



National
Qualifications
2026

2026 History

Advanced Higher

Question Paper Finalised Marking Instructions

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General marking principles for Advanced Higher History

Always apply these general principles. Use them in conjunction with the detailed marking instructions, which identify the key features required in candidate responses.

- (a) Always use positive marking. This means candidates accumulate marks for the demonstration of relevant skills, knowledge and understanding; marks are not deducted for errors or omissions.
- (b) If a candidate response does not seem to be covered by either the principles or detailed marking instructions, and you are uncertain how to assess it, you must seek guidance from your team leader.
- (c) Marking must be consistent. Never make a hasty judgement on a response based on length, quality of handwriting or a confused start.
- (d) Use the full range of marks available for each question.
- (e) The detailed marking instructions are not an exhaustive list. Award marks for other relevant points.
- (f) Award marks only where points relate to the question asked. Where candidates give points of knowledge without specifying the context, award marks unless it is clear that they do not refer to the context of the question.
- (g) Award knowledge and understanding marks where points are:
 - relevant to the issue in the question
 - developed (by providing additional detail, exemplification, reasons or evidence)
 - used to respond to the demands of the question (for example, evaluate, analyse).

Marking principles: 25 mark essay questions

To gain more than 12 marks in a 25 mark essay question, candidates must make a reference (however minor) to historiography. If candidates do not refer to or quote from historians, or show that they have considered historical schools of thought, they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marking scheme and so will not achieve more than 12 marks.

The detailed marking instructions provide guidance on the intention of each essay question, and the possible format and relevant content of expected responses.

Marking criteria grids

The marking criteria grids give detailed guidance on how to assess candidate responses against these four criteria:

- structure
- **thoroughness and/or relevance of information and approach**
- **analysis, evaluation and line of argument**
- historical sources and interpretations.

Of these four, use the two criteria given in **bold** to determine where to place an essay within a mark range.

The grids identify features of essays falling within the given mark ranges, which correspond approximately with the grades D, C, B, A, A+ and A++, assuming candidates perform evenly across all questions in the paper, and in the coursework.

Most essays show some, but perhaps not all, of the features listed; others are stronger in one area than another. Features described in one column may appear in a response which, overall, falls more within another column(s).

The grids describe the typical qualities of responses. Individual candidate responses do not follow a set pattern and some may fall outside these descriptions, or a candidate's arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marking scheme. Where this is the case, use your professional expertise to award marks appropriately.

25 mark question – mark ranges and individual marking criteria

Mark ranges								
Marking criteria	STRUCTURE	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No attempt to set out a structure for the essay.	An attempt to structure the essay, seen in at least one of the following:	The structure displays a basic organisation but this may be loose. This would refer to:	The structure is readily apparent with a competent presentation of the issues. This would include:	Clearly structured, perceptive, presentation of issues. This would be included in:	Well-defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question:	Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops throughout:
		No relevant functional introduction.	relevant functional introduction.	relevant functional introduction.	relevant functional introduction with main interpretations.	relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a suggested line of argument.	relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised which looks at the debate and a clear line of argument.	relevant introduction with main interpretations prioritised and clear direction of debate and a clear line of argument.
		No separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	separate sections which relate to relevant factors.	separate sections which relate to relevant factors.
		No conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue.	conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue, bringing together the key issues.	conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue evaluating the key issues.	conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.	conclusion which makes an overall judgement on the issue based on direct synthesis and evaluation of key issues/points.

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	THOROUGHNESS/ RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION AND APPROACH	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No evidence of relevant knowledge of the issue.	Treatment of the issue shows little relevant knowledge. Some elements of the factual content and approach relate only very loosely to the issue.	Treatment of the issue shows sufficient knowledge which reflects a basic understanding of the issue. The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis.	Treatment of the issue shows an awareness of the width and depth of the knowledge required for a study of the issue. The factual content links to the issue. The approach relates to analysis and evaluation.	Treatment of the issue is based on a fair quantity of research, demonstrating width and depth of knowledge. Evidence is linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	Treatment of the issue is based on wide research and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge. Evidence is clearly linked to points of analysis or evaluation.	Treatment of the issue is clearly based on a wide range of serious reading and demonstrates a considerable width and depth of knowledge. Evidence clearly supports linked to points of analysis or evaluation.

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	ANALYSIS/EVALUATION/ LINE OF ARGUMENT	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No evidence of analysis. OR Analysis is not relevant to the question.	There is much narrative and description rather than analysis or evaluation. There is a weak sense of argument.	There is an attempt to answer the evaluative aims of the question and analyse the issues involved. This is possibly not deep or sustained. Argument is generally clear and accurate but there may be confusions.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and the candidate tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis. Argument is clear and accurate and comes to a suitable – largely summative – conclusion.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues. Argument is clear and directed throughout the essay. The conclusions arise logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body and attempts synthesis.	There is a firm grasp of the evaluative aims of the question and a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues. Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues and arguments. Clarity in direction of argument linking to evaluation. The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.	Fluent and insightful presentation of the issues with a detailed and effective analysis and evaluation which advances the argument and considers various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones. The conclusions give a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.

