrates Byzantine and Coptic influences
- stimulus to art – boxes for art, reliquaries for saints’ bones, altar goods, Class II and Class III stones are increasingly sophisticated, Book of Kells may have been started in Pictland
- literacy developed – prior to Christianity all we had was the ABCD stone from Traprain Law, literate monks and increasing number of literate laymen
- Bible and Psalter promoted literacy
- numeracy developed
- development of monastic libraries – Portmahomack monastery
- impetus to development of a literate society – writing used to legitimise claims to secular power – Kings List and Senchus Fer n-Alban

- Northern Britain was partially integrated into a network of European cultural influences – greater cultural unity
- polygamy replaced by monogamy
- place names changed, for example appearance of names such as Eccles from Latin ecclesia or church
- change in burial practice – long cist burials.

Evidence which may support the view that the impact of the conversion of Northern Britons to Christianity was limited

- conversion was slow: conversion of the Pictish elite may have begun in the 5th century and continued until the 7th century
- initially, impact was localised, resulting in some small Christian communities – not the conversion of the leaders or of the people as a whole
- conversion was initially confined to the social elite – minimal impact on the laity and the ordinary people
- life did not fundamentally change overnight – essentially still the same barbarian warrior society
- leaders still depended upon warfare and prestige to rule their peoples
- ‘apostate’ Picts suggests that Picts converted superficially to Christianity and then denounced it – suggests minimal short-term impact
- pagan symbols such as fish and oak leaves were consciously used in Christianity
- some pagan practices survived, including limited evidence of grave goods in Christian burials
- polytheism continued in part.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Alfred Smyth	Highlights the slow, gradualist nature of conversion.
Sally Foster	Argues that the nature of kingship was redefined by Christianity.
Barbara Crawford	Highlights that we see signposts of conversion but little evidence of an actual spiritual conversion.
Roderick Graham	Highlights that saints in Scotland were able to unify a country by unifying their religion.

Question 4 'Britain received a third tribe, namely the Irish (the Scotii).'

How valid is this view of the origin of the Scots?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to consider the issue of the origin of the Scots and to engage with the debate on their Irish origins in relation to the view that the Scots were indigenous to Northern Britain. Candidates might discuss the historical, archaeological, linguistic and cultural evidence for and against the migration hypothesis. This discussion would allow candidates to consider and present reasoned conclusions on the most probable origin of the Scots.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence suggesting the Scots originated from Ireland

Historical evidence

- origin legends dating from 8th century – suggest that Scots from north-eastern Antrim migrated into western Scotland, displacing a native Pictish or British people
- in Bede's *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, he mentions that Britain received a third tribe, namely the Irish – named Dalruedini after their leader, Reudai
- *The Annals of Tigernach*, around AD 500, states 'Fergus More Mac Erc, with the people of Dal Riata, held part of Britain, or held Britain and died there' – a statement of invasion from Ireland and colonisation
- the *Senchus Fer n-Alban* provides a genealogy of kings of Dal Riata descended from Fergus Mor, who is said to have crossed from County Antrim to Argyll about AD 500.

Archaeological evidence

- workshops for penannular brooches are found in both Argyll (at Dunadd) and in Ireland (at Dooley in County Donegal)
- crannogs are found both in Argyll and in Ireland.

Linguistic and cultural evidence

- Gaelic speakers were present in early medieval Argyll
- Adamnan writing in 7th century Argyll is living in a Gaelic-speaking world
- place names and personal names mentioned by Adamnan are Gaelic and he calls the people of Argyll the Scotii in Britain
- St Columba, a Gaelic speaker, allegedly needed translators when he travelled into Pictish areas
- modern place names in Argyll are mostly of Goidelic (Gaelic) origin whereas in the East there is a substantial Brittonic element
- there are no Brittonic place names in Argyll, which suggests the obliteration or displacement of Brittonic speakers
- Ptolemy, around AD 150, referred to the Epidii in Argyll (a Brittonic name in P-Celtic) – the fact that the name is replaced by a Gaelic one suggests population movement.

Evidence which may challenge the view that the Scots originated from Ireland

Historical evidence

- origin legends designed to legitimise and show the descent of a ruling dynasty from a powerful, mythical figure; not an historically accurate record
- manipulation of genealogies with Middle Irish historians promulgating a view of Irish kingship influencing Scottish kings
- claims made to bolster Dal Riata claims to territory in County Antrim.

Archaeological evidence

- no archaeological evidence for the alleged 'Goideli invaders' or to suggest mass population movement

- the characteristic Irish settlement types are not found in Argyll – circular enclosures with earthen banks (raths), or stone walls (cashel) are either not found or pre-date the period of the proposed movement
- Irish crannogs date from around AD 600 while Scottish ones have been constructed since the Iron Age
- the characteristic settlement in Dal Riata is a hilltop dun, built from the early Iron Age, forming a settlement type distinct to Argyll. No evidence of a change in the normal settlement type at any point in the first millennium
- no apparent change in domestic equipment
- no examples of zoomorphic peninsular brooches in Argyll while these were the most common type in Ireland
- dress pins – one example of a spiral-ringed pin in Argyll compared to over 40 examples in Ireland
- any similarities in brooches suggests a possible movement from Scotland to Ireland: Scottish brooches date to 7th century while the Irish brooches date from the 8th century.

Linguistic and cultural evidence

- to base evidence on use of Ptolemy's use of Brittonic term 'Epidii' – is inherently weak – it is possible that Ptolemy used the Brittonic form of a Goidelic tribal name
- early medieval commentators regard the Highland massif as a linguistic divide, separating Brittonic and Goidelic, while there were open communications between western Scotland and Ireland across the Irish Sea
- early Ireland was a sea-based society and linguistic similarities are explained by the short sea passage – 12 miles at the closest point – between Ireland and western Scotland
- lack of evidence that an Irish elite came and took over material culture and settlement since there is no place name evidence for this
- the people of Argyll appear to have maintained their regional identity through the Iron Age and early medieval period.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Lesley Alcock	Argues that the settlement patterns show very little sign of the transportation of material cultures to Dalriadic Scotland.
Ewan Campbell	States that there is no evidence in the archaeological record for any population movement from Ireland to Scotland, 'other than travel by occasional individuals'.
Alfred Smyth	Establishes that the Scots were infiltrating western Scotland as early as the 3rd century.
David Dumville	Suggests 'the stories of Dalriadic origins cannot be held worthy of acceptance as history'.

Question 5	To what extent was the creation of Alba a result of cultural domination by the Scots over the Picts?
Aim of the question	The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse a range of factors which led to the creation of Alba. In their discussion, candidates should include the evidence for the Scots' cultural domination of the Picts. Candidates might consider other relevant factors and they might also discuss the alternative view that Alba was a result of Viking incursions, common Celtic inheritance or even Kenneth MacAlpin. In this way, candidates may draw and present reasoned conclusions as to the extent to which cultural domination led to the birth of Alba.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the creation of Alba was the result of cultural domination by the Scots over the Picts

- Scots from Dal Riada were penetrating Pictland long before the accession of Kenneth MacAlpin
- the Pictish area around Dunkeld was referred to as 'New Ireland', Athfotla, as early as AD 739
- evidently Gaels were already well established in parts of Pictland during the 8th century
- by the 9th century, Gaelic place names were appearing across Pictland (Pit being combined with Gaelic personal names)
- Oengus II's dynasty was 'essentially Scottish', suggesting the Gaels had pushed into Pictland a generation before MacAlpin
- increasing Scottish migration as a result of Viking threat, a common foe, led to Scotification of Picts and the birth of Alba.

Evidence which supports the view that the Viking invasions were a key factor in creating Alba

- Viking invasions had a massive impact on the political landscape
- at the Battle of Fortriu (AD 839), Vikings killed many of the Pictish nobility, leaving a Pictish power vacuum for Kenneth and the Scots to exploit
- inadvertently, the Vikings created 'the need for a consolidated kingdom' of Alba, as this was the only real way to resist the Norse incursions
- due to Norse pressure, the Dalriadic nobility would have been increasingly attracted to the wealth and security offered in Pictland.

Evidence which may emphasise the role of the Celtic inheritance the Scots and the Picts shared

- Dal Riada had virtually become a Pictish province over the preceding century
- the Dupplin Cross suggests that Constantine was king of both the Picts (from AD 789) and later of Dal Riada (from 811)
- commonality bred through intermarriage between the ruling kindreds – demonstrated by the Gaelic names of some Pictish kings
- common Christian faith – a common faith would have increased ties between peoples and reinforced existing cultural affinities
- church was primarily a Gaelic institution and as such it brought the Picts within their cultural sphere for the next 200 years
- Picts and Scots had a common Celtic background and values
- both Picts and Scots were pastoral, warrior societies, speaking variants of a once-common source language
- Scots and Picts had long been acquaintances in peace and war – through intermarriage, trade and cultural exchange
- the maternal gene pool is more or less the same in Pictland, in Celtic Argyll and in the Highlands.

Evidence which might highlight the role of Kenneth MacAlpin

- *The Chronicle of Huntingdon* claims that in the 7th year of his reign, Kenneth attacked and overthrew the Picts when they had been crushed by Danish pirates
- *The Prophecy of Berchan* tells of Kenneth's invitation to the Pictish nobility to attend a feast at Scone. Once there, they were plied with drink until drunk, trapped in pits and massacred, creating opportunity for Kenneth to claim the Pictish throne

- *The Treachery of Scone* would suggest that Kenneth spearheaded the elimination of the Picts, according to Giraldus Cambrensis
- *The Scottish Chronicle* states ‘Kenneth . . . ruled Pictavia happily for 26 years. Pictavia has its name from the Picts, whom Kenneth destroyed’.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Stephen Driscoll	Suggests that ‘the Viking predations caused nothing less than the re-making of the political landscape and catalysed the Gaelic intrusion into Pictland’.
Alfred Smyth	Suggests that Kenneth’s role has been exaggerated – smothered in mythological tradition; ‘the sustained success [of his dynasty] over many centuries gave added posthumous glory to Kenneth’.
Ian Walker	Takes the view that it was ‘a slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time’.
Fiona Watson	Favours the view that the birth of Alba was a long, drawn-out development, born of long-term contacts.

Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

Part B – Historical sources

Question 6 How much do **Sources A** and **B** reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of Severus' methods of control of Northern Britain?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
The fort may have been used as a Roman POW (Prisoner of War) camp.	Argues that natives appear to have been imprisoned at Vindolanda during the Severan campaigns.
Severus, who brought an imperial force to quell a native uprising.	Emphasises that the Emperor Severus arrived with troops to deal with barbarian unrest in the North.
Severus pushed well into Scotland.	Highlights that Severus and his sons succeeded in extending Rome's presence beyond established boundaries.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Patricia Birley suggests that the approximately 300 prison huts were too small and too basic for Roman soldiers, and too close to each other to be used for livestock
- Birley also suggests that the POW huts endured for only six months before being destroyed and a new fort built on top – assumed prisoners were sent home
- researchers believe that prisoners built their own huts, which would explain their native architecture – similar to native huts and about six metres in diameter
- the huts in the internment camps housed male prisoners and their families
- the date of the huts coincides with an uprising of Caledonii and Maeatae against Roman rule, uprisings of AD 209 and AD 211
- Severus pushed north of the Antonine Wall and, according to Cassius Dio, progressed into north-eastern Scotland.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
The imperial expedition . . . was to be primarily focused on the east coast.	Argues that Severus focused on the east coast as he intended to subdue the lands occupied by the Maeatae, to suppress revolt.
The fort at South Shields, at the mouth of the Tyne, was converted into a massive supply dump.	Suggests that a fort on the east coast near the mouth of the Tyne was used for storage of vast amounts of food supplies in preparation for invasion.
Instead of glory in battle, the emphasis . . . may have to have been on great engineering projects.	Suggests that Severus and his son Caracalla attempted to control the North by impressing the natives with grand Roman installations and engineering works.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Severus concentrated on the east of Scotland and appears to have enlarged the existing fort at Cramond
- the fort at Carpow on the Tay may have been developed at this time

- the size of the depots at South Shields indicate that this was to be a massive drive north into hostile territory
- Severus intended to lead a brutal, scorched-earth campaign and could not rely on natives and their land for supplies
- Severus launched a combined military and naval campaign to control the North
- his combined military and naval force consisted of elite troops – the imperial guard – nine cohorts each of 1,000 men with accompanying cavalry, the new Second Legion as well as four fleets (including the Classis Britannica).

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- Cassius Dio refers to Severus as building a wall. This probably refers to repairing or reinforcing the Antonine Wall as part of his strategy for controlling Northern Britain
- Cassius Dio records that Severus took with him from Rome ‘an immense amount of money’ – some of this, in the form of silver and gold, was undoubtedly paid to the Caledonians to win them over
- Severus minted coins celebrating Roman victory in AD 211 after treaties were agreed between the Caledonii and Maeatae
- Cassius Dio tells us that the guerrilla warfare tactics of the natives impaired Severus’ ability to control the North
- Dio also states that Severus forced the Caledonii and Maeatae to come to terms and agree that they should abandon a large part of their territory
- Severus appears to have pursued a ruthless method of control – genocide – and he attempted to wipe the barbarians out by systematic devastation of the landscape
- Severus sought to control the natives by systematically destroying the productive capacity of their lands – burning the standing or stored crops and killing the livestock
- after Severus’ death, Caracalla abandoned the invasion.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
C Martin	Suggests Emperor Severus attempted genocide in Scotland.
Antony Kamm	Suggests that gold and silver were used to negotiate a truce between natives and Rome.
Alistair Moffat	Stresses the brutality of the Severan campaign, the annihilation of war bands and the society which sustained them.
David Shotter	Suggests that Severus kept natives in control through the payment of subsidies, followed by force, until more coherent measures of control could be put in place.

Question 7 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source C** as evidence of the extent of Viking control of the Northern and Western Isles.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that they provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	from <i>Orkneyinga Saga</i> a Norse account	Compiled from a number of sources. The saga is as much a fictional story as a historic document – the product of a long tradition of story-telling and oral history.
Purpose	saga	Combining oral legends with historical facts in order to tell the lives of the earls of Orkney and how they came about their earldom, which gave them domination of the Northern Isles and much of Caithness. It glorifies past deeds rather than describing them accurately.
Timing	1230	By the 13 th century the sagas are being written down (three centuries after the events they record), compiled by an unknown Icelandic author, therefore likely to be relatively unreliable, partly because of the problems of converting the oral into the written.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
King Harald Finehair sailed west over the North Sea to Orkney and Shetland in order to teach a lesson to certain Vikings.	Emphasises the planned and deliberate nature of expeditions, retaliation for attacks.
King Harald subdued Shetland and the Orkneys and the Hebrides.	Indicates that the Vikings used force to oppress and control the Northern Isles. There is emphasis on the role of Harald Finehair.
. . . he gave Earl Rögnvaldr the Orkneys and Shetland.	Emphasises that the Norwegian king was in complete enough control to bestow titles on local supporters – Orkney was his to give. It glorified and possibly exaggerated the role of one individual.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- saga evidence from the *Historia Norwegiae* also suggests domination of the islands: 'In the days of Harald Finehair, King of Norway . . . stripped these races of their ancient settlements, destroyed them wholly, and subdued the islands to themselves'
- by AD 800, Viking raiders were already using the Northern and Western Isles as bases for their activities
- the Norse earldom of Orkney was established by the end of the 9th century
- sagas reveal that the inhabitants of the Northern Isles were all 'subjects' of the earls, such as Earl Sigurd.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- speculation that the Vikings dominated by taking land and dispossessing native Picts
- in Udal in North Uist the native settlement appears to have been destroyed by an entirely Norse style of settlement
- peaceful co-existence suggested by presence of Pictish artefacts (pins, combs and pottery) found in Viking settlements in the Northern Isles
- Buckquoy reveals significant evidence for integration – littered with Norse and native artefacts
- further Orkney excavations suggest a blending of Norse and native culture
- absence of battle sites or mass graves suggests integration rather than domination
- Picts and their Christian faith prevailed – although Vikings were pagans, once they had settled they adopted the Christian faith of those they were living among, indicative of integration rather than domination
- absence of pre-Norse place names in Orkneys suggests total Norse domination
- the survival of native place names in the Western Isles suggests integration rather than ‘genocide’.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Alistair Moffat and James Wilson	Present DNA evidence to suggest an enduring Viking domination in Northern Isles and therefore a significant Viking legacy.
Frederick Wainwright	Claims that the natives were overwhelmed politically, linguistically, culturally and socially, submerged beneath the sheer weight of the Scandinavian settlement.
Ann Ritchie	Suggests successful integration, with establishment of a close relationship between Vikings and native Northern Britons.
Michael Lynch	Argues that the Northern and Western Isles were drawn into the Norwegian kingdom for centuries and were controlled as if wholly Norwegian.

Question 8 How fully does **Source D** explain the war-like nature of Pictish society?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . kings were placing increasing emphasis on organising themselves for war . . .	Suggests that organised war rather than sporadic raiding was an increasingly prominent aspect of Pictish society.
Military aggression could be . . . used to decide which particular person inherited or acquired authority over any given area; kings had to be strong.	States that warfare was neither infrequent nor insignificant, it was a constant and defining feature of Pictish society.
So military might was used to obtain and assert power.	Highlights that military aggression was used in the rise to, and consolidation of, power.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Picts were able to raise resources sufficient to support large navies: 150 Pictish ships wrecked in AD 729 and Burghead served as a naval base
- the *Senchus fer n-Alban* indicates the sophistication of the Scots' military organisation, and the Picts would have been comparable in this area
- abundant evidence that Picts engaged in battle, for example with the Angles at the Battle of Nechtansmere, AD 685
- the Picts also fought both the Scots and the Vikings
- kings depicted in a military capacity on sculpted stones, for example the Dupplin Cross – indicative of a war-like society.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

War-like nature evidenced at forts

- approximately 30 stone bull plaques from in and around the fort at Burghead suggest an association between the site and strength and power
- evidence of ritual drowning and killing of royal prisoners in Pictland suggested by the presence of the fort's large well
- hills exploited with citadels and enclosures, for example Dundurn, multiple ramparts at Clatchard Craig
- monumental entrances – suggests military strength of inhabitants.

War-like nature evidenced from symbol stones

- decapitation may have been practised – as depicted on Sueno's Stone
- sculpted stones show spears, axes, decorated shields and swords
- the Aberlemno Cross Slab 2 depicts a battle scene with both hunters and foot soldiers; it possibly depicts Battle of Nechtansmere against the Anglian king, Ecgfrith
- Aberlemno Cross Slab 2 appears to depict a dead Anglian being devoured by a raven – suggests the war-like nature of society.

Other evidence of war-like nature

- Pictish kings recorded as drowning enemy leaders in AD 734 and AD 739
- the St Ninian's Isle Hoard contained decorative silver, probably from swords, which were valued as symbols of status.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Lynch	Suggests 'Their culture was the culture of the warrior' . . . and further comments 'Whatever the Picts were, they are likely, as were other peoples either in post-Roman Western Europe or in contemporary Ireland, to have been an amalgam of tribes, headed by a warrior aristocracy which was by nature mobile. Their culture was the culture of the warrior . . .'
Sally Foster	Suggests 'The early historic period throughout British Isles was characterised by war-like, heroic kings . . .'
Ann Ritchie	States 'The existence of forts and the records in monastic annals of battles and sieges testify to the war-like aspects of Pictish society . . .'
Tim Clarkson	Highlights the fact that Pictish warriors played a key role in the barbarian conspiracy of AD 397 and continued raiding and war-like ways.

Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

Part A – Historical issues

Question 9 ‘King Alexander III’s success in consolidating the authority of the Scottish monarchy has been greatly exaggerated.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the evidence and its merits regarding whether or not King Alexander III’s success in consolidating the authority of the Scottish monarchy has been greatly exaggerated. Candidates might examine issues of long- and short-term success and examine how far these claims have been exaggerated. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that King Alexander III’s success in consolidating the authority of the Scottish monarchy has been greatly exaggerated

Government

- there was no ‘bench of judges’ comparable to that in England; there was no provision for legal training in the country – the justiciars (made up of senior earls) remained the most senior legal advisers in the country
- the great officers of state were not as well developed as in England
- there was not yet any real equivalent to the English parliament; Scotland held regular meetings under the French term ‘colloquium’ but had not formalised the arrangement.

Territory

- King Alexander did not extend royal authority as far as has been sometimes claimed; much of the west of Scotland and the Western Isles remained only nominally part of the kingdom.

Nobles

- faction was never far from the surface during King Alexander III’s reign
- the Comyn domination of the government revealed the reality that Alexander III never really overcame the problem of faction which dogged his minority; the Comyns, the victors over the Durwards and the Bissets in the 1250s, wielded the real power.

Overlordship of England

- giving homage to Henry III and Edward I kept the issue alive and allowed the English records to reflect a different account of events from the Scots
- King Alexander III’s marriage to King Henry III’s daughter only heightened the English sense that they had a right to a say in the Scottish kingdom.

Succession

- Alexander III took too long to remarry after his first wife died in 1275. By 1284 all of his children were dead and it was only 10 years after Margaret’s death that Alexander took steps to remarry
- the need to make his magnates accept the 1284 tailzie suggests Alexander’s nervousness over the weakness of the succession of the Maid of Norway.

Evidence which may support the view that King Alexander III’s success in consolidating the authority of the Scottish monarchy has not been greatly exaggerated

Government

- there were significant developments in the offices of Chamberlain, Chancellor and the role of the Chancery and the increased use of writs and breves
- the division of the sheriffdom of Perth to create a new sheriffdom in Argyll was a concerted attempt to extend royal authority into the West.

Territory

- peace with Norway in 1266 led to the annexation of the Western Isles
- improved relations with England created conditions which led to greater economic stability and prosperity.

Nobles

- King Alexander III was careful to balance rival factions, although the Comyns remained the dominant noble family.

Overlordship of England

- King Alexander refused to pay homage for his kingdom in 1251 to Henry III and again in 1278, to Edward I of England
- a close personal relationship existed between Alexander III and Edward I
- King Alexander III was strong enough to admonish Henry III over his failure to pay Margaret's dowry in full.

Succession

- Alexander held a parliament at Scone in 1284 to settle the succession crisis as soon as it arose, getting his nobility to swear an oath to Margaret, Maid of Norway
- Alexander remarried to provide a new heir for the Scottish throne.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that the Scottish 'Community of the Realm' was emerging by the 1250s and was strengthened during Alexander's reign.
A A M Duncan	Takes the view that there was continuing factionalism during Alexander's reign and the idea of the Community of the Realm must be treated with more caution.
Alan Young	Emphasises the crucial role of the Comyns in this period.
Norman Reid	Takes the view that while many of the perceptions of this reign come from later 'Brucean' propaganda, it did see considerable advances in royal authority, although it may not deserve to be remembered as a 'Golden Age'.

Question 10 'The Scottish resistance of 1297 was caused by resentment of English mismanagement of Scotland.'

How justified is this view?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the evidence and its merits regarding whether the Scottish resistance which arose in 1297 was caused more by resentment of English mismanagement of Scotland than by other factors, which might include evidence of an emergent Scottish 'national' identity. This might be considered as patriotism or nationhood. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Scottish resistance was mainly caused by resentment of English mismanagement

English leadership

- John de Warenne, Lieutenant of Scotland, had very little interest in the country and did not return until the country was in open rebellion
- treasurer, Hugh de Cressingham, became a hated figure for enforcing punitive taxation based on the English system
- many Scots referred to Cressingham as the 'treacherer', rather than treasurer.

Economics and government

- revenue dried up across Scotland as local officials found themselves unable to collect taxation
- the imposition of English sheriffs and law officers to replace their Scottish equivalents caused much bitterness as these men knew little of the Scottish laws, customs or language, for example Haselrig in Lanark.

Evidence which may support the view that Scottish resistance was mainly caused by other factors

Patriotism

- the risings appear to have enjoyed 'spontaneous' support among the commoners in the absence of overt noble leadership
- Wallace may have made a conscious political decision not to affix his seal to the 'Ragmans Roll' in 1296
- a variety of motives have been attributed to Wallace, including being offended by the sheriff of Lanark and wishing to remove the English from Scotland
- the rebellion of Andrew Moray in the North is evidence of the 'national' nature of the uprising
- lesser nobles and knights led rebellions to free Scotland, including Douglas and Lundie, attacking English officials with William Wallace
- the MacDougall uprising in the northern West Highlands and Islands was the result of the MacDonald family being named as Edward's men in the region – a local dispute, rather than against English mismanagement
- the murder of the sheriff at Lanark
- the raid on Scone
- the rebellion was encouraged or possibly financed by Scottish nobles, including James the Stewart and Bishop Wishart of Glasgow. Their delay at Irvine may also have been designed to take the focus from the Wallace and Murray rebellions elsewhere in the kingdom
- some nobles were concerned that they might be forced to perform military service overseas for Edward I, causing them to rebel.

Nationhood

- Scots were particularly angered by the removal of the symbols of Scottish 'nationhood' – the Stone of Destiny and the Black Rood of St Margaret
- King John was still seen as the rightful king by many – if not most – Scots, and they were prompted into rebellion by the very heavy-handed treatment he received from King Edward I

- Wallace always claimed to be fighting in the name of King John and never sought political power in his own right
- Wallace struck at symbols of English authority in order to remove them from his country, not simply because of his resentment at the regime's incompetence.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that the risings were the result of English mismanagement that fired a latent Scottish patriotism which was discernible by the 1290s.
Andrew Fisher	Takes the view that the grasping nature of Hugh de Cressingham was noted by the English, who viewed him as loving money, and by the Scots, who disliked him personally as well as hating his official position.
Fiona Watson	Emphasises the highly punitive nature of the English management of Scotland, with particular reference to garrisoning and taxation.
Michael Brown	Takes the view that Edward I now expected the Scottish nobles who had submitted to him in 1296 would join his army, along with their vassals, to fight in English conflicts.

Question 11 To what extent was the decision of John Comyn to submit in 1304 caused by the defection of Robert the Bruce?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse and evaluate the view that the main reason for the submission of John Comyn in 1304 was the defection of Robert the Bruce. In so doing, they might also evaluate the impact that other factors had in leading to the Scottish submission in 1304. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions on the relative importance of the different factors.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the decision of John Comyn to submit in 1304 was caused by the defection of Robert the Bruce

Defection of Bruce

- Robert the Bruce failed to give his full support to the resistance offered by the Guardianship for fear that its success might lead to a Balliol restoration
- Bruce resigned the Guardianship in 1300, possibly as a result of his growing concern that a Balliol restoration was becoming a real possibility
- Robert the Bruce defected to the English side in 1302
- Bruce joined a significant number of Scots already supporting Edward I, including the earls of Angus and Dunbar.

Evidence which may support the view that the decision of John Comyn to submit in 1304 was caused by other factors

International defection

- the Treaty of Asnieres of 1302, which ended the English war with France, allowed King Edward I to concentrate his resources on Scotland
- the French were now unlikely to assist with King John Balliol's return to Scotland or provide aid to the Scots' fight against the English
- the Treaty of Paris of 1303 between England and France left the Scots further isolated
- the quarrel between King Philip IV of France and the papacy led to a change of heart from Pope Boniface VIII, who withdrew his support for the Scots.

Bruce and Comyn rivalry

- the Bruce family and the Comyn family had been rivals for political power in Scotland for many years before the Guardianship of 1298
- the retinues of Bruce and Comyn appear to have been consistently at odds with each other; Bruce and Comyn (or at least their supporters) came to blows while meeting in Selkirk forest
- the Bruce and Comyn Guardianship required the appointment of a 'Chief Guardian' – Bishop Lamberton of St Andrews – in 1299 to regulate disputes
- King Edward exploited the Bruce and Comyn rivalry by making generous terms to the Comyn-led political community in 1304 rather than rewarding Robert the Bruce for his support since 1302. Edward needed the support of Comyn (to gain control of Scotland) more than he needed Bruce, whom Edward viewed as less powerful in Scotland.

Political factionalism

- there was a dispute over what would happen to the lands of the dispossessed Wallace
- Bruce was replaced by Ingram de Umfraville
- by 1300, John de Soules may have been operating as sole Guardian (however, some historians believe that John Comyn was still involved in the Scottish government and resistance)
- the Guardianship, even when not led by Bruce or Comyn (under de Soules) still failed to defeat the English beyond the relatively minor skirmish at Roslin. They needed to win more than a single battle to defeat the English overall
- other factional considerations apart from the Bruce and Comyn rivalry undermined the strength of the Guardianships
- Sir John of Menteith was instrumental in turning William Wallace over to the English in 1305

- John Balliol was in exile and doubts were being raised over his commitment to the Scottish cause
- many Scottish nobles submitted to Edward I across the early 1300s, for example McDougalls in 1301, Earl of Ross in 1303. The disunity of Scots would have made it much harder for Comyn to keep their resistance going
- Scotland suffered in the absence of a legitimate king wielding direct royal authority.

English strength

- the English retained significant military superiority throughout the period
- when Edward I came north to attack the Scots in 1303 it was the first time he didn't need to worry about international pressure as both the King of France and the Papacy had ended their support for the Scottish cause
- the 'warwolf' was constructed to assault Stirling Castle in 1303
- several full-scale campaigns were launched into Scotland by the English during this period
- Edward changed tactics in 1303, avoiding lengthy sieges of Scottish castles and attacked Comyn heartlands in the North-East
- the English were able to maintain an army in the field across the winter of 1303–1304
- Edward I was offering a different type of settlement in 1304, enabling nobles to retain their lands and power, as well as a share in government, in return for submission. Edward recognised the need for a 'Scottish Party' to help him control Scotland as he could not simply impose his authority.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that Robert the Bruce's defection was a tactical decision which does not reflect the underlying strength of his commitment to Scottish independence.
Michael Penman	Emphasises the insurmountable problems of faction in the period.
Michael Prestwich	Emphasises King Edward I's continued desire to deliver a crushing military blow to Scotland in the period.
Ranald Nicholson	Takes the view that Robert the Bruce's opportunism was to blame for his desertion of the Guardianship and of the Scottish cause.

Question 12 How far does the support of the Scottish Church explain Robert the Bruce's victory in the Civil War between 1306 and 1309?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse and evaluate the extent to which the support of the Scottish Church helps to explain Robert the Bruce's victory over his Scottish rivals. Candidates might examine the role of the church in military and/or political terms, as well as balancing this with other factors which help to explain Bruce's success. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may help to explain how far the support of the Scottish Church led to Robert the Bruce's victory in the Civil War between 1306 and 1309

Military

- both Wishart and Lamberton also provided armed retinues to Bruce.

Political support

- the indenture made by Bruce and Lamberton in 1304 provided Bruce with a key supporter from the church
- Bishop Wishart of Glasgow was quick to offer his support to Bruce after he seized the throne in 1306
- clergy were able to preach in favour of Bruce from the pulpit
- the Scottish Church wanted to protect its ecclesiastical independence and 'special daughter status'. As such, it needed Scottish political independence from England, so they supported Robert the Bruce despite his actions and the excommunication by the Pope
- *The Declaration of the Clergy*, 1309, showed the clergy's support for Bruce and attempted to legitimise his kingship.

Administration

- the church gave Bruce access to the machinery of government, allowing him to issue writs and breves from an early date
- the role of Abbot Bernard of Arbroath was crucial.

Evidence which may help to explain how far other factors led to Robert the Bruce's victory in the Civil War between 1306 and 1309

Political factors

- the death of King Edward I in 1307 considerably weakened English resolve to prosecute the war in Scotland, allowing Bruce to concentrate on fighting his Scottish opponents
- Edward II was distracted by internal political problems; he was not able to focus on Scotland
- the defection of the Earl of Ross and others to his side left the Comyns isolated in the north of the country.

Military factors

- Bruce scored an early victory at Loudon Hill which allowed him to break out of the south-west of Scotland
- Bruce left his brother Edward and James Douglas to subjugate the Balliol lands in Galloway
- Bruce was able to win victories in the west and north of Scotland which encouraged more people to join him
- the victory at Oldmeldrum and the herschip of Buchan effectively ended Comyn resistance
- Bruce pioneered tactics designed to destroy his opponents' resources, such as the razing of castles
- Bruce successfully avoided pitched battles and preferred to use guerilla tactics which were more likely to gain successes.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Neil Oliver	Takes the view that the church was vital in encouraging and promoting Bruce's war.
G W S Barrow	Emphasises the military and political skill of King Robert, while acknowledging the importance of support from the church.
Michael Penman	Takes the view that the church was crucial in lending legitimacy to Bruce's military struggle.
Alan Young	Emphasises the weakness of the position of the Comyns after 1306.

Question 13	To what extent was the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton of 1328 made possible by the overthrow of Edward II in 1327?
Aim of the question	The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse and evaluate the extent to which the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton was made possible by the deposition of Edward II in 1327. Candidates might examine the influence of this factor in Scotland and/or England and consider it along with other evidence which may suggest other reasons why the Treaty was made. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest that the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton was made possible by the overthrow of Edward II

Regime change in England

- Edward II, who had consistently refused to make any concessions to the Scots, was deposed in 1327 and murdered in 1328, allowing a new English regime to take a more conciliatory approach
- Edward II had refused to recognise Robert the Bruce as King of Scots; to the English he was just a rebellious vassal
- the new English regime of Isabella and Mortimer was very unstable, and England faced an unsettled minority for Edward III, so they were keen to make peace
- the removal of King Edward II led to a resumption of Scottish raids on the north of England, ending the 13-year truce
- resumed raids into England, known as the Weardale Campaign, almost led to the capture of the young Edward III
- resumed activities in Ireland put further pressure on the new English regime to settle with the Scots
- in late 1327, Robert the Bruce laid siege to castles like Norham and began to draw up charters to hand out land in the north of England. This worried English authorities who feared that he intended to annex northern English territories.

Evidence which may suggest that the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton was made possible by other considerations

Strength of Bruce position in Scotland

- King Robert was prepared to make major concessions in order to achieve recognition both of Scottish sovereignty and his own legitimacy
- £20,000 was paid to the English as part of the settlement
- there was a growing recognition in England that King Robert's position in Scotland was increasingly strong, especially after the Soules plot.

Papal pressure

- by the mid-1320s the Papacy was putting pressure on both sides to end the conflict.

Lack of decisive move

- after over 20 years of war, it was becoming increasingly clear that neither side could deliver a decisive military blow
- neither Bannockburn (1314) nor Old Byland (1322) brought significant progress towards peace
- the English campaigns of 1319 and 1322 similarly failed to lead to substantive talks
- the two truces of the 1320s (in December 1319 for two years, and the Bishopthorpe Truce in 1323 for 13 years) indicated a desire by both sides to end the fighting.

Impact of the Scottish raids

- English nobles had become weary of the Scottish raids into Northumberland
- the Harcla negotiations for peace with Robert the Bruce showed that some northern English nobles were prepared to side with the Scots if that would hasten the end of the conflict.