		Mark range						
Marking criteria	HISTORICAL SOURCES/INTERPRETATIONS	0–9	10–12	13–14	15–17	18–19	20–22	23–25
		No discernible reference to historical works.	General reference to historical works.	There is some awareness of historians' interpretations in relation to the issue. Historians may be used as illustrative points of knowledge.	There is an awareness of historians' interpretations and arguments. Historians may be used as illustrative points of main lines of interpretation.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments. There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments which is consistent. There is some awareness of possible variations of these interpretations or connections between them. There may be an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.	There is a sound knowledge and understanding of historians' interpretations and arguments and an engagement with current historiography. Shows consistent awareness of possible variations of these interpretations and connections between them, including an appreciation of the context which gives rise to these interpretations.

Marking the source-handling questions

There are three standardised stems used in the source questions:

- 'How fully . . .' or 'How much . . .'
- 'Evaluate the usefulness . . .'
- Interpretation of two sources

'How fully . . .' question (12 marks)

Candidates must:

- establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use **Contextual Development** to add knowledge as exemplification of interpretation points to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- use **Wider Contextual Development** to assess what the source does not reveal about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Up to 3 marks

- interpretation of points from the source.

Up to 7 marks

- Contextual Development which develops points from the source with the candidate's own historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question
- Wider Contextual Development to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information such as omissions
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Candidates should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is. They can gain up to **3 marks** by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. Candidates cannot gain marks for simply quoting points from the source; they must paraphrase or interpret them to gain marks.

Candidates can gain the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual development they give in their overall evaluation of the source's comprehensiveness. This should include the views of two relevant historians (**2 marks** are available for this). Where a candidate includes the views of additional historians, award marks for wider contextual development.

There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question, and therefore no marks awarded for this.

‘Evaluate the usefulness . . .’ question (12 marks)

Candidates must

- consider the provenance of the **entire** source in light of the topic being discussed. At all stages of the answer the provenance should underpin commentary which should include analysis and evaluation of the source
 - **Source Rubric Provenance** – comment on authorship, purpose and timing of the source in light of the historical event or issue in the question
 - **Source Content Provenance** – establish the view of the source by selecting and interpreting points which illustrate provenance, and analysing and evaluating them in light of the historical event or issue in the question
- contextualise those points with historical knowledge which may enhance or refute views of the historical event or issue in the question – **Contextual Development**
- use **Wider Contextual Development** to assess what the source reveals about a historical event or issue
- interpret points from the source by bringing in their own knowledge to show how the source relates to the wider historical and/or historiographical context.

Award marks as follows

Award a **maximum of 6 marks** for provenance comments based on **3 marks** for the rubric and **3 marks** for source content interpretation.

3 marks

- Source Rubric Provenance – comments on provenance regarding authorship, purpose and timing as seen in the rubric.

3 marks

- Source Content Provenance – comments on provenance regarding the interpretation of the content of the source.

Up to 4 marks

- Contextual Development which develops points from the sources with the candidate’s own knowledge
- Wider Contextual Development, for example other relevant information which provides more information about the historical issue, and significant omissions in the source
- other points of view, including additional historians’ interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Interpretation of two-sources question (16 marks)

Candidates must:

- establish the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue within each source by selecting and interpreting points and linking them to the aims of the question
- use **Contextual Development** to assess what the sources reveal about different interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue
- comment on how the interpretations and/or viewpoints of a historical issue in the two sources relate to other possible interpretations with **Wider Contextual Development**.

Award marks as follows

6 marks

- comments on interpretation (**3 marks** per source).

Up to 8 marks

- **Contextual Development** which develops points from the sources
- Wider Contextual Development to assess what the source reveals about interpretations of a historical event or issue by considering other relevant information about other interpretations of a historical issue which have been omitted
- other points of view, including additional historians' interpretations beyond the two specifically allocated (see below).

Up to 2 marks

- historical interpretations with reference to historians and their views.

Marking instructions for each question

Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 1 ‘Roman invasions of Northern Britain were motivated largely by economic gain.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To evaluate the importance of various factors which prompted the Roman invasions of Scotland. These might include economic gain, military necessity, Roman imperialism and personal prestige – the desire of individual Emperors to win glory through military conquest. Responses might refer to some or all of the three main invasions, during the Flavian, Antonine and Severan periods. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Roman invasions were motivated by economic gain:

- Rome may have sought to gain material wealth through the conquest of Scotland. Southern Scotland (particularly the Lothians) and the east coast possessed good farmland, which produced cereal crops and beef cattle. Rome made several attempts to incorporate these areas within the Empire
- the Romans traded in enslaved people from areas which they conquered, including Northern Britain. Captives taken in war were often sold into enslavement
- **Tacitus** refers to Rome’s imposition of taxes upon conquered native tribes in the *Agricola*. Calgacus complains that under Rome’s yoke ‘Goods and possessions are consumed by taxation, the fields and their harvests by the grain-requisition’
- **DJ Woolliscroft** argues that completing the conquest of Britain and subduing the northern tribes may actually have allowed Rome to reduce its permanent garrison, saving money in the long term.