Weakening of the English position

- after the fall of Berwick in 1318, the English had lost control everywhere in Scotland – and there was no sign it would be restored in the foreseeable future
- Edward II's campaigns in 1319 and 1322 ended in failure, as did Edward III's campaign in 1327
- the outbreak of war between England and France in 1327 significantly reduced the appetite for war with Scotland among the English.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that the intransigence of King Edward II had long been the key stumbling block, and that his deposition was therefore crucial in allowing peace to be made.
Ranald Nicholson	Takes the view that the Treaty was a pragmatic recognition of the relationship between the countries which had existed in practice for some time.
Michael Penman	Takes the view that the Treaty was reflecting an English fear that the resumption of Scottish raids into England actually marked a renewed determination to prosecute the war.
A A M Duncan	Takes the view that the Treaty was reflecting the eagerness for peace on both sides.

Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249–1334

Part B – Historical sources

Question 14 How much do **Sources A** and **B** reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of the role of the Guardians in defending Scottish independence between 1286 and 1292?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
The gathering of the Bruces with Stewart and his uncle, Walter, Earl of Menteith, the Earl of Dunbar and Angus of Islay was a roll call of families, largely from the west, most of whom would later support the Bruce claim to the throne.	Contends that the Turnberry meeting only consisted of those who supported the Bruce claim to the throne.
The Guardians lacked the stature of a king in the vital job of managing flashpoints and rivalries within the nobility.	Contends that the Guardians lacked the God-given authority of a king in dealing with factionalism among the nobility.
. . . the Guardians actively sought Edward's support.	Suggests that the Guardians actively sought the support of King Edward of England to try and maintain stability in Scotland.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Turnberry Bond may have been a deliberate attempt by the Bruce faction to undermine the authority of the Guardians
- the Guardians governed in the name of the political community and maintained government under their own seal
- Robert the Bruce, as a potential claimant to the throne, was excluded from the Guardianship, as was John Balliol
- the Guardians viewed King Edward I as a friend of the Scottish kingdom
- the Guardians were able to maintain the routine business of government despite the absence of the monarch.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
Robert Wishart . . . respond on behalf of the startled Scots.	Argues that Wishart drafted the Scottish reply, on behalf of the alarmed Scots, where the Guardians rejected Edward's claim of lordship.
. . . only a king of Scotland could answer such a momentous demand.	Argues that they responded to Edward that only a king could answer his point on overlordship.
Wishart reminded the English king that he was supposed to be a crusader and observed that to threaten to unleash war on a defenceless people did him no credit.	Argues that they defended themselves by taking King Edward to task, arguing that it was inappropriate to threaten a weaker nation with force.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Wishart, as Bishop of Glasgow, was to be a consistent supporter of Scottish independence. The Scots should have expected Edward's actions, based on past behaviour, rather than having been startled
- the Guardians met with Edward I at Norham in 1291, to discuss terms of his intervention in the succession crisis
- the Guardians were dismissed and then re-instated by Edward, with the addition of an English Guardian
- King Edward arrived at Norham with an armed retinue
- in the Appeal of the 7 Earls, Robert the Bruce appears to have sought 'the peace and protection of Edward I'.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- the Guardians reflected the balance of Scottish society; comprising two bishops, two earls and two lords
- recent research suggests that there may have been a seventh Guardian – the Bishop of Dunkeld – possibly to help settle disputes and prevent a deadlock
- the Guardians governed following the death of King Alexander III, and were expected to rule during the minority of Queen Margaret
- the Guardians negotiated the Treaty of Salisbury with England and Norway to settle concerns over where the Maid should travel to and how she should be protected once she left Norway
- the Guardians managed to gain the clause that the Maid of Norway would arrive free of marriage or marriage contracts
- the Guardians negotiated the Treaty of Birgham with England, which aimed to maintain Scottish independence in the event of a dynastic marriage between Margaret and Prince Edward of England
- the Guardians managed to keep the peace, even containing Robert the Bruce's attempts to raise a host, including involving him in negotiations for the Treaty of Salisbury, and surviving the murder of one of the Guardians, the Earl of Fife
- the Guardians successfully prevented tensions from spiralling into Civil War or further violence
- the Guardians failed to replace any of their number who died
- after Edward went over the heads of the Guardians and extracted homage from the claimants, the Guardians also accepted his overlordship.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that the composition of the Guardianship was politically astute and constitutionally impeccable.
Alan Young	Takes the view that the Guardianship was dominated by the Comyn interest.
Andrew Fisher	Takes the view that the Guardians were insufficiently robust in their defence of the Scottish kingdom.
A A M Duncan	Takes the view that the Guardians lacked the authority of king.

Question 15 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source C** as evidence of the difficulties faced by King John during his reign.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that they provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	Gesta Annalia II	This account was created by contemporaries, likely clerics at St Andrews who were educated and could have formed part of the clerical support for the Scottish government, so should have been involved enough to create a detailed record of events during John's reign.
Purpose	Yearly deeds	There are a variety of purposes within the material, praising or criticising the key players depending on the different authors responsible for the original material, for example there is evidence of a pro-Bruce narrative at points; in other areas there is material sympathetic to King John.
Timing	Copied during the late 14 th century from original materials	Although the Gesta Annalia were appended to Fordun's Chronicle some time after the events, they are derived from contemporary primary sources.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
Macduff managed to get John, king of Scotland, summoned to the English king's parliament held in London.	Describes how Macduff appealed to the English king for justice over his land claim, on the grounds that the English king was feudal superior in Scotland; and had John summoned to an English parliament over the issue; clearly being seen as subordinate to King Edward.
The king of England. . . would not listen in any way to the representative speak until the king of Scotland. . . convey his answers to his representative with his own lips.	Describes how Edward would not allow the king of Scotland to speak through a proxy but forced him to answer for himself, like any other subject. John seemed a helpless victim of the English king's assertion of power.
John . . . experienced innumerable insults and slights from all those assembled, contrary to his kingly rank and dignity.	Maintains that John was embarrassed by his treatment in England which was contrary to his rank as king, where his authority was being undermined.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Macduff appealed to the English king when he was denied territories in Fife which he claimed were his by right as Edward was the feudal overlord of Scotland
- kings (as the living embodiment of the law) were not expected to appear as witnesses in court cases; therefore, by summoning King John to London, King Edward was exercising his lordship in a very provocative way
- King John's initial refusal to appear in person or speak directly, followed by his subsequent capitulation, had become a pattern in his behaviour towards King Edward; the same had happened when he had been asked to renew his homage earlier
- John's treatment in England and his acceptance of Edward's actions as his overlord undermined his authority within Scotland, as nobles began to view him as weak
- John was forced to appear in person at the English parliament despite his kingly rank.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- King John was also summoned to appear in a number of other legal cases, for example Roger Bartholomew
- John failed to attend a summons in 1293 or send attorneys. As such, Edward I drew up new rules covering the appeals, with appropriate penalties for non-appearance
- King John was made to pay homage to King Edward no less than three times during the course of his short reign
- King John also demanded military service from the Scots in his war against the French; another insult to John's kingly rank
- King John faced difficulties with his own nobility during the course of his reign, including the refusal of the Bruce family to pay homage to him
- King John may have been replaced by the Council of 12, who removed power from his hands in 1296
- John proved to be a weak military leader; he allowed himself to be sidelined during the 1296 rebellion against England, not leading his own army at Berwick or Dunbar
- John capitulated completely to Edward at Stracathro
- King John was stripped of the symbols of his kingly rank, giving rise, much later, to the epithet 'Toom Tabard'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that King John's reign bears comparison with that of King Alexander III, but that his situation was made intolerable by the intervention of King Edward I.
Fiona Watson	Takes the view that John does not deserve the terrible reputation he has gained.
Amanda Beam	Takes the view that John's 'weakness' was largely a result of him taking seriously his position as a vassal of King Edward I.
Michael Brown	Takes the view that John would have faced difficulties even without homage to Edward, given the fractured nature of Scottish society and the lack of royal authority for six years.

Question 16 How fully does **Source D** explain the methods used by Robert I to secure his government's authority between 1314 and 1320?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . attempting to build up Sir James Douglas's lands as the Crown agent in the south-west. . .	Suggests that Robert used lands taken from the disinherited to reward his supporters.
. . . another round of seal abuse and coercion by the royal government in demanding that nobles approve the Declaration of Arbroath. . .	Suggests that Bruce threatened and intimidated people to get support for his authority, or used their seals without their consent or knowledge to suggest support that did not exist.
At the so-called 'Black Parliament' in August 1320 . . . Robert made a cruel example of those involved.	States that Robert made an example of those who were caught conspiring against him in an effort to deter others, showing a ruthless streak.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- large tracts of formerly Comyn and Balliol lands, for example in Buchan and Badenoch, were given to Bruce supporters including Thomas Randolph, Sir Robert Keith and Sir Walter Barclay
- Bruce intimidated his nobility in 1314, forcing them to come into his peace or face perpetual disinheritance
- the Black Parliament seems to have been packed with Bruce supporters
- it was likely that the conspiracy actually aimed to put Edward Balliol, son of the exiled King John, on the Scottish throne in place of Robert the Bruce
- Bruce distorted the truth to make it seem that it was only Soules who wanted the Scottish throne.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the primary purpose of the Declaration of Arbroath appears to have been to persuade the Papacy to lift the excommunication on Robert
- some historians think Robert the Bruce used the Declaration of Arbroath as a test of loyalty to see whether his political community would sign it
- Bruce was very tolerant of some who remained outside his peace, including the Earl of Mar and the Earl of Angus, refusing to confiscate their estates
- Bruce secured support for tailzies in 1315 and 1318 to secure his succession and provide a strong royal authority, including provisions for the succession of a minor
- Bruce held frequent parliaments to deal with justice, extend royal authority and pass legislation
- Bruce was able to resurrect the Scottish economy, exporting goods like wool, hides and timber, and importing luxury goods as well as war materials from English North Sea ports as well as European centres
- Bruce worked to restore government to similar levels as under King Alexander III, including filling traditional offices, such as the Chancellor, Chamberlain and justiciars
- Bruce gave his opponents an ultimatum in 1313 and a year to come into his peace or face disinheritance
- the 1318 parliament at Scone confirmed systems of military service and reformed criminal law in Scotland.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Caroline Bingham	Emphasises the relative ease with which Bruce quashed the Soules plot against his authority.
Michael Penman	Takes the view that Bruce was nowhere near as successful at establishing royal authority as the contemporary record suggests.
G W S Barrow	Takes the view that Bruce was extremely successful in consolidating royal power and maintained typical government activity which included a blend of continuity from the reign of Alexander III and novelty, much of which was necessitated by a period of prolonged warfare.
Michael Brown	Takes the view that Bruce's authority depended on a communal character of government, from parliaments to declarations of support.

Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

Part A – Historical issues

Question 17 How important were the methods of the tobacco lords in establishing Glasgow as the ‘tobacco metropolis of Western Europe’?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse and assess the various factors which contributed to the great success of Glasgow’s tobacco industry. Candidates might discriminate between legal and illegal methods and compare the significance of these practices against other relevant factors, assessing their relative importance. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the methods used by the tobacco lords were important

Undercutting the English

- development of smuggling on a huge scale enabled Glasgow’s merchants to exploit the opportunity for trade with America by undercutting their English rivals including Liverpool, London and Whitehaven
- estimated that in the two decades following the Treaty of Union, Scottish merchants paid duty on only a half to two-thirds of their colonial imports. To offer a balanced comment, candidates should note that the reorganisation of the customs service in 1723 reduced the scale of illicit practices.

Personal connections

- close family partnerships and clannish alliances allowed the tobacco lords to manipulate burgh politics. Notably, the dominant role of the city’s Merchant House ensured local policy-making relating to the provision of infrastructure, including dredging the Clyde and improvement of harbouring facilities, were prioritised to the advantage of the tobacco barons
- tradition of sending young men to Virginia as part of their mercantile training gave Glasgow’s merchants further advantage, consolidating relationships with Scots-American emigrants – many of whom became important figures in the plantation economies of Virginia and Maryland.

Investment

- improved port facilities allowed merchants to abandon satellite ports of Greenock and Port Glasgow by the 1750s as over 200 wharves and jetties were able to support ocean-going ships
- efficient business methods reduced costs through innovations in purchasing, marketing and shipping, enabling Glasgow to account for 40% of UK tobacco trade by 1765
- in particular, the store system allowed lower purchase prices and faster turnaround times, while increased ownership rather than chartering of ships reduced costs further
- the tobacco lords were noted for their willingness to invest in a wide range of industries, founding the city’s first three banks. Industrial developments, such as shipbuilding innovation and the pioneering construction of dry docks (1762) was supported by the commercial enterprise of the tobacco lords, which in turn led to more efficient trade through a considerable multiplier effect.

Evidence which may support the view that geography was important

- a key period of expansion, 1739–1740, during the War of Jenkin’s Ear, was beneficial for Glasgow as the passage around the north of Ireland was significantly safer than more southern routes
- Glasgow’s location gave fortuitous access to Atlantic trade, enabling shorter sea crossings and resultantly lower freight costs across the Atlantic. (Importance of Glasgow’s location should not be overstated, given 90% of all tobacco was re-exported east to European markets.)

Evidence which may support the view that the Treaty of Union was important

- pre-1707, the Scottish tobacco trade was small-scale – Scottish merchants were prevented from trading directly with English colonies by the Navigation Laws
- the Union guaranteed free trade to the colonies and the English home markets, providing a context within which the growth of the industry was possible

- massive expansion in the Glasgow tobacco trade in the years immediately after the Union, in sharp contrast to the stagnation of the trade across the rest of Britain – Glasgow was the only part of Scotland thriving in the politically-sensitive year of 1715
- continuation of illicit practices was tolerated, partly because Scotland was now within the Union. Benign British rulers would have been unlikely to have afforded such an attitude to foreign competitors
- Scottish ships now sailed under the protection of the Royal Navy's cruisers and 'strong convoys'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Lynch	Argues that the tobacco lords' methods were instrumental to the success of the industry, particularly in the early 18 th century. States that 'The tobacco trade until the mid-1720s grew not through the new opportunities offered by free trade but through the long-honed skills of Scottish merchants of carrying on an illicit trade evading customs regulations'.
Tom Devine	Emphasises the impact of illicit methods used by Glasgow merchants which were so widespread as to cause fierce resentment in England: 'The view from Westminster was that Scots were not paying their way through taxation because of the enormous scale of smuggling and systematic revenue fraud.'
Christopher Whatley	Acknowledges the colonial trade opportunities afforded by the Treaty of Union, though ultimately stresses the illegal practices of the tobacco lords: 'Much of their success was based on their ability to evade on a massive scale and bend to their own advantage the customs regulations.'
T C Smout	Highlights that Glasgow found it had to push hard (and smuggle hard) to muscle in on a market occupied for a century by English merchants.

Question 18 How far does the poor leadership of James Francis Stuart, the Old Pretender, explain why the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 failed?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the relative importance of causal factors which resulted in the 1715 rising being unsuccessful. The question refers to the culmination of the rebellion at Sheriffmuir and the squandering of Mar's excellent position before and during the battle. Candidates might analyse the leadership, tactics and support for the rising to explain this anti-climax. Additional central issues which candidates may refer to include English and European support. Candidates may also comment on the Hanoverian response. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the lack of success was due to the leadership of James Francis Stuart, the Old Pretender

- James Francis Stuart was distant, unattractive and lacking charisma
- he was barely present during the rising – landed on 22 December, two months after Sheriffmuir, by which time effective momentum had been lost
- he sailed to France on 4 February having contributed little to the cause
- his lack of presence throughout ensured the rebellion lacked effective leadership, ending in fiasco.

Evidence which may support the view that the lack of success was due to the leadership of the Earl of Mar

- a self-interested and opportunistic politician with no military experience, Mar squandered numerical and strategic advantage before and after Sheriffmuir
- the rising was characterised by abortive, unsuccessful strategies and continual hesitation. A pre-emptive seizure of Edinburgh Castle stalled and was then hastily abandoned, while the planned western advance on Glasgow collapsed due to poor organisation
- details of events at the battle of Sheriffmuir – stalemate which was effectively a defeat, though military operations continued until February 1716.

Evidence which may support the view that the lack of success was due to the support within Scotland

- 1715 was easily the largest and most threatening Jacobite rising, partly as a result of widespread economic and political opposition to the Treaty of Union
- the strength of arms was considerable. Mar's 16,000-strong host was the largest Jacobite army of any rising. Significantly, considerable support came from the great landed families of the North-East and, to a lesser extent, the Lowlands
- 70% were Highland clansmen – the only Jacobites within Great Britain that retained an armed capacity. However, few western clans played an active role and no Highland chief gave the rising unqualified support
- the majority of Scotland's population was anti-Catholic. Whig and Hanoverian propaganda successfully separated Protestantism and Jacobitism; as a result, support for the Stuarts became synonymous with Catholicism
- Stuarts were inextricably linked with opposition to the Union, yet the Union guaranteed the Presbyterian Church. Therefore, the Jacobites failed to gain the support of the Kirk which enjoyed a near total control of the Lowland population in the early 18th century
- although the Jacobites committed themselves to the re-establishment of the Scottish parliament, the Stuarts, as reigning monarchs, had a record of hostility towards the institution.

Evidence which may support the view that the lack of success was due to little English support

- the small force of Northumbrian Jacobites which joined with Jacobites from the Scottish borders represented the total English contingent, and was the only occasion when English Jacobites raised and led their own host in any rising
- lacking effective leadership and purpose, and suspicious of their Scottish allies, they were encircled and defeated at Preston on 12 November.

Evidence which may support the view that the lack of success was due to the Hanoverian response

- Hanoverian army led by John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll – an able commander, thorough, effective and open to his officers' advice
- Mar was tactically superior – he succeeded in forcing a stalemate at Sheriffmuir despite being outnumbered by three to one.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Andrew Mackillop	Confirms the inadequate response from English Jacobites – in England. 'Jacobitism was nearly always a social form of political disaffection which preferred getting on the wrong side of a claret bottle than a bullet or bayonet.'
Michael Lynch	Focuses on Sheriffmuir, stressing the importance of a first major victory that never came to galvanise support among sympathetic, but hesitant, Jacobite supporters.
Tom Devine	States that in 1715 there had been a real chance of Stuart counter-revolution. Opportunities for real progress were there, but they had been thrown away by inept leadership.
Murray Pittock	An influential critic of Mar, he dismisses his leadership in concise terms. Mar was more interested in diluting his army's effectiveness than using it.

Question 19 'Urban areas had become the dominant presence in the society and economy of Scotland by 1800.'

How valid is this assessment of the growth of Scottish towns and cities during the 18th century?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the extent and nature of the growth of Scottish towns and cities by the end of the 18th century. Candidates might analyse the migration of the rural population to Scotland's cities during a time of unprecedented population growth. Candidates might also define the growth of cities beyond mere size of population, accounting for both social and economic change. They may also recognise regional trends. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that urban areas dominated Scotland's society and economy

Patterns of population growth

- Scottish population: 1707 – estimated one million; 1755 – Webster's survey 1,265,000; 1801 census – 1,608,000
- growth in the population of towns considerably exceeded that of the countryside. In 1750, 9% of the population lived in towns; by 1800 this figure had doubled, by which time nearly one in four Scots lived in towns or cities
- in a league of urbanised European countries, Scotland progressed from tenth in 1700, to seventh in 1750 and fourth in 1800
- growth of towns was most pronounced in the western burghs of the Clyde valley. Between 1755 and 1801, the populations of Falkirk and Kilmarnock doubled, while Glasgow, Greenock and Paisley more than trebled. This substantial growth was largely due to the initial stages of industrialisation
- Edinburgh and the eastern seaports including Leith, Dundee and Aberdeen also experienced significant, if less rapid, expansion.

Society

- Edinburgh's New Town was imbued with political significance, its street names confirming the new Whig Scotland's loyalty to the House of Hanover. It also redefined class divisions, as the urban poor remained in the Old Town
- Glasgow's western district consisted of 13 new streets and squares. Perth and Aberdeen had analogous, smaller-scale developments
- these developments resulted in new middle-class urban communities, providing a contrasting model of urban development from that associated with industrialisation and the arrival of workers from the countryside.

Economy

- the administrative, judicial and economic role of towns and especially cities was reinforced and redefined, partly as a result of the emergence of town planning. New public buildings and open spaces emerged, such as Glasgow's Chamber of Commerce and George Square
- Scotland's rapid rate of economic growth in the late 18th century was at least partly due to increased urbanisation (and resultant greater concentration of consumers and producers), enlarged pools of labour and external economies such as reduced transport costs.

Evidence which may support the view that urban areas did not dominate Scotland's society and economy

Patterns of population growth

- every rural region of Scotland registered population growth during the late 18th century
- although the urban population was growing faster than that of the countryside, the rural population remained a far larger proportion of the total Scottish population at the end of the 18th century
- by the 1830s, an estimated two-thirds of Scottish weavers lived in villages and small towns

- aside from Inverness, there was a complete absence of significant urban development in the Highlands.

Society

- continued pre-eminence of elite landed gentry
- rural hinterlands became steadily more prosperous, resulting in increased incomes of tenant farmers and landlords.

Economy

- the agricultural revolution transformed the rural economy. Increased production and productivity and the reorganisation of agricultural practice significantly increased output. Devine estimates that vegetable production doubled, while animal production increased six-fold between 1750 and 1820
- substantial increases in food production provided the foundation for both industrialisation and urbanisation
- the vast majority of the population was employed in agriculture or rural-based industry
- other major industries, including pig iron manufacture and coal-mining, were often located in villages.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
T C Smout	Concludes that urbanisation impacted on a minority of the Scottish population by the end of the 18 th century.
Tom Devine	Emphasises the extent and rapidity of urbanisation in the latter 18 th century.
Stana Nenadic	Underlines the inherent difficulty in drawing definitive conclusions when examining population migration in 18 th century Scotland due to the prevalence of temporary migration.
Gavin Sprott	Notes the regional variation in the extent of urbanisation which is concentrated in the Lowlands and barely perceptible in the Highlands and Islands.

Question 20 How important was the French Revolution in explaining political unrest in Scotland in the 1790s?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse the nature and development of Scottish society in the last decade of the 18th century by assessing the relative impact made by the ideals associated with the French Revolution. Candidates might examine Scottish society immediately prior to the French Revolution to provide an appropriate context which can be set against the increased political activity of the early 1790s. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that factors which pre-date the French Revolution were important

The Enlightenment

- the impact of the teachings of Enlightenment figures such as Francis Hutcheson and that of American independence, and the dissemination of associated ideas through pamphlets and newsletters.

Political changes

- Thomas McGrugar (Zeno) launched the 1782–1783 burgh reform movement. Freeholders agitating for county franchise representing most counties in Scotland met in Edinburgh, though ambitions were limited to modest reforms extending the franchise to the propertied classes
- increased interest in political affairs indicated by increase in the number of newspapers, from eight in 1782 to 27 by 1790, and their increasingly politicised content
- the years immediately preceding the French Revolution were characterised by political apathy and indifference due to rampant corruption – only nine county and burgh elections contested in 1790.

Evidence which may support the view that the French Revolution's impact was significant

Impact of ideas

- February 1791 publication of volume 1 of Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* generated significant interest in the ideas associated with the French Revolution 'well beyond the political classes'. Paine's writings went beyond reform and were genuinely revolutionary including universal suffrage
- agitation represented new popular opposition.

Key events 1792

- 1792 was the key year, the watershed being the failure of constitutional monarchy in France which was replaced by more radical Republican government. This triggered a wave of politicised activity in Scotland, much of which was specifically targeted at Henry Dundas, Home Secretary, whom many Scots identified as the personification of the establishment
- volume 2 of Paine's *Rights of Man* was also published. By the end of 1793, over 200,000 copies had been sold across Britain
- July – establishment of the Scottish Association of the Friends of the People; rapid expansion and assembly of the British National Convention of the Friends of the People in November. Revolutionary objectives were rejected in favour of 'moderate, firm and constitutional proceedings'
- August – king's birthday riots across Scotland including Dundee, Perth and Aberdeen. In Edinburgh, riots culminated in an attack on the residence of Henry Dundas. Riots continued sporadically through 1792 across Scotland
- numerous instances of public disorder across Scotland indicate a popular anger against 'Old Corruption', including erection of liberty poles, planting trees of liberty, wearing the redcaps, torching Dundas effigies and further rioting
- establishment of localised 'Societies of the Friends of General Reform'
- cultural references – Burns poem 'A Man's a Man for a' That'.

Severity of government response indicating significant impact

- supported by Robert Dundas, the Lord Advocate, the Court of Justiciary led by Lord Braxfield issued harsh sentences to protestors including Thomas Muir, who was deported to Australia, and Robert Watt who was executed
- 1793 ownership of Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* declared an act of treason – Devine notes this simply increased its popularity. Norman MacLeod, MP for Inverness, observed the government action 'acted like an electric shock: it set people of all ranks a-reading'
- in 1793, following France's declaration of war, lawyers, teachers, tradesmen and shopkeepers of allegedly 'Jacobin' sympathies were dismissed or boycotted
- ministers of the Kirk declared parliamentary reform a threat to Christianity.

Evidence which may suggest the impact of the French Revolution was limited

- in addition to political discontent, economic and social factors contributed significantly to the unrest of the 1790s
- in 1792, corn prices reached a 10-year high while agricultural improvement caused large-scale population displacement
- gross exaggeration to state that the majority of the Scottish population became politicised. Even at its height, unrest was localised and sporadic.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Argues that the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 changed everything and set the scene for an unprecedented challenge to the existing regime. The ideas of the revolution had a catalytic effect and gave fresh impetus to political discussion.
Christopher Whatley	Argues that the initial stimulus for much of the political activity was a lack of burgh reform and the corruption of political patronage, rather than a direct stimulus from the French Revolution.
Alexander Murdoch	Notes that, although many of the ideas associated with the French Revolution are universal constitutional issues, the Scottish reaction was uniquely focused on Henry Dundas as the established representation of the status quo.
Michael Brown	Underlines the impact of the French Revolution upon significant leaders of Scottish radicalism, particularly Thomas Muir, who was prepared to break the terms of his bail in order to travel to Paris and witness first-hand the revolution.

Question 21	To what extent does John Cockburn of Ormiston deserve to be considered the most significant contributor to Scotland's agricultural revolution?
Aim of the question	The aim of this question is to allow candidates to consider which of the improvers made the greatest contribution to the Scottish agricultural revolution. Candidates might interpret individual improvers' contributions in their fullest sense, covering themes such as influence upon contemporaries through their ideas, scale of improvements undertaken, the dissemination of good husbandry through influential texts, and wider achievement beyond the obvious improving of their own lands. Candidates may consider numerous improvers and gain marks by comparing a range of individuals; they do not need to cover all improvers. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that John Cockburn of Ormiston was the most significant contributor

- an early improver of the first generation, and therefore a genuine pioneer
- unusual in that, beyond economic gain, Cockburn can be considered a cultural improver. Cockburn was pro-Union, and believed agricultural improvement would allow Scotland to justify its place in 18th century Britain
- between 1714 and 1746, Cockburn oversaw a far-reaching programme of improvement. All steadings were rebuilt, enclosure, hedge planting
- paid for tenants and their sons to learn husbandry in England
- granted unprecedented 19-year leases in exchange for tenants' agreements binding them to improve the land at their expense, emulating Cockburn's improvements on his home farm
- unlike typical gentry of the era, Cockburn adopted an active interest, continually inspecting husbandry and even corresponding directly with tenants when on business in London
- rebuilt the local farm-toun into the 'new-town' of Ormiston, providing a market for surplus produce and facilities – including a brewery, distillery and bleachfield
- Cockburn was declared bankrupt in 1747; however, it may be argued that while he failed as a businessman, he succeeded in making an impact on the agricultural revolution, so failure and success can coexist – many of his tenants continued in their improved husbandry while benefiting from the material infrastructure which became his legacy.

Evidence which may support the view that Archibald Grant of Monymusk was the most significant contributor

- like Cockburn, Grant was an MP, wealthy landowner and pioneer improver whose efforts to modernise the husbandry practised on his lands ran in parallel with Cockburn's
- proved improvement was compatible with sound business practice, restoring his family fortune through the implementation of efficient methods
- invested heavily in infrastructure, such as his planned village of Archiestown to provide not only a marketplace but also employment in textile manufacture
- imported European workers to instruct on agricultural and industrial techniques.

Evidence which may support the view that Sir John Sinclair was the most significant contributor

- influential landowner who actively involved himself in the encouragement of his tenants to adopt improvement
- a prominent member of the Board of Agriculture and the Highland and Agricultural Society, Sinclair instigated agricultural research and investigation on a vast scale, culminating in editing the *Statistical Accounts and the General Views of Agriculture*
- prolific, widely-read author who denounced customary practice, which he claimed relied on implements 'of the worst description', ensuring 'all attempts at improvement would be in vain'
- numerous publications provided an important impetus for progressive ideas
- financed new and improved infrastructure, including the redesign of Caithness and the establishment of Thurso.

Evidence which may support the view that Thomas Hope of Rankeillor was the most significant contributor

- member of the gentry who toured England and Europe in search of agricultural innovation
- instrumental in forming and running Edinburgh's Honourable Society of Improvers which, itself, was instrumental in disseminating knowledge of the new husbandry
- became particularly adept in the use of drainage, gaining repute for the draining of Edinburgh's south loch which was replaced by the Meadows.

Evidence which may support the view that Henry Home, Lord Kames, was the most significant contributor

- a prolific agricultural author and publicist, Kames wrote extensively on the importance of the practical application of science in agriculture – most famously in his publication of the influential *Gentleman Farmer* in 1776
- commissioned extensive agricultural studies to record and publicise best agricultural practice
- provided capital for ambitious rural transport improvements including road improvements, bridges and the cutting of canals
- gained fame for the scale of his improvements on his Blair Drummond estate which included the drainage and cultivation of 330 acres of marsh, described by a contemporary as 'the most singular and considerable improvement in Scotland'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
T C Smout	Identifies Cockburn as being particularly important in applying and dissemination of improved farming practice. 'It is impossible not to be impressed by the energy and vision with which a man like John Cockburn of Ormiston burst open the high walls of tradition on his estate.'
Christopher Whatley	Notes Sir Archibald Grant of Monymusk's considerable investment in infrastructure in both planned towns and associated industry.
W A Adams	Confirms Lord Kames' influence upon contemporaries, courtesy of the enormous scale of improvement at Blair Drummond.
Tom Devine	Emphasises the pivotal role of the individual improvers as a collective force in the promotion of agricultural change.

Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

Part B – Historical sources

Question 22 How much do **Sources A** and **B** reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the failure of the Jacobite rising of 1745?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
. . . he . . . imagined they would beat four times their number of regular troops'. Charles, however, deceived himself. . .	Suggests that Charles' esteem of his Highland army was exaggerated, leading to over-confidence in their potential.
. . . an opponent not sufficiently trained or led . . . left Charles over-confident. . .	Suggests that early in the '45, government troops were poorly trained and this led Charles to underestimate the government troops.
. . . Culloden was to place the clan regiments on an ill-chosen field that greatly favoured conventional British tactics. . .	Argues that the battlefield chosen by the Jacobites handed the conventional Hanoverian forces a significant advantage.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- victory at Prestonpans on 20 September was total. Cope was a very ordinary general. His force of 2,500 was disposed of decisively in 20 minutes. Therefore, Charles' admiration of his Highland army was within a clear context
- the invasion of England was partly justified by the ease of victory at Prestonpans and the Highland army's ability to defend 'fortress Scotland'
- Culloden Moor suited the tactics and discipline of the Hanoverian army, in contrast to the confused Highland charge. The Highland troops were not effectively commanded.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
It was wrong to have raised your royal standard without having a positive assurance from the French. . .	Maintains that French support was vital to the success of the rising – Charles should not have started the rising by raising his royal standard without it.
I'm also convinced that Mr O'Sullivan, whom you trusted with most essential things, was exceedingly unfit and committed terrible blunders . . . his orders were completely confused.	Claims that the appointment of O'Sullivan as a senior officer and quartermaster was a serious mistake, resulting in pivotal poor decisions which undermined the Jacobite campaign.
. . . the lack of provisions . . . This had fatal consequences. You trusted Mr Hay to order provisions, yet he served you very poorly . . . he neglected his duty. In the three days before battle your army was starved.	Maintains that the appointment of Hay contributed towards the inadequate supply of food which hampered the Jacobite army throughout the rising.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Charles' 700 professional French soldiers and munitions never landed, being forced to return to France after bombardment by HMS Lion. Further French assistance was extremely limited and a full invasion, despite Charles' rhetoric, was never promised
- advised by O'Sullivan, Charles insisted on fighting an orthodox defensive action at Culloden despite opposition from a number of his senior officers led by Lord George Murray
- Hanoverian troops adopted modern, disciplined tactics – integrating musket fire, a new bayonet drill and effective use of field artillery
- food and, critically, money were running short by April 1746. Charles' army was underfed, underpaid and in an increasingly desperate situation.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Lord George Murray was the military genius of the Jacobite army. Throughout the campaign he favoured a more cautious, defensive strategy than Charles, with whom he had a volatile relationship
- the 'fortress Scotland' policy favoured by Charles and some of his senior officers including Lochiel was, according to Pittock, strategically inept. He states that the rapid capture of London was never likely if Scotland was used as the landing point of the rising
- regionalised support in Scotland – little support in the Lowlands and outright opposition in Glasgow and the West. Uneven support throughout the Highlands
- lack of support in England. Charles' disingenuous assurances of pledges from English Tories undermined his leadership when they failed to materialise
- Charles' authority was further undermined by his promise of French invasion and refusal to participate in the command of his army during the retreat from Derby
- factionalism within the Jacobite command. Most celebrated was the fractious relationship between Charles and Lord George Murray. However, there were frequent disagreements among others, as seen by the council's decisions to invade England and retreat from Derby
- Charles' Catholicism was a propaganda gift for the Hanoverians who portrayed him as a foreigner from Italy, the home of popery
- the abortive night raid on Cumberland's camp prior to Culloden.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Daniel Szechi	Criticises Charles' tactics and leadership throughout the rising.
Christopher Duffy	Defends Charles' leadership noting that given the overwhelming odds he faced, he came within 100 miles of marching upon London.
Murray Pittock	Downplays the likelihood of France committing to an invasion: 'Charles himself was an embarrassment to France, who wished to downplay his importance to some of its allies.'
Tom Devine	Emphasises the lack of support for Charles' cause rather than the specific events at Culloden: 'Scottish backing during the rising was remarkably thin on the ground long before the crushing defeat of Culloden; it was this together with the virtual disappearance of support in England rather than force of arms in itself which ultimately ended the last hopes of restoration.'

Question 23 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source C** as evidence of the nature of social change in the Highlands in the late 18th century

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that they provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	Samuel Johnson	A famous literary figure of the 18 th century, publishing poetry, essays, and most famously, <i>The Dictionary of the English Language</i> . 'Johnson was the leading author of London's literary community. His travelogues provide commentary upon all aspects of an unfamiliar Gaelic society including religion, education, economy and customs.' Written from an English perspective without a full understanding of Highland society. His writings do not hide his low regard for most things about living in the Scottish Highlands.
Purpose	To publish a description of the lives of the Gaelic-speaking Highlanders	One of the most detailed descriptions of Highland life in the late 18 th century – recognised as a monument of English literature and Highland history. An Englishman, Johnson's motivation was to observe the traditions and lives of the Gaelic-speaking inhabitants of Scotland.
Timing	1773	Written at a time when the conflicting pressures on traditional clan society and clearance were well established. It was a period of rapid social change which Johnson did not always grasp.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The clan chiefs have turned their thoughts to the improvements of their finances and expect more rent.	Underlines the increasing tension between the chiefs' desire to increase their revenue and the consequent need to increase their tenant's rents. His writing does not acknowledge that the traditional relationship between the clan chief and his men was one of service; and that this is now being dispensed with.
. . . the tenant . . . refuses to pay the demand, and is ejected.	Describes the Highlander's inability to pay increased rent which led to eviction. Again, his writing does not show much sympathy for the tenant whose whole social organisation was being over-turned by his chiefs' new demand just for money.
The willingness to seek another country is clear from the behaviour of the Highlanders.	Describes the consequential emigration of the Highlanders in significant numbers. His writing does acknowledge that Highlanders are recognising that there are other opportunities elsewhere.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- *duthchas* – the traditional role of the clan chief to provide protection and land to his people was, at its essence, a principle of heart and mind. Traditional clan land management prioritised accessible landholding rather than the maximisation of agricultural production for a market economy
- increasing consumerism among chiefs, including the purchase of second homes, furniture and clothing, grew in parallel with unprecedented rent increases – Glengarry rentals increased 472% between 1768 and 1802
- the competitive allocation of land to the highest bidder was a major causal factor in the emigration of Highlanders in unprecedented numbers.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the decline in clan values was a long-term trend preceding the beginning of the 18th century. However, by the 1770s there was an acceleration in the rate of social change
- commercial forces pressurised the social contract of clanship as southern markets grew for Highland products such as cattle and timber
- a new class of commercial tenant emerged. Usually Lowland or English, they had little ethnic or hereditary links to the clan chief
- increasing absenteeism of clan elites who established second homes in London or Edinburgh was symptomatic of societal change in the Highlands
- significant emigration from the Highlands began in the 1730s, primarily from Argyll and Sutherland
- some Highlanders were forcibly evicted, others were compelled by financial necessity, while some simply chose to leave
- although recent historiography has placed less emphasis on the impact of Culloden and government legislation on the decline in clanship, government intervention reinforced the long-term decline in Gaeldom
- societal change also included the demise of the traditional township (baile), the disappearance of the tacksmen, the migration to coastal land, and the widespread introduction of commercial sheep farming.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
J T Cameron	Confirms the acceleration of clearance in the 1780s and underlines the importance of both the introduction of sheep and the demand for men for military service during the American War of Independence.
Tom Devine	Emphasises the role of a massive increase in demand for Highland produce which led to the destruction of traditional Highland society.
Alan Macquarrie	Maintains that the demise of clanship was caused by ‘commercial productivity and profitability replacing kinship as the means to organise relations between Highland elites and their clansmen’.
John Prebble	Argues social change in the Highlands was directly linked to the defeat of the Jacobite rising and government policy which followed rather than inevitable market pressures. Due to the ‘sustained terrorisation of highlanders . . . the structure of the clan system was torn down and left to its inevitable decay’.

Question 24 How fully does **Source D** explain the reasons for the changes in Scottish schooling in the 18th century?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
. . . there had been . . . schools outside the statutory system . . . parishes were often too large for one master to satisfy demand.	Suggests that the Kirk no longer had absolute control as the large size of some parishes encouraged the development of alternative schooling.
The most dynamic feature of schooling in the large burghs was a response to the new needs of the expanding business and professional classes.	Highlights that the rise of business and the professions led to fundamental changes in subjects taught and the type of teachers employed.
. . . financial problems encouraged some rural schoolmasters to broaden their teaching. . .	States that financial necessity encouraged some teachers to broaden the curriculum and offer more subjects.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise points in the source

- rapid population growth, migration and the parish school system were incompatible, diluting the Kirk's control over the schooling of the growing non-rural population
- although the Kirk's influence remained strong, as ministers and elders appointed masters and supervised instruction in parish schools, a general secularisation of society was gradually weakening its influence
- the foundation of town academies providing an intensive education in 'modern' subjects represented an even more radical response to the demands of the business and professional communities
- there was a growing demand for literacy which encouraged the rapid growth of private schools
- the success of town 'academies' such as Ayr, Stirling and Perth, which focused on the 'new subjects' with specific links to commerce, led to an expansion of the academy movement acting in itself as a powerful agent of change.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the reformation had used education to instil Christian adherence in children. However, secularisation across Scottish society created considerable social pressure for change
- Scottish schools were becoming more varied – burgh grammars and academies were augmented by numerous private institutions. All of these schools were out-with the direct control of the Kirk, providing greater choice for parents and therefore providing further impetus for change
- university reform permeated down to schools, partly as a legacy of the reformation's attempts to create an integrated system of education
- significant regional variation existed between rural and urban development. Urbanisation placed significant strain on grammar schools in increasingly densely-populated towns
- town councils played an important role in the development of grammar schools, emphasising the study of Latin and progression to the universities
- the Scottish Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (SSPCK) supplemented the parish system in the Highlands for evangelical and political purposes.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Donald Withrington	Acknowledges the strength of the partnership between the state and Kirk in developing Scottish schools during the 18 th century: 'the state . . . gave parliamentary backing for the funding of a parochial school system and the church acted as managers for the whole enterprise.'
John Mackie	Emphasises the powerful position of the Kirk in Scottish education: 'A . . . result of clerical insistence was an Act of 1696 compelling the heritors of every parish to provide a commodious house for a school. By the early 1690s, Scotland appears to have had extraordinarily good provision for schooling.'
T C Smout	In recognition of its expansion and rate of change, Smout labels 18 th -century education a growth industry, arguing that the changing nature of education reflected its changing purpose which was largely due to the demands of the emerging middle and professional classes.
Arthur Herman	Links the role of the Kirk, and in particular the Education Act of 1696, with the relatively high rate of literacy. 'One thing is certain: Scotland's literacy rate would be higher than that of any other country by the end of the 18 th century.'

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

Part A – Historical issues

Question 25 To what extent was the Kansas-Nebraska Act the most significant reason for the emergence of the Republican Party by 1856?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse the reasons for the formation of the Republican Party by 1856 and, in particular, assess the importance of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as one of several reasons for the emergence of the Republican Party. Candidates might analyse the importance of the Kansas-Nebraska Act as part of the long- and short-term reasons for the emergence of the Republicans. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the Kansas-Nebraska Act was the most significant reason

- awakened the spectre of the slave power
- prompted a coalition of anti-slavery groups, for example Anti-Nebraska Party, the People’s Party and Republicans
- Stephen Douglas’ repeal of the Missouri Compromise caused outrage in the North
- the competition for control of Kansas sparked a race between pro-slave and free-soil settlers giving a focal point for the Northern political voice
- Lecompton versus Topeka state legislatures in Kansas
- ‘Bleeding Kansas’.

Evidence which may support the view that Southern political power, anti-slavery sentiment and Slave Power Conspiracy were the most important reasons

- many Northern Democrat voters sought a new political party as the Democrats were dominated by Southern opinion
- Democrat control of the Presidency for nearly 50 years
- five out of seven Supreme Court judges were from Southern states
- the Democrats appeared to be committed to advancing the cause of slavery; hence the Slave Power Conspiracy theory which dominated Northern thinking
- ‘Bleeding Sumner’
- Northerners opposed slavery’s extension into the territories
- Republicans viewed slavery as restricting the South’s economic growth
- the Republicans were one of a number of anti-slavery coalitions in the North.

Evidence which may suggest or support the view that Nativism was the most important reason

- mass immigration from Europe to Northern cities
- rise of the ‘American Party’ or Know Nothings
- strong link between the hierarchy of the Democratic Party and the Catholic Church
- most Catholics voted Democrat
- religious and political opposition to immigration but – critically – social and economic motivations also
- not all Republicans held Nativist views – Lincoln famously stated his opposition to the Know Nothings in 1855
- perhaps a degree of inevitability that the Know Nothings would be dominated by a Northern coalition movement

Evidence which may support the view that the collapse of the Whigs was the most important reason

- the rise of new political movements in the North won mass support in 1854 elections – Whigs ceased to be a main political force
- the Democrats seriously lost out in 1854 elections

- division of Whigs into sections following Kansas-Nebraska Act
- issues of temperance, anti-immigration, anti-Catholicism fatally divided Whigs.

Evidence which may support the view that Northern economic policies were the most important reasons

- the protective tariff
- concept of 'free labour'
- government aid for internal improvements and the desire for a homestead law
- multi-faceted appeal of the Republicans – a rainbow coalition of Northern ideals.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
James McPherson	Establishes that the Republican Party developed a free-labour rationale for their vision of capitalist development. Counter Southern attacks upon system of wages and division of labour. Republican support came from upwardly mobile Protestants and farmers operating within the national market.
Hugh Tulloch	Establishes the view that the birth of Republican Party came in the aftermath of the Kansas-Nebraska controversy. Republicans attracted those opposed to Southern determination to maintain slavery.
Alan Farmer	Points out that given its ideas, it was believed the Republican Party could never be more than a Northern sectional party – rescued by events in Kansas.
Brian Reid	States that political evangelicalism permeated the developing Republican Party. Sectional issue crucial to Republican philosophy.

Question 26 'The role of the Western Theatre in the Civil War has been underestimated.'
How valid is this view?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse the importance of the Western Theatre to Union military strategy. Candidates might choose to analyse the issue as part of the debate over 'East versus West'. Candidates might consider the extent to which Confederate Strategy appeared to ignore the importance of the Western Theatre in favour of the Virginian Theatre. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions regarding the importance of military operations in the Western Theatre to eventual Union victory in the Civil War.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the role of the Western Theatre has been underestimated

The key to military strategy

- potential for Union victory in the West was great due to its sheer size, its lack of natural defence lines and rivers flowing into the heart of the Confederacy
- Grant's successes in February 1862 opened up the South's 'soft underbelly'
- Battle of Shiloh prevented the Confederacy regaining the initiative in the West
- the capture of Vicksburg opened up the Mississippi to Union shipping and split the Confederacy in two
- key Union military victories dealt severe blows to Confederate morale, for example Battle of Murfreesboro forcing Bragg's army into retreat, Battles of Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge forcing Confederate forces to retreat into Georgia in disarray
- the experiences on the battlefield in the Western Theatre would be critical for generals such as Grant and Halleck when they came to fight in the East
- Union successes in the West ultimately opened up the route for Sherman's march on Atlanta in summer 1864.

Difficulties for Union strategy in the West

- key problems organising its Western forces
- problems of command and control
- difficulties in communication and therefore coordinating a strategy
- Union had to police areas conquered, therefore tying up men that could have been used to fight elsewhere
- difficulties in guarding an extremely long supply line.

Evidence which may support the view that the role of the Virginian or Eastern Theatre has been overestimated

Military strategy

- 'Forward to Richmond' from Northern press encouraging victory by capturing the Confederate capital
- the Eastern Theatre is where the most decisive battles took place
- Grant versus Lee
- Army of Potomac versus Army of Northern Virginia
- the Naval Blockade restricted trade and supplies entering and leaving the Confederacy. The 'Anaconda Plan' was critical to eventual Union victory, allowing the Union land forces to enforce its superior 'manpower and resources'.

Difficulties for the Union in the Virginian Theatre

- Union forces faced real difficulty in the Virginian Theatre with determined defence of Virginia, for example 'Stonewall' Jackson at First Manassas or Bull Run in July 1861

- earlier victories gave the Confederate forces in Virginia an 'esprit de corps' and allowed the Confederates to ensure reinforcements to defend the line along the Potomac River
- the Confederacy, with its defence of Virginia, would struggle even more than Union forces to fight in the Western Theatre.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hugh Tulloch	Believes that Grant realised the importance of grasping the details of ammunition, supplies and transport. While victory in the West was a necessary pre-requisite for Northern victory, it did not guarantee it.
Basil Liddell Hart	Claims that Sherman understood the concept of deep strategic penetration.
Hari Jones	Criticises Lee for depriving West of men and reinforcements. Union had to rely on supplies brought by river and rail to supplement what they could find in the area.
Peter Parish	Establishes that after February 1862, the South lost much of its confidence in its ability to defend its western front.

Question 27 To what extent have criticisms of Jefferson Davis as a wartime leader been exaggerated?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess Davis' political abilities in his leadership of the Confederacy during the American Civil War. Candidates may make a comparison with Abraham Lincoln but this should not be the sole consideration of the discussion. Rather, candidates might consider Davis' strengths and limitations with possible reference to Lincoln as a comparison. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions regarding the validity of the criticisms of Jefferson Davis' wartime leadership of the Confederacy.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that criticisms are exaggerated

Political leadership

- Davis established the Confederacy and put a decent political team in position from nothing in 1860
- Davis made difficult and bold decisions, for example imposing martial law on areas threatened by Union invasion or higher taxation on land, cotton and slaves
- Davis was dedicated to the Southern cause and worked hard to establish a sense of Confederate nationalism.

Military leadership

- the Confederacy fought for four years under Davis' leadership
- Davis gave key military commanders freedom and trust
- Lee held Davis in high regard
- Davis was poorly advised by many Confederate generals, for example Lee could have advised Davis to change the Confederate capital.

Personality and personal experiences

- Davis had a respected military and administrative background, proving himself as a Mexican war hero and in the US Senate as War Secretary
- Davis had a realistic view of the war's length
- Davis struggled to control state governors which cost him and the Confederate cause dearly, for example Vance and Brown.

Evidence which may support the view that criticisms are justified

Political leadership

- Davis struggled to manage competing factions within the Confederate government
- Davis was criticised by his own war department staff for his lack of knowledge and interference. Vice-President Stephens called Davis 'My poor blind and deaf dog'
- disastrous Confederate economy
- Davis left foreign policy to others in his government. He failed to ensure a proactive diplomatic effort; rather, expecting events during the Civil War to achieve his diplomatic aims. He also relied too heavily on the importance of cotton in achieving his diplomatic aims.

Military leadership

- Beauregard and Johnston both blamed Davis for military failure
- Davis did not deal effectively with the problems facing the Confederacy which resulted from the length of the war, for example morale and food shortages.

Personal characteristics

- Davis did not clearly define and express his war aims for the Confederacy
- Davis struggled to establish good working relations with many of his political colleagues. His personality seemed to have made him more enemies than friends. Constant feuds in his government undermined the Confederate war effort, for example during the war he appointed four Secretaries of State and six Secretaries of War

- Davis had poor judgement and inability to appoint effectively, both politically and militarily
- Davis was well-known for his indecision.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
David Potter	Argues that if the Union and the Confederacy had exchanged presidents with one another, the Confederacy might have won its independence.
Gary Gallagher	Establishes that Davis did do well, he just had an absence of capable subordinates.
Frank Vandiver	Believes that Davis had many failings but he did have 'nerve'.
John Eaton	Argues that at many points during the Civil War it was impossible for Davis and the Confederacy to achieve victory in the Civil War.

Question 28 How justified is the view that the Civil War's greatest impact on women was in the South?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the level of the impact that war had on the role of women on both sides during the conflict. Candidates may choose to consider the impact of the Civil War on women in both the South and the North, but they may compare the war's impact on Southern women with any other relevant group of women. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions on the extent of the war's impact on Southern women, relative to other relevant group(s).

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the greatest impact was on women in the South

- women kept plantations going
- women had to deal with shortages
- they needed to control slaves
- women led civil unrest, for example Richmond bread riots in mid-summer 1862
- they played a role in undermining the morale of the Confederate army from autumn 1864 onwards, with letters to soldiers pleading for the latter's return
- the severe hardships led to a sense of defeatism among women in the South.

Evidence which may support the view that the greatest impact was on women in the North

- women played a role in US Sanitary Commission
- role of Clara Barton
- women had an increased role in industry and farming
- women replaced men, who had volunteered, in many professions
- women had an increased role in food and factory output.

Evidence which may support the view that there were common impacts to women in the North and the South

- women volunteered to be nurses despite social opprobrium
- they helped raise funds by, for example, the sale of bonds
- some acted as spies, for example Union spy Elizabeth van Lew or Confederate spy Rose Greenhow
- women kept the home fires burning
- women set up relief organisations
- women kept up morale: by letter-writing, tending to the sick or sending additional supplies to men in camp.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Drew Faust	Comments that women faced severe hardship on the home front and this led to the growth of defeatism as seen in the content of letters sent to the fighting men of the South.
Reid Mitchell	Notes that historical judgements on Confederate women have ranged from them as more devoted to the cause than their men folk, to arguing that their withdrawal of support doomed the Confederacy.
Mary Massey	Believes the Civil War compelled women to become more active, self-reliant and resourceful.
Hugh McPherson	Argues that the war led to a great increase in the employment of women. Volunteer nurses gave valuable service that overcame military and medical prejudice.

Question 29 'It seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected.'
How valid is this view of the difficulties Lincoln faced during the 1864 Presidential campaign?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the comparative depth of wartime difficulties facing the North in 1864. Candidates may choose to concentrate on the 1864 Presidential election as a springboard for wider discussion or take a chronological approach. Both are acceptable but will be assessed according to the complexity of their arguments. Candidates might look beyond the politics of Washington by considering the military and domestic difficulties facing Lincoln and his administration. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions on the difficulties facing Lincoln during the 1864 Presidential election campaign.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that there were factors causing major difficulty for Lincoln

Military difficulties

- low level of success in Western and Eastern Theatre at start of the year, for example Grant's Wilderness Campaign, Sigel in Shenandoah, Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain
- Army of the Potomac had mixed degree of success in early 1864 despite superior manpower, for example Grant's Wilderness Campaign, May-June 1864 and Cold Harbour, June 1864
- casualty figures very high, 32,000, 5-12 May 1864 – 'Butcher' Grant and apparent failure of Total War tactics
- enlistment difficulties and use of 'green' black troops.

Northern domestic problems

- morale – popular press defeatist, longing for peace in song
- fear – Jubal Early had appeared on outskirts of Washington
- social – growing dissatisfaction with legal and press restrictions
- ethnic – attracted by opportunities, more immigrants arrived in the North which fuelled further tension.

Political difficulties for Lincoln

- Lincoln – support for Grant, military failures and casualties meant he was very unpopular. Lincoln thought he might not gain the Republican nomination to stand in the November Presidential election
- Fremont created his own party, the Radical Democracy, which threatened to split the Republican vote
- September 1864 – election fitted in with Mobile victory, fall of Atlanta and Sheridan success
- reconstruction policy – radical Republicans and 10% plan – Wade-Davis.

Evidence which may support the view that there were factors in favour of Lincoln

Military successes

- Grant's perseverance resulted in a change of fortunes from June 1864 threatening Petersburg and Richmond and forcing Lee and the Confederates into a defensive formation
- success of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley
- siege and capture of Atlanta by Sherman and the capture of Mobile by Farragut reduced casualties or placed Union troops closer to success
- capture of Atlanta was a significant boost to Northern morale and Lincoln's campaign
- military success eventually reduced problems on the home front.

Northern domestic issues in favour of Lincoln

- Lincoln had the support of the soldiers. The War Department allowed whole regiments to return home to vote. Most states allowed soldiers the opportunity to vote in the field. 78% of soldiers voted for Lincoln.

Political advantages for Lincoln

- Democrats chose McClellan as their candidate but could not agree on a platform for election, being divided by peace and continuation of the war
- Democrat campaign lacked serious political challenge, resorting to calling Lincoln a 'negro lover'
- Lincoln had the support of the Republican Party and the Republican voters on the whole. Chase and Fremont, the challengers for nomination, failed to mount any serious challenge
- renaming the Republican Party, the National Union or Union League enhanced the potential for re-election as it presented a united front.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Reid Mitchell	Believes the failure to capture Atlanta would probably have led to Lincoln and pro-war party defeat.
Archer Jones	Establishes the view that Grant's campaign was a 'political liability' for Lincoln.
Hugh McPherson	States that domestic gloom in May was changing to optimism and further suggests a greater chance of elections in November rather than August.
Joseph Glatthaar	Points out that Northern regiments were rarely filled by 1864.

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850–1865

Part B – Historical sources

Question 30 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source A** as evidence of the nature of the debate over slave conditions in antebellum Southern society.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians’ views, that they provide in their overall interpretation of the source’s value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	George Fitzhugh, a Virginian lawyer	Virginian lawyer who would be representative of views in his own state and in the defence of slavery; leading pro-slavery intellect and representative of Southern plantation owners’ views in the 1850s. Fitzhugh published three books, all attacking Northern capitalism and defending Southern slavery. His infamous work <i>Cannibals All</i> was published at the same time as the Dred Scott decision which added to the outrage in the North.
Purpose	From his book <i>The Blessings of Slavery</i>	To defend the institution of slavery and bolster Southern arguments for the retention of slavery at a time of constitutional uncertainty over the future of slavery. He is using the language constantly used by southerners to point out the alleged advantages of slavery.
Timing	published in 1857	Published at the time of increasing tension over extension of slavery, for example Dred Scott, 1857.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . slaves . . . are the happiest and freest . . . in the world . . . the free labourer . . . works longer and harder . . . than the slave . . .	Argues that slaves did not work harder than many other Americans, using language that paints a very happy picture of their lives.
. . . work, on the average, in good weather, no more than nine hours a day.	Gives an example to support the assertion that slaves were well-treated, relative to other workers. Inviting the reader to continue considering this comparison of the slaves’ lives against the working hours and conditions of the industrial north.
The negro children, the aged and infirm work not at all, and yet have all the comforts and necessities of life provided for them. They enjoy liberty, because they are oppressed neither by care or labor.	Claims that children, the elderly and infirm do not work and are provided for by the slave-owner. Idyllic picture continued here of the alleged benefits and apparently caring attitudes of the slave owners.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Southerners argued that slaves did not work harder than most 19th century free Americans. There was little work on Sunday, half days on Saturday and regular holidays
- Fogel and Engelmann support these statements in their influential work, but this was not always the case, as slave testaments suggest
- evidence of healthcare for slaves in some Southern plantations
- the importance of religion in the South led to days off, particularly Sundays. However, this was always at the discretion of the slave-owner and varied across the South and from plantation to plantation.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- no major slave revolt, suggesting that slave conditions were not particularly bad
- only a few hundred slaves tried to escape each year out of a population of approximately four million
- some slaves were granted their freedom on the death of their owner
- use of carrot rather than stick to motivate slaves, for example hard-working slaves received additional holidays, more food and clothing
- floggings were rare. Few brutal owners. Most whites were constrained by Christian morality and own standards of decency.

However

- slaves could be sold, punished, sexually exploited and even killed by their owners
- firm discipline was the norm – disobedient slaves were flogged or branded
- slaves usually worked longer hours than free Americans
- slave family units could be broken through sale – up to 25% of slave family units were broken by forced separation
- lack of slave revolt shows the reality of the situation. Impossible to organise – slaves not allowed to meet or to own weapons
- extremely limited potential for successful escape, therefore severe punishment for escapees.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Christopher Phillips	Apologist for slavery. Argues that slavery protected blacks from African savagery. Treatment of slaves was governed by high, gentlemanly code – a form of benign authoritarianism. Slaves were content with their lot. Relationship between slave and owner was marked by ‘gentleness, kind-hearted friendship and mutual loyalty’.
Kenneth Stampp	Argues that cruelty was endemic in all slave-holding communities. Fear among slaves of being sold on by their master. Slave unhappiness as shown by acts of resistance and sabotage, but not open rebellion. The typical plantation was an area of persistent conflict between master and slave.
Stanley Elkins	Takes the view that slaves were dependent on the mood of an authoritarian master.
Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman	Take the view that slave accommodation and standard of living was superior to that of free Americans living in New York in 1893. Slaves were controlled with minimal force; whippings have been exaggerated: only 0.7% of hands per year.

Question 31 How much do **Sources B** and **C** reveal about differing interpretations of the causes of the Civil War?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
For 25 years this agitation (against slavery) has been steadily increasing . . .	Argues that the South has felt under threat from Northern anti-slavery agitation for many years.
A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery.	Argues that the Republicans (a sectional party) who were elected on a Northern vote have elected a president whose opinions and aim are incompatible with slavery.
It has announced that the South shall be excluded from the common territory and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.	Argues that Republicans believe that war should be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States. The Republican commitment to end the expansion of slavery in the territories is hostile to the interests of the South.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- perceived Northern aggression against slavery and the rise of the abolitionist movement from 1835 and the abolition of slavery by the Mexican government in Texas, prompting the outbreak of the Mexican War. There was a perception that agitation against slavery had increased so much that it had gained the support of the government
- Republicans formed in 1854 – anti-slavery movement purely with a Northern support base
- the Republicans controlled the House and Senate in 1858
- Lincoln elected President in 1860. His views were clear and well-known across the South following the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858
- prevention of slavery in the territories, Topeka government and Lincoln's views.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
But equilibrium was impossible under expansion, and growth at one time or another became dominant and therefore controls the national government.	Argues that equality was impossible; territorial expansion was a key source of tension. Each side battled for control of government.
Therein lies the irrepressible conflict; the eternal struggle between the agrarian South and the industrial North to control the government.	Argues that the Civil War was not about slavery but about economics – industry versus agriculture.
Their political philosophies growing out of their economic and social systems were impossible to reconcile.	Emphasises that the different structures (agrarian and industrial) led to different political philosophies, but it was the different economic structures which were the key cause of this.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- North and South divided into two sections – contrasting in many ways, for example industry versus agriculture, free labour versus slave labour, interventionist government versus limited government
- territorial expansion the key to tension, for example Texas, Mexican War, California, Kansas, Nebraska – should these new territories be free or slave?
- control of government meant representation for the controlling section and the dominance of their ideology, for example tariff in the North meant potentially lower profits in the South therefore the economy of the South would be threatened
- slavery was arguably at the heart of the economic and social differences.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Southern fears of becoming a minority within the federal Union
- Southern press hostile to all Northern actions, for example portrayal of Republicans as the party of the blacks, which would encourage social and racial chaos
- Lincoln portrayed as a direct threat to the social and economic status of the South, and this justified immediate secession if he were to be elected
- North regarded the South as ‘un-American’ and out of step with mid-19th century values
- impact of John Brown’s raid – struck a sensitive nerve in the Southern psyche
- disputes over tariff legislation
- economic disagreements over funding of internal improvements
- splits within the Democratic Party that allowed for the election of Lincoln
- political disagreements over the future nature of the American republic
- issue of slavery and, more importantly, slavery expansion
- Northern perception of a ‘Slave Power’ conspiracy
- concept of a ‘blundering generation’
- doctrine of States’ rights
- Davis: the South seceded in defence of States’ rights. The Republican Party had engineered war to further their political and economic domination over the South.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Charles and Mary Beard	Argue that economic divergence between the North and the South led to tensions culminating in war.
Brian Holden Reid	Takes the view that that the Southern people were hated by the Northerners. The Southern approach was defensive and many saw secession as an alternative to war.
Allan Nevins	Believes that the moral issues associated with slavery were the catalyst for Civil War.
Kenneth Stampp	Takes the view that slavery was the prime cause of the Civil War.

Question 32 How fully does **Source D** explain the consequences of the Emancipation Proclamation?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The Emancipation Proclamation heightened the possibility of slave insurrection across the South, which distracted Confederate officials and lowered morale in the rebel armies.	Claims that the Emancipation Proclamation lowered the morale of the Confederate forces as they feared the threat of a slave rebellion.
Once Lincoln publicly defined the war as a conflict between freedom and slavery, any chance of European aid to the Confederacy vanished.	Highlights that this ended the potential European recognition of the Confederacy and therefore European support.
However, by emancipating the Confederacy's slaves as a war measure – and not as an act of justice towards the Negro – Lincoln subordinated the ideal of freedom to the preservation of the Union.	Claims that as a war aim rather than a moral decision, Lincoln undermined the notion of liberty in his decision.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Lincoln argued that 'freedom has given us the control of 200,000 able-bodied men, born and raised on Southern soil. It will give us more yet. Just so much has it subtracted from the strength of our enemies'. Indeed, there were 179,000 Blacks in the Union armies at the end of the war, most of whom were former slaves
- Britain could not be seen to recognise a nation that supported slavery, despite the benefits the Confederacy brought to Britain
- the Emancipation Proclamation had no effect on slavery in Union slave states. September 1862 – no slave had been liberated. The British Prime Minister Palmerston was critical, as was the world's media
- Lincoln barely mentioned the Emancipation Proclamation in his annual address to Congress in December 1862 – many questioned this.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Lincoln turned the war into a revolution with the Emancipation Proclamation
- emancipation boosted Northern morale, adding a humanitarian ideal as well as a preservation of the Union to the war effort
- Lincoln was now assured of the support of radical Republicans in Congress
- the Emancipation Proclamation destroyed the Northern pro-war coalition. Conservative Republicans withdrew their support for a period. War Democrats did not approve
- the Emancipation Proclamation only freed slaves in select geographical areas. Emancipation depended on the advance of Union armies. Freedom did not reach many blacks until well after the end of the war
- Kentuckians resisted the Proclamation fiercely, even keeping 65,000 slaves captive while challenging the decision legally
- Lincoln described the Emancipation Proclamation as 'an act of justice' as well as 'military necessity'
- the Proclamation meant that the Confederacy could no longer look for a peace settlement if it insisted on retaining slavery
- the black recruitment came at a critical point in the war as whites were less willing to volunteer and, in 1864 when 100,000 whites did not re-enlist, the 125,000 blacks were essential to the end of the war
- an eighth of Union troops around Petersburg were black. This was critical to the strategy of 'Total War'

- the Emancipation Proclamation required Republicans to pass a constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery as the Proclamation lacked the necessary force in legal terms
- in the 1862 elections, the Republicans lost control of five states and 35 congressional seats.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
James Randall and David Donald	Take the view that the war took a new turn as a result of the Proclamation.
James Rawley	Takes the view that the Emancipation Proclamation widened the war's purpose.
Benjamin Quarles	Takes the view that blacks entered at time of real shortage, swung war in favour of Union.
James McPherson	Takes the view that the Proclamation was more important than Congressional Acts; black enlistment was one of the most important acts of the war. The turning point theory; victories of 1864–1865 unachievable without blacks.

Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

Part A – Historical issues

Question 33 How far was the elimination of the Shoguns between 1868 and 1869 the decisive step towards achieving a centralised state?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse the extent to which a centralised state was established after 1868. This might include an overview of the political reform that took place as the new Meiji regime transformed the autonomous Han system into prefectures, and then established a centralised government to oversee these prefectures. Candidates might discuss the development of a centralised sense of national identity. Candidates may begin by giving an overview of the decentralised system as it existed under the Shogun to allow evaluation of the extent to which it was transformed. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions regarding the extent to which Japan became a centralised state.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Japan, prior to 1868, was a decentralised state

- details about the decentralised system of government prior to 1868
- reform was essential because the Tokugawa only had direct control over 25% of the country
- introduced a decentralised form of government through the division of Japan into Han, and the careful positioning of Daimyo
- control structures such as the caste structure and orthodoxy associated with Neo-Confucianism used to underpin decentralised system
- system based upon loyalty and trust – although this was waning by mid-19th century
- Tempo Reforms highlighted the weakness of the decentralised form of government
- Japanese people were also divided by differences in dialect and their strong ties to their village and neighbourhoods, where often their families had lived for centuries.

Evidence which may support the view that there was progress towards a more centralised state after 1868

- 1869 – beginnings of abolition of caste structure, which allowed for all peoples to be answerable to the emperor and his representatives, as opposed to the next social grouping above them in the caste structure
- 1871 – abolition of the Daimyo's domains and their replacement by prefectures. This effectively all came under the control of the emperor (and eventually the new government), and allowed the new Meiji regime to implement centralised policies and reforms. They were also able to collect taxes directly from all parts of Japan – something the Tokugawa had not been able to do
- generally, Daimyo accepted posts as governors of their former domains and their retirement was on comfortable pensions
- 1889 – the government promulgated the Imperial Japanese constitution. Drawing on the Prussian model, it set in place a two-house chamber – the House of Peers and House of Representatives – which consolidated central control over Japan
- barely 1% of the population were able to vote – so, although centralised, active participation was not encouraged
- these two houses had the power to pass laws, approve the budget and discuss national policy – which all highlights the huge step away from the decentralised system of government that had existed prior to 1868
- basic aim was the centralised control of Japan in the theoretical absolute, if symbolic, sovereign power in the hands of the emperor, and actual political power in the hands of the ruling elite who acted as his advisors
- what took precedence was the right of the nation – not the individual – which consolidated the centralisation process
- political centralisation was focused on the emperor – the new constitution stressed the duties of the subject rather than the rights of the citizen

- according to Article 11, the emperor assumed centralised control of the army and navy, had the power to appoint the prime minister, cabinet members, military chiefs of staff and other senior advisors
- Meiji regime worked hard to combat parochialism and secure popular identity with a newly-centralised Japan
- national political parties were established, drawing support from all of Japan, highlighting establishment of a centralised state
- suppression of political parties calling for greater democracy by state evidence of their centralised powers (contrast with Tokugawa failure to implement Tempo Reforms).

Evidence which may support the view that there were limitations with regard to the centralisation process

- politically, Meiji were successful at establishing a centralised state
- however, there was not a dramatic transformation in the lives of the majority within Japan, the peasants, and they often continued to identify largely with their local village
- within the new constitution there was a separation of powers between the monarchy, the Privy Council, the legislature of the House of Peers and House of Representatives
- military chief of staff answerable only to the emperor, not the main centralised political institutions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Janet Hunter	Argues that the Meiji Constitution did not create a unified nation under an absolute emperor, nor a parliamentary democracy, but a series of major groupings, each of which could utilise the imperial position to impose its policies on the rest of the population. Believes that the acts of political centralisation carried out after 1868 were aimed at building a united nation capable of withstanding the western threat. For that purpose it was imperative that the fragmentation and divisions of the Bakufu era be replaced by a substantive unity, at least in the face presented to the outside world.
Ian Buruma	Challenges the idea that any sense of national unity came from political reform. National unity was armed unity. National education was military education. The samurai virtues were now applied nationally. Loyalty and obedience to the emperor, who was paraded around the country in military uniform, was the highest form of patriotism.
Mikisko Hane	Cites that the new political leaders were confronted with formidable tasks. They had to end Tokugawa feudal order and establish a tightly-controlled centralised government.
John Benson and Takao Matsumura	Highlight that ‘criticism of the shogun developed eventually into a coherent – and near revolutionary – programme which involved overthrowing the shogun’s regime and replacing it with a government headed by the emperor, around whom a renewed sense of national unity would be developed’.