Counter arguments might include:

- many historians argue that economic gain is unlikely to have been a major motivation for the Roman invasions. **DJ Woolliscroft** argues that one reason for the Roman withdrawals from northern Scotland may be that there was ‘not enough to be gained from staying’
- **Aelius Aristides** (2nd century) claimed that Rome already held all that was worth having in Britain. **Appian** agreed that Rome already ruled the most important part of the island, Southern Britain, and had no need of the rest, dismissing the northern peoples as ‘poverty stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians’
- **David Breeze** argues that Scotland was not rich in minerals or agricultural produce, and that ‘It is difficult to believe that the conquest of Scotland would have brought any economic gain to Rome.’

Evidence which supports the view that other factors motivated the Roman invasions:

Military factors:

- Rome needed to control the troublesome tribes of the north in order to protect the Romanised south against barbarian attacks
- Rome’s presence in the north was purely military – marching camps, roads, bridges, forts and walls. It was an army of occupation
- the Brigantes of northern England revolted in AD 69 and the pro-Roman queen, Cartimandua, was expelled by anti-Roman forces. It was partly in response to this native unrest that Vespasian ordered Roman forces to advance into the north
- Antoninus Pius’ biographer claims he ‘thrust back the barbarians and . . . conquered the Britons’ through his legate Lollius Urbicus – suggesting the reason for the Antonine invasion may have been further unrest among the native tribes

- there was serious unrest in the north in the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries. **Cassius Dio** records that in about AD 180 ‘the tribes in the island crossed the wall that separated them from the Roman forts, did a great deal of damage, and cut down a general and his troops’ and that in 197 the Governor of Britain, Virius Lupus, ‘had no choice but to buy peace from the Maeatae for a considerable sum of money, recovering a few captives’
- **Joan Alcock** notes that Governor Clodius Albinus’ unsuccessful attempt to win the imperial throne led to a power vacuum in Britain at this time, encouraging rebellion among native tribes. The Severan campaigns may therefore have been essentially punitive in nature
- **Nicholas Reed** estimates that Severus invaded Scotland with up to 40,000 troops and **Simon Elliott** believes his army may have numbered over 50,000 troops. The huge size of Severus’ army suggests he intended to crush native resistance once and for all
- **Colin Martin** believes that, following a further rebellion of the northern tribes, Severus attempted genocide in the north – to solve the Scottish problem once and for all by wiping out every man, woman and child who opposed Roman rule
- during periods of occupation, Roman garrisons policed the north and created a ‘buffer zone’ which preserved the *pax Romana* (Roman peace) and allowed the further Romanisation of the province to the south.

Counter arguments might include:

- some historians argue that Roman writers’ claims of native unrest were exaggerated and that this was sometimes used as a pretext for invasion, rather than being a genuine reason for a new advance.

Roman imperialism:

- Rome’s ambitions were inherently imperialistic – to conquer new territory and bring it within the Empire. Rome sought an *imperium sine fine* – an ‘Empire without limits’
- **David Breeze**: ‘There can be little doubt that Rome’s long-term aim was the conquest of the whole island.’ **John Reid**: ‘Rome was intent on acquisition for acquisition’s sake, regardless of the size of the prize’
- before he left Britain following his invasion of AD 43, the Emperor Claudius instructed his Governor Aulus Plautius to ‘conquer the rest’. The Flavian invasions in particular may be seen as an attempt to complete the conquest of the entire island
- as well as conquering territory, Rome also sought to bring the benefits of Roman civilisation (*Romanitas*) to barbarian peoples – **Tacitus** famously stated ‘one must remember we are dealing with barbarians’. Rome felt it was its duty to civilise and ‘Romanise’ its barbarian neighbours
- Rome sought the cooperation of native tribal elites with offers of citizenship and imperial favour and sought to foster the development of ‘client kingdoms’, for example, the Votadini in the Lothians
- the ABCD stone from Traprain Law offers some evidence that Rome attempted to bring literacy and the Latin language to the north, suggesting Rome’s motives were imperialistic rather than purely military.

Counter arguments might include:

- some contemporary historians argue that the Roman occupation of Northern Britain was purely military and little attempt was made to ‘Romanise’ the north. **John Reid** argues that the Romans weren’t here as ‘improvers’ and left little meaningful civilian legacy.