Question 34 How successful were the educational reforms of the Meiji era?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate the success of the educational reforms that occurred after 1868. Candidates might explore the nature of the reforms themselves, how they illustrate the backlash against perceived excessive westernisation after 1890 and how education was manipulated by the state to develop loyalty and subservience to the emperor and the state. Candidates may also make the link between the need for an educated workforce to help Japan modernise and achieve equality with the West. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions regarding the success of educational reform.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the educational changes were successful

Success at lifting literacy rates and creating an educated workforce

- Meiji regime was able to build upon a solid foundation of relatively high rates of literacy
- initially, education reform was highly influenced by the West
- influence of missionary schools, which particularly influenced the education of girls
- western works of literature translated into Japanese in early Meiji era
- Ministry of Education set up in 1871, which restructured primary, secondary and tertiary sectors along western lines
- influenced by the Iwakura Mission – and especially the French system
- key figures of Motada Eifu, who played an important role in shaping the direction of Japanese education, Inoue Kowashi, who established a private academy, and Mori Arinori, who was minister of Education from 1885 until his assassination in 1889 (because some believed his reforms were too Western)
- universities established – 1897 second university (after Tokyo) established at Kyoto
- education was used as a vehicle to modernise Japan with a new ideal while still retaining an identity with the cultural past
- improvements in education provision were also essential to create an educated workforce for Japan to embark on the rapid process of modernisation and industrialisation
- Japanese people had greater accessibility to the new ideas and new techniques.

Success at promoting nationalism

- Imperial Rescript of Education – 30 October 1890 – and its role in directing schools to place more emphasis on moral education, developing a sense of nationalism and loyalty to their emperor
- education was a primary agent in the Cultural Revolution
- the divine position of the emperor is greatly exploited within the Imperial Rescript to enforce a compliant attitude and unquestioning sense of responsibility towards the Japanese state
- Japanese people defined as subjects of an absolute monarch rather than citizens in a democratic state
- Neo-Confucianist notions of loyalty and filial piety obvious in the Rescript.

Evidence which may support the view that there were limitations to the success of the educational changes

With regard to lifting literacy rates and creating an educated workforce

- the impact of the educational reforms was somewhat limited until the abolition of school fees in 1899. Took until 1909 for 100% of boys and girls to attend primary school
- educational reforms highly focused on the education of boys. Girls did not have access to education beyond the compulsory four years until 1899, when at least one girls' high school was set up within each prefecture
- universities remained accessible only to males.

With regard to promoting nationalism

- concern that early educational reforms were becoming too westernised by the 1890s

- educational reforms reflect the division that existed within Japanese society towards excessive westernisation – and the hybrid nature of the reform process – and caused division at times
- educational reforms led to the assassination of Arinori – dividing rather than uniting opinion.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Storry	Contends that ‘the progress of education moulded the people into a nation of patriots . . . The government needed literate soldiers, factory workers, business employees and government employees to achieve its goal of enriching the nation and challenging the Unequal Treaties’.
William Beasley	Argues that ‘the Rescript was condemning the indiscriminate emulation of western ways’.
Janet Hunter	Believes that ‘The prime objective of the (education) structure was the needs of the state and its main goals were the provision of skills and patriotic morality among the many to produce a literate and pliable workforce’.
John Benson and Takao Matsumara	Summarises that education, ‘it is said, has been the chief tool in shaping national identity’.

Question 35 'Recent historians have drawn attention to the indispensable part played by the Zaibatsu in Japan's economic advance.'

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the undoubtedly important role that the huge vertical monopolies, the Zaibatsu, played in industrial development. Candidates might go on to discuss the other factors which aided the initial establishment of these factories, such as the economic foundations of the Tokugawa, the role of the West government support, the role of women and the role of World War I. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions on the role played by the Zaibatsu in Japan's economic advance.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the role of Zaibatsu was indispensable

- government favouritism resulted in the development of huge monopolistic concerns
- from the 1880s onwards, Zaibatsu began to dominate manufacturing and commercial activities
- most had their own bank
- some concentrated on certain fields; others embraced a range of activities
- by the early 20th century, control was becoming a problem
- these huge conglomerates were led by four giants – Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda
- the Mitsubishi conglomerate controlled 25% of shipping and shipbuilding, 15% of coal and metals, 16% of bank loans, 50% of flour milling, 59% of sheet glass, 35% of sugar and 15% of cotton textiles
- the Zaibatsu developed networks of foreign contacts and gathered information in order to sell and purchase a wide variety of goods abroad
- the Zaibatsu became influential in politics – so powerful that they could not be ignored.

Evidence which may support the view that foundations laid pre-1868 were indispensable

- highly developed agriculture with inter-regional trade
- good communication infrastructure to build upon
- Japan had an abundance of well-educated and loyal human labour
- growth of commercial activities around castle towns
- growing influence of merchants – blurring of caste divisions
- movement away from rice-based to money-based economy already occurring
- contact with the Dutch.

Evidence which may support the view that the role of westerners and international environment were indispensable

- the effects of the Unequal Treaties in promoting industrial development – Japan's desire to be accepted as an equal
- Iwakura Mission
- the international environment led to Japan expanding and adopting new industrial technologies, which helped Japan to catch up
- cultural borrowing like shipbuilding, iron and steel mills, banking and commerce, textiles (positive impact of silkworm disease in Europe)
- use of Yatoi.

Evidence which may support the view that the role of the government was indispensable

- role of state in process and policies they implemented – built model factories such as Tomioka silk-reeling mill
- careful control of Yatoi – dismissed once their knowledge was disseminated
- military reform and connection with industrial expansion
- government had limited reliance on foreign loans. They took firm control over expenditure – partial funding of large-scale private enterprises and support for Zaibatsu
- their improvements in infrastructure.

Evidence which may support the view that the role of women was indispensable

- freed up by the abolition of the caste structure, women became the dominant workforce within the textile industry
- throughout this period, women consistently formed the majority of the workforce within Japanese factories
- often paid a high price for this in terms of their working conditions and the physical and emotional impact
- women were often sold into contracts with factories by their parents, and lived in dorms attached to the factories
- yet at the same time, the accepted view of women was still to be 'good wives and wise mothers'
- often when women married, they left the factories
- small numbers of women went from textile workers and domestic service to become typists, telephone operators and store assistants
- took until 1911 to limit their working day to 12 hours
- women continued to play a vital role in agriculture, which throughout the Meiji period still remained Japan's most important commercial activity. They were the dominant workforce in the paddy fields.

Evidence which may support the view that the role of World War I was indispensable

- gained a foothold in Asian market – merchant shipping doubled
- ending of imports from the West forced development, especially in the chemical industry
- Japan reversed balance of payments deficit during the war years.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Edwin Reischauer	Suggests that 'The great wealth and broad base of the combines (Zaibatsu) enabled them to finance promising new fields in the economy and thus increase their share in its fast-growing industrial sector'.
Georgia Macpherson	Suggests that the role of the government was crucial.
Waturu Hiromatso	Takes the view that the foundations of Japan's modernisation were to a large extent laid during the years of peaceful isolation.
Mikiso Hane	Highlights the importance of the textile industry – within which women formed the dominant workforce. The industry that developed rapidly from the early Meiji years and remained a key component of the economy was textile manufacture . . . by 1904 it had become the world's largest producer, with a 31% share. Argues that modernisation would depend heavily on the adoption of western science, technology and industrialisation.

Question 36 To what extent do the military reforms explain why Japan had defeated China by 1895?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to consider the relative importance of a range of factors in the emergence of Japan as the leading Asian nation by 1895. The key question candidates should address is how Japan was able to conduct such a successful foreign policy. This can partly be explained by internal factors which encouraged its military might, and partly by how it 'managed' two foreign policy incidents. Candidates may discuss the Formosa Incident and events during the war itself – discussion of these points is central to the debate. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions as to why Japan successfully destabilised and dominated China by 1895.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that military reform was important

- military and naval reforms that took place were moulded from the French, then German for the army, and British for the navy
- the introduction of conscription in 1873 – three-year service for 20-year-old men, followed by four years subsequent service in the army reserve with exemption from conscription being very limited
- schools of artillery and engineering trained officers in the technology of modern warfare. Reform of public finances made it feasible to increase spending on the armed forces. One-third of government revenue was devoted to developing a modern army and navy
- army was made almost an autonomous entity – being answerable only to the emperor. Military leaders wielded significant political power because they were members of the ruling oligarchy.

Evidence which may support the view that success in the Formosa Incident, leading to a power shift in favour of Japan, was important

- the process leading to eventual defeat was a gradual one, which began with the Formosa Incident. In September 1871, Japan concluded a commercial treaty with China establishing equal trading rights, low tariffs and consular jurisdiction to operate in both countries
- however, tension mounted over the Ryukyu Islands and events served to illustrate the shifting balance of power away from Japan to China
- from 1871, Japanese governments made moves aimed at incorporating the islands into their national administrative framework
- this was strongly contested by China, who claimed ownership. Late in 1871, 54 Ryukyuan fishermen were shipwrecked on Formosa (Taiwan)
- they were killed by Formosan aborigines. The Japanese government claimed them as nationals and demanded compensation from China. China refused. Japan sent an expedition to the Ryukyuan Islands (to assert their ownership)
- in May 1874, a further 3,500 Japanese troops landed in Formosa. In October, after negotiations, Japanese troops withdrew. China paid the indemnity. Japan's receipt of compensation and China's failure to condemn the Japanese action signified in western international law that the Ryukyuan were Japanese citizens. The islands including Formosa were formally conceded in 1879. This incident demonstrated the weakness of China and growing strength of Japan.

Evidence which may support the view that military and strategic events during the war which contributed to Japanese victory were important

- Japan was to formally replace China as the leading Asian nation through military defeat. War was centred over Korea
- during the early decades of the Meiji, China maintained a strong influence in Korea
- July 1882 – anti-Japanese riots in Seoul (Korea) which forced Japanese to flee
- troops were sent to Korea from both Japan and China – which marked direct Japanese intervention in the internal affairs of Korea
- negotiations aimed at settling the problem resulted in the April 1885 Treaty of Tianjin
- Japan and China agreed to withdraw their troops. In 1894, Chinese troops were sent to Korea in response to the king's request for help against a domestic rebellion
- acting under the terms of the 1885 Treaty, Japan also sent troops. Both parties refused to withdraw

- in July 1894, Japan sunk a British ship chartered to carry Chinese reinforcements
- fighting escalated. By the end of 1894, Japanese troops had driven Chinese troops from Korean soil. They were advancing through Manchuria, threatening Tianjin and Beijing
- by 1895 the Chinese navy had been virtually annihilated
- Japan agreed to a request for peace conference
- the Treaty was signed on 17 April and the terms of the Treaty included Japanese possession of Formosa, Pescadores Islands and the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria
- the opening by China of four more treaty ports
- payment of a sizeable indemnity. A separate Treaty of Commerce and Navigation awarded Japan the most favoured nation treatment in China – all of which highlighted the extent to which Japan now dominated China.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Janet Hunter	Argues that 'As Japan's strength grew, so did her ambitions on the Asian mainland and her ability to advance them'.
Sheldon Harris	Suggests that extending Japanese power and influence on the continent of Asia was part of a larger vision.
William Beasley	Contends that Japanese leaders of almost all shades and opinion wanted to draw Korea into the Japanese orbit.
Kenneth Henshall	Highlights that Japan proved superior both on land and sea, but the most decisive element was its superiority in naval tactics, which were modelled on the British.

Question 37 How significant was the impact of the First World War on Japan?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to examine the impact of the First World War on Japan, considering factors such as territorial expansion, economic impact and international perceptions. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions regarding the impact of the First World War on Japan.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the First World War had an impact on Japan

Territory

- Japan joined the conflict on the winning side, acquiring Germany's Chinese sphere of influence in Shantung, extending its control of Manchuria
- Japan tried to further extend its influence over China during the First World War with the 21 Demands in 1915. If achieved, these demands would have essentially reduced China to a Japanese protectorate. Clear evidence of the increasing confidence of Japan.

Economically

- from 1915, Japanese industry underwent considerable expansion because it was able to capture markets from European powers actively involved in the war, for example the Indian markets for textiles that had been dominated by Lancashire products before 1914
- there was an expansion of other Japanese industries, such as shipbuilding and heavy industries, which had previously been flooded with European-produced products
- Japanese industry also responded to the insatiable demands of the Allies for war materials and other industrial goods. The resulting trade was valuable to the Allies and profitable to Japan
- exports quadrupled from 1913 to 1918
- Japan lost only five naval vessels during the course of the war, out of a total of 150
- Japan emerged on the winning side in 1918 virtually as a non-combatant and without having incurred any of the costs of war, unlike Britain and America
- Japan took over trade routes in Asia that had been dominated by western powers prior to the war. The number of merchant ships dramatically increased over the period of the First World War, from 488 in 1900 to 2,996 by 1920.

International perceptions

- the war also confirmed Japan's position as a westernised nation by participating in the Paris Peace Conference
- Japan became a council member of the new League of Nations in 1920.

Evidence which may support the view that the impact of the First World War on Japan was limited

- the international economy was also very unstable after the war and Japan was forced to trade in a very uncertain political world
- the growth that had taken place had only been possible because of the absence of competition, and on the return to peace, Japanese industry suffered severe dislocation
- not all workers benefited equally as wages had not risen as fast as prices; high food prices led to Rice Riots in 1918
- Japan's desire for racial equality clause as part of League of Nations' Charter was not accepted
- although Japan maintained control of the former German Mariana Islands, it was through a League Mandate rather than outright ownership.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Kenneth Pyle	Contends that 'the outbreak of WW1 in Europe in the summer of 1914 provided extraordinary opportunities to advance the twin objectives of empire and industry'.
Richard Storry	Highlights that during this period 'it was not long before Japan became a creditor instead of a debtor among the nations'.
Ayira Iriye	Argues that 'the Japanese were rewarded for their involvement in the war by 'being invited to the peace conference, the first time Japan attended a conference as a fully-fledged member'.
Janet Hunter	Suggests that 'the Anglo-Japanese Alliance provided them with the excuse to enter the war, but the real motivation was to take over the German concessions in China'.

Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840–1920

Part B – Historical sources

Question 38 How fully does **Source A** explain the traditional nature of Japanese society in 1850?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . Japanese continued to live and work in structures as predictable and carefully defined as their social rank . . .	Identifies some of the key members of Japanese society – the Samurai, the peasant, the craftsmen and the merchant.
Manufacturing consisted mainly of weaving, pottery and metalwork, performed skilfully . . .	Describes the foundations of industrial development that existed in 1850 – weaving, pottery, metalwork.
People and their freight travelled by small sailing ships between coastal towns, or moved by palanquin, packhorse, or foot along the traditional highways.	Suggests that traditional methods of transport were still being used.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Tokugawa Shoguns had implemented a strict caste structure after they secured control in 1603, which dictated everyone's place in society and, in theory, prevented any mobility between castes
- the Samurai and peasants were two of the important castes: the former were individual warriors tied to a daimyo who were responsible for maintaining law and order; the latter were responsible for producing Japan's staple food source and form of currency – rice
- although the physical infrastructure was developing as a result of 'Alternate Attendance', traditional methods of transport powered by humans or water were largely used.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- although the Shogun, based in Edo, held real political power, the Tokugawa kept the emperor as the nominal figurehead of this social structure, in an attempt to legitimise their rule
- the source fails to mention the daimyo, the landowners, who were so crucial within the Tokugawa social structure and control mechanisms
- these were divided into those that were loyal (Fudai) and those that traditionally had not been loyal (Tozama) who were carefully controlled
- Samurai had transformed from being warriors into administrators during the period of relative peace during the Tokugawa period
- many Samurai and daimyo began to live relatively lavish lifestyles and fell into debt to the merchants – who in theory were far below them in the caste structure
- some Samurai were reduced to selling some of their privileges to pay off their debts to the merchants
- socio-economic changes also meant that rice was being replaced by money as the main currency
- society was essentially ruled through a decentralised system of government, as the Tokugawa only had direct control over 25% of the land. This was a system fundamentally based on loyalty and this loyalty was clearly waning by 1850
- source does not mention the Eta caste within the social structure
- source fails to mention the importance of Neo-Confucianism within Japanese society, along with Shintoism and Buddhism
- the source does not mention the policy of isolation that had helped shape Japanese society by 1850
- relatively high literacy rates in Japan by 1850
- the failures of the Meiji Reforms in the 1840s highlight the changes that were going on in Japanese society by 1850.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ann Waswo	States that conditions in Japan most closely resembled those of high feudalism in Europe.
Mikiso Hane	Argues that, to ensure political control and social stability, the Tokugawa bakufu set out to fix a rigid class system.
Janet Hunter	States that a rigid hierarchy of hereditary caste continued to prevail both in theory and, to a large extent, in practice.
Richard Storry	Highlights the blurring of caste divisions that were occurring by the mid-19 th century: 'The whole regime had been under indirect attack for many quarters inside Japan long before 1850.'

Question 39 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source B** as evidence of the significance of the part played by foreign forces in the downfall of the Tokugawa in 1868.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that they provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source B		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	Iwakura Tomomi	It is a correspondence between two leading members of the new Meiji regime, Iwakura was so important that he went on to lead the Iwakura Mission to the West to try and deal with the issue of the threat from the West. He was highly critical of the Tokugawa's handling of the threatened western incursion. Clearly highlights the political division Perry's arrival created.
Purpose	Memo to Sanjo Sanetomi	Purpose was to highlight the inadequacies of the Tokugawa regime, written from the perspective of one of the individuals involved in toppling that regime.
Timing	1869	Written within 12 months of the collapse of the Tokugawa regime and within the context of a Civil War between Tokugawa and Meiji supporters.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
. . . it was not addressed whether this was good for the country or bad and among their numerous failings was deceiving the Imperial Court . . .	Claims that the Tokugawa failed to consider if the way they handled foreign relations was really good for the country and it misled the Imperial Court about what it was doing and how it was doing it. Quite a pointed criticism of his own government's actions.
. . . revising the unfair trade treaties . . .	Maintains that the trade treaties were viewed as unfair and in need of revision. Japan couldn't keep its independence unless these treaties (which had been forced on them) were revised because they gave a reason for the foreign aggressors to stay. If that wasn't dealt with, that might lead to the fall of the government.
Currently, foreign countries' troops have landed in our ports and they show no sign of leaving and these treaties are a mere cover for the use of imperialist force.	Argues that the foreign threat instilled fear in the Tokugawa, because they didn't have the ability to take effective action against the foreigners. The source is taking a pessimistic view about the consequences of the involvement of foreign forces.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the arrival of Commodore Perry carrying his letter from President Fillmore threw the Tokugawa bakufu into turmoil. It highlighted their breakdown in control and their great sense of inertia in making a decision. They approached the Imperial Court for advice (a highly significant move), and then completely disregarded the view of the emperor. Such disregard for the emperor's view served to increase popularity for movements like the Sonno-Joi
- the lack of a standing army made it very difficult for the Tokugawa to withstand the pressure of the West, especially considering that Perry arrived with considerable force and a large proportion of the US navy
- the Treaties brought with them a profound sense of shame upon the proud Japanese, who had long tried to isolate themselves and heavily control any relations with the West, and believed that they were superior to them. The Tokugawa were held responsible for this and seen to have lost their mandate to rule in the name of the emperor.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- 14 years pass between the signing of the first Unequal Treaty and the downfall of the Tokugawa, which suggests that to attribute the downfall of the Tokugawa to the role of the West is too simplistic
- despite the policy of isolation, Japan had managed to maintain successful relations with the Dutch during the Tokugawa period
- there were also inherent weaknesses of the decentralised government already apparent before the arrival of Perry, as illustrated by the failure of the Tempō Reforms
- socio-economic changes were also weakening important forms of social control during the Tokugawa – especially the caste structure
- daimyo and Samurai were falling into debt to the merchants because of their increasingly lavish lifestyles
- increasing burden of taxation upon the peasants led to an increase in their discontent and incidents of riots
- control mechanisms were rooted in rice as the stable currency – which was being replaced by money by the mid-19th century
- Tokugawa bakufu were suffering from a sense of inertia in responding to these changes – and only had direct control over 25% of the land
- in 1868 there was an important alliance between two leading opponents, Satsuma and Chōshū, against the Tokugawa
- age of new emperor (15) meant he was open to exploitation
- the nationalist school of thought that had been growing since the late-18th century was gaining momentum and culminated in the extreme men of Shishi.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Rebecca Wall	Contends that the arrival of Perry in July 1853 brought the whole complicated debate to a head.
Richard Storry	Argues that 'The Tokugawa system might have continued essentially unchanged had it not been for the forcible opening of the closed door'.
Thomas Huber	Argues that it was Perry's arrival which finally made it possible for serious reformers in Chōshū and elsewhere to convert their theoretical understanding into an urgent demand for change.
Harold Bolitho	Highlights that 'in the country the authority of the Shogun and Daimyo alike was successfully flouted'.

Question 40 How much do **Sources C** and **D** reveal about differing interpretations regarding the extent of the authority of the emperor within the new Meiji Government?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The Emperor is the head of the Empire . . .	Emperor is stressed as the head of the empire with all the powers of a sovereign – an interpretation stating that the emperor is to play a pivotal role within the new Meiji Government.
. . . all the different legislative as well as executive powers of state . . . are united in this Most Exalted Personage.	This interpretation of an all-powerful political figurehead is further strengthened by stating he has power over all legislative and executive powers of the state, including responsibility for issuing the new constitution.
. . . this power shall always be exercised with the consent of the Diet.	However, Article V of the Meiji constitution, states the emperor has to get the consent of the Diet and therefore his powers can in theory be restrained – a contradiction, open to exploitation – but supports the interpretation of the facade of democracy that the new regime was trying to present to the West.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the emperor's position was legally established by the Meiji Constitution, promulgated in 1889, instigated the following year, which declared his inviolability and allowed him theoretical wide-ranging powers
- the emperor had the right to declare war, make peace, conclude treaties and adjourn the Diet
- the Constitution was produced by the new Meiji oligarchy in the name of the emperor. Theoretically the emperor had powers, but did not really exploit them during the Meiji and Taisho years. Real decision-making power lay with the Meiji oligarchy.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
After his gracious bestowal of the constitution, the Emperor's relation to politics was maintained in public on a strictly ceremonial level.	Presents a different interpretation of the role of the emperor within the new Meiji Government, with the author arguing the powers of emperor were strictly ceremonial, for example the opening of the Diet – he did not actually exercise much direct power himself.
He . . . met with his ministers . . . and spoke . . . in infrequent rescripts that expressed his government's will . . .	Acknowledges that meetings occurred between the emperor and the new ministers and his name appeared on political rescripts – which marked a change from Tokugawa times.
. . . he did not decide anything by himself . . .	Argues that although meetings occurred, the emperor did not decide anything for himself, despite being described as believing in principles of progress.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- ceremonial position of emperor reinforced by Imperial Rescript in Education
- Charter Oath of 1868 proclaimed by the emperor – yet was really the product of Kido Koin
- authority lay with the clan leaders from Satsuma and Choshu who led the rebellion against the Tokugawa regime

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- source offers two contrasting interpretations about the power distribution – the first emphasising the power of the emperor, the second challenging these assertions (provenance can explain this)
- emperor had theoretical powers, but the Meiji and Taisho emperors rarely exploited these, and they were largely puppet rulers
- significance of age of Emperor Meiji, modest and conscientious leader, decrees issued in name only
- undoubtedly the emperor's symbolic role was crucial to permit the Meiji oligarchy to push through their unprecedented rate of rapid reform in his name – that of a living deity
- real power lay with prime ministers and other politicians – elected by only a tiny percentage of the population.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Marius Jansen	Argues that 'A modernising elite had emerged; the power lay with this oligarchy'. And that 'Restoration leaders kept the court at the centre of national identity and that emphasis diffused amidst the population as a means of control'.
Richard Storry	Establishes that 'The nominal head of the new government in Tokyo was a court noble but the real controllers of power were men from much more junior rank from the western clans'.
William Beasley	Contends that 'The Emperor's importance as a source of legitimacy for the Meiji leadership has never been in doubt'. To the Meiji leaders he was 'useful as a symbol and occasionally as a weapon of last resort'.
Rebecca Wall	Establishes that 'At first the new government made a show of being open; soon, however, power was concentrated in the powers of the samurai from the western han'.

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

Part A – Historical issues

Question 41 How valid is the view that there was nothing more than a revolutionary situation in Germany in 1918–1919?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the nature of what historians call the German Revolution. Candidates might opt to discuss the extent to which there was a revolutionary situation rather than merely war weariness; the degree of change during 1918–1919; and whether or not the degree of change merits the label ‘revolution’. Or candidates might opt to weigh up aspects of change during 1918–1919 against each another. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions about the German Revolution.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that there was a revolutionary situation in 1918–1919 but not a revolution

Prince Max attempted to preserve the old regime as far as possible

- Max von Baden’s October Reforms had changed Germany from a military dictatorship into a parliamentary monarchy
- the October Reforms were not enough to stop popular unrest as expressed in mutinies at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, strikes, riots, and the setting up of soviets across the country
- on 9 November, Baden forced the Kaiser to abdicate; a republic was declared and power was handed to Ebert and the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
- on 15 November, industrialists and trade unionists agreed to create a Central Working Association which established the principle of workers’ rights, trade union negotiating rights with binding arbitration on disputes, and an eight-hour day. However, the structure of the economy remained unchanged – Capitalism was left intact
- the judiciary and the civil service remained unreformed.

Ebert attempted to create a moderate revolution

- Ebert set up a provisional government – the Council of People’s Commissars – made up of three men from the SPD and three from the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD)
- on 10 November, Ebert struck a deal with Groener (the new head of the army) which left the army officer corps intact and the army un-purged in return for army support for the new government. As a result, an opportunity for radical change was missed. The military elite were left in a strong position to undermine the republic
- in December 1918, the USPD left the government because they felt the revolution was stalling under Ebert’s leadership
- Ebert’s moderate position was challenged by Spartacists (and other radical socialists) who argued that he was stopping the revolutionary impetus which defeat had set in motion
- in December 1918, the National Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils voted to support Ebert’s preference for elections to a Constituent Assembly, thereby endorsing his moderate position.

Social revolutionaries attempted a Bolshevik-style revolution

- in January 1919, the German Communists attempted to initiate a Bolshevik-style revolution, but this uprising was crushed by the SPD government using the army and the *Freikorps*. The government’s action permanently alienated the Communists from the SPD.

Evidence which may support the view that there was not a revolutionary situation, but simply widespread, diverse discontent

- discontent due to war weariness
- mutiny of the High Seas Fleet due to futility of risking lives
- relatively little support for Communism

- Workers' Councils were not particularly revolutionary
- fragmented nature of discontent
- effects of Spanish flu and food shortages.

Evidence which may support the view that the events of 1918–1919 were more than just a revolutionary situation and amounted to a full-blown revolution

Government

- although Ebert made a deal with the army, this was pragmatic and in no sense meant that Germany was not to be a democracy
- keeping the judges and the top civil servants in post was a practical necessity intended to protect the gains made in the revolution by ensuring that the government of the country could continue to function rather than collapse.

Economy

- although the industry had not been taken over by the state on behalf of the people, Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft (ZAG) was a revolutionary change – not least because it meant that for the first time in Germany there was a radical shift of power away from industrialists to trade unions and the workers.

Constitution

- on 9 November, Germany became a republic. This was a radical change in the country's political identity – a truly revolutionary change
- just as important, the rulers of the German states also disappeared so the new Germany was radically different in form from the Germany of 1914
- the Constitution of August 1919 embedded the changes Ebert had overseen – it was a revolutionary document because it meant that the republic and the democratic system were now enshrined in law.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
William Carr	Takes the view that the achievements of the revolution were undoubtedly limited. The structure of Germany was hardly affected by the revolution. The spirit of Imperial Germany lived on in the unreformed civil service, the judiciary and the officer corps. Nor did the powerful industrial barons have much to fear from the revolution.
Ruth Henig	Takes the view that the revolution did not result in the wholesale removal of the existing economic or social structures. A Marxist revolution had been prevented and the forces of reaction and strident nationalism made a swift recovery and emerged by 1920 as the most potent enemies of the new republic.
Eberhard Kolb	Takes the view that the revolutionary mass movement was essentially a failure, both in its moderate phase and in its second radical phase – 'a revolution that ran aground, and one with which none of the main political groups wished to be identified. Scarcely anyone in Germany had wanted the revolution to develop and come to stop in the way it did'.
Detlev Peukert	Takes the view that Ebert's decisions from 9 November 1918 to 19 January 1919 signalled that the revolution was to be confined to constitutional and corporatist measures. The existence of a democratic tradition in Germany before the revolution, and the complexity of Germany's industrial and social structure 'meant that any radical break with the past was impossible'.

Question 42 'The Treaty of Versailles lay at the root of the instability faced by the German government between 1919 and 1923.'

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the impact of the Treaty of Versailles on people's attitude towards democracy and the republic. Candidates might opt to look at the way in which resentment of Versailles eroded people's faith in the republic and weigh up the impact of Versailles against other factors which undermined faith in the republic. Or candidates might opt to examine different aspects of the Treaty and weigh up the impact of each against the other(s) on faith in the republic. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the Treaty of Versailles lay at the root of the instability faced by the German government between 1919–1923

Political

- the Treaty created a deep and widespread resentment that was then aimed at the republic and the democrats who had accepted it
- there were strong objections to the territorial and military terms of the Treaty and this lost support for the republic among the traditional elites
- clause 231 – the 'War Guilt' clause – was regarded by Germans as humiliating
- by accepting the Treaty – even though it had no choice but to do so – the newly-elected democratic government was blamed for Germany's humiliation
- the Treaty became a focus for right-wing nationalist opposition to the republic and to democracy
- resentment of the Treaty enabled conservatives and extreme nationalists such as the Nazis to argue that democracy was un-German, and that parliamentarianism weak and ineffectual, and a foreign imposition.

Economic

- Germany's economic crisis in 1923 was also blamed directly on the Treaty, especially the reparations clauses, and therefore on the republic and democracy
- reparations were viewed as little more than an attempt to destroy Germany.

Evidence which may contradict the view that Versailles lay at the root of the instability faced by the German government between 1919–1923

Political

- continuous coalition government from 1919, and the fact that voters were not voting for constituency MPs but rather for people on a party list, helped to erode trust between the voters and the Reichstag.

Economic

- the hyperinflation crisis of 1923 caused widespread anger and frustration with the government. Collapse of confidence in the currency was very damaging for confidence in the democratic system.

Violence

- political violence and instability, 1919–1923, which often had little to do with the Versailles Treaty, frightened people and made them uncertain about democracy's ability to maintain law and order
- Ebert's use of the *Freikorps* to crush the Spartacists in January 1919 created a permanent alienation from democracy among Communists
- KPD's attacks on democracy frightened the middle and business classes; they feared democracy would not be able to hold back Communism.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard J Evans	Takes the view that Versailles was only one reason for the republic's weakness. The republic was beset by insurmountable problems of political violence, assassination and irreconcilable conflicts about its right to exist. It was unloved and undefended by its servants in the army and bureaucracy . . . it had to face enormous economic problems . . .
Martin Collier and Phillip Pedley	Take the view that hatred of the Treaty and the 'stab in the back myth' peddled by the anti-republican right, undermined support for the republic and the parties who were involved in its creation.
Ruth Henig	Takes the view that Versailles meant that the parties of the moderate left and centre found themselves increasingly on the defensive against nationalists and supporters of the former regime. The Treaty was a significant factor in the recovery of right-wing and anti-democratic political forces from 1919.
Stephen Lee	Takes the view that the Treaty set in motion influences which were to prove more damaging to the republic than the Treaty itself. Its impact was therefore indirect, but real nevertheless.

Question 43 To what extent does Stresemann's foreign policy show him to be little more than a traditional German nationalist?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the motives behind Stresemann's foreign policy. Candidates might weigh up arguments for the view that Stresemann was acting according to his instincts as a traditional German nationalist against other interpretations, such as the view that Stresemann's actions demonstrate that he truly was a 'Good European'. Or candidates might discuss Stresemann's foreign policy as containing elements of both nationalism and Europeanism. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that in his foreign policy Stresemann was a traditional German nationalist

Fulfilment of Versailles

- in a private letter to Crown Prince Wilhelm (the Kaiser's son) in September 1925, Stresemann said that the priorities for German foreign policy were to settle the reparations question in Germany's favour, to protect those Germans living under foreign rule, to readjust Germany's eastern frontiers
- in the same letter he said that German policy 'must be one of scheming' and that while he could say this in private, he had to exercise 'the utmost restraint in his public utterances'
- Stresemann pursued a policy of *erfüllungspolitik* (fulfilment) in which he complied with the terms of Versailles in order to deceive Britain and France about Germany's intentions and so encourage them to agree to revision of the Treaty
- he aimed to get revision of the reparations through the Dawes Plan (1924) and the Young Plan (1929) in order to allow Germany to build up her economic power
- he aimed to end the Ruhr and Rhineland occupations in order to gain the support of nationalist and conservative opinion in Germany.

International relations

- in the Locarno Pact (1925), Stresemann accepted that Germany's western borders should remain as agreed at Versailles but managed to have the question of Germany's eastern borders left open so that Germany could, in the future, pursue expansion in the East
- he aimed to have Germany's great power status restored and achieved this by ensuring that Germany would only agree to re-join the League of Nations if a permanent seat on the Council was secured.

Military

- in 1926 Stresemann managed to negotiate the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission that monitored Germany's compliance with the military terms of Versailles so he could begin the process of strengthening Germany's military
- the Treaty of Berlin (1926) contained secret clauses that enabled the Reichswehr to try out new weapons and to train in Soviet territory. This pleased the Reichswehr and symbolised Stresemann's determination to highlight his nationalist credentials.

Evidence which may support the view that in his foreign policy Stresemann was being 'a Good European'

Fulfilment of Versailles

- *erfüllungspolitik* still meant accepting the humiliating 'diktat' of the allies, which Stresemann did in the interests of maintaining European peace
- Stresemann did not pursue revision of reparations vigorously enough to satisfy the right. By pursuing a policy of fulfilment at all, he ensured that opposition to the republic continued unabated and that Versailles was a major focus of that opposition. He accepted this as the price of maintaining European peace
- Locarno did not allow Germany to revise the eastern borders; it only left the question of such revision open.

International relations

- recognition of Germany's great power status with a permanent seat on the League of Nations Council had less to do with Stresemann's supposedly covert nationalism and more to do with the fact that he understood that the international system could not work effectively without Germany's involvement.