Personal prestige:

- individual Emperors sought to win military glory in order to further their own political ambitions. **David Breeze** notes that the Roman Empire was ‘essentially a military dictatorship’ in which foreign policy was decided by individual Emperors. Emperors took the personal credit for the achievements of governors and generals, who were ultimately under their command
- Northern Britain was at the very edge of the known world, so the Emperor who succeeded in conquering it would gain great prestige. **Tacitus** reports Calgacus as stating in his pre-battle speech: ‘We are the last people on earth, and the last to be free’
- **Hanson and Maxwell** observe that Roman expansion into Scotland tended to coincide with the accession of new Emperors, suggesting the invasions were very much tied up with personal motives

- the Flavians – Vespasian and his sons Titus and Domitian – were a new dynasty which came to the throne in AD 69 following a civil war and Nero’s forced suicide. They were keen to win a victory in Britain in order to consolidate their position in Rome
- Agricola was given a hero’s welcome upon his return to Rome: a statue was erected in his honour and he was awarded an *ornamenta triumphalia*. This suggests prestige and glory were important considerations behind the desire to conquer the north
- Antoninus Pius was not Hadrian’s first choice as successor and had little military experience. His invasion helped him win military prestige in order to bolster his position in Rome. **Breeze** notes Pius made no attempt to conquer the whole island: ‘Advance under Antoninus Pius seems to have been engineered simply in order for the new emperor to gain military prestige.’ Pius took the title *imperator* (‘Conqueror’) in AD 142, following the reconquest of southern Scotland
- **Joan Alcock**: ‘Antoninus Pius may have decided to emulate his predecessor, Hadrian, and thus make his bid for glory’ by building a new wall across the Forth-Clyde isthmus. The suggestion that the Antonine Wall was closely associated with Pius’ personal prestige is supported by the fact that it was swiftly abandoned by his successor, Marcus Aurelius, shortly after Pius’ death in AD 161
- Septimius Severus was very much a warrior Emperor, who personally led the invasion of Scotland during the first Severan campaign. His invasion may be seen as a ‘swan song’ – the attempt of an ailing Emperor to win one last great victory before his death. **Herodian** explicitly states that Severus ‘enjoyed winning renown and after victories and titles he had won in the east and north he wanted to raise trophies over the Britons as well’.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Fraser Hunter	Argues that unlike warfare between native tribes, which was relatively small-scale and driven by competition for resources and/or local rivalries, Rome’s invasions were driven by a desire to conquer territory and expand the Empire.
David Breeze	Argues that Roman imperialism was the driving force behind the invasions and that as the ‘superpower’ of the Classical era, Rome saw it as its mission and its right to rule the world.
Lawrence Keppie	Argues that Roman expansion, in Scotland as elsewhere, largely resulted from the personal ambitions of individual Emperors, who sought military glory and used military successes to consolidate their position on the throne.
John Reid	Contends that Rome’s invasions were more than just an ‘imperial vanity project’. The northern tribes presented a genuine threat to the security of the Roman province and needed to be dealt with, while the fertile Lowlands were worth conquering.

Question 2

To what extent did the coming of Christianity transform the lives of the peoples of Northern Britain by AD 900?

Aim of the question To examine the extent to which the conversion to Christianity changed society in Northern Britain. Responses might refer to evidence of Christianity among the Britons, Scots, Picts and northern Angles. They might also consider evidence that Christianity did not change life in the region. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Christianity transformed life in Northern Britain:

Development of literacy:

- some evidence of literacy developing among native peoples prior to conversion – Irish and Pictish ogham, Germanic runes used by Angles. ‘ABCD’ stone from Traprain Law suggests some awareness of Latin alphabet among native Britons during later Roman period
- the Britons of southern Scotland were first to convert to Christianity and the first to adopt the Latin alphabet in the post-Roman period, for example, the Latinus stone from Whithorn. Latin was the language of the Church and many early Latin inscriptions are explicitly Christian
- the Ruthwell cross suggests a transitional period as it was carved with both Anglo-Saxon runes and Latin letters, yet ultimately the Latin alphabet replaced native scripts altogether. As **Bede** noted in AD 731, the spread of Christianity meant Latin was the one language which was common to all the peoples of Northern Britain
- monks were literate and monasteries were centres of learning, with libraries and scriptoria for the creation of manuscripts, for example, Iona in Dal Riata, Lindisfarne and Jarrow in Northumbria, Portmahomack in Pictland. Most of the laity would have been illiterate but the ability to read and write became a status symbol among the ruling classes. The percentage of literate laymen in Dal Riata was claimed to be the highest in contemporary Europe
- literacy enabled the keeping of the first native written records. King-lists recorded the reigns of kings; charters recorded the ownership of land; monastic chronicles/annals recorded important events, including battles; hagiography (saints’ lives, for example, **Adomnan’s *Life of Columba***) contains valuable historical detail as well as much myth and legend
- the advent of written laws transformed how society worked. The *Senchus fer n-Alban* recorded the obligation of the different kindreds in Dal Riata to provide military service; the Law of the Innocents (dating from 697) sought to protect clergy, women and children from the brutalities of warfare; Gaelic and Anglo-Saxon laws record what penalties and/or compensation was due in cases of injury to persons and property.

Development of Insular art:

- conversion to Christianity encouraged a greater degree of cooperation between the peoples of Scotland. Monks travelled between monasteries, for example, Irish clerics in Northumbria and Pictland. This led to the flourishing of Insular art in the early medieval period, which combined Celtic, Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean elements to create a vibrant new artistic style
- monasteries were centres for the production of gospel books and psalters and stunning illuminated manuscripts were created throughout the region. Rare pigments were imported from the Mediterranean. It is likely that at least part of the Book of Kells was produced in Iona, and note similarities with the Lindisfarne Gospels – produced hundreds of miles away in Northumbria
- similarly, Pictish cross-slabs show influences from different parts of Northern Britain, for example, a nimbus/halo around the cross suggests Irish influence and inhabited vine-scrolls were adopted from Anglian Northumbria
- Christianity also plugged the peoples of Northern Britain into a wider European cultural network. Exotic beasts such as lions appear in manuscripts and sculpture; the Glamis 2 stone depicts a centaur, showing an awareness of Classical Greek mythology.

Other significant cultural changes:

- changes in burial practices – Christian cemeteries first appear in southern Scotland in the post-Roman period. Christian burials were aligned on an east/west axis (facing east to greet Christ at the Second Coming) and unlike pagan burials, had no grave goods
- Christianity brought a new form of ‘magic’ to Northern Britain. Saints were reputed to be able to perform miracles; the Scots carried St Columba’s relics into battle as they believed they would provide divine assistance and prevent defeat
- early Christianity actively sought to adapt and ‘Christianise’ pagan religious practices to help make the new faith more palatable. Existing pagan festivals were replaced by Christian holy days, for example, the Celtic harvest festival of Samhain became All Saints’ Day; Imbolc, marking the beginning of Spring, became St Brigid’s Day. Pagan animal sacrifice was refashioned as Christian feasting and the cult of Christian saints replaced the pantheon of pagan gods
- similarly, pagan religious sites were converted to places of Christian worship – hence the existence of pagan Class I and Christian Class II symbol stones in Pictish churchyards in places such as Aberlemno.

Changing nature of kingship:

- increasingly close relationship between state and Church in early medieval Europe – kings, like bishops, were God’s representatives on earth. Clergy played an important role in the inauguration of kings, for example, Aedan mac Gabrain of Dal Riata was supposedly ordained by St Columba in AD 574 and Constantine II of Alba was confirmed by Bishop Cellac of St Andrews at Scone in AD 906
- the support of the Church gave kings divine legitimacy. The Dupplin cross shows Constantine I seated on a horse with God above (represented by a cross) and his warriors below – suggesting kings were seen as deriving their power both through spiritual and temporal means. The St Andrews sarcophagus shows David rending the jaws of a lion – this was the tomb of a king (possibly Oengus son of Fergus) and suggests kings modelled themselves on Biblical heroes
- the influence of Roman Christianity is reflected in the popularity of the name Constantine among later Pictish royal kindreds. Constantine the Great (AD 303-337) had made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire
- the conversion to Christianity was essentially a ‘top down’ process and the support of kings was crucial to the success of the new religion eg note Columba’s (apparently unsuccessful) attempt to convert King Bridei of the northern Picts. When kings converted, mass conversions of their people followed, as **Bede** records in the *Ecclesiastical History*. After King Oswald of Northumbria died in battle against a pagan rival, he was made a saint
- the close relationship between kings and the Church is shown by their attendance at, and sponsorship of, important church meetings, for example, synods at Whitby (AD 664) and Birr (AD 697). Kings ultimately decided the form of worship in their kingdoms – Oswiu of Northumbria and Nechtan of Pictland both chose to abandon Celtic traditions in favour of following standard Roman practices.

Evidence which suggests that Christianity did not substantially change life in Northern Britain:

- the conversion to Christianity was an extended and piecemeal process. The Angles of Northumbria were the last to convert, during the 7th century
- people could accept Christianity only to revert to paganism: St Patrick wrote of the ‘apostate Picts’ (presumably referring to the southern Picts) in the 5th century
- note evidence for continuity between paganism and Christianity, as given above. Pagan traditions and practices were absorbed and adapted, not swept away altogether
- such written records as we have focus on the aristocracy and it is difficult to assess the extent to which Christian beliefs had taken hold among the common folk. Evidence such as the disappearance of pagan Pictish symbols from later Class III stones suggests that the ruling classes fully embraced Christianity over time, but this process may have been much slower away from the royal court. Latin *paganos* originally meant a ‘country-dweller’ and **Bede** complained that many Angles were only half-hearted Christians. The same is likely to have been true further north
- it is possible to exaggerate the extent to which Christianity was a unifying force. Northern Britain remained fragmented, and this is reflected in the presence of different saints’ cults in different parts of Scotland, for example, Cuthbert and Oswald were ‘home grown’ Anglian saints and their cults were restricted to Northumbrian territory