Military

- Germany still could not re-arm and was still not allowed to change the demilitarisation terms of Versailles, and Stresemann did not press for these to be permitted
- Stresemann did not try to ensure that Germany would have the military power to insist on revision of the territorial terms of Versailles.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Sally Marks	Takes the view that Stresemann was a superlative liar, dispensing total untruths . . . 'He was not the Good European he appeared to be but was in reality 'a great German nationalist'. Through his foreign policy, Germany became the pre-eminent member of the European family of nations – which is what he all along intended should happen'.
Jonathan Wright	Takes the view that Stresemann felt the tension between the constraints of a responsible foreign policy and the romantic nationalism of his early career. He hoped for a stable and peaceful international order because he understood Germany's dependence on its great power partners. From his pragmatism, there developed a strong commitment to European peace.
Eberhard Kolb	Takes the view that Stresemann was a nationalist, but his 'keen sense of reality' meant that he viewed Germany's restoration and European peace as interdependent.
Stephen Lee	Takes the view that Stresemann was neither a covert nationalist nor a Good European but a pragmatist who adapted to changed times and circumstances and, where he could, created new opportunities.

Question 44 To what extent did industrialists gain most from Nazi economic policies between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the effects of Nazi economic policies and, in particular, the issue of who gained more from the Nazi economy. Candidates might weigh up the gains made by industrialists and the military against the gains made by, for example, the rural economy, small businesses, workers and the *mittelstand*. Alternatively, candidates might weigh the gains against the losses made by big business, and the gains against the losses made by other groups. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that industrialists gained most from Nazi economic policies

- industry was brought under government supervision in the interests of national unity. All firms were members of the *Reichsgruppe* for industry
- the state controlled most resources, but industry remained in private hands
- large firms had to join cartels but they expanded to meet government requirements
- from 1936, under the Four Year Plan, re-armament became the main focus of the economy. Re-armament benefited big business enormously. Firms like Krupps, IG Farben and Daimler-Benz all expanded dramatically. Heavy industry expanded almost 200% over the period 1933–1938
- new areas of business also benefited such as the motor industry, chemicals and aircraft manufacture
- big business also benefited from the attack on the labour movement. Wages were now controlled and profits, though also controlled, rose significantly
- the Nazi regime was not simply a businessman's regime but set about subordinating the independence of business to the interests of the Nazi state. During the 1930s around 300,000 small businesses disappeared.

Evidence which may support the view that the military gained the most from Nazi economic changes

- although Hitler was not able to subordinate all areas of the economy to the re-armament drive, there is no doubt that the military benefited hugely. Military expenditure went from 1% of gross national product (GNP) in 1929 to 6% in 1934, 13% in 1936 and 17% in 1938. By 1940 it had reached 38% of GNP
- the focus on re-armament meant that the military gained from the increased production of tanks, artillery, rifles, advanced weaponry, aircraft, ships and submarines.

Evidence which may support the view that the rural economy gained most from Nazi economic changes

- to begin with, the government took measures that helped peasants such as the regulation of food prices and the cancellation of some debts
- initially, protection and controlled prices also helped farmers
- arable farmers were helped via government subsidies
- the Four Year Plan helped to increase production by reducing fertiliser prices, providing subsidies for mechanisation and giving grants for the cultivation of new land
- the Reich Entailed Farm Law (1935) was designed to protect traditional small farms (about 35% of all farms in Germany). These farms could not now be sold or mortgaged and had to be passed on to one person.

Evidence which may support the view that small businesses gained most from Nazi economic changes

- the Nazi government attempted to protect small traders. The Law to protect the Retail Trade (1933) placed special taxes on large stores and banned new department stores.

Evidence which may support the view that workers gained the most from Nazi economic changes

- crucially, workers benefited from increased employment. By 1939, only 35,000 of 25 million male workers were officially unemployed

- there was a small but perceptible rise in workers' living standards
- by 1936, the average wage for a worker was 35 marks per week – ten times more than the dole money which over six million had been receiving in 1932. Average paid holidays rose from three days per year in 1933 to between six and 12 days per year in 1939
- the DAF (German Labour Front) that replaced the now-banned trade unions, provided workers with a range of facilities while the KdF (Strength through Joy) and the SdA (Beauty of Work) organisations provided leisure opportunities and better working conditions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Wolfgang Benz	Takes the view that, on the issue of unemployment, the Nazi government's success 'was dramatic'. By 1937–1938, many companies were already complaining of a shortage of workers.
Richard Grunberger	Takes the view that the attitude of German business to the regime 'was that of a conductor of a runaway bus who has no control over the actions of the driver but keeps collecting the passengers' fares right up to the final crash'.
Ian Kershaw	Takes the view that 'The crushing of the left, the free hand accorded to industry, the re-ordering of industrial relations, and in general the new political climate, formed the basis of a positive relationship between the Nazi government and big business – a relationship which became cemented by the stimulus to the economy through the work creation programme and then in growing measure by the massive profits to be derived from the armaments boom'.
Roderick Stackelberg	Takes the view that business enjoyed a privileged position, handsome profits and a considerable degree of self-management in the Third Reich, on condition that it served the political objectives of the Nazi leadership. The 'primacy of politics' was the guiding principle of Nazi economic theory and practice.

Question 45 How far does Nazi oppression explain the ineffectiveness of opposition to the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the significance of different reasons for the failure of opposition and resistance to the Nazi regime. Candidates have wide scope: they might look at a broad range of factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of opposition, or they might look in depth at two or three. Whichever route they choose candidates should make a judgement about the relative importance of the factors they have selected. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the Nazis were successful in repressing opponents and potential opposition

Legal repression

- 28 February 1933 – *Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the Nation and the State*, used to repress the KPD. By the end of March, 20,000 Communists were in prison and by summer 100,000 Communists, Social Democrats and trade unionists were in prison
- 13 March 1933 – Goebbels was appointed Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment. The Nazis now took complete control of the press, radio, cinema and all cultural output and were thereby able to prevent opposition views from being heard and to ensure the complete dominance of Nazi propaganda
- 24 March 1933 – the passing of the *Enabling Act*. Decrees could now be passed by the Cabinet (in effect Hitler) without recourse to the President, so cutting out the need for any debate
- 22 June 1934 – SPD banned; other political parties dissolved themselves soon after. Trade unions were made illegal
- 14 July 1933 – *Law Against the Formation of New Parties*. Germany became a one-party state
- 20 July 1933 – *Concordat* agreement between the state and the Vatican ensured that opposition from the Roman Catholic Church was neutered
- April 1934 – Himmler became chief of the Prussian *Gestapo*
- success of apparatus of the Nazi Police State from 1933–1939. In search of enemies of the state, the *Gestapo* was allowed to operate outside the law and take suspects into custody. Such victims were liable to be tortured and sent to concentration camps. The courts were also thoroughly Nazified and the establishment of the People's Court (April 1934) ensured that 'treasonable offences' were dealt with harshly
- the success and effectiveness of *Gleichschaltung*.

Use of terror

- 30 June 1933 – 'Night of the Long Knives' destroyed internal opposition (from the SA) and won support from the army for Hitler
- terror was highly effective as disincentive to opposition to the regime
- not all Germans went along with the regime, but the odds were stacked against them if they chose to oppose it. Although the *Gestapo* is no longer viewed by historians as the all-seeing, all-knowing organisation it used to be portrayed as, it was highly effective because of people's willingness to inform on their neighbours and the variety of agencies and institutions that worked with it
- opponents of the regime had to contend with the fact that whether their opposition was non-conformity or dissent or outright resistance, there was a good chance that the *Gestapo* would get to know about it very quickly. Coercion was important in keeping opposition in Nazi Germany down, but so was the consent of the masses.

Evidence which may support the view that the failure of the opposition was because of its own weaknesses

- opposition did not exist as one unified movement but was fragmented, often along class lines
- Communist and Social Democrat underground opposition remained bitterly divided and completely unable to cooperate
- there was lack of organisation, leadership and the ability to maintain secrecy
- opposition lacked a common purpose and was weakened by diversity of motives.

Evidence which may support the view that the willingness of most Germans to go along with the regime led to the ineffectiveness of opposition

- Nazi propaganda *did* have an impact in persuading people to support the regime but, more importantly, as unemployment fell and living standards improved, more people felt better off and were inclined to support rather than oppose the regime
- many people also welcomed Hitler's promises to restore national prestige and his foreign policy successes from 1933–1939 seemed to many to be proof that he was able to fulfil these promises.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Nikolaus Wachsmann	Takes the view that Hitler's police apparatus commanded extensive weapons of repression. Fear of the Gestapo was widespread. The Gestapo drew extensively on support from outside its ranks. It used information and denunciations from paid informers, low-ranking party activists and state and municipal agencies, as well as the general public.
Klaus Mallmann and Gerhard Paul	Take the view that the National Socialist rulers could live with insubordination, superficial conformity and insidious criticism as long as the consensus in political fundamental principles appeared secure and dissatisfaction, 'nonconformity and partial opposition did not coalesce and organise effectively'.
Robert Gellately	Takes the view that it was a characteristic feature of Nazi Germany that the regime found no difficulty in obtaining the collaboration of ordinary citizens. Most people seemed prepared to live with the idea of a surveillance society, to put aside the opportunity to develop the freedoms we usually associate with liberal democracies, in return for crime-free streets, a return to prosperity, and what they regarded as good government. There was no organised resistance.
Ian Kershaw	Takes the view that resistance and opposition to Hitler acted without the active mass support of the population. Large proportions of the population did not even passively support the resistance but, rather, condemned it. Resistance was fragmented, atomised and isolated from any possibility of mass support. Opposition – real and potential – was crushed through the unprecedented level of repression by the Nazi state.

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918–1939

Part B – Historical sources

Question 46 How fully does **Source A** explain the impact of hyperinflation on the lives of Germans in 1923?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
Inflation pounds daily on the nerves: the insanity of the numbers, the uncertain future.	Explains how the period of hyperinflation was a surreal experience and one that caused deep anxiety.
The lines always send the same signal: the city will be shopped empty yet again.	Highlights the concrete effects of hyperinflation, such as the very small chances of actually obtaining food.
The piece of paper, the spanking brand new banknote still moist from the printing presses, paid out today as a weekly wage shrinks in value on the way to the grocer's shop.	Explains that prices rose so quickly that in the time it took workers to run to the shops after being given their pay packets, their money had become virtually worthless – just bits of paper.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the hyperinflation crisis was triggered by the French occupation of the Ruhr (beginning in January 1923) and by August 1923, inflation was completely out of control
- not just wages were affected. Anyone who depended on a fixed income of any kind was reduced to poverty because their income was fixed but prices rocketed and the value of the currency was destroyed
- points out the fact that during the crisis there were 300 paper mills and 2,000 printing firms working 24-hour shifts to produce banknotes.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the catastrophe that hyperinflation caused is apparent in the value of the dollar to the mark. At the start of 1923, one dollar was worth 17,792 marks. By November 1923, one dollar was worth 200,000,000,000 marks
- hyperinflation pauperised the middle classes and some historians think that this was more revolutionary in its effects than the revolution of 1918–1919 had been
- people's health suffered, especially that of elderly people reduced to poverty by the hyperinflation
- panic buying was only one among many negative effects of the hyperinflation on people's lives. Living standards crashed. Any savings that people had accumulated were rendered completely worthless
- hyperinflation had psychological effects as well as the more visible economic and social effects. The catastrophe made people suspicious of democracy and the republic, and distrustful of politicians
- the crisis provided opportunities for demagogues on both the left and the right to attack the republic and democracy
- given that so many Germans suffered, from all classes and backgrounds, the hyperinflation crisis challenged basic values and the deep scars left by the crisis contributed, in the long run, to the collapse of the republic
- not all Germans lost out – for example, people with large mortgages and farmers in debt benefited because they could pay off their loans with devalued currency
- people who rented property with long-term rents gained as the real value of their payments fell
- exporters gained because of the mark's falling value

- some businessmen also benefited, most famously Hugo Stinnes who quickly bought up businesses that had failed because of the crisis. By 1924, Stinnes owned 1,535 companies – an estimated 20% of Germany's industries
- the state benefited because it lost its debt.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Alan Bullock	Takes the view that the inflation was to undermine German society in a way which neither the war, nor the revolution of 1918, nor the Treaty of Versailles had ever done.
David Evans and Jane Jenkins	Take the view that 'The pauperised and those cheated of their savings became more prepared to listen to the firebrand orators of the extremist parties'.
Mary Fulbrook	Takes the view that 'The psychological shock eroded democratic values and instilled a heightened fear of the possibility of economic instability'.
Detlev Peukert	Takes the view that 'The social effects . . . are not easy to assess. Two individuals from the same broad social class could be affected very differently'.

Question 47 How much do **Sources B** and **C** reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor of Germany?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Yet not many people seem to realise the extent to which Hitler arose because of the harsh clauses of Versailles and the economic crisis caused by reparations.	Argues that it was <i>not</i> backstairs intrigue but the Treaty of Versailles and economic crisis caused by reparations that best explain Hitler's rise, and so the Allies are as much to blame for Hitler's appointment as anyone else.
Hitler and his movement were in essence a reaction against hopelessness . . .	Suggests that Hitler's political movement was the product of the sense of hopelessness of the German people. Hitler gained the support of almost 40% of the German electorate which is why he was appointed Chancellor.
I have been accused of indecision and prevarication but the correct narrative of events shows that this is not true as these are delicate times.	Highlights that Papen denied that he was the cause of the crisis, claiming that he was dealing with the crisis despite the uncertainty of the situation.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Papen actively sought the support of the Nazis, and in June 1932 he lifted the ban on the SA. Much more serious for the fate of democracy, Papen used emergency powers to depose the SPD-led coalition government in Prussia
- it was Papen who, in response to Hitler's demands, agreed to new elections in July 1932 in which the Nazis made yet more spectacular gains. In January 1933, Papen agreed to serve in a Hitler-led government and declared, 'We've hired him' which showed just how badly he had miscalculated
- economic crisis was an important factor in the rise of the Nazis and in the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor. So was Hitler's promise to 'smash Versailles', a Treaty that most Germans loathed. So Papen is right to highlight the importance of forces beyond the control of individuals
- Papen was not the only intriguer as Schleicher was also at the centre of intrigue, and Papen claimed that his actions were not an attempt to attack Schleicher.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Five months later he changed his mind, with the Nazi Party in crisis following the electoral setback of November 1932.	Argues that Hindenburg changed his mind. Following initial opposition, five months later he appointed Hitler as Chancellor.
Few among the elite groups had Hitler down as their first choice, but by January 1933, with other options apparently exhausted . . .	Argues that Hitler was not first choice but, by January 1933, other options had been exhausted.
Hitler needed the elites to attain power.	Argues that without the support of the elite, Hitler could not have become Chancellor of Germany when he did.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the Nazis also did badly in the local elections of November and December 1932
- by the end of 1932, the Nazis' finances were extremely low because of the costs of competing in so many elections
- Hindenburg's options in December 1932 were clearly limited, but he had options. In the end he *chose* to follow the advice of Papen and others who hoped to use Hitler, with his popular appeal, to enhance their own power.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- by 1932, many, if not most, Germans were disillusioned with democracy and the republic. This was demonstrated not just in the Nazis' rising vote but also in the rising vote for the Communists. The collapse in the support for the more moderate, pro-democracy parties was a disaster for the republic
- in the elections of July 1932, the Nazis gained 37.4% of the votes and 230 seats in the Reichstag – not a majority. However, in the elections of November, the Nazis lost two million votes and 34 seats – indicating, as Kershaw suggests, that their rise was not unstoppable
- other conservative and elite interests also worked to get Hitler appointed. Leading industrialists Bosch, Thyssen and Krupp, for example, wrote to Hindenburg in November 1932 asking him to consider transferring responsibility for leading a Presidential cabinet to the leader of the largest national party – to Hitler, leader of the Nazis
- Papen is not being completely honest when he tries to assert that he was not an intriguer or a plotter. He worked tirelessly behind the scenes not just to secure his own interests but to ensure that, whatever happened, there would not be a return to parliamentary democracy. In May 1932, for example, Papen was content to be appointed by Hindenburg and to try to govern through the elite without any support from the Reichstag
- shortly after Hitler's appointment – on 21 March 1933 – Hindenburg cooperated in a ceremony to mark the opening of the Reichstag. The ceremony, arranged and stage-managed by Goebbels, took place at the Potsdam Garrison Church in the presence of Hindenburg, the son of the exiled Kaiser and many of the army's leading generals. The aim was to reassure the people that Hitler could be trusted.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Martin Broszat	Takes the view that it was during the Papen era, between June and November 1932, that the presidential system was tilted towards the extreme right . . . This was the phase when advance concessions were made that created the conditions of an assumption of power by the Nazis.
Richard J Evans	Takes the view that the Depression helped to make the Nazis a catch-all party of social protest, appealing to a greater or lesser degree to virtually every social group in the land. The Nazis succeeded in transcending social boundaries and uniting highly disparate groups on the basis of a common ideology . . . as no other party in Germany had managed to do before.
Conan Fischer	Takes the view that the translation of Nazi popularity into power . . . owed much to the disastrous miscalculation of the elites. It is true that millions of middle-class Germans sought deliverance by the Nazi movement from Marxism, but the presence also of millions of working-class Germans was unmistakable. Although the Nazis benefited from the Weimar Republic's recurrent crises, this is not to say that their success was either straightforward or inevitable.
Mary Fulbrook	Takes the view that, by late January 1933, the elites were not prepared to uphold democracy at any cost; most wanted some form of authoritarian government. The NSDAP no longer seemed dangerous and in these circumstances Hindenburg was persuaded by a small group (including his son and von Papen) to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.

Question 48 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source D** in explaining the aims of the Nazis' *Volksgemeinschaft*.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	German Central Institute of Education	An official Nazi party publication, therefore a clear representation of the ideological goal of the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> .
Purpose	Guidelines for teachers in secondary schools	To ensure that all teachers of history conform to the Nazi ideological line and that all pupils are fed the same ideological line.
Timing	1938	Five years into the regime, and so a confident assertion of the importance of the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> from a time when the regime was at the peak of its achievements, both domestic and foreign.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The teaching of History must bring the past alive for the young German in such a way that it enables him to feel the responsibility of every individual for the nation as a whole.	Underlines the importance in the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> of the subordination of the individual to the interests of the nation. This was its great attraction; the idea of a people's community.
The certainty of a great national existence.	Highlights the fact that the goal of the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> is the revival of German nationalism and the German nation, and the teaching of history is to be used to create respect for, and to glorify, Germany's past. Throughout the source there is an unquestioning assumption that history should be used to create a national sense of unity. Many Nazi documents reflect this mystic, visionary, millenarian language . . . the dream of the '1000 Year Reich'.
. . . at the same time on the clear recognition of the basic racial forces of the German nation, which are always active and indestructibly enduring.	Makes it clear that the true goal of the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> will always be the creation of a racial community.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the source is an example of the Nazis' absolute determination to completely control teachers and the school curriculum, to ensure that both teachers and the curriculum were used as vehicles for propaganda and the transmission of Nazi ideology. Education was at the heart of the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft*, not least because the Nazis recognised that winning the hearts and minds of Germany's youth was absolutely vital to the future of the *Volksgemeinschaft* ideal
- given that the goal of the *Volksgemeinschaft* was the creation of a community based on race, winning over the hearts and minds of youth was seen as crucial. Under the Nazis, virtually from birth German children were to be brought up as good National Socialists and with a strong awareness of Germany's history – at least according to how the Nazis interpreted it
- the Nazis also sought to ensure that education was a propaganda vehicle for the Nazi message of a classless society and one unified by race. Teachers were coordinated from early on in the regime and, by 1937, 97% of schoolteachers were in the National Socialist Teachers' League. In addition, the school curriculum was Nazified so that all subjects, not just history, but mathematics, biology and art, simply became carriers of Nazi ideology about race and nationalism.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the Nazi attempt to create a *Volksgemeinschaft* went way beyond youth groups and schooling. Universities too were subject to Nazi control, and students were forced to join the Nazi-controlled German Students' League. University curricula were also modified with racial and eugenic ideas, just as in schools
- Nazi youth organisations for boys and girls had been set up well before Hitler became Chancellor, but once the Nazis were in power they moved to make Nazi youth organisations compulsory (which they were from 1936)
- youth organisations aimed to produce young people who would idolise Hitler, be obedient, be physically fit, prepared to sacrifice themselves for the good of the nation, and who would do everything in their power to strengthen the health and racial purity of the German nation
- Nazi policies on women were also specifically meant to help achieve the goal of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. For example, the attempt was made to ensure that women became chiefly responsible for producing healthy 'Aryan' babies, and for bringing children up to be good Nazis and good Germans
- as well as policies on women, the Nazis targeted the workers. The DAF was set up to replace all trade unions (which were banned) and its main objective was to spread Nazi propaganda
- workers were encouraged to support the aims of the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft* through the Beauty of Labour organisation (set up to persuade employers to improve working conditions) and Strength through Joy organisation (which offered rewards to loyal workers – evening classes, theatre trips, holidays). The *Mittelstand* were also encouraged to support the Nazis through policies targeted at them such as the banning of cut-price competition between businesses
- the Nazis also pursued policies that were specifically designed to exclude those who were deemed not German, and the group that suffered most from this exclusion was the Jews
- policies such as the Nuremberg Laws (September 1935) or the *Kristallnacht* pogrom (November 1938) were designed to 'cleanse' Germany of Jews, who were to be treated as racial inferiors and whose presence in Germany, argued the Nazis, 'polluted' pure Germans
- racial ideology permeated all aspects of Nazi policy and society, underlining the fact that the goal of the *Volksgemeinschaft* was to end class divisions and to bring about a new and unified community, based on race.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Martin Collier and Phillip Pedley	Claim that the Nazis attempted to unite all Germans in a racially pure, classless national community. In this community, the Nazis promised there would be no political, religious, economic or social divisions. The status of a German would be determined by racial purity and ideological commitment to the state.
Tim Kirk	Takes the view that the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> was a myth. Despite the ambitious rhetoric of its propaganda, Nazism did not in fact bring about a social revolution in Germany – either in terms of real social change or in the way in which social reality was perceived. The effect of Nazi social and economic policies was to reinforce rather than transcend or overcome class divisions; the working class, for instance, was contained rather than integrated into a national community.
Jill Stephenson	Takes the view that the creation of a national community was an aspiration of the Nazi leadership. It was conceived as a collective body of ‘valuable Aryan’ Germans who would live and work in harmony together under the leadership of the Nazi party. The myth of the national community had perhaps some credibility in the years of peace, although there were sceptics even then.
Adam Tooze	Takes the view that National Socialism’s proudest boast was to have superseded the old politics of sectional interests in the name of the <i>Volksgemeinschaft</i> .

Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

Part A – Historical issues

Question 49 How important a part did the demand for cheap labour play in the development of segregationist policies in South Africa between 1910 and 1924?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate the reasons for the introduction of segregationist legislation by consecutive South African governments before the Wall Street Crash in 1929 in order to assess how far legislation was driven by the desire to maintain a migrant labour system for the mines. Candidates might discuss a range of factors including the demands of agriculture and Boer farmers for labour, racial ideology and Afrikaner nationalism as a driving force, and other arguments such as development of British precedent and the will of African Chiefs. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the demand for cheap labour played an important role in segregation policies

- mineral revolution of the 1880s resulted in drive for cheap labour to maximise profits from mining companies
- establishment of migrant labour system in order to restrict cost of mining labour through controlling the cost of labour
- impact of 1913 Land Act making it illegal for Africans to purchase or lease land outwith the reserves forced blacks into the migrant labour system or on to farms as wage labourers
- Wolpe's 'reserve labour subsidy' theory – the Land Act was designed to ensure a ready supply of labour to the mines
- 1911 Native Regulation Act banned strikes by African workers hired under contract
- South Africa Party (SAP) regarded as having strong links to mining corporations and favouring mine owners over the workers (such as in the 1922 Rand Revolt)
- widely recognised that mining was the lifeblood of the Union
- the importance of gold as a source of revenue
- Smuts seen as the ally of 'Hoggenheimer' – mining capital represented by the Chamber of Mines.

Evidence which may support the view that the influence of demands in agriculture played an important role in segregation policies

- 1913 Land Act was also designed to aid the needs of poor white farmers for cheap labour
- Trapido describes it as 'the union between gold and maize'
- vast majority of Bills passed by the SA Parliament were designed to assist farming
- the laws of 1913 and 1929 ensured that most of the best land stayed in white hands
- Hertzog promoted the export of agricultural produce through transport subsidies
- grants were given to tackle drought relief and rural unemployment.

Evidence which may support the view that the influence of attitudes to race played an important role in segregation policies

- white mineworkers demanded greater job protection and the safeguarding of wage differentials in the post-war period
- the Pact government (Hertzog) responded to pressure from white mineworkers
- Mines and Works Amendment Act (1926) excluded black workers from certain jobs
- Chamber of Mines objected to the Act of 1926 but had to accept it.

Evidence which may support the view that the influence of other factors played an important role in segregation policies

- evidence of African Chiefs supporting the migrant labour system to ensure cash returned to the reserves and potentially troublesome young men worked away
- segregationist legislation developed and escalated pre-union legislation introduced by the British as advocated by the Lagden Report. Compounds already existed to maximise profit.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Wood Johnstone	Revisionists argue that the high costs involved in mining and the demand for cheap labour produced the migrant labour system and the colour bar.
William Beinart	Argues that early government policy was also influenced by African Chiefs (most notably the Land Act) in order to bring back wages and ensure their authority was not diminished by young male workers.
Charles Feinstein	Contends that 'It was revenue raised from the gold mines that enabled the state to give huge sums to other sectors, especially the commercial farmers, with an array of subsidies, relief grants and loans'.
Rodney Davenport	Challenges the view that while Smuts favoured mining capital, there was a change of direction under Hertzog, and policies were more favourable to mineworkers.

Question 50 How far was a unique sense of Afrikaner identity the main reason for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism between 1924 and 1948?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate the significance of the development of a coherent Afrikaner identity in the rise of Afrikaner nationalism before the National Party's victory in the 1948 election. By considering the range of factors in this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Afrikaner identity and belief in a set destiny was the main factor

- Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) influence and message of purification through suffering
- values of the DRC perceiving Afrikaners as chosen people, 'divinely guided pilgrimage'
- influence of language – Pretorius as 'populariser of history'
- mythology of Afrikaner nationalism whereby real events are forged into a view of Afrikaner past in the 20th century
- distortion of history to justify beliefs such as the Cape frontier, Great Trek, Battle of Blood River, Day of the Covenant
- emphasis on ethnic struggle versus the British, such as the legacy of the Boer war, traits of the 'bittereinders' mythologised
- 19th century Cape experience – Die Afrikaanse Patriot stressed the distinctiveness of Afrikaner experience
- 1880 Formation of Afrikaner Bond – emphasises Afrikaner unity but had limited support beyond the Cape
- papers, magazines (*Die Huisgenoot*) stressed the common heritage of all Afrikaners and reached 20% of all Afrikaner families by the 1930s
- 1929 *Federasie of Afrikaanse Kultuur Vereniging* (FAK) sought to unify and disseminate sense of separate Afrikaner identity: Volkseenheid (unity of the volk)
- creation of martyrs such as Joubert Fourie
- Afrikaner culture further propagated and defined by the 1938 Eeufees celebrations
- Afrikaner business encouraged to serve whole community of Afrikaners
- growing fears of loss of ethnic identity in the cities.

Evidence which may support the view that limits the role of Afrikaner identity as a main factor

- unity not easy to achieve
- class divisions, as shown by Afrikaner workers supporting the Labour Party
- in 1934, Hertzog had rejected Afrikaner separatism by joining the Fusion government. This was regarded as a turning point by O'Meara, resulting in the Purified National Party's breakaway from Malan, with its 'unique culture' emphasis for Afrikaners.

Evidence which may support the view that other factors contributed to the rise of Afrikaner nationalism

- findings of the 1932 Carnegie Commission on poor whites revealed the extent of urban poverty
- Malan's commitment to the poor white question
- FAK organised the *Volkskongres* of 1939 in response to the findings of a special commission established to investigate poverty among Afrikaners
- the *Volkskongres* established the machinery for Afrikaner mobilisation in the economic field
- *Reddingsdaadfonds* (relief fund) set up so that Afrikaners could help other Afrikaners
- *Broederbond* aimed to establish Afrikaner trade unions to win the allegiance of Afrikaner workers
- distrust of Fusion and the United Party
- changes in leadership of Afrikanerdom with the new Purified National Party.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Albert Grundlingh	Argues that Afrikaner nationalism was a product of fear. Traditional view that a mythologised interpretation of Afrikaner history contributes to the rise in Afrikaner nationalism.
Hermann Giliomee	Argues that the communally deprived or those driven to preserve their position had their concerns mobilised by leaders, resulting in the rise of national identity. The Afrikaner leadership aimed to uplift the poor whites through the psychological and cultural dimension of collective security. He also emphasises the language movement ('cultural nationalism') and the popularisation of history.
Dan O'Meara	Views the rise of Afrikaner nationalism as an expression of class interests.
Leonard Thompson	Highlights the role of the DRC in shaping the political philosophy of Afrikaners (90% were adherents of the DRC).

Question 51	To what extent was disunity among resistance groups the main factor in undermining the effectiveness of opposition to segregation between 1910 and 1948?
Aim of the question	The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate the view that resistance before the Second World War was ineffective due to the disunity and lack of cooperation between organisations. Candidates should examine a range of factors. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that disunity among resistance groups was the main factor

- diversity of African resistance movements
- lack of agreement about aims and methods
- financial scandals and internal disputes which destroyed the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU)
- early African National Congress (ANC) leadership disdainful of popular agitation, so failed to link up with other resistance groups
- the methods of the early ANC included deputations and petitions
- some leaders, including Dube, were reluctantly prepared to accept rural segregation as long as there was a just distribution of land
- by the 1930s, ANC membership probably did not exceed 1,000. The more radical ICU was far more significant in the 1920s because it attempted to establish a mass movement, although this was not the view of the ANC
- by the 1930s, the ANC leadership was bitterly divided and split into warring cliques, not least due to Gumede's flirtation with the Communist Party which deeply divided the ANC
- ANC radicals in the Cape mounted a campaign of civil disobedience to achieve the native republic, further exacerbating splits within the organisation
- opposition to Hertzog's Native Bills was led by the All African Convention, not the ANC, demonstrating lack of cohesion – and competition over which would be dominant
- women played little part in the early ANC
- the ANC's policy of working with those who had political power bound them more closely to the ruling class, alienating others
- ANC cooperated in the late 1920s with the Communist Party of South Africa
- failure to capitalise on rural resistance.

Evidence which may support the view that other factors were important

- pursuit of economic routes
- most believed that, if they were economically successful, whites would give them political representation – thereby limiting their methods
- most of the early leaders (Dube, Plaatje, Gumede, Seme) were mission-educated and – as doctors, lawyers, ministers, for example – they were from the African middle class
- economic success would only be possible with good (and equal) education for blacks.

Pursuit of equal opportunity not political power

- between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s, the ANC had lost its coherence following the collapse of the ICU
- black intellectuals maintained support for education and working within the existing system, despite the impact of the Depression
- early ANC leaders aimed for equal opportunity, not political power, or African domination
- they hoped improved understanding, and greater justice, would allow Africans to make a growing contribution to South African society
- failure of international deputations such as that at Versailles
- resistance at this time is described by Beinart as being localised in issue and often in action
- methods of early resistance organisations, for example, African People's Organisation established in the Cape in 1902, and Mohandas Gandhi's passive resistance campaign.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Peter Walshe	Argues that early leaders were hugely influenced by the 'Cape tradition' of relative liberalism. The ultimate goals were equal opportunity and equality before the law.
William Beinart	Argues that regional organisations of the ANC tended to go their own way – Transvaal leaders were drawn into workers' issues; the Western Cape was influenced by Garveyism. Furthermore, the level of rural resistance was underestimated.
Dale McKinley	A Marxist historian, McKinley argues that the ANC failed to establish grassroots organisations among the masses in South Africa, that they were preoccupied by their petty bourgeois interests such as obtaining a free market.
Nigel Worden	Describes the limitations of the ICU due to leadership and regional struggles, and an unwillingness to move focus away from the countryside until the late 1920s where it obtained most of its support. In general, he attributes the ineffectiveness of early resistance as being that 'African protest lacked the link with political mobilisation'.

Question 52 'The policy of Separate Development after 1960 was apartheid by another name.'
How valid is this view?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to consider to what extent a change or turning point can be seen in the development of apartheid legislation at the start of the 1960s, or whether there was a continuation of apartheid as it was. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Separate Development was 'sanitised apartheid'

- Verwoerd's vision of a multi-national rather than a multi-racial state
- creation of the Bantustans based on existing and expanded reserves
- 17% of land for Bantustans was based on traditional tribal areas
- continued use of migrant labour through increased relocation of industry to the edge of Bantustans. In reality, government provided little funding for this relocation of industry
- Verwoerd appears to have seen Separate Development as a just policy
- continued aim of securing white dominance in a smaller white state
- continued economic interdependence, but Verwoerd then promised political 'independence'
- continued ambiguity over the position of blacks
- granting of 'independence' to areas such as the Transkei in order to neutralise black demands for political rights
- Verwoerd defended apartheid as protecting the interests of the white minority which had clearly been in evidence under early apartheid legislation such as the Mixed Marriages Act
- new constitution of 1961 maintained the white monopoly in parliament, as existed previously
- Africans would only be given special permission to live in the white state to work, further developing the previous Urban Areas Act and Abolition of Passes Act
- the crisis that engulfed the government in the early 1960s as resistance intensified arguably led to a repackaging of apartheid, with the prospect of blacks gaining self-government as Bantu nations. In reality, this was further removal of their rights within South Africa
- Verwoerd persuaded hundreds of chiefs to support this policy, which appears to legitimise it
- the policy, however, failed to separate the races and by the 1970s nearly eight million Africans continued to live in 'white' areas.

Evidence which may support views that are contrary to the claim that it was apartheid by another name

- evidence that Separate Development went further than previous apartheid, including ending any form of African representation in white politics
- the government's Bantu policy was not fixed, and evolved over time
- the ultimate goal of giving 'independence' to the Bantustans was a 'remarkable shift in the government's position' (Barber)
- evidence of escalation in apartheid, such as the forced removal of 3.5 million Africans from their homes
- increasing violence among resistance groups such as Poqo and Umkhonto we Sizwe resulted in the 'granite response', with increasing state oppression
- the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970) made all Africans citizens of one of the homelands, even if they had never lived outside a 'white' area
- by 1972, Ciskei, KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana and Lebowa had all been granted 'self-governing' status
- the homelands remained poor, overcrowded and weakened by the forced removal to them of the sick and the old
- the homelands, which had been designed to appease international criticism of apartheid, had the opposite effect
- almost all countries in the world regarded the Bantustans as puppets of the South African government.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Deborah Posel	Describes apartheid after 1960 as having entered a 'second phase'. Apartheid 'underwent an important change of direction . . . which ushered in a discrete second phase of policy-making'.
Brian Bunting	Offers a contemporary communist perspective, arguing that there was continuity between the 1950s and 1960s: 'Operating on the basis of a preconceived ideology . . . the Nationalists have planned their strategy with care and worked step by step towards their goal. Nothing has been left to chance.'
Dan O'Meara	Favours the 'Grand Design' view and sees coherence between the policies of the 1950s and those of the 1960s and claims that policies of the 1960s – such as decentralisation, population removal and homelands development – were central to the development of apartheid from the start.
Hermann Giliomee, Bernard Mbenga et al	Present apartheid as a coherent body of discriminatory laws, while acknowledging that, after 1960, Verwoerd saw the homelands as an alternative form of political representation for black South Africans, at a time when political rights were increasingly on the agenda throughout the continent.