- despite the coming of Christianity, violence remained a key feature of early medieval societies. Rival kings attacked one another's territories and this might include the sacking of monasteries, for example, Kenneth MacAlpin burned Melrose when he attacked the Lothians in the mid-9th century.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Gilbert Markus	Argues that the coming of Christianity brought 'multiple transformations' to society – new beliefs, literacy and literature, new theories of kingship and cosmology, new forms of social organisation, new artistic traditions.
Sally Foster	Contends that Christianity redefined the nature of kingship. Inauguration ceremonies had political as well as religious significance. No king succeeded to his throne as a matter of course, and it helped to have the legitimisation which the Church could provide.
Barbara Crawford	Highlights that Christianity may not have taken hold in parts of Pictland until as late as the 9 th century and even then, the depth of Christian belief may have been patchy.
Martin Carver	Argues that Christianity in early medieval Scotland could be a set of private beliefs or a political programme but since the Christian faith lacked uniformity across the land, its impact was localised and inconsistent.

Question 3 To what extent can it still be argued that there is a 'Problem of the Picts'?

Aim of the question To decide whether it is still valid to consider the Picts as a 'problematic' or mysterious people. Responses might discuss key debates such as Pictish origins, language, political systems, barbarism, the lack of documentary sources and the supposed 'disappearance' of the Picts. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Picts are problematic:

- the origins of the debate lie in **Frederick Wainwright's** seminal 1955 study, *'The Problem of the Picts'* – which greatly shaped historical research over succeeding decades.

Origins:

- **Bede** (731) claimed the Picts were immigrants from Scythia who settled in the north of Scotland. Having no women with them, they asked wives of the Irish. **Paul Dunbavin** is unusual as a contemporary author who believes the Picts were indeed immigrants from Scythia.

Language:

- traditionalist historians, for example, **Charles Thomas**, **Isabel Henderson** believe two languages were spoken in Pictland – including an archaic, non-Indo-European language which was spoken by significant numbers of people, although a Celtic language was spoken by the ruling elite
- in his *Life of Columba*, **Adomnan** records that St Columba needed an interpreter when speaking with the Pictish king, Bridei – confirming the Picts spoke a different language to the Q-Celtic spoken by the Scots/Irish.

Political system:

- **Bede** states that when disputes over the succession arose, the Picts chose their kings 'from the female line rather than the male'. Traditionalist historians have argued that the Picts practised matrilineal succession – marking them out as distinct from their neighbours
- Pictish king-lists have been used as evidence to support this claim: sons do not inherit the throne from their fathers, demonstrating that succession was not directly patrilineal.

Barbarism:

- the Picts were less influenced by the 'civilising' influence of Rome than the Britons further south and have traditionally been seen as being more barbaric than neighbouring peoples. The British monk **Gildas** described them (along with the Scots) as 'foul hordes'
- the Picts (particularly north of the Mounth) were slower to convert to Christianity and to adopt the Latin alphabet than the Britons. Evidence from Class II symbol stones may suggest an extended period of transition from Celtic paganism to Christianity
- the Picts may have held onto ancient British customs longer than the Britons eg tattooing their bodies – hence the 'painted people'
- evidence to suggest that the Picts adhered to ancient pagan rituals well into the historic period is that in AD 739 Talorcan, King of Atholl, was executed by drowning – resembling pagan sacrifice.

Lack of written sources:

- constructing a narrative of Pictish history is problematic due to the lack of Pictish written sources. We must rely on accounts from their neighbours, for example, Irish annals
- only Pictish king-lists have survived. However, these only exist as 14th century copies, clearly contain scribal errors and/or may have been altered to suit later political conditions
- Pictish symbol stones have traditionally been regarded as adding to the 'aura of mystery' (**Anna Ritchie**) surrounding the Picts. Abstract symbols such as the crescent and V-rod and the double-disc and Z-rod are unique to the Picts and modern scholars continue to speculate about what meaning they may have had to the people who carved them.

Disappearance:

- after c. AD 900, the terms 'Pict' and 'Pictland' ceased to be used, and the former Pictish heartlands are referred to as Alba (in Gaelic) or Scotia (in Latin). Pictish symbols were no longer carved and the Pictish language (or languages) died out
- later medieval sources such as the **Declaration of Arbroath** (1320) claim the Picts were 'wiped out' by the Scots.

Evidence which supports the view that the Picts are not problematic:

- recent research has greatly improved our understanding of the Picts and the vast majority of contemporary historians would no longer regard them as 'problematic'.

Origins:

- there is now (almost) universal agreement that the Picts were the descendants of the Iron Age tribes who had been living north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus long before Rome's arrival
- the Romans gave them a new name, '*Picti*', to distinguish them from the more Romanised Britons further south
- Pictland formed as these tribes gradually coalesced to resist Rome's advance.

Language:

- most historians now agree that the Picts spoke a P-Celtic language, closely related to that spoken by the Britons, for example, '*Aber*' – placenames (meaning 'river mouth') are common in Wales (Aberystwyth, Abergavenny) and eastern Scotland (Aberdeen, Aberdour).

Political system:

- most historians now dismiss suggestions that the Picts practised matriliney. In fact, **Bede** stated that this was only used when disputes arose. It is notable that references to women are vanishingly rare on Pictish symbol stones and that the king-lists identify Pictish rulers as sons of their fathers; mothers are not mentioned at all. This suggests Pictish society was patriarchal, as elsewhere in Northern Britain
- it is more probable the Picts practised a system akin to tanistry, which was used in contemporary Ireland: heirs were chosen from the wider royal kindred while the king was still alive to promote stability and minimise infighting. Indeed, in the 3rd century, **Dio** had noted that 'they choose their boldest men to be their leaders'.

Barbarism:

- the lack of Pictish written sources means we rely on accounts from their rivals and enemies – Romans, Britons, Angles. These are inherently biased and likely to exaggerate the Picts' barbarism
- **Lloyd and Jenny Laing** observe that **Gildas** is notorious for using 'forthright and somewhat over-theatrical phraseology'.

Lack of written sources:

- symbol stones are now understood to offer valuable insights into Pictish life, and help identify Pictish territory – both the heartlands and the periphery
- they clearly show that the Picts were ruled by a powerful warrior elite who fought, feasted and hunted and that in time, the Picts converted to Christianity – just like their neighbours
- recent archaeological research confirms this and is also improving our understanding of the everyday life of ordinary Picts – most of whom were farmers, again like their neighbours.

Disappearance:

- the Picts did not disappear, they evolved as Pictland steadily fell under increasing Gaelic influence. Pictland was rebranded as Alba (the Gaelic word for 'Britain'); the Gaelic language replaced Pictish; Pictish symbols ceased to be used as they no longer had relevance to a people who were now thoroughly Christian.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Isabel Henderson	Offers a traditional view of the Picts, arguing that two languages were spoken in Pictland, that the Picts strictly followed a system of matrilineal succession and that Pictish culture was significantly different from that of the Scots and Britons.
Sally Foster	Argues that the Picts were not distinctive – they were descended from the Iron Age tribes of Northern Britain, spoke a P-Celtic language and followed a system of patrilineal succession. They were a ‘Celtic’ people, like their neighbours, the Scots and Britons.
Alfred Smyth	Observes that archaeology shows significant continuity from the Iron Age into the Pictish period eg the construction of timber-laced forts. This suggests a continuity of population and Smyth even argues that all monuments and artefacts north of the Forth-Clyde isthmus from the 7 th century BC to AD 850 may be described as Pictish.
Leslie Alcock	Dismisses the idea that there was a ‘Problem of the Picts’ – in fact, they were a typical barbarian society with wide connections and parallels, not only in the British Isles but across contemporary northwest Europe.

Question 4

How far can it be argued that the Britons of southern Scotland made a significant contribution to the development of the Scottish nation by 1034?

Aim of the question To evaluate the extent to which the post-Roman British kingdoms of southern Scotland influenced the development of the later medieval Kingdom of Scotland. Some historians have recently argued that a lack of documentary evidence means this contribution may have been underappreciated. Responses might consider political, religious and cultural aspects of the British influence on the development of Scotland. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Britons influenced Scotland's political development:

- a number of British kingdoms emerged in the north in the post-Roman period, including Elmet, Rheged, Gododdin and Alt Clut/Strathclyde. These competed amongst one another as well as against other neighbouring peoples – Picts, Scots and Angles – for influence, and survival
- Elmet, Rheged and Gododdin had all fallen under the control of the Angles of Northumbria by the mid-7th century; Edinburgh was captured in c. AD 640. However, as **D.P. Kirby** notes, 'The Strathclyde Britons for long played a significant part in the power politics of the North'
- Elmet and Rheged disappeared from history so completely that historians continue to debate where they may have been located – the former possibly in Yorkshire, near modern Leeds, the latter perhaps centred on Carlisle or Dunragit ('Fortress of Rheged?'), north of the Solway Firth
- the politics of Northern Britain were complicated; although there was conflict, Strathclyde's British rulers also made alliances and intermarried with rival dynasties. **Fiona Watson** and many other historians have observed that Bridei son of Beli, the Pictish king who defeated and killed Ecgrith of Northumbria at Dunnichen/Nechtansmere in AD 685, was the son of a King of Strathclyde
- **Alfred Smyth** contends that the Britons of Strathclyde exercised overlordship over the Picts at various points during the 7th century.

Counter arguments might include:

- **Crawford and Clancy** believe that the fall of Dumbarton Rock to the Dublin Vikings in AD 870 'struck a severe blow to the old British kingdom'. Its powerbase moved upstream to Govan, where the presence of Viking hogback tombs suggests continued Norse influence
- historians such as **Crawford and Clancy**, **Ian Walker** and **Michael Lynch** observe that after the later 9th century, Strathclyde seems increasingly to have fallen under the influence of the macAlpin Kings of Alba. **Lynch** argues that the Kings of Alba used Strathclyde as a 'dower kingdom', installing their own heirs as rulers
- by 1034, Strathclyde – the last kingdom of the Britons in the north – had been absorbed within the expanding Kingdom of Alba and had ceased to exist as a political entity in its own right.