Question 53 How significant was the United Nations in influencing the foreign policy of the South African government between 1960 and 1984?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the significance of the United Nations in influencing the foreign policy of the South African government between 1960 and 1984. Candidates might discuss a range of factors outside and inside South Africa. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that pressure from the United Nations was significant

- 1950 – General Assembly declared that ‘a policy of ‘racial segregation’ (apartheid) is based on doctrines of racial discrimination’. Previously, the UN refused to condemn matters of ‘internal policy’. In the 1950s, South Africa was excluded from UN specialised agencies
- 1960 – the Security Council, in its first action on South Africa, adopted Resolution 134 deploring the policies and actions of the South African government in the wake of Sharpeville, calling on the government to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination
- 1961 – the Secretary-General meets Verwoerd to request speedy integration of the races. Verwoerd described this as ‘totally unacceptable’
- 1963 – first meeting of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, it was later renamed the Special Committee against Apartheid. Resolution 181 calling on all states to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. Not mandatory until 1977
- 1966 – International Seminar on Apartheid
- 1968 – General Assembly requested all states and organisations ‘to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid’
- 1973 – UN declared apartheid a ‘crime against humanity’
- 1 January 1976 – the UN Centre Against Apartheid was established
- 1984 – the Security Council declared null and void the new racist constitution of South Africa. Strong language from the UN was not matched by action as the UK, US and France vetoed resolutions supporting the armed struggle in the UN Security Council. They also opposed economic sanctions. Only the Scandinavian countries imposed sanctions and gave aid to the ANC.

Evidence which may support the view that other external threats to South African government were significant

- black majority rule in frontline states meant South Africa faced ‘total onslaught’ from neighbouring African states
- communist support from frontline states – the role of Mozambique and Angola
- the impact of liberation movements elsewhere in Southern Africa
- churches and Christian-based organisations significant in spreading awareness
- sporting questions like the Basil D’Oliveira affair encouraged white sympathies
- the role of the ANC in exile
- Umkhonto we Sizwe organised raids from Mozambique in the early 1980s
- influence of Cold War in limited Western pressure on SA government – failure of arms embargoes related to Cold War
- the UK Labour government of the 1970s, and the USA, vetoed sanctions and largely followed a pro-South African policy, allowing capital and investment in the country.

Evidence which may support the view that internal threats to the South African government were significant

- economic problems such as the falling price of gold, rising price of oil, the balance of payments crisis and rising inflation
- changes within the South African economy leading to demands for a more stable urbanised workforce
- rapid growth of the African urban population in squatter camps
- unrest in townships: Soweto

- the growth of powerful trade unions
- the impact of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commission reports
- hostility to the Black Local Authorities Act and Tricameral Constitution (1984)
- the formation of the National Forum (NF) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983
- the split within the National Party, leading to the formation of Treunicht's Conservative Party
- introduction of National Service
- black resistance increasingly dominated by the non-racialism of the ANC and the South African Communist Party in the 1980s.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Nigel Worden	Argues that 'total strategy' intensified the very problems which it sought to defuse and emphasises the role of African trade unions in the decline of apartheid.
Merle Lipton	Argues that 'the trend (among capitalists) is towards increasing opposition (to apartheid) and it has been accelerating'. Capitalist interests in South Africa were already working to undermine apartheid by the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Tom Lodge	Argues that 'from its inception, the UN had supplied a sympathetic forum for condemnation of South African race policies'. He describes the UN as having 'weak expression of concern about violence' of Sharpeville but this signified an advance in the UN's opposition to apartheid.
Adrian Guelke	Provides a balanced evaluation, claiming that changes in the region of Southern Africa, and the end of the Portuguese empire in Africa, had weakened the position of the South African government.

Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

Part B – Historical sources

Question 54 How much do **Sources A** and **B** reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of British policy in South Africa between 1902 and 1910?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
His plans involved major social and economic engineering, with the intention of creating a loyal dominion of the crown.	Suggests that Milner planned to reconstruct South Africa in such a way as to create a loyal dominion within the empire.
. . . increase the British population by a vigorous immigration policy . . .	Suggests that he aimed to encourage immigration to South Africa to increase the British population.
Milner's second route was through cultural imperialism; in particular the use of education to anglicise the Boers.	Suggests that education would be used to embed British values among the Afrikaners.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- reconstruction was needed after the defeat of the Boers and the Treaty of Vereeniging
- the Treaty itself was a compromise with Transvaal and the Orange Free State becoming British colonies but with the promise of eventual self-government
- Milner's stated aim was to promote immigration from Britain so that people of British origin would outnumber the Boers three to two
- all teaching in schools and universities would be in English
- Dutch was only allowed as a means of teaching English. Particular importance was attached to the teaching of history.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . the Milner regime re-established Afrikaner landowners and made African lives harsher than before the war.	Argues that Milner's administration restored land to Afrikaner farmers, making the lives of Africans more difficult.
Milner tightened pass laws to restrict the mobility of African labourers . . .	Points out that existing pass laws were tightened, restricting movement for Africans and making it more difficult for African workers to find work in the towns.
. . . the mining companies cut Africans' wages and stopped competing for their labour . . .	Points out that in the mines, wages were cut and mining companies ended the existing competition between companies for African workers.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Milner guaranteed property rights as they had existed before the war, and in Natal the Delimitation Commission set aside millions of acres for white settler sugar farms
- many Africans were forced into labour tenancies or became sharecroppers. Some became wage labourers on farms
- Milner appointed South African Native National Congress, which recommended regulating labour influx by tightening pass laws

- in 1902 wages for unskilled labour were pegged well below the pre-war maximum, partly because mining companies wanted to extract lower grade ores for which the anticipated profits were less.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- Milner's plans for British immigration were not a success
- Afrikaners continued to constitute well over 50% of the white population in South Africa
- major investment in infrastructure, including a loan of £35 million for railways and public works
- labour for the mines was recruited in Mozambique, Basutoland and Swaziland, as well as China
- by 1906, gold production was almost double pre-war production
- the South African Native Convention (SANNC) report (1905) formalised ideas about segregation
- these proposals laid the foundation for legislation in 1913 and 1923
- British rule did nothing to destroy Afrikaner nationalism
- Het Volk and Orania Unie provided leadership for dissatisfied Afrikaners
- in 1907, the former Boer republics were granted self-government under Afrikaner-led administrations
- Selborne Memorandum (1907) stressed the potential advantages of Union
- Bambatha Rebellion highlighted the need for a strong central authority
- economic difficulties created by customs disputes and railway rivalry would be overcome by Union
- Milner's verdict on Union: 'All power is with the Boers, and will remain with them.'

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido	Reject Milner's own belief that he had failed to achieve his imperialist vision for South Africa: 'Milner succeeded in South Africa better than he realised. He laid the foundations for a state which reflected the demands of 20 th century imperialism but also fulfilled them.'
John Cell	Argues that the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission (1902-1905), established by Lord Milner, provided the first clear articulation of segregationist ideals. As such, it provided a blueprint for much of the legislation which followed after 1910.
Allister Sparks	Criticises the Liberals' policy of reconciliation with the Afrikaners after 1905: 'Four years later, Campbell-Bannerman gave the defeated republics back their independence in a union with the two British colonies. It was an act of unprecedented generosity to a defeated enemy. It was also an act of unprecedented betrayal of the black South Africans. For it was the first and only time an imperial power has given sovereign independence to a radical minority.'
Nigel Worden	Argues that the British government had achieved what it considered essential – the protection of mining interests – while agriculture had largely been reconstructed. In 1910 'political unity for the sake of economic growth was the British priority'.

Question 55 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source C** in explaining the reasons for the introduction of apartheid before 1959.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	Nelson Mandela	Mandela was a leading opponent of apartheid. His increasingly militant opposition and subsequent incarceration led to him being identified as the figurehead of the struggle in the West in particular.
Purpose	Autobiography	As a personal account of his life, it focuses on the anti-apartheid struggle; therefore would give an opponent's view of why apartheid was implemented and as a result, a negative portrayal.
Timing	Published 1994	Extract from Mandela's autobiography which was started in 1974 while he was incarcerated by the apartheid regime. Resumed his writing in 1990 after the collapse of apartheid, and therefore his writing is retrospective. Published in the year he became president.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The Nationalists were a party animated by . . . bitterness towards the English, who treated them as inferiors for decades, and bitterness towards the African, who the Nationalists believed was threatening the prosperity and purity of Afrikaner culture.	Afrikaners bitterly resented the English for treating them as their social inferiors, and the Africans whom they saw as threatening the Afrikaner way of life. This highlights the resentment and insecurity felt by supporters of Afrikaner nationalism. Apartheid has its origins in this racial bitterness.
Apartheid was a new term but an old idea, and it represented the codification . . . of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans in an inferior position to whites for centuries.	It looked like a new idea but in fact it was part of a long history of oppression of the Africans; what was new was that it brought together all existing segregationist legislation which ensured white supremacy. Apartheid cannot just be explained by events in the recent past.
The often haphazard segregation of the past 300 years was to be consolidated into a system that was inescapable in its reach and overwhelming in its power.	It had been haphazard in the past but the nationalists now wanted to create a single all-embracing, all-powerful system of laws that would oversee the control of every group that was under its power.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- evidence of the legacy of oppression of the Afrikaner by the British and the perceived threat of the 'black peril' as driving apartheid
- earlier legislation, such as the 1913 Land Act and the 1923 Urban Areas Act, was expanded under apartheid

- evidence of apartheid policy as a way of maintaining white supremacy – such as the prohibition of Mixed Marriages, the Population Registration Act and the Bantu Authorities Act
- geographical segregation of the races brought more into towns by the Group Areas Act and Native Resettlement Act, which built on the 1923 Urban Areas Act.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- evidence for the economic justification for apartheid, including apartheid as a means of extracting the benefits of the migrant labour system to meet the needs of manufacturing
- influx control legislation would restrict the process of black urbanisation and therefore the development of an urban proletariat
- influx control would also protect the interests of white workers threatened by the lower wages of black workers
- section 10 rights granted to certain groups of urban Africans would protect the needs of the manufacturing industry
- commercial farmers guaranteed labour supply from the reserves
- gradual relocation of industry to the reserves
- ambiguities contained within the Sauer Report
- stated aims of the Bantu Education Act.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hermann Giliomee	Describes apartheid as a ‘radical survival plan’ rooted in the DRC.
Harold Wolpe	Argues that apartheid ideology was a way of justifying the extension of cheap labour to the manufacturing industry.
Deborah Posel	Analysis of influx control in the 1950s shows apartheid was a more flexible policy than once believed.
Saul Dubow	Argues that the conflicting views contained in the Sauer Report had not been worked out a decade later. Verwoerd’s mid-1950s rejection of the Tomlinson Report – which outlined the investment needed to achieve complete separation – reflects the disparate elements within apartheid thinking at this time.

Question 56 How fully does **Source D** explain the decision to adopt militant tactics by some resistance groups in the 1960s?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . the Sharpeville massacre . . . and the nationwide tumult it engendered, . . . made violent strategies . . . seem very compelling.	Claims that the massacre (at Sharpeville) and the resulting demonstrations across South Africa made the resort to violent tactics more attractive.
. . . among the ANC there were influential people who already believed that a violent confrontation . . . was inevitable.	Claims that some of the ANC leaders had come to believe that violent resistance was unavoidable.
. . . if the Pan-Africanist Congress' protests had not mobilised such a massive Response . . . guerilla warfare might have remained a minority view.	Claims that the decision to adopt militant tactics was dependent on the mobilisation of the masses, as evident at Sharpeville.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the 69 deaths at Sharpeville, and the nationwide anti-pass demonstrations that followed, led to the declaration of a state of emergency
- Nelson Mandela was among those who accepted the need for violent confrontation. He discussed this with Joe Slovo (South African Communist Party) in the summer of 1960
- post-Sharpeville, protest escalated
- Luthuli burned his pass publicly; demonstrations in Western Cape involved more than 30,000 people.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Mandela had discussed the prospect of an armed struggle with Walter Sisulu as early as 1952, explaining that 'the attacks of the wild beast cannot be averted with only bare hands'
- banning of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and ANC after Sharpeville forced the movements underground, resulting in a change in tactics
- Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) established 1961; first campaign December 1961
- Poqo in action from 1962
- increased white oppression due to Verwoerd's fear of black resistance becoming cohesive and concentrated against the white government
- evidence of armed resistance before 1961 in the Pondoland Revolt of 1960
- frustration over limits of ANC and resistance success in the 1950s
- rise of African nationalism and belief that there was no hope for a policy of peaceful agitation
- leaders were arguably brought closer by their experience in the Treason Trials, facilitating greater cooperation thereafter
- by 1960, levels of agitation had significantly increased against the government
- Defiance Campaign had overcome apathy and aroused a spirit of militancy and determination.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Rodney Davenport	Suggests that the ANC was driven apart by leadership disputes and this contributed to the launch of the armed struggle.
Stephen Davis and Robert Fine	Argue that the move to armed struggle was not just a consequence of the Sharpeville massacre, but that local armed resistance had been in evidence before 1961–1962.
James Barber	Argues that the failure of the Defiance Campaign demonstrated that there was no constitutional route to liberation.
Saul Dubow	Rejects the view that the turn to violence represents a ‘takeover’ of the ANC by the Communists, arguing that the decision by some members of the ANC to work with the Communists at this time was tactical alliance: ‘In this, personal ambition surely played a role, for Mandela’s ascendancy to a position of leadership after 1960 was inseparable from his role as MK commander-in-chief.’ Argues that it does not necessarily follow that Mandela was being used by the Communists; in fact it is just as possible to claim that Mandela was using Communist Party organisation and resources to advance orthodox African nationalism.

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

Part A – Historical issues

Question 57 To what extent did a one-party dictatorship emerge in Russia between October 1917 and March 1921?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to consider the nature of Russian society under a one-party leadership between October 1917 and March 1921. Candidates might explore the political, economic, social and ideological spheres, and consider their relative importance. The main Bolshevik aim was to stay in power, and this was achieved by a number of means: weakness of the opposition, the use of terror and class warfare to distract workers and peasants. They also granted concessions to urban workers and peasants, and easily attacked or manipulated the political opposition. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions by giving an evaluation of the extent to which this meant a one-party dictatorship was the result.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of political aspects of one-party state

- closing down the opposition press
- removal of freedoms granted by the provisional government
- destruction of the Constituent Assembly as the opposition was too weak
- significant demand for cooperation between parties; threat of railwaymen's union, post and telegraph workers to cut off communication – hence Lenin agreed to talks, but engineered their collapse and made an alliance of sorts with Socialist Revolutionaries to claim he represented the peasantry (land issue)
- control imposed over the Soviets – compromise from the beginning; 'all power to the Soviets' denied by setting up the Sovnarkom; intention to centre power in the hands of the Bolsheviks alone
- destruction of other political parties – Kadets, Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks
- establishment of central control – pyramid of power – Politburo at the top: to eliminate opposition, to maintain the revolution, but tight-knit group in Moscow
- party control over the state; the party was the vanguard of the revolution hence development of bureaucracy (Soviet constitution)
- use of terror, Red Terror and Cheka
- legal system abolished – replaced by revolutionary justice, arbitrary and violent
- some Bolsheviks became disillusioned about democratic centralism as the source of Bolshevik discipline
- so much political power placed in the hands of one man – Lenin.

Evidence which may support the view of economic aspects of a one-party state

- 1917 Land Decree – abolishing private ownership
- War Communism was used to strictly control the economic sphere of Russia
- loss of the proletarian base, developed role of Politburo and status of Central Committee.

Evidence which may support the view of social aspects of a one-party state

- abolition of titles; use of egalitarian 'comrade'
- socialist press encouraged class warfare – 'parasites' and 'bloodsuckers'
- class warfare encouraged – burzhui beaten, robbed, arrested. State licensed and encouraged people to attack middle-class houses 'to loot the looters'
- civil servants on strike so were purged, juniors promoted – third-rate but obedient
- religion was frowned upon and Bolshevism became the new religion.

Evidence which may support the view of ideological aspects of a one-party state

- the ideology of Bolshevism, for example, 'What is to be done', 'April Theses', 'State and Revolution', 'War and Revolution': to promote development of socialism, harsh measures and strong leadership were required for the dictatorship of the proletariat
- building on the February Revolution; sweeping away 'pillars of Tsarism'
- rejecting liberal democracy as represented by the provisional government and would-be Constituent Assembly in favour of proletarian democracy, through Soviets and party leadership
- need for democratic centralism.

Evidence which may support the view of other aspects of a one-party state

- precarious situation of the Bolsheviks
- assassination attempt on Lenin's life in August 1918
- provinces – plundering houses, violence, looting *burzhui*
- war with Germany, politics in Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – not a duty to fight the capitalist imperialists, ending of World War I symbolic of the working-class revolution. In reality, Bolshevik support needed to be extended beyond the cities – the army was not fit to fight but territory lost would be regained in the international proletarian revolution
- fear of breakdown of whole apparatus of government; failure of world revolutions to materialise
- the building of forces of terror and the wiping out of opposition were vital to ensure the survival of the revolution and the Bolsheviks. Creation of a one-party state was justified ideologically in order to avoid the counter-revolution.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Pipes	Argues that Lenin intended all of this. He only had one agenda and that was a one-party dictatorship.
Mikhail Bulgakov and Mikhail Shiskin	Take the view that the Bolsheviks were 'destructive demagogues'.
Orlando Figes	In respect of the one-party state's encouragement of class warfare, he takes the view that 'drunken mobs went on the rampage . . . sailors and soldiers went round the well-to-do districts robbing apartments and killing people for sport'.
Richard Sakwa	Takes the view that 'it was clear from 1918 that Lenin insisted that the Constituent Assembly had outlived its usefulness'.

Question 58 To what extent has the role of Trotsky in bringing about Red victory in the Civil War been exaggerated?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the significance of the role of Trotsky in the outcome of the Civil War against other significant factors involved. Candidates might consider the nature of the Civil War and the political, economic and social aspects. They might also discuss the role of the Allies, the influence of geography and propaganda. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of Trotsky's strengths

- Trotsky, Commissar of War, who formed the Red Army, used oratory, propaganda machine, and the train to invoke unity and organisation and centralised communications
- he showed the decisive and strong leadership needed through his inspirational leadership and tough management of the army, and by attaching political commissars to each unit, introducing the death penalty, military specialists, forming labour battalions and recruiting ex-tsarist officers
- Lenin's support of Trotsky
- Reds had advantages but the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky should not be overstated.

Evidence which may support the view of the weakness of others

- the main forces of the Whites – a mix of liberals, nationalists, former tsarists, nationalists separatists, socialist revolutionaries (SRs) and moderates
- at first Kornilov was inspiring, part of the Don Cossack army and, as Figs states, the growth of the Volunteer Army 'was largely due to the charismatic presence of General Kornilov' – but he was killed in April 1918
- at the beginning, the Volunteer Army (3,000) was largely an officers' army, and much better organised, for example, Denikin's defeat of the Red Army in the Don region
- but too often white leaders were at odds to the extent that it had an impact, for example, Alexeev and Kornilov had to communicate by messenger (even though they had offices next to each other)
- Denikin condoned the 'ethnic cleansing' practices of Cossacks and he helped landowners recover their estates, alienating the peasants.

Evidence which may support the view of geographical advantage

- initially, the Whites surrounded the Red forces: Yudenich in the North-West; Kolchak in the North controlling much of Siberia; the Komuch in the East; Kornilov, Alexeev and Denikin in the South-West. But ultimately they were too scattered geographically to use it to their advantage
- Reds had the heartland: Sovdepiia, Petrograd and Moscow. Sovdepiia was mainly industrialised and contained most of the country's armaments factories and industrial base
- Bolshevik areas were heavily populated – which aided conscription and allowed them to outnumber the white forces
- moving capital to Moscow – the hub of the rail system – made distribution and transportation of men and weapons easier.

Evidence which may support the view of political ideology

Bolsheviks

- Bolshevik actions alienated the other groups (SRs, Mensheviks, liberals and conservatives). But Whites associated with old system of government were considered worse
- the Bolshevik cause was the patriotic one – to sustain the revolution from outside forces
- 'Peace, Bread, Land' was still the ideology and main policy focus
- peasant support was vital. The Bolsheviks made promises earlier than Whites, which helped get support from the peasants.

Whites

- Whites were unsure if they were fighting for monarchism, republicanism or a Constituent Assembly
- the spectrum of political cultures as represented by the different factions. These included the simple resistance – with the Greens, peasants and soldiers; the more sophisticated – with the Allied powers each having their own agenda about what should be done with Russia and what should emerge; the Komuch and the possibility of a third democratic phase with the Czechs as natural allies.

Nationalities

- White leaders aimed to restore pre-1917 borders. Ukrainians and Georgians wanted autonomy.

Evidence which may support the view of economic and social factors

- evidence of the institutions of Bolshevism was seen in the Red Army and how it was created (breaking local groups)
- the Red Army managed healthcare and took care of dependants, hence they coped with resistance to grain requisitioning
- other institutions might be mentioned (Party, Cheka) – allowed talent to flourish, won allegiance; many did not want to return to the old order
- the Whites had too many officers already to allow others to rise; the Greens were reactive to the situation, not permanent in their allegiance.

Evidence which may support the view of other factors

- the cause of the Czech Legion hostilities
- the motivation of the Greens and Makhno's Insurgent Army
- the issue of Allied intervention: aid to Whites tended to be ineffectual.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Evan Mawdsley	Emphasises the advantage of the 'Aladdin's cave' regarding the territory.
Geoff Swain	Takes the view that 'the Civil War became a war between Red Bolsheviks and the White Generals'.
W Bruce Lincoln	Emphasises the limited nature of white support: 'Kolchak drew his main support from the British, the armourers and the financiers of his government . . . Here at last was a commander who spoke of legality, order, freedom and firm democratic foundations and did not consign capitalists to the purgatory of world revolution.'
Orlando Figes	Takes the view that 'The crucial advantage the Reds had (encouraging more volunteers to be part of the fighting force), was the claim that they were defending 'the Revolution'.

Question 59 'Stalin was very much in the right place at the right time, lucky – but the luck had to be used.'

How valid is this assessment of the reasons for Stalin's emergence as leader?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to address the main issues and arguments surrounding Stalin's emergence as leader. Candidates might discuss the role of luck as a prevalent factor. They might also compare all the main contenders in the leadership struggle by addressing the weaknesses and strengths of the main contenders – Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, Bukharin and Stalin. Candidates might also address ideological debates, policy, and the legacy of Lenin. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of the importance of Stalin's luck

- Lenin and Sverdlov died at the right time for Stalin
- Sverdlov died of Spanish flu in March 1919 – left few administrators among the party, so Lenin turned to Stalin
- also, the death of Dzerzhinsky in 1926 (head of Cheka from beginning, not a Stalin fan) allowed Stalin to put his supporters into the Cheka
- Lenin died in January 1924 of a stroke (he had been ill for several years)
- Stalin was the General Secretary and therefore delivered the eulogy at Lenin's funeral. This speech positioned him as the heir or successor to Lenin, and put down his marker for the way party ideas should progress in the future
- the handling within the Politburo of Lenin's *Testament*. By incriminating everyone, it was 'shelved' letting Stalin escape lightly
- if Lenin had not died, Stalin would have been seriously demoted
- for three years from 1923, Trotsky suffered bouts of undiagnosed fever, sapped strength, less able to deal with his medical problems, absent from crucial Politburo votes in meetings. In particular, his failure to attend Lenin's funeral was seized upon by Stalin, although Stalin may not have deliberately engineered it.

Evidence which may support the view of opponents' weaknesses

- the contenders for power in the 1920s included Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev and Bukharin
- Stalin's use of contenders, for example, Zinoviev (side-lining Comintern) and Kamenev, plus the roles of other key figures including Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky
- the qualities and deficiencies of each candidate – in terms of their practical and ideological appeal and constituencies of support – as well as the ideological differences
- factionalism
- Trotsky – the intellectual who had Lenin's ear but lacked social graces and a party power base.

Evidence which may support the view of Stalin's strengths

- good administrator (Commissar for Nationalities)
- pragmatist or opportunist (Lenin's death, Stalin's actions to producing the cult of Lenin and Stalin's self-adopted role as Lenin's disciple)
- Stalin stayed in the background – let 'Old Bolsheviks' dig each other's graves
- powers of patronage (as General Secretary, Lenin Enrolment)
- the creator of the mass Party by 1925
- control of Party organisation and Party membership, the Orgburo and Secretariat; his position let him control the timing and agenda of meetings
- manipulated situations to his own benefit, for example during the 'war scare' of 1927
- his determination and ruthlessness.

Evidence which may support the view of ideology

- Stalin's positions during the New Economic Policy (NEP) debates on how to treat the peasantry and the speed of industrialisation
- Trotsky's idea of 'Permanent Revolution' compared to Stalin's 'Socialism in One Country'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Martin McCauley	Takes the view that Stalin had luck on his side.
Isaac Deutscher	Emphasises the importance of Trotsky's inability to recognise this wilful, sly but shabby and inarticulate man as his rival.
Robert Conquest	Takes the view that Stalin simply outmanoeuvred his colleagues.
Peter Kenez	Argues that Stalin 'skilfully removed from key positions the supporters of his opponents, replacing them with his own people. He knew how to define the terms of disagreement in such a way as to gain benefits in politically relevant parts of the population. He managed to present his own positions so that middle-level cadres found them attractive and worthy of support'.

Question 60 To what extent did collectivisation achieve its aims?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse and evaluate the impact of collectivisation on Russian society, and the extent to which the policy achieved its aims. Candidates might consider the aims of collectivisation in terms of the impact politically, economic change and the impact on society. They might debate the motivations for change and evaluate their impact. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of political reasons for its implementation

Achieved its aims – positive impact

- end to peasant 'petit bourgeois' kulaks' influence which created enemies of the state, ripe for purging
- Socialist solution not to have private holdings (NEP), but 'socialist agrotowns'
- strengthened control of Central Party apparatus over provinces such as Ukraine and central Asia
- exerted control of local party cliques from above
- needed to prepare for potential war and to support industrial expansion
- aimed to compete with the USA as a superpower.

However

- force, propaganda and terror were used
- liquidation of the kulak class to make the middle peasants obey Stalin
- 'Twenty Five Thousanders' rounded up families and deported 10 million people (some estimate 20 million dead or deported)
- the extent of denunciations by neighbours reflected the success of the propaganda machine in inflaming class hatred
- armed resistance and riots: crops, tools and houses burned rather than hand them over
- women's protests were significant and effective in organisation and outcome.

Evidence which may support the view of economic reasons for its implementation

Achieved its aims – positive impact

- 1930 was a bumper year in grain harvest – 83.5 million tonnes, compared to 73.3 million tonnes in 1928
- the NEP had failed to solve the eternal problem of feeding the people. Collectivisation had to work
- many crops were better suited to larger farms – small farms meant poor use of labour, unable to benefit from mechanisation. Too much consumed by the farm, not enough going to market
- larger units of land meant efficiency via mechanisation – tractors and machinery supplied through Machine and Tractor Station
- fewer peasants were needed to work the land – released labour for industry
- easier for state to take grain for cities and export – all controlled by Communist supporters.

However

- agriculture was a disaster – significant numbers of animals were slaughtered, enterprising peasants had left the country, fled to city to seize opportunity of upward mobility
- grain procurement crisis 1928–1929 – peasants were resisting government policies and not sending goods to market; bread and meat were rationed in the cities
- collectivisation aimed to build a social and economic system to make USSR a great power
- those left were in no mood to begin work, and passive resistance was the order of the day – referred to this as 'second serfdom'
- statistics after 1930 were distorted to show alleged success, even though grain harvests had fallen, grain procurement still increased – 10.8 million tonnes in 1928 with 73.3 million tonnes harvested, but by 1933, 22.6 million tonnes procured from only 68.4 million tonnes harvested

- 'Dizzy with success' speech (2 March 1930) meant pace slowed down and return to voluntary principle indicates limitations of policy
- life was the same for most, for example, most lived in the same wooden huts
- tractors were most often not produced or delivered, although officials reported that they had been. Stated figures for tractor production were largely made up.

Evidence which may support the view of social reasons for its implementation

Achieved its aims – positive impact

- by February 1930, the party claimed that half of all peasant holdings had been collectivised
- estimated that 70% of peasant households were collectivised by 1934 and 90% by 1936; 120 million people, 600,000 villages, 25 million holdings consolidated into 240,000 state-controlled collective farms.

However

- famine 1932–1934 because of high targets at a time of huge drop in grain production due to collectivisation – seven million people died from a manmade famine
- the most successful peasant farmers were accused of being kulaks and were deported or killed. 25–30% of animals died due to starvation
- Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) vicious. 1.73 million tonnes exported
- 1932 – strict laws introduced to ensure grain was handed over, handing out 10-year sentences for stealing 'socialised property'.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Chris Ward	Offers a view on how great the impact of collectivisation was; claiming that '... the whirlwind which swept across the countryside destroyed the way of life of the vast majority of the Soviet people.
Moshe Lewin	Takes the view that the aim was creating a 'quicksand society' where the state was in control of everyone and all were 'equal'.
Robert Conquest	Believes that collectivisation was the weapon used to break peasants. The human toll was higher than the total deaths for all countries in World War I.
Stephen Cohen	Takes the view that the peasantry was seen as a vast, inert and yet somehow threatening mass of people, barring Russia's path to industrialisation, modernity, socialism: a kingdom of darkness that must be conquered before the Soviet Union could become the Promised Land.

Question 61 How significant was the contribution of the Soviet generals to victory in the Great Patriotic War?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to debate the key factors which allowed Russia to prevail in World War II. They might consider the significance of Stalin's generals in relation to other relevant factors. These may include size and use of armies, the economic set-up, the role of Stalin and the weaknesses of the enemy – which are the key points in the traditional viewpoint of the outcome of conflict. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of that the contribution of the generals was significant

- Zhukov himself had good military experience fighting on Russia's Eastern borders
- General Zhukov had the benefit of calling on newly-arrived Siberian shock troops, trained to fight in harsh winter conditions, unlike their German counterparts
- Zhukov's defence of Moscow in the winter of 1941–1942 was the first successful counter-attack by Soviet forces
- General Chuikov's role was vital in the defence of Stalingrad, especially in Operation Uranus when the German Sixth Army was captured
- candidates may refer to other generals and their actions – Voronov, Malinovsky, Rokossovsky and Rodimtsev, all of whom had been Soviet advisors in Spain. As had general Shumilov, the commander of the 64th Army. Many of Stalin's generals were experienced
- candidates may refer to the legacy of Tukhachevsky – re-writing the manual of field regulations and use of parachute troops. He was later disgraced (and purged) but his principles of 'deep battle' (defence in depth) were realised by the Russian tank armies by 1943–1945
- after Stalin's Purges, the Red Army had been left weakened and leaderless. The initial catastrophic defeats can be put down to the inexperience of the newly-appointed Soviet officers and commanders
- Chuikov's successes relied too much on the Soviets' sheer weight in numbers, rather than any tactical expertise. German officers were shocked at Chuikov's careless counter-attacks and willingness to send his soldiers to near certain deaths in persistent counter-attacks.

Evidence which may support the view that Stalin's leadership was significant

Stalin's strengths

- Stavka (General Staff) set up on 23 June 1941 – responsible for military operations. On 30 June, GKO (State Committee of Defence) was set up, and was more important: military, political, economic life, highly centralised control
- Stalin used 'scorched-earth policy' – nothing valuable left for the Germans if the Reds retreated
- Gosplan (under Voznesensky) produced war plans, decisions went to small centralised GKO, met almost daily (Stalin was chairman)
- Stalin had able individuals such as Molotov (diplomacy), Voznesensky (economic planning), Krushchev (administration) and Zhukov (military). The latter commended Stalin on his readiness to learn about military strategy.

However

- Stalin was unwilling to believe that German forces were invading (despite intelligence reports from Fitin), ordering troops not to retaliate to 'provocation' from German forces
- the Wehrmacht enjoyed astounding successes during the summer of 1941, partly down to Stalin's indecisiveness
- mistakes made in ruthless purging (especially in national groups) were compensated by his ability to command the loyalty of the nation to fight for 'Mother Russia'.

Evidence which may support the view that geo-strategic and military issues were significant

- the Russian traditional strategy of trading space for time and taking the Germans deeper into a Russian winter – when the Germans were far from prepared for a long war. The size of the country and extremes of climate made it difficult for the Wehrmacht

- Stalingrad may be discussed in terms of the type of fighting required – suiting the Russians; the use of snipers; manipulating the war zone. Stalingrad is seen at this level as ‘a matter of prestige between Hitler and Stalin’
- candidates may offer views on the quality and quantity of Soviet weaponry as a factor: T34 tank, some high-quality artillery and later in the war, katyusha rocket launchers and mobile artillery on tracks, and the rise of mass production of equipment.

Evidence which may support the view that German weaknesses were significant

- dealing with the Russian climate and land mass meant Germans were overstretched and could not apply the same tactics as in France, and so errors occurred – this altered the focus of the offensive and delayed the attack on Moscow
- General Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus’ German Sixth Army failed to capture Stalingrad and became trapped and overrun by the Soviets, as Hitler refused to let them retreat
- effects of Allied bombing of Germany; Allied invasion in the West
- German General Bock admitted ‘no further hope of strategic successes’ remained.

Evidence which may support the view that economic factors were significant

- the relocation of industries to beyond the Urals (evacuation of approximately 10 million people)
- the economic system was already suited to war because of established central planning, unlike Germany which did not have total war economy until 1942
- economic stability attained, allowing the supply of the military with adequate material; constant upgrading of the Red Army; opening up new fronts and the quantity of Allied military hardware sent to Russia.

However

- Victor Kravchenko criticised the view of relocation. He states that a minor part was moved, that Stalin had actually supplied Hitler during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and that the retreat after the invasion left Hitler rich resources and abandoned millions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Service	Takes the view that the contribution of generals in the Red Army was equally as important to the Soviet victory as Stalin’s role.
Antony Beevor	Believes that ‘they (the Russian generals) were severely hampered by the political demands of the state leadership and suffered a basic fear of responsibility’.
Martin McCauley	Takes the view that the defence of Moscow was chiefly down to Zhukov’s leadership and tactical expertise. Argues it was down to an overstretched German army. Contrasts Germany’s military and political failures with Soviet Union’s tenacity and responsiveness in war.
Richard Overy	Takes the view that the reasons for Soviet victory were popular patriotism encouraged to some extent by government, Stalin, political planning and mobilisation. The people and the government, though not trusting each other, were bound together ‘by mutual necessity’, and this led to the success. Soviet defence against German attack ‘could not have been worse’, with defence belts not finished, reserve army just formed, poor organisation and preparation.

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

Part B – Historical sources

Question 62 How fully does **Source A** explain why support for Tsarism collapsed in February 1917?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
There was suspicion of treason in high places, and one of the main targets was Nicholas's wife, Empress Alexandra, who had caused scandal . . .	Suggests that there was widespread concern that even people like the Empress, in the highest ranks of society, were untrustworthy because of the scandal she was involved in with Rasputin.
Nicholas assumed the responsibilities of commander-in-chief of the Russian army, which took him away from the capital for long periods.	Claims that Nicholas' long absences from Petrograd led to huge problems as the Tsarina and Rasputin were left in charge.
Alexandra and Rasputin began to exercise a disastrous influence over ministerial appointments with the 'ministerial leapfrog' of incompetent favourites in the Cabinet.	Claims that the Tsarina and Rasputin had been left to run the war back in Petrograd and ended up picking their own friends and favourites to do the job, despite the lack of experience of everyone concerned.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Tsarina played down events in the city in her letters to the Tsar of a 'hooligan movement'. She did not really understand what was going on around her
- Tsarina was German by birth, directly related to the German royal family, and there was widespread suspicion that she favoured the enemy
- examples of some of the appointments and mistakes in the 'ministerial leapfrog'
- Tsar ignored the approaches and advice of the Progressive Bloc
- Miliukov's 'Is this stupidity or treason?' speech
- heavy defeats at the Front (Tannenburg and Masurian Lakes) and when the Tsar took over as commander-in-chief, he was inept
- Tsar's decision to take command in Sept 1915 let him be personally blamed for defeats – he had been better off as a 'figurehead' where he could pass the blame to someone else
- higher ranks of society became disenchanted with the Tsar as an upholder of autocracy. There were some competent administrators in government circles but they had no chance to progress in this 'circus'.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- increased unrest on the streets of Petrograd – 23 February Women's Day protests turned to mass protest in two days
- candidates may review a range of explanations for why the different 'props' for Tsarism over the ages were withdrawn under the pressures of the wartime situation; the role of the military leaders, the lower military ranks, the politicians and the political framework, the industrialist classes, the workers, the peasants – all figure in this story of how tsarist autocracy imploded
- the Tsar was forced to abdicate by the Generals which supports 'revolution from above'; role of Guchkov and Generals Krymov and Alexeev – ready to desert the Tsar, autocracy and their power being saved by his abdication

- economic change and its impact by 1917 – the case for modernisation at the turn of the century may be presented, with expansion in production and record harvests in 1913. Similarly, there were growth rates in industry yet this was not benefiting workers – resulting in strikes and protests, for example, Lena Goldfields – evidence of discontent and brutal reaction. Increased problems by 1917, the demand for bread, the pressures of modernising Russia as seen by the strikes, Putilov and others – the key was reform to address economic disaster as shown by food shortages, queuing and inflation
- impact on the Home Front, disruption in communications, second place to army, food shortages and queues, the need to increase productivity, and the interruption of the development of the modern state
- war highlighted the fight for power between the Army elites and the civilian elites
- by 1915, Russian troops had retreated from Poland
- failure of Summer Offensive in 1916
- dire performance of War Ministry – lack of ammunition and resources
- the role of the revolutionary parties – all contributed in different ways; the Kadets, SRs, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks influence on the street
- role of Petrograd Garrison, reserve and wounded soldiers, middle-ranking soldiers like Sergeant Timofei Kirpichnikov, who led the mutiny of the Volynsky Guard Regiment that brought the Petrograd Garrison over to the side of the revolutionaries
- the role of the railwaymen at Pskov – view that they deliberately stranded Nicholas so that a deputation could get out from Petrograd to encourage his abdication.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Pipes	Takes the view that ‘rebellions happen, revolutions are made’.
Peter Kenez	Takes the view that ‘there was not to be found anywhere in the country any groups of the population . . . which were ready to put up a fight for the old regime’.
Robert McKean	Takes the view that the Great War acted as the spark which set the combustible of mass discontent alight.
Rex Wade	Takes the view that the long-awaited revolution had come swiftly, arising out of strikes and popular demonstrations.

Question 63 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source B** as evidence of the extent of support for the Bolsheviks after July 1917.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source B		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	Lenin	He was still in 'exile' in Finland and trying to establish his control (and displaying his remarkable revolutionary foresight) over a party which wasn't convinced about this action.
Purpose	<i>The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power</i>	A letter to the Bolshevik Central Committee urging them towards the view that the Bolsheviks should go it alone without any of the other revolutionary groups. He is trying to convince his own party to take this action. One of a series of letters and demands.
Timing	12 September 1917	Written in the aftermath of the Kornilov revolt where the Bolsheviks had helped the Provisional Government to quell the attempted coup, leading to a significant growth of party membership.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The Bolsheviks, having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals.	Highlights that the Bolsheviks had control over the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets. Lenin was well aware of how crucial this moment was; for the first time the two major cities in Russia were on his side; he had to move on quickly to exploit that position of strength.
For the Bolsheviks, by immediately proposing a democratic peace, we will form a government which <i>nobody</i> will be able to overthrow.	States that by offering a democratic peace, the Bolsheviks could form a sustainable government with widespread support. Lenin knew that this appeal for peace, which <i>no</i> other party was offering, would have widespread support. He was desperate to move fast on this.
The people are tired of the waverings of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. It is only our victory in the metropolitan cities that will carry the peasants with us.	Claims that the SRs and Mensheviks have lost popular support to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks should exploit their urban victory to drag the peasants along with it. Lenin was quite dismissive of the other socialist parties; he had the conviction that they had blown their chances by conspiring with the liberal parties, and that possession of control of the major cities would swing the peasants behind the Bolsheviks. Lenin appreciated that those in control of the capital, and therefore the levers of government power, could largely control the instructions that went out to the countryside.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- 23 September – Trotsky elected as chairman of Petrograd Soviet
- even though the Bolsheviks were a majority in the cities, they were still a minority in the rest of Russia
- Kerensky had arranged for Constituent Assembly elections so Lenin wanted to act before these happened
- Lenin realised the Mensheviks had ‘blown it’ as socialists, being too tightly linked to the liberal bourgeois parties like the Kadets. All the other parties still supported continuing the war
- membership of the Bolshevik party increased from 10,000 in February to 250,000 by October
- Zinoviev and Kamenev were two of the chief opponents of the strategy outlined in Lenin’s letter. Their reply was published in *Novaia zhizn*.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- by persisting with the war, the Provisional Government continued to lose support
- the Provisional Government had failed to carry out their promises of elections, freedoms and land for the peasant
- Mensheviks and SRs lost support after the June Offensive
- land – faced with a food shortage which caused unrest in the cities and at the Front, the government proclaimed a grain monopoly. Government prices failed to keep up with inflation, even in August. The question of land was to be discussed after the Constituent Assembly was formed
- for some, the Bolshevik Party played a key role in guiding the workers to success, under the vital leadership of Lenin – others highlight attitudes to police, army, banks, fraternisation
- masses wanted to revolt but for a variety of reasons – fatigue, desire for ‘peace, bread and land’ – and Lenin successfully tapped into this
- the October Revolution was more against the Provisional Government than for Bolshevism. Kerensky’s actions in Provisional Government helped cause mistrust
- for some it was a coup d’état as Lenin and his ‘evil minority’ took over – these views were not widely held within the Bolshevik Party in Petrograd before his return, resulting in limited support
- workers did not expect the Bolsheviks to run the state on their own – consternation in the ranks
- there was an ambiguity of support. Workers seemed Bolshevik in mood, but it was apparent that they were only supporting them if certain conditions were met . . . the promise of ‘peace, bread and land’. The soldiers were war-weary, not Bolsheviks
- the Constituent Assembly elections revealed the limited support of the Bolsheviks who gained 24% of the votes, with the SRs gaining 53%.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Service	Believes that Lenin was a key figure.
Orlando Figes	Takes the view that amidst a social revolution, centred the popular realisation of Soviet power.
Stephen Smith	As a revisionist, sees the active role of the lower ranks in pushing forward the revolution.
Harold Shukman	Takes the view that Trotsky realised they could not be sure of all the workers and soldiers in Petrograd, let alone the country at large.

Question 64 How much do **Sources C** and **D** reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for the Purges?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
The following day a special decree on terrorist offences gave the recently reorganised NKVD wide-ranging powers of trial and execution.	Argues that Nikolaev's assassination of Kirov sparked off special powers for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) with an anti-terror decree.
Within a few weeks, 13 members of a supposed 'Leningrad centre' (including Nikolaev) and at least 98 others scattered across the country had been shot for preparing 'terrorist attacks against officials of the Soviet regime'.	Argues that the Purges escalated across the country because of an alleged threat from Leningrad terrorist centre.
. . . the Central Committee circulated a letter instructing local organisations to hunt down 'Trotskyites' and 'Zinovievites' . . .	Argues that the Purge of the Party spread to local party groups at the order of the Central Committee.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Kirov, his role in the 17th Party Congress, becoming rival to Stalin and why it might lead to problems
- possible moderation or relaxation of political and economic controls, leading to reduction in role of NKVD
- issues about role of NKVD in the whole business
- the escalation of 'terror' saw an extensive purge of the Leningrad party, Kirov's power base
- it soon became a witch-hunt after evidence was found linking Trotsky with oppositionists.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
It has been suggested that he sent the men of the old guard to their deaths as scapegoats for his economic failures.	Argues that the Purges started due to economic problems and high-ranking party members were made scapegoats to hide this.
Stalin's real and much wider motive was to destroy the men who represented the potentiality of alternative government.	Argues that Stalin's motive was to destroy any potential threat to his power.
There was also danger from abroad . . . Hitler's army marched into the Rhineland . . .	Argues that fear of war with Nazi Germany was a factor.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- the pace of industrialisation had to quicken and more workers or prisoners were needed
- by 1939, less than one-fifth of the membership at the beginning of 1921 remained – but, over 70% of 1939 members had been recruited since 1929
- mid-1930s – Five-Year Plans falling behind schedule – downturn in the Soviet economy after 1936 because of technical problems, Stalin's management of the economy, and a bad harvest that year
- Purges sustained the importance of the NKVD; they increased the scope of Purges.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- debatable who was behind the Kirov murder – the murder provided a good excuse for the Purges. If the Party leadership (Stalin) was behind it, Purges came from above, if not, Party members were destroying each other – leadership forced to cover-up inner destruction of the Party and carry out the Purges
- show trials not from thin air – Trotsky formed ‘bloc’ threat
- the ‘top down’ view – Stalin intended to kill his opponents to increase his personal power, for example, high profile show trials such as Zinoviev and Kamenev and Bukharin
- Purges used to push an unwilling population to work even harder, although already suffering from impact of First Five-Year Plan
- tension between workers and managers because of Stakhanovite campaign of 1936 – centre wanted to encourage workers to produce more and to put pressure on managers by demanding tools and materials. If managers did not respond they were denounced by workers
- some did not denounce managers – did not want production rates to fall
- Stalin’s personality – vengeful and paranoid, especially after suicide of his wife in 1932, as he believed others around him would try to betray him
- Stalin’s self-image – hero of the revolution
- Stalin thought he was acting in the interests of the Party
- no master plan – response to circumstances in Soviet Russia
- Stalin replaced Yagoda – criticised for not finding enemies of the people quickly enough. Yezhov instigated period of terror called Yezhovshchina (known by Western historians as the Great Purge) – reached height in mid-1937 and lasted until 1938
- people looked for personal gain from Purges – denounced others
- government worried about loss of support and control of the masses
- Purges caused so much social instability that it was impossible for society to challenge government
- Purges induced fear and submission, like under Lenin and the Tsars
- Stalin simply followed Lenin’s lead from the Red Terror
- campaign encouraging people to criticise officials – to deflect criticism from government
- people forced to look after their own interests, making it difficult to unite with each other
- in some ways hysteria was responsible for the spread of terror to such an extent as people were encouraged to denounce others.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Service	Takes the view that the Purges ‘could not have taken place but for Stalin’s personality and ideas’.
Sheila Fitzpatrick	Takes the view that the Purges came from ‘below’ – the Purges were the result of decisions made by the Communist leadership in reaction to a series of crises in the mid-1930s.
Stephen Cohen	Takes the view that Stalin knew old Bolsheviks could see he was not Lenin’s equal. By the end of the 1930s, the party was completely different – most members had joined since 1929.
Isaac Deutscher	Takes the view that, due to threat of war, Stalin purged the opposition who might interfere with his war plans – war could unite people against Stalin and overthrow him.

Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

Part A – Historical issues

Question 65 How far does the desire to protect the crown explain Miguel Primo de Rivera's attempts at social and economic reform in the 1920s?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the aims and policies of Primo de Rivera and the motives for these policies including longer-term economic, political, social and military problems within the country. Candidates might make a qualitative judgement on the relative importance of these factors. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of the intentions of Primo de Rivera as a significant factor

- a discussion of Primo's initial motives
- protection of the crown and the army and of a single, unified Spain
- restoration of social order through social improvements, political progress and economic expansion
- opposition to growing Republicanism, liberalism and left-wing ideologies.

Evidence which may support the view of economic reasons as a significant factor

- few producers controlling the supply of essential products, resulting in corruption and favouritism, for example, domination of the Latifundias
- hugely rural economy, reliant on backwards agrarian system with poor communications. Roads enhanced. Increase of four times the number of cars. Tourism encouraged. Reduced unemployment. Promoted a free market economy.

Evidence which may support the view of political reasons as a significant factor

- monarch massively unpopular
- regionalism popular in Basque Region, Catalonia and several other regions
- Caciques' power base damaging to growth and creation of a modern economy
- widespread discontent with the Turno Pacifico
- possible opposition of Confederation *National de Trabajo* and Union *General de Trabajadores* and, in particular, Francisco Largo Caballero in his social crusade
- growing Liberal movement
- significant Anarchist movement.

Evidence which may support the view of social reasons as a significant factor

- women's status in the urban society needed to improve. This also meant a gradual integration into the labour market
- need for affordable housing and pension benefits for the elderly
- health service needed to improve in line with the guidelines for a welfare state, as did education due to population increasing by over two million in one decade, mainly due to a fall in the mortality rate
- improvements also demanded in entertainments and sports sectors.

Evidence which may support the view of military reasons as a significant factor

- backwards colonial army designed to occupy lost empire
- officer corps bloated, technology lacking, promotion class-based
- difficulties in Morocco – an issue which had divided Spain over two decades.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Gerald Brenan	States that 'his greatness – for he had a kind of greatness – came from being a typical Andalusian, drawn larger than life'.
Stanley Payne	Argues that (Primo's) instincts were paternalistic and semi-liberal.
Luis Bolin	Argues that (initially) there were no strikes, production attained new levels, private enterprise flourished. A network of roads, properly banked and well-surfaced, spread over the country.
Paul Preston	Establishes that neither fascist nor democratic, Primo de Rivera's regime was anchored in the powerful Liberal tradition of Spain, but in its aimless drift towards nowhere it also looked to Fascism for inspiration.

Question 66 To what extent was a lack of finance the main reason for the failure of Azaña's agrarian reforms?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to highlight finance as one issue preventing the success of Azaña's agrarian reforms. Candidates might assess the reasons why, or question the extent to which, the reforms failed. Candidates might discuss the level to which the reforms succeeded and the other factors affecting this. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the background to the reforms were significant

General issues

- problems of Latifundias, although aristocracy only owned (the best) 6% of land
- conservatives believed reform was impossible and would be angered at any attempts
- leftists believed collectivisation held the solution and would be unhappy with less
- middle-class Republicans believed in reform but balked at potential sacrifices
- bad weather in the year 1930–1931.

Agrarian Reform Law, September 1932

- accepted principle of ownership: non-revolutionary
- recompensed all but 'Grande'
- however, a huge amount of (potentially pro-Republican) small-holders were involved
- some argue it was complicated, ineffective and expensive
- limited nature of the reforms gained no new supporters on the left but alienated the centre and right
- Caballero – 'An aspirin to cure appendicitis'.

Agrarian issues – covered by Caballero's 'Eight Laws'

- security of tenure
- security of occupation
- working conditions
- inefficient land use
- centuries of neglect had left a hugely inefficient rural sector, often unable to meet the demands of its population. Polarisation of rich and poor had carried on apace. South was mainly large estates in the hands of a few wealthy people. North had more small-holdings.

Evidence which may support the view that failure was due to lack of finance

- Spain suffered from the world economic collapse post-1929, therefore any government in 1931–1933 would lack finance
- Morgan's Bank cancelled a loan of 60 million dollars agreed prior to the Republic
- massive debts were inherited and the value of the peseta had collapsed
- there was a flight of capital in anticipation of wealth taxes
- the budget given to the Institute of Agrarian Reform was only 50 million pesetas – intended to resettle between 60,000 and 75,000 families a year
- money was used to retire generals and officers on full pay (could also argue this was not lack of finance but incorrect priorities).

Evidence which may support the view that failure was due to other reasons

- the Agrarian Reform Law of 1932 was too timid and could never have tackled Spain's deep-rooted problems
- compensation was paid to most landowners
- Azaña was more interested in attacking the church and reorganising the army
- in many places, the new laws were simply ignored by the landowners and law enforcement was weak

- the reforms showed the failures in the coalition – Azaña did not want revolutionary reforms which angered the trade unions and the left. Caballero's reforms as Minister of Labour were much more effective
- many on the left would never have accepted reforms as they wanted revolution and collectivisation.

Evidence which may support the view that the effect of the reforms were a reason for their failure

- at a local level, landlords simply ignored the new legislation and employed armed retainers
- Latifundias remained – many were recompensed for land; Minifundias and other small-holders also suffered, despite many being pro-Republic
- Prieto's reforms on irrigation and railroads were hampered by fiscal restrictions
- outside labour legislation 'punished' braceros (manual labourers) from high unemployment areas
- revolutionary measures.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Stanley Payne	Argues that Caballero's eight laws gave better pay, power, conditions and respect and constituted an impressive achievement. However, Caballero stated it would be unreasonable to go beyond the limits established in the most advanced countries of Western Europe. Republican reforms tended to reflect fragmentation rather than provide the means to overcome it.
Edward Malfekis	States that 'the nature of the rural oligarchy and its operation of the large estates may have made land reform economically justifiable . . . they did not thereby make it especially practicable in economic or political terms'.
Paul Preston	States that 'the response of big landowners . . . had been rapid . . . Their press networks spouted prophecies of doom . . . and further . . . the law of obligatory cultivation was effectively ignored and . . . it did nothing to help the smallholders of the north'.
Hugh Thomas	Argues that . . . 'the law of Términos municipales adversely affected migrant workers. Its effect was to prevent a further drift of labour to the cities . . . if it had been carried out fairly . . . it might have had a startling effect . . . But the reform was not properly introduced at all . . . the only real solution to the agrarian problem was to find a way to reduce the population on the land by encouraging industry'.

Question 67 How far can the Asturias Rising of 1934 be described as the ‘first battle of the Civil War’?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to assess the nature of the Asturias Rising and the extent to which long-term peace between opposing forces was impossible after it. Candidates might make comparisons between traditional industrial unrest and full-scale Civil War. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that it was the ‘first battle’ of the Civil War

- left had good reason to fear Robles’ rhetoric
- Asturias Rising was inspired by legal inclusion of elected members, therefore it was an illegal attack on government. Short-term devastation over and above that required to restore order, therefore an attack on workers by the forces of reaction
- Asturias not alone, there were strikes all over Spain
- Declaration of Catalan State on announcement of *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA) delegates – undemocratic
- insurrectionary behaviour of *Confederation National de Trabajo* (CNT), *Union General de Trabajadores* (UGT), *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI)
- reactions to *Federación Nacional da Trabajadores de la Tierra* (FNTT) strikes, banned on grounds of harvest being ‘sacred’
- suspension of *El Obrero de la Tierra*
- suspension of strike meetings
- Azaña, Lluís Companys, Caballero imprisoned
- government of Catalonia disbanded
- statute of autonomy suspended
- martial law.

Evidence which may contradict the view that it was the ‘first battle’ of the Civil War

- coordinated by trade unions therefore a ‘normal strike’
- the Civil War did not break out until 1936 and when it did, it was initiated by the right
- labour conditions in Asturias were horrendous and strike action was justified
- brutality of Casas Viejas
- Cortes not disbanded
- no right-wing coup
- Socialist Party and trade unions not proscribed
- both sides participated in the 1936 election and initially accepted the results
- it was election defeat which persuaded the right to rebel.

Evidence which may support the view of that this increased tension, but was not the ‘first battle’

- convinced right that left had abandoned democracy. War was closer
- convinced left that any gains made in 1931–1933 were doomed
- left knew that unity was essential
- polarisation between right and left.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Raymond Carr	States that 'Robles had declared . . . that socialism must be defeated at all costs. When it (the Asturias Rising) was over the nation was morally divided between those who favoured repression and those who did not'.
Paul Preston	Emphasises the increasing mimicking of Fascist tactics: 'A crowd of 20,000 gathered and shouted '¡jefe!¡jefe!¡jefe!' and 'Our Leaders never make mistakes!'.
Hugh Thomas	States that 'Largo reaffirmed his belief in the necessity of preparing a proletarian rising . . . describes this as a fatal error of judgement. Political feelings were . . . worsened beyond cure (during Bienio Negro). Where lay the difference between Dollfuss and Gil Robles? Gil Robles did nothing to make it clear'.
Gerald Brenan	Claims Asturias was the 'first battle of the Civil War' (left united against CEDA).

Question 68 To what extent was Franco's rise the result of his ability to manage potential rivals?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse Franco's rise to power, making comparisons of events and actions to evaluate the extent to which Franco's ability to manage political rivals was responsible for his success, the extent to which good fortune favoured him, and the role played by others. Candidates might discuss the loss of other potential leaders of the right; the role of Franco in securing German and Italian aid; military successes and lack of damage from military failures; political manoeuvrings which saw Franco as the leader of a unified right. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions regarding the reasons for Franco's rise during the Spanish Civil War.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Franco's rise was a result of his ability to manage political rivals

- Franco was revered by the Army of Africa and was viewed by them as the leader; Franco used this against other generals
- Franco skilfully manipulated the political vacuum to become the undisputed leader
- the clashes between the Carlists and the Falange were orchestrated by Franco to encourage Hedilla to make a move, which meant he overstepped the mark and could be sidelined by Franco
- military tactics – Franco argued that the delayed military victory was deliberate in order to ensure complete political control of the country
- the slow 'reconquering' of Spain was carried out in order to ensure a victory for Francoism over all his enemies. The left was not just to be defeated, it was to be annihilated. His potential rivals on the right were to be left in no doubt who the victor was
- Franco's skill in negotiating with Hitler and Mussolini to deliver foreign aid meant that he was unchallengeable as the conduit for aid.

Evidence which may support the view that Franco's rise was due to other factors

- deaths of Sotelo, Sanjurjo and Primo de Rivera meant that Franco was placed in a fortunate position
- Mola was arguably a better strategist but his personal reluctance – he wanted to ensure victory and then decide – helped leave a political vacuum for Franco to fill. Mola's death confirmed Franco's undisputed military leadership
- Franco had resources at his disposal, including aid from Germany and Italy not available to anyone else
- the channelling of aid through Franco meant that he had an unequalled position among the generals. Although Hitler had a personal dislike of Franco, he recognised from an early stage that he was the one most likely to unite the nationalists and win the war
- Franco made military mistakes including at Alcazar, Madrid and Brunette, which did not prove crucial, leaving his reputation largely intact
- the need of various groups on the right to find a unifying leader played into Franco's hands once others had died or disappeared. The right craved a central, authoritarian figure and Franco was the only one left who fitted the bill.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hugh Thomas	Argues that (before the rising), on the mainland, ‘Franco remained for some time a myth. He was spoken of incessantly, but no one seemed to know where he was.’; ‘He established himself as the political leader of the most passionately concerned country in the world by a contempt for political passions.’; ‘. . . no doubt he was assisted . . . by Serrano Súñer.’; ‘(There were) many opportunities for the Nationalist Alliance to collapse.’; ‘Franco’s calm, effortless, professional superiority first obtained him the leadership.’
Antony Beevor	States that ‘(Franco) had no effective rival and the very nature of the Nationalist movement begged a single, disciplined command’.
Paul Preston	States that ‘With his major political rivals all dead, Franco was free to control . . . the political direction of the Nationalists.’; ‘Franco (was) profligate with the lives of his troops – questionable strategic wisdom’.
Sheelagh Ellwood	Argues that ‘inhibition on behalf of the western democracies, together with the active involvement of Italy and Germany, undoubtedly swung the balance decisively in favour of Franco’.

Question 69	To what extent did Soviet aid make a positive contribution to the defence of the Spanish Republic between 1936 and 1939?
Aim of the question	The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate the overall effect of Soviet support on the Republican war effort. Candidates should make specific reference to Soviet aid and its effect on the economic, military, political and psychological sectors of the Republican side. Candidates might also refer to the positive and negative effects on morale at different interludes. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions. It is not sufficient to cite Soviet aid as one of the many factors leading to the defeat of the Republic.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of the positive aspects of Soviet support

Military

- only substantial support available
- imposed necessary military discipline on a disorganised Republic
- if Fascist support had been unopposed, the Republic would have been defeated sooner
- International Brigades and associated triumphs and advantages.

Economic

- argument that ‘accounting deficit’ was small
- specific reference to ‘good’ aid (tanks – excellent, ‘Mosca’ significant in aerial defence, logistics important).

Psychological

- huge boost to morale.

Evidence which may support the view of the negative aspects of Soviet support

Military

- less than Italians and Germans – candidates may have some statistics here.

Political

- nature of support aimed at continuation, not victory
- communist control of Republic inevitable
- accusations of political sectarianism against anarchists and Part of Marxist Unification (POUM)
- distancing from western democracies
- ultimately unreliable – Nazi-Soviet Pact
- communisation of cause.

Economic

- argument that accountancy deficit was large, and gold was lost to Moscow.

Psychological

- attacks on collectivisation led to demoralising effect on militias.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
George Esenwein	States that ‘. . . the communists were determined to put the Popular Front policy to . . . the collective security of the Soviet Union. For many, the foreign volunteers who had come to Spain embodied the international spirit of anti-fascism’.
Gerald Brenan	Establishes that ‘Stalin saw to it that the arms which he supplied . . . should secure the predominance of the communist party’.
Raymond Carr	Argues that ‘The war was kept going by Soviet supplies and the Popular Army, (del Vayo) . . . was unconditionally in the service of the communist party. . . . The International Brigades were shock troops whose losses were among the heaviest in military history . . . very few Russians actually in Spain. . . . the communists . . . virtually controlled the destinies of the left camp. Many conservatives (in Britain) . . . because of their fear of Bolshevism privately hoped Franco would win.’
Antony Beevor	States that ‘The arrival of the Russian Mosca made the Heinkel 51 obsolete; (In 1937) Stalinist spy mania was reaching a peak’.

Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923–1945

Part B – Historical sources

Question 70 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source A** in explaining the reasons for Alfonso's 'departure'.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	King Alfonso XIII	Alfonso was held responsible by many for his own downfall due to his incompetence, lifestyle and, latterly, his alliance with Primo de Rivera.
Purpose	Speech	Made to announce his departure (not his abdication) and to attempt to retain some credibility and leave the possibility of his return open; trying to present himself as a monarch acting in the interests of Spain.
Timing	April 1931	Alfonso's farewell speech almost immediately following the municipal elections (the first for 9 years) which returned a majority of anti-monarchical parties and had been fought as a virtual referendum on the future of the monarchy. Alfonso left Spain two days after this result.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
The elections held on Sunday proved to me that I no longer hold the love and affection of my people.	The elections are mentioned at the outset. Suggests that these were the immediate reason for his demise. He has realised that he is not what the Spanish people want; the strength of support for a Republic frightened Alfonso into this action.
A king may make mistakes. Without doubt I have done so on occasion, but I know our country has always shown herself generous towards the faults of others committed without malice.	Highlights that Alfonso also mentions his own 'mistakes', clearly looking for the 'sympathy vote', a plaintive plea for forgiveness; this is at odds with the following sentence where he suggests he could have beaten anyone who threatened him. This indecisiveness seemed to show what a weak man he was.
. . . I prefer to stand resolutely aside rather than to provoke a conflict which might array my countrymen against one another in civil war and patricidal strife.	He is putting it in a very noble way to show the reasons for his departure in a favourable light. He claims his motives are to avoid Civil War but by now he knew there was no one to stand up for him; he had alienated the army and the church and they now stood aside and let him go.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- specific analysis of the electoral results which gave sweeping gains to anti-monarchical parties
- Alfonso made many of his own 'mistakes', particularly his alliance with the dictator
- reference to details of Alfonso's playboy lifestyle throughout his reign
- growth of political extremes in Spain had led to some civil strife and it is possible Alfonso's presence could have prompted more. He was the subject of several assassination attempts during his reign including on his wedding day
- Alfonso claims stepping down is voluntary for the love of his country.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- broader discussion of the reasons for Alfonso's decline
- widespread poverty led to his unpopularity
- growth of socialism and anarchism widespread
- links to the church and army were extremely close and led to him being blamed for the failure of both
- latterly, the Dictadura and Alfonso's embracing of 'My Mussolini' damaged the credibility of the institution and of Alfonso himself. It is often argued that this period alienated Primo and Alfonso from all sections of society
- despite his comments, it was unlikely he could have maintained power – both the church and the army had withdrawn support.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Raymond Carr	Argues that 'The Republicans rejected monarchy as an illegitimate and outmoded form of government; the Carlists rejected the Alfonsine branch . . . The Socialists considered (it) reactionary . . . The anarchists rejected it <i>in toto</i> . To the regionalists it . . . strangled local interests . . . the radical regenerationists believed (in) root and branch reform . . . The destruction of the historic provinces and their replacement by artificial entities . . . was at the root of the regionalist movements . . . (it was) the personal unpopularity of the king himself (which brought down the monarchy) . . . the conservative classes, during 1930, lost confidence in the monarchy'.
Gerald Brenan	States that 'Unlike England and France there was no upward movement from one (class) to another . . . the corruption of all the upper layers of society. The ease with which the dictator had been brought down encouraged the middle classes . . . to think that Alfonso could be got rid of too. Since 1788, not a single Spanish sovereign had had a natural reign'.
Paul Preston	Argues that '(the monarchy) had fallen into disrepute by the time Primo seized power'.
Anthony Beevor	Argues that 'Alfonso treated the ruling of Spain as little more than a fascinating hobby. The Spanish Church was said to have owned up to one third of the total wealth of Spain. (The Latifundias') subjects were treated almost as a subject race'.

Question 71 How fully does **Source B** explain the motives of those who rebelled against the Republic in 1936?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
The new government seemed obsessively biased against the Right [as shown when] Prime Minister Azaña pardoned those workers and left-wing soldiers involved in the Asturias and other risings.	Highlights the perception of some that the government was 'biased against the Right'.
Franco and Mola were redeployed, with the aim of neutralising their potential as plotters.	Argues that Franco and Mola's redeployment looked like another attack on the Army, to many people on the right.
The month of May began with a general strike invoked by the anarchist CNT.	Claims that behaviour of left, especially the anarchists, would frighten many on the right.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- plotting had been going on for some time, not directly linked to Popular Front
- the government had little time to show its bias before the uprising
- Popular Front campaign based around the 'political prisoners', therefore an issue for both left and right
- newspapers were rife with stories of murder and assassinations by the 'Reds'
- by 1936, the left were in little mood for restraint and there was an outburst of demands from the left
- press produced propaganda designed to provoke the right-wing conservatives.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- the right was a diverse group, with diverse reasons for participation
- many in Spain saw Communism as the 'real' threat, giving unified purpose
- Falange believed in the possibility of the establishment of a fascist state
- loss of election in 1936 had convinced the right that violence was needed and ended split with 'Accidentalists'
- the election had been fought on the basis of civilisation versus barbarism for the right
- apparent communist support for the government caused alarm and the army was given the message that a coup might be the answer
- a struggle against separatism
- the Carlists wanted a traditional Spain without liberal democracy
- motives of the Spanish Church and of some Roman Catholics.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Emphasises that the Carlists were famous for their ferocious rejection of modernity.
Julian Casanova	Believes that 'the Church suffered brutal persecution'.
Hugh Thomas	Argues that 'Between February and June 1936 (according to Robles) . . . 160 churches had been burned to the ground, 269 mainly political murders and 1,287 assaults . . . 69 political centres had been wrecked, there had been 113 general strikes and 228 partial strikes, while ten newspaper offices had been sacked. The conditions in the country and the regime were as grave as Robles described them. This unified the right behind the 'Crusade''.
Stanley Payne	States that '. . . a very large number of people wanted a new Spain-which would be worthy of Spain's great past . . . Murders for political reasons (in 1936) were reported almost daily'.

Question 72 How much do **Sources C** and **D** reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of the role of the Barcelona rising in the growing disunity among Republican forces after 1937?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
. . . fighting in the streets of Barcelona between supporters of the POUM aided by some Anarchists, on the one hand, and Government forces on the other.	Suggests a fair amount of disagreement in Barcelona between the sections of the Republican supporters, showing itself in street fighting.
The POUM, who had always been hostile to unity, talked of ‘beginning the struggle for working-class power’.	Suggests that the POUM were pursuing their own agenda, further fragmenting the Republican forces; the POUM had never felt the Republican government was going far enough towards the real demands of the working class.
The news of the fighting was greeted with incredulity, consternation and then extreme anger by the International Brigaders.	Contents that International Brigaders couldn’t believe what they were hearing; they wanted to fight international fascism rather than see internal fighting on their own side.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- fighting was initiated by government forces in reaction to trivial incident. Anarchist occupation of the telephone exchange was unacceptable to their ‘allies’. Animosity between POUM and the Communist Party
- Anarchists believed they had been starved of resources by the Communists
- the International Brigades were not universally welcomed.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The distance between the base and the leadership widened even further, [for example] in May 1937 . . .	Argues that political extremes led to divisions within the anarchists and the left in general.
This proved the key event that brought down the government of Largo Caballero . . .	Claims that the ‘May Days’, when CNT and FAI leadership ordered their militants to lay down their arms, were key in bringing down the government.
It finally broke the tremendous moral influence of the CNT-FAI on its main stronghold – Catalonia.	Claims that the laying down of arms meant that the CNT-FAI lost its influence in its main power base of Catalonia – this weakened it overall.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- accounts of the early days of the conflict, including Orwell’s, highlight the popular enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of many of the working-class anarchists
- the conflict which exploded in May 1937 in Barcelona is believed by many to have been engineered by the Stalin-led Communists who sought to conceal any evidence of revolutionary behaviour due to their need for western alliances
- discussion of the profound consequences for the anarchists as a result of this victory for the Communists against other socialist and left-wing groups
- impact of the fall of Caballero’s government.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- divisions were apparent well before 1937
- arguably, May Days took place because Communists were now sufficiently in control – May Days were a result, not a cause
- International Brigades would receive their information from pro-Communist sources
- much of the equipment held back was for use against the ‘revolutionaries’
- for many, the democratic nature of anarchism meant that the defence was delayed at best
- collectivisation in Barcelona was widespread and popular with many – however, its effect on productivity throughout the Republican zone is hotly debated
- redistribution led to arguments between ‘allies’ over ownership and other ‘revolutionary’ ideals
- the key debate of ‘war or revolution’ is often cited as a reason for the defeat of the Republic and Orwell claims that the government was more afraid of revolution than the fascists, often deploying its own forces to ‘police’ the Republican zone.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Gerald Brenan	States that ‘By the end of 1936 the period of social revolution was over; (the Communists) stood for a regular army instead of party militias, for an end to all revolutionary measures, for greater centralisation and a more efficient conduct of the war. In this, Prieto and Negrín with about half of the socialists and all the Republicans supported them. On the other side stood the Prime Minister, Largo Caballero, with his group of Left-wing Socialists and all the CNT’.
George Esenwein	States that ‘Up to the May events of 1937, the main rivals of the Communists were to be found on the far Left . . . Yet not long after (they) were challenged not only by the caballeristas, the anarcho-syndicalists and the poumistas, but also by high-ranking members of the government itself (including Azaña). . . . The CNT-FAI was not called to account for its role in the disturbances . . . partly because its relative power and strength was still considerable’.
Paul Preston	States that ‘. . . after the May Days (there were complaints) about (Caballero’s) ineptitude, lack of control . . . In large part because of Communist pressure (he) was replaced on 17 May.’
Raymond Carr	Believes that Axis fears of rebel defeat led to extra aid in November 1938. Republican government blamed lack of unity.

Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

Part A – Historical issues

Question 73 To what extent was Chamberlain's resignation due to his inability to gear the economy effectively for 'total war'?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate to what extent the state of the economy was responsible for Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's resignation. Candidates might not only consider the isolated factor, the economy, but also the various other factors which led to Chamberlain's resignation in May 1940. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Chamberlain's resignation was due to the economy

Throughout his tenure as Prime Minister, Chamberlain's management of the economy has been criticised

- there was concern that, to prepare for war, Britain's workforce had to be organised in such a way as to maximise its potential. One of the major criticisms of Chamberlain was his inability to organise the workforce with any specific focus – domestically or militaristically
- however, Chamberlain's government was ideologically opposed to extensive state intervention in the economy
- while there was a demand and a need for extra workers to provide the manpower for re-armament, there was still an estimated one million unemployed by 1940. This reflected badly on Chamberlain's organisational skills at a time of national emergency, when commentators thought that full employment was not only achievable but necessary
- the consequence of this economic mismanagement was the failure of essential industries to work at peak capacity due to a lack of manpower
- Chamberlain had a poor relationship with the unions which stretched back to the 1930s
- Chamberlain had been Chancellor of the Exchequer and due to the austere government policies and the high unemployment of the hungry '30s, the trade union movement refused to work with him because they believed he was responsible for so much misery in the recent past
- the trade unions were supported by the parliamentary Labour Party
- there was a concern that the government would limit access to resources and goods usually needed by the domestic market. The consequence of this was a serious threat of uncontrolled inflation which would ultimately increase the cost of living, thereby making people poorer. After the lean years of the early '30s, this was not popular
- perhaps Chamberlain's overall failure in the management of the economy before the war was his inability to appoint a cabinet member with full control of the economy. The result was that a holistic view of the economy was not realised. Therefore, the transition from a peacetime economy to wartime economy was slow and uncoordinated
- these issues exposed failings in Chamberlain putting his leadership under increasing scrutiny
- to control inflation, the government restricted the supply of foodstuffs and, more importantly, raised taxation. These policies were not popular with the general public. Nevertheless, there was some understanding concerning the need for more monies to be generated to pay for future conflict.

Evidence which may support the view that Chamberlain's resignation was due to his policy of appeasement

Chamberlain's resignation was due to the misguided policy of appeasement

- Chamberlain was criticised for his policy of appeasement as it gave Germany and allies time to re-arm and prepare for war
- the policy was criticised as an attempt to avoid conflict by using inappropriate concession and negotiation that led Britain to the brink of defeat

- Chamberlain was associated with this policy which is given as one of the main reasons for his downfall and, consequently, his resignation.

Appeasement was a reasonable policy

- it was a popular policy at the time and was endorsed by both sides in parliament
- in retrospect, the policy of appeasement was seen by some as a farsighted policy which was the only realistic option which allowed Britain time to re-arm
- while the argument about the importance of appeasement continues, at that time it was not the policy of appeasement which was the issue, because it had cross-party support – it was the leadership style or the lack of leadership of Chamberlain himself
- the policy of appeasement continued by Chamberlain demonstrated to the empire that Britain had done everything possible to avoid another war – therefore when the war started, the empire quickly came to Britain's aid.

Evidence which may support the view that the lack of allies caused Chamberlain's resignation

Lack of allies

- with the real possibility of war looming, Chamberlain tried but was unsuccessful in gaining meaningful alliances to fight a successful war in Europe
- the USA confirmed its isolationist policy towards conflict in Europe
- Czechoslovakia was conceded after the Munich agreement of September 1938
- Chamberlain's distrust of the USSR prevented any alliance in the East against Germany
- this left France – with a heavily defended border and unstable government – as Britain's only viable option
- however, France had large armed forces and had built the Maginot Line to guard against German aggression.

Evidence which may support the view that the Phoney War and the Norway Campaign caused Chamberlain's resignation

Issues arising from Chamberlain's handling of the Phoney War

- once Germany violated the ultimatum over Poland, there was a two-day silence from the government which led Chamberlain's opponents to believe that he was preparing for another negotiation with Germany. This act reduced his credibility even with his own party
- while fears were allayed on 3 September, the preceding weeks and months of inactivity led his critics to question his appetite for war
- this appetite may have been sated by the Army's first taste of combat in Norway. However, the shambolic sortie to Norway – and Chamberlain's association with it – perhaps for some illustrated his inability to plan, equip and execute a basic military strategy. This lack of ability is seen as a metaphor not only for his leadership so far but also for his ability to sustain coherent leadership for the duration of the war
- politicians such as Churchill, who was the instigator of the Norway Campaign, emerged blameless
- it was the resultant vote of no confidence in parliament after this event that persuaded Chamberlain to resign, as a huge majority of over 200 seats was reduced to 80
- the Norway Campaign was one of the factors responsible for his resignation.

Evidence which may support other factors

- changing attitudes of many members of the Conservative Party towards Chamberlain by May 1940
- long-standing Labour Party criticisms of Chamberlain
- Labour Party's refusal to serve under Chamberlain in a coalition government.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Angus Calder	Suggests that it was not Chamberlain alone who contributed to difficulties faced by Britain but that 'His optimism, which now seems so feckless, was shared by other leaders of both major parties'.
Robert MacKay	Contends that 'Absolute readiness for war is probably an unattainable ideal for any country, not least because of the uncertainty about the exact circumstances in which a future war might take place'.
A J P Taylor	Concludes that the policy of appeasement was 'both logical and realistic, although it was not well executed'.
Paul Addison	Argues that 'the major criticism of Chamberlain centred on his refusal to institute stronger coordination of the economy'.

Question 74 How far can the Allied bombing campaign against Germany between 1939 and 1945 be judged a success?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to evaluate the success or otherwise of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany. Candidates might include comments about Allied strategy, target selection and accuracy, and damage inflicted on targets. Candidates might provide an assessment of the positive and negative impacts of strategic bombing during the Second World War. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the bombing campaign can be judged a success

- the reasons for bombing Germany were to disrupt industrial production of weapons, to wear down German morale and to force the German army and air force to defend against the bombing over a wide area
- repeated attacks on Germany caused the diversion of industrial war production to defensive rather than offensive weapons
- forcing the Germans on to the defensive was a critical factor in the liberation of Europe and the resulting defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945
- the bombing campaign diverted a great deal of Germany's war effort away from the war at sea or the main fighting fronts. German bomber production was cut back and one-third of the production of heavy guns, electrical and radar equipment went to anti-aircraft defences
- bombing was vital to British victory as 'bombing placed a ceiling on the expansion of German war potential'. Germany mounted a huge effort to protect itself from Bomber Command and this, in turn, deprived its army and air force of men and equipment. 75% of its heavy anti-tank guns, manned by 900,000 soldiers, had to be used as anti-aircraft guns, scattered across Germany
- German factories had to concentrate on producing aircraft which were used in a defensive role
- Erhard Milch, a German field marshal, commented that 'The British inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us, but the Americans stabbed us to the heart'
- bombing was a component part of the wider strategy, complementary to land invasion and to the exercise of tactical air power. In October 1940, the War Cabinet agreed 'the civilian population around the target areas must be made to feel the weight of the war'. Weeks later, it sanctioned an experimental 'terror raid' on Mannheim. 'Thus British and Germans alike', asserts Basil Collier, 'believed that destroying cathedrals and hospitals and killing non-combatants of all ages and both sexes, either in the course of impracticable attempts to bomb strictly military objectives . . . [was] . . . both legitimate and sound'
- a key objective of the bombing offensive was to weaken the German war effort by disrupting its economy. The defeat of the German air force coincided with improvements in bombing accuracy which made the bomber force a valuable wartime weapon
- Churchill, in the final volume of his memoirs, said 'In judging the contribution to victory of strategic air power . . . before the end, we and the US had developed striking forces so powerful that they played a major part in the economic collapse of Germany'
- bombing was justified on the grounds that the Germans had used similar tactics against Britain (the Blitz), and retaliation in kind was a morale booster for the British public
- Germany's losses in the bombing offensive are estimated to be as high as 600,000, most of them civilians. A further five million were 'de-housed'
- by 1945, the major cities of the Third Reich had been razed to the ground.

Evidence which may support the view that the bombing campaign was not a success

- by August 1941, 'only about one in five of Bomber Command's aircraft was putting its bombs within five miles of its target' due to difficulties encountered in flying in darkness and in bad weather
- in the autumn of 1941, the decision was taken by Air Ministry planners to switch the order of target priority. Area bombing was to be the first priority and precision raids would be carried out when appropriate. The bomber force needed more aircrews, bigger bombers and better navigation equipment to be effective

- there was further criticism of the bombing strategy when economists looked at the amount of men and material involved. They claimed that the immense resources devoted to Bomber Command could have been better used during the war
- they may have been arrogant to think that the reaction of the German civilian population would be any less patriotic than the reaction of Londoners during the Blitz
- this strategy was further compromised by the moral issue that area bombing would ultimately lead to what we now call collateral damage
- as the war was nearing an end, it became harder to argue that raids were saving the lives of Allied soldiers
- Churchill's attitude towards the morality of bombing changed after the destruction of Dresden (February 1945).

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Overy	Argues that the bombing of Germany was vital to British victory. 'Bombing placed a ceiling on the expansion of German war potential'. Germany mounted a huge effort to protect itself from Bomber Command and this, in turn, deprived its army and air force of men and equipment. 'The bombing campaign diverted a great deal of Germany's war effort away from the war at sea or the main fighting fronts.'
Ian Kershaw	Claims that during the autumn of 1944, all spheres of German armament production fell sharply . . . 'The main reason was the huge increase in Allied bombing – 60% of all bombs dropped over Germany fell after July 1944.'
Max Hastings	Argues that in respect of denting German morale, Britain failed: 'It was a terrible experience to be bombed, but German morale never came near to collapse until the very end.' If anything, the continuous bombings of German cities only strengthened morale.
Detlef Siebert	Is equally sceptical about the effectiveness of area bombing on German war production and its population.

Question 75 'Only the Lend-Lease programme prevented the collapse of the British economy.'

How valid is this view of the impact of the war on the British economy?

Aim of the question

The aim of this question is to allow candidates to analyse the impact of the war on the British economy, and therefore some appreciation of the country's finances and economic position at the beginning of the war may be a useful starting point. However, candidates should concentrate on the war years, assessing how much the war cost Britain in lost exports, and its impact on the industrial infrastructure of the country. Candidates might show clear knowledge of government strategies for paying for the war, and the value of US Lend-Lease to the British economy. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Lend-Lease played a crucial role in Britain's wartime economy

- a brief explanation of the shortcomings of the British economy at the outbreak of war
- Roosevelt instigated Lend-Lease in March 1941, nine months before the USA entered World War II, as Britain was running out of money to pay for the war
- Britain was the greatest recipient of Lend-Lease
- the origins, nature and extent of the Lend-Lease programme
- Canada gave Britain a gift of a considerable amount of money during the war
- Reverse Lend-Lease supplied equipment and food to US forces, for example, Spitfires to the US Air Force
- Lend-Lease merely postponed an ongoing decline – the level of debt incurred by Britain and the reliance on the USA for machine tools and other essential production tools even prior to the programme
- Lend-Lease ended suddenly after the defeat of Japan which left Britain facing a 'financial Dunkirk' (Keynes).

Evidence which may support the view that government policies played a crucial role in Britain's wartime economy

Economic

- income tax was raised to 50% in 1941
- 1941 Budget promoted saving to prevent inflation
- restriction of civilian consumption kept inflation in check
- the Board of Trade managed a reduction in the output of civilian goods. Production of consumer goods fell to half its pre-war level, leading to shortages of household goods such as furniture and clothing
- government controlled imports through shipping licenses
- reduction of imports by 40% during the war
- rationing was introduced in January 1940. It was generally considered to be a fair policy and was therefore quite popular
- alcohol and cigarettes were not rationed, but were heavily taxed to increase government revenue
- food was subsidised – much of the money came from tax revenues from alcohol and cigarettes
- Ministry of Supply supplied the army, Ministry of Aircraft Production supplied the RAF, Admiralty supplied the navy.

Rationing

- shortages of some foods and consumer goods due to restriction of imports
- rationing – complaints that individuals involved in heavy manual work did not have sufficient rations
- there was a large black market in rationed goods and items. These were affordable by the wealthy while the poor had to do without
- the impact of the war on the balance of payments.

Evidence which may support the view that organisation of the workforce played a crucial role in Britain's wartime economy

War work

- Minister of Labour and National Service, Ernest Bevin, was responsible for organising the nation's workers
- Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940 gave Bevin the authority to force individuals to do war work
- 10,000,000 people employed in active service or employed in the munitions industries
- key workers were prevented from joining the armed forces to ensure war materials were produced
- unions reluctantly accepted dilution to ensure productivity
- Bevin consulted both unions and employers over policy to avoid industrial unrest.

Industrial disputes

- 250,000 men and 90,000 women were directed into wartime industrial work
- industrial disputes continued throughout the war.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Paul Addison	Argues that the government fiscal policies (even a 50% basic income tax rate), the returns from indirect taxation and the seven-fold increase in personal savings would not, as stated in the Test of War, 'taken together, have been sufficient to finance the protracted war in which Britain was engaged'.
Robert MacKay	Argues that the transition to a thorough-going economy for total war was an uneven process, as much a product of external events as of the steady implementation of a comprehensive strategy.
Winston Churchill	In his later <i>History of the Second World War</i> , he praised its importance and its spirit of generosity; calling it 'the most un-sordid act in the history of any nation'.
Peter Howlett	Argues that the wartime economy was effective; if not, Britain could not have resisted the powers of Germany.

Question 76 To what extent did the Labour Governments of 1945–1951 deliver a ‘New Jerusalem’ to the British people?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to examine the policies that the Labour government implemented between 1945 and 1951. Candidates should establish the intent of the reforms and evaluate whether they delivered a significant change in governmental style which delivered a new people-centric society that promoted a vision of equality. To enable them to do this, candidates might define ‘New Jerusalem’ and match the reforms to their stated criteria. This allows them to make a value judgement in each area and overall. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view of a ‘New Jerusalem’ such as:

Economy

- an examination of the principles and workings of the welfare state as a system of universal and comprehensive services, and the degree to which this found acceptance with the public
- an appraisal of Labour domestic policies, such as nationalisation
- the extent to which there was a redistribution of wealth within the country. An indicator of change might be that a high proportion of its wealth is shared among most of its people. This is unlike a traditional capitalist state, where most of the wealth is in the hands of a few of its people
- some attempt at public ownership of the commanding heights of the economy was made
- the most exhaustive study of Labour’s economic policy concludes that it was difficult to see how this performance could have been improved upon
- Attlee’s record emerges in a far more positive light when judged against a range of contemporary yardsticks – for example, the performance of previous governments, the aims of Labour compared with the Conservative Party, and the economic circumstances inherited in 1945.

Health and housing

- the development of the NHS and an evaluation of its worth as a policy of equality
- Bevan built an NHS system from scratch, despite the formidable opposition of the British Medical Association (BMA)
- universality meant an end to the hated means test
- provision of quality, affordable council housing.

Welfare

- Labour went beyond even Beveridge’s ideas on welfare.

Education

- the extension of educational provision can also be used to establish a baseline of provision which can be linked to the ideal of a social meritocracy.

Evidence which may support the view that a ‘New Jerusalem’ was not achieved

Economy

- some argue that Labour ministers may have introduced long-overdue social reforms but they failed to redistribute wealth or to break down rigid class barriers, for example, 1% of the population still owned 50% of private capital
- there is debate over how popular and how effective the policy of nationalisation was. Was it popular at the polls?

Health and housing

- the NHS did not eliminate private medicine, nor discourage its use in NHS hospitals
- consultants could work for both the NHS and also have private patients
- disappointment at Labour’s record on the housing issue which arguably led to their electoral defeat in 1951.

Welfare

- a benefit system based on flat-rated insurance payments was not equal in nature. Some even saw it as a stealth tax on the least well off
- the principle of universal benefits might aid those most well off who didn't need them.

Education

- little was done to promote educational equality.

Political change

- for left-wing critics, the immediate post-war years were marked by a betrayal of socialist idealism and by wasted opportunities. Instead of using public backing as evidence in 1945 to introduce wholesale socialist change, Labour instead opted for cautious reformism, for example, failing to break down entrenched class barriers
- the major complaint of left-wing critics was that the Attlee years did not see enough socialism to create a 'New Jerusalem'
- government can be criticised for not going far enough, and for those hoping to see the end of capitalism, Attlee's ministry was extremely disappointing.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Kenneth Morgan	As a supporter of the Attlee reforms, he feels that the Attlee era constituted Labour's finest hour. This period went some way towards satisfying wartime demands for a 'New Jerusalem': the economy recovered from the ravages of war while avoiding a return to mass unemployment, and ministers never wavered in their determination to fulfil the Beveridge promise of social protection 'from the cradle to the grave'.
Peter Hennessy	Claims that the Attlee government 'disillusioned its own militants by achieving only modest reform, so providing a springboard for the rich to take off into the profiteers' paradise of the 1950s'.
Correlli Barnett	Is highly critical of wartime evangelists of a 'Brave New World', such as Beveridge, who were allowed to prevail over those aware of the 'Cruel Real World' of lost exports and vanished overseas investment.
Kevin Jefferys	Calls the Attlee reforms 'revolution without tears'.

Question 77 To what extent did the war hasten Britain's imperial decline?

Aim of the question The aim of this question is to allow candidates to discuss the extent of decolonisation that had taken place by 1951, setting it within the context of imperial decline. Candidates might offer an appreciation of the factors at work in hastening decolonisation and analyse whether the war was the primary agent in bringing about this process or merely an accelerating factor. In this way, candidates may present reasoned conclusions.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that economic reasons linked to the impact of the war hastened Britain's imperial decline

Impact of the war

- reference to specific examples of decolonisation, in particular India and Pakistan independence (1947), but also Transjordan (1946), Burma and Ceylon (1948), Palestine (1948) and Libya (1951)
- the loss of India was a major blow to Britain's military and political presence East of Suez
- question of whether Indian independence and further decolonisation was a noble foreign policy initiative or an abandonment of the Indian sub-continent to Civil War with undue haste. An analysis of the cost of the war and Britain's additional military and financial obligations as a reason for decolonisation
- Britain continued to see itself as the world's third greatest power, and to that end retained a military presence in significant and strategic areas of the world which it could not afford.

Longer-term economic reasons

- from being a great creditor nation with the world's most powerful currency, Britain ended the war in debt to the tune of £3,500 million, a huge balance of payments deficit and an enormous loss of overseas markets
- by July 1947, sterling was freely convertible to dollars, threatening to wipe out Britain's dollar reserve and virtually destroying the pound as a trading currency
- however, the sterling area still accounted for over half the world's trade in the immediate post-war years, and Britain retained close commercial ties with British dominions – despite interference from the USA
- after the financial crises of 1947, 1949 and 1951, Britain's economic capacity to remain a world power, even with US aid, was severely challenged by the fragility of the British trading and financial position.

Evidence which may support the view that political reasons hastened Britain's imperial decline

Domestic political pressures

- the attitude of the Labour Party to the issue of decolonisation
- pressure from anti-colonial movements during and after the war.

Changing perception of status

- Britain's decolonisation can be attributed to pragmatism and prestige, with officials convinced that refusing to decolonise would tarnish Britain's image forever, or even that decolonising required strength
- Britain's self-interest was still served in large parts of Africa as well as the Caribbean and Hong Kong
- Britain's concept of 'an informal empire', post-1947
- Britain's retreat from status as an imperial power in the Middle East and the reasons for this
- financial constraints forced Britain to reduce some overseas commitments resulting in military withdrawal from Greece, Turkey and Palestine.

Evidence which may support the view that the changing international position hastened Britain's imperial decline

Relations with empire

- two forces accelerated the end of the empire as Britain sought to salvage its international image: criticism at the United Nations and decolonisation by the other European powers
- influence of other decolonising nations such as the French and Dutch
- Nationalism, economic constraints, and Britain's relative decline all played a part
- British governments had to face the imperative of economic recovery and the threat of communist expansion during the Cold War
- the so-called special relationship with the United States and Britain's support of its Cold War policies
- the Commonwealth and the emerging European Community as potentially conflicting circles of interest influenced the pace of decolonisation and Britain's relations with former territories
- by 1951, Commonwealth relationships had undergone a fundamental transformation, the full effects of which were only just becoming apparent. In Malaya and Iran, the emerging conflicts there clearly marked out some of the limits of British world power status in the post-war world.

Relations with the USA, UN and NATO

- the pressure placed on Britain by the superpowers to decolonise, and in particular the desire of the USA to gain access to British colonial markets
- the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent was a significant factor in allowing the British to see themselves as the third world power, and, if nothing else, the gap between Britain's status in the world and any other countries apart from the USA and USSR was enormous
- British diplomacy brought the USA into NATO – this demonstrated to others that they still had considerable global influence
- as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Britain had a successful influence.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robert Pearce	Believes in the importance of the war as a precipitating factor.
John Darwin	Cites the changing economic relationship between Britain and the British colonies (dominions) brought about by the war, as a vital reason for the colonies' desire to extend economic independence to a full political one. He refers to 'the convulsive moment in Asia' in 1947–1948 as a fundamental harbinger of change'.
Correlli Barnett	Produces the most savage critique of global overstretch and the pursuit of the illusion of power as a primary cause of British imperial decline in the post-war period.
Roger Lewis	Is more specific and attributes the process to specific decisions taken by the Attlee government of 1947–1948. Others blur the focus and describe a more gradual and spasmodic process.

Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938–1951

Part B – Historical sources

Question 78 How much do **Sources A** and **B** reveal about differing interpretations of the extent of the challenges facing the leaders of Britain's naval and land forces during World War Two?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
. . . during the happy, beaming honeymoon of Anglo-American relations, the two groups of Joint Chiefs were fused into a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee with a permanent apparatus. This body became the ultimate strategy-making institution for the two Western Allies.	Suggests that the challenge was how to coordinate Britain's military plans with the USA, and at the start, everybody was happy with the relationship.
National differences [what often looked like the contest between American dogmatism and British pragmatism] inevitably caused disagreements.	Suggests that there were disagreements inside the Committee, especially between the British and Americans, on their views over how the war should be fought (American dogmatism versus British pragmatism).
Above all, there were the personalities of the two great leaders, Roosevelt and Churchill, both of them liable, in the eyes of their military advisors, to take up far-fetched schemes and fly off at tangents.	Suggests that there were also problems which arose from the personalities of the two great wartime leaders who were involved in the Committee; they often had far-fetched schemes.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- detail on the appointment of different Supreme Commanders, their theatres of war and their success in them, and the challenges facing them in pursuit of their strategies
- examples of dogmatism versus pragmatism in different theatres
- details on the challenges facing the British military leaders in pursuit of their strategies, for example, Casablanca Conference, D-Day planning, demand for unconditional German surrender
- the challenge for the British was to keep the Americans focused on Europe and their desire to ensure allocation of US naval forces in the Atlantic.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Until March 1943, Enigma decrypts were primarily used defensively, so that convoys could be diverted away from waiting wolf packs. By the end of March there were so many U-boats in the North Atlantic that, even when Enigma decrypts revealed their whereabouts, there were often other U-boats waiting on any diverted route.	Argues that the problem was how to best handle the information that Britain was getting from its decryption of the German naval Enigma codes. Britain used the information defensively to move convoys out of the way of German U-boats, but that wasn't working now since there were so many German U-boats that this just moved the convoy into the path of another wolf pack.
Admiral King of the US Navy, tried to convince the British to use Enigma offensively, particularly against German U-tankers.	Points out that the US Navy argued that the Enigma decrypts should be used offensively rather than defensively to actually get at the German U-tankers which were refuelling the rest of the German U-boats.
Admiral King's proposals were strongly opposed by Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, on the grounds that aggressive use of Enigma would compromise its source.	Argues that British naval leaders believed that, by using Enigma offensively, they would risk compromising the source (and make the Germans suspicious about whether Enigma had been broken) and this could lead to a drastic increase in shipping losses.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- loss of shipping in the Atlantic as a result of U-boat activity, for example, Happy Time
- detail on Enigma decoding, Bletchley Park, Churchill's views on its importance, its influence on the Battle of the Atlantic
- details on the challenges facing the British military leaders in pursuit of their strategies, for example, Casablanca Conference, D-Day planning, demand for unconditional German surrender
- other exemplification of British military decision-making in the Battle of the Atlantic; the convoy system, the use of corvettes, the deployment of the Canadian navy, long-range air patrols with air-to-surface vessel (ASV) radar systems, closing the mid-Atlantic gap, decisions over use of military technology (for example, centimetric radar, Hedgehog, Huff-duff)
- challenge was to ensure Britain's continued use of Enigma to keep informed of German naval technological improvements and tactics
- the British First Sea Lord also believed that Enigma decrypts were also giving valuable evidence on Germany's tactical decisions in the U-boat war (and that might be lost).

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources

- British and US commanders often personally disliked each other, for example, Montgomery and Patten
- problems of maintaining the Mediterranean supply route to the Near and Far East
- Britain's commitment to help the Soviet Union, for example, Arctic Convoys
- efficiency and effectiveness of the German armed forces
- disagreements over the timing and location of the Second Front
- the challenges facing Britain's military leaders in their decision-making in other Western theatres of war – North Africa and Italy, D-Day and mainland Europe post-invasion
- an evaluation of Britain's military contribution in the Asian theatre of war; decisions that were made there regarding appointments (Slim, Mountbatten), deployment of resources, cooperation between allies and introduction of innovative methods of fighting
- the issue of relations with and contacts with Soviet Russia, and how best use could be made of that ally.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
David Syrett	Stresses the huge importance of the use of intelligence in winning the Battle of the Atlantic, and, in particular, significance of the cracking of the Enigma code.
Correlli Barnett	Stresses the importance of the navy and how key decisions taken there were fundamental to Britain's ultimate victory in the war.
John Keegan	Overall survey of the war – places only limited emphasis on British military contribution (and presumably downgrades the significance of any decisions taken by Britain's military leaders). However, he stresses the importance of the revamped convoy system as an integral part of the success against the submarine menace.
Richard Overy	Is reluctant to pinpoint any one factor over the other as a specific reason for victory, but commends highly the energy, drive and invention of Admiral Horton as being significant.

Question 79 How fully does **Source C** explain the impact of the Blitz?

Candidates can gain up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The myth of the Blitz was vital to British national identity.	Claims that the Blitz was vital in helping to create a British national identity; in a time of great adversity the British people stood shoulder to shoulder, united.
Instead of buckling, the people laughed and joked their way through it, full of wonderful British self-control.	Claims that the British people didn't give way; instead, they improvised an effective resistance to it, in the face of a powerful enemy.
Like most events of 1940, the Blitz was something the British people looked upon with pride; and the endurance and fortitude of the nation in the face of it is something the world should thank us for.	Suggests that it raised Britain's standing in the world and earned the world's gratitude.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- many who advocate that a 'spirit of the Blitz' existed, claim that the British people were at their best in this period of extreme adversity
- the Blitz was crucial in bringing the British people together at a time when the very survival of the country was seriously in doubt. The source typifies those views expressed by many at the time and which were taken up by the Ministry of Information newsreel films for public consumption in cinemas, both home and abroad
- the fact that there was no wide-scale collapse of civilian morale would suggest a fair element of truth in the source's interpretation of people's resolute reaction to the Blitz
- this is the image that the government wished to convey to the public at large and (just as vitally) to the American press and public.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- examples of physical destruction caused by the Blitz – the loss of life, the extent of damage and destruction caused, and specific examples of towns and cities, and industries that were hard hit
- approximately 60,000 civilians were killed during the Blitz
- prior to the war, the British government calculated that the number of deaths caused by German bombing would be far higher than was actually the case
- some would argue that the theory that there was unity at this time was a myth
- class was used as a barrier for people to access air raid shelters in the more expensive London hotels, where only customers and guests were allowed to use the safer facilities
- under the cloak of the blackout, crime rates increased and criminals used it to organise robberies
- critics have claimed that the government was slow to make Anderson shelters available to those who couldn't afford them
- claim that overall shelter provision was poor in the areas most affected by German bombing
- the Blitz caused widespread homelessness
- in areas of extensive bombing – London, Clydebank and Coventry – people had to be recruited as fire crews and air raid wardens to prevent large-scale damage to infrastructure.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Andrew Roberts	Remains steadfast in his adherence to the 'finest hour' argument and insists that the British people were indeed at their best in this period of crisis, and that morale was rock solid.
Nick Tiratsoo	Takes a more sceptical view of this argument, asserting that morale was nowhere near as high as suggested, citing widespread panic and anger in the east end of London at inadequate shelter provision.
H L Smith	Makes several references to the huge increase in opportunistic crime during the Blitz.
Robert Mackay	Argues that there is considerable foundation to the notion that morale did indeed remain strong during the Blitz. The adherents to the 'spirit of the Blitz' as a traditional view are not prepared to concede that more modern evidence cited by the revisionists named above outweighs the heroism, altruism and solidarity of the many.

Question 80 Evaluate the usefulness of **Source D** in explaining the reasons why the Labour Party lost the 1951 general election.

Candidates can gain a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. They can gain up to **3 marks** for provenance evaluation and up to **3 marks** for source evaluation.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks for the quality and depth of their immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the provenance of the source
Author	Herbert Morrison	Responsible for drafting the Labour Party's 1945 manifesto <i>Let Us Face the Future</i> . He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Commons in Attlee's government. Morrison was in a position to evaluate the situation first-hand.
Purpose	Autobiography	A long serving Labour MP who rose to hold high office, and with a deep and wide knowledge of politics. These experiences led to this autobiography. Little evidence of pro-Labour bias or exaggeration in this source.
Timing	1960	Labour government has been out of power for 9 years, he's not been in office; these are the views of a politician mellowed by the years. In this case particularly he doesn't seem out to settle scores with past opponents.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Rab Butler . . . can be regarded as the architect of the policies which helped to produce victory in 1951.	Rab Butler was responsible for the way that Conservative policies changed at this time, aiming to respond to the new demands of post-war society and giving the party electoral appeal. They realised that they needed to change in order to win back voters.
He had certainly learned the lessons of the 1945 defeat. In 1945, the Tories had fought on a negative line of prophesying ruin under socialism and denouncing all the types of control that war had created.	Learnt that it was more effective to present a positive vision to voters than to focus on negativity about other parties.
I can pay Butler the compliment of saying that his policy made Labour's fight more difficult. His more progressive attitude softened the contrasts of black and white; conflicts of principle diminished.	Labour had previously done well because there was a clear divide between Conservative and Labour policies, and people favoured socialist policies at that time. This divide was now less clear. Although Morrison was an opponent of Butler, he is quite complimentary about him in the source, partly because Morrison is getting 'reflected glory' because Butler stole his ideas.

Points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source

- Butler's development of the Industrial Charter in 1947 was a significant ideological step forward for the Conservatives. There was an acceptance by the Conservatives of the political consensus or post-war settlement based on an acknowledgement of the role played by the trade unions in economic life, support for the policy of full employment and an abandonment of the failed economic policies of the 1930s
- in 1949, the 'Right Road for Britain' policy document pledged to preserve the welfare state and the continuation of a mixed economy, while also promising to build 300,000 new homes
- the work done by Lord Woolton as chairman of the party in reorganising the party at both local and national level, appointing full-time agents, instigating a membership drive and founding the Young Conservatives movement. By 1950, the party membership rose to three million and funding was vastly improved through local constituency efforts and donations from big business and from abroad.

Points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source

- Britain's involvement in the Korean War was not universally popular and the division which it caused in the cabinet in April 1951 between the Bevanites and Gaitskellites split the party and presented the electorate with a picture of Labour as being a divided party
- Nye Bevan resigned, as did Harold Wilson and John Freeman, over expenditure cuts to pay for the re-armament programme
- where the heroic efforts of the Red Army during the war had increased support for the Labour Party in 1945, the onset of the Cold War had the opposite effect by 1951. Where Communism was seen as stifling individual freedom, comparisons could be made with the limitations of personal freedom in Britain under Labour
- in the 'First Past the Post' system, Labour polled more votes than the Conservatives in October 1951, and more than they had in 1945, yet lost more seats. The influence of the missing Liberal candidates helped the Conservatives and hindered Labour
- the Liberal vote evaporated, leaving the party with just 2.5% support and six MPs
- tactical voting, majority of ex-Liberal voters voted for the Conservatives
- Labour's continued economic difficulties helped the Conservatives. By 1950, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the electorate was sick of austerity, rationing, shortages and bureaucracy – as witnessed by the creation of the Housewives League as a pressure group
- other critics would argue that Attlee had no need to go to the polls in October 1951 since the economic indicators for 1952 were reasonably healthy, and that he made a tactical error in doing so
- the Conservative vote in 1945 was still 8.7 million and its support had held up reasonably well.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Paul Addison	Points to the rebirth of the Conservatives <i>a la</i> New Labour as a vital factor in explaining Labour's defeat.
Kenneth Morgan	Agrees that austerity was a significant factor in reducing Labour popularity, saying 'It is not remarkable that Labour duly lost the October 1951 election. What is surprising is that the defeat was so narrow.'
Phillip Murphy	Emphasises the disillusionment of the electorate with austerity and the impact of the Cold War on the popularity of socialism as such.
Robert Pearce	Looks at involvement in the Korean War as a significant factor which turned voters against Labour.

[END OF SPECIMEN MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]