Evidence which supports the view that the Britons influenced Scotland's religious development:

- the Britons of southern Scotland were the first of the northern peoples to embrace Christianity. **James Fraser** argues that this was a product of extended contact with the Roman Empire
- the traditional date for the establishment of the first known church in Scotland – *Candida Casa*, the 'White House', at Whithorn in Dumfries and Galloway – is AD 397, during the late Roman period
- there were thriving Christian communities in Galloway by the mid-5th century – hence early Christian monuments featuring Chi-Rho symbols and Latin text at Whithorn and Kirkmadrine
- Christianity spread throughout the Britons of southern Scotland, for example, early Christian inscriptions at Catstane near Kirkliston in the Lothians; cemeteries featuring long-cist burials which are oriented east-west, without grave goods, in a Christian fashion; and 'egles' – placenames, from the British word for 'church', for example, Eaglesham, Eccles, Ecclefechan
- the poem *Y Gododdin* describes British warriors from Edinburgh receiving communion and confessing their sins before riding to defeat against the Angles of Northumbria
- St Patrick, a Briton from the north, played a key role in evangelising Ireland
- St Kentigern/Mungo was appointed as bishop to the Kings of Strathclyde in c. AD 600

- **Bede** claimed that St Ninian, a Briton, acted as apostle to the southern Picts. **Gilbert Márkus** notes that churches in southern Pictland do seem to have been founded as a result of British missionary work, hence the existence of ‘*egles*’ – placenames north of the Forth and south of the Mounth.

Counter arguments might include:

- Irish, rather than British, missionaries seem to have played a key role in converting the Scots of Dal Riata. The Angles of Northumbria were converted through the efforts of Roman missionaries (in Deira) and Irish missionaries (in Bernicia)
- it is generally agreed that the wider development of Pictish Christianity was primarily due to the influence of the Columban church, based at Iona in the Gaelic Kingdom of Dalriada, and that Pictland conformed with Roman practices due to the influence of the Northumbrian church.

Evidence which supports the view that the Britons influenced Scotland’s cultural development:

- some of the most famous early ‘Welsh’ poetry was in fact originally composed in the north, by bards such as Aneirin and Taliesin; it celebrates the exploits of British rulers of Northern Britain
- British influence is still seen through placenames in southern Scotland, for example, Penicuik ‘Hill of the Cuckoo’. This is particularly true in the southwest, where British political control endured longest, for example, Glasgow ‘Green Hollow’, Lanark ‘Forest Glade’.

Counter arguments might include:

- many placenames in southeastern Scotland reflect the fact that Old English (the ancestor of modern Scots) replaced Cumbric/Brythonic Celtic as the dominant language, for example, Haddington
- the settlement of *Gall Gaedhil* – Gaelic speakers of mixed native/Norse ancestry – from Ireland is reflected in the placenames of Galloway (which itself takes its name from the *Gall Gaedhil*)
- it is likely that Cumbric was still widely spoken in the former Kingdom of Strathclyde in 1034, but **Ian Walker** notes a gradual process of Gaelicisation, for example, the spread of Gaelic placenames.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Crawford and Clancy	Observe that, with the exception of poetry which is preserved in later Welsh manuscripts, the Britons are ‘otherwise poorly documented’ and ‘without doubt the most elusive of the northern peoples’. This may mean that their contribution to the development of Scotland has not been fully appreciated.
Michael Lynch	Argues that the emergence of the Kingdom of Alba was not the product of a straightforward marriage between the Picts and Scots but rather of a <i>menage a trois</i> in which the Britons of Strathclyde also played an important role.
Alfred Smyth	Notes that Strathclyde appears to have been ‘the premier kingdom in the north’ for much of the 7 th century and that the Dumbarton Britons seem to have headed a confederacy of Britons and Picts which repelled threats from both the Scots (AD 642) and the Angles (AD 685).
Tim Clarkson	Observes that the growing dominance of the Kings of Alba ultimately led to the ‘extinction’ of the northern Britons, politically and culturally. Although the descendants of Britons continued to live in southern Scotland after 1034, ‘in all practical aspects of daily life, the Britons ceased to be a distinct element within Scotland’s population’.

Question 5

How important a role did Kenneth MacAlpin play in the creation of Alba to AD 858?

Aim of the question To evaluate the importance of different factors which led to the creation of the Kingdom of Alba. The traditional view is that Alba was the result of a conquest of the Picts by the Scots, led by Kenneth MacAlpin; however, many historians now believe Kenneth's importance has been exaggerated and that other factors were more important. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Kenneth MacAlpin played a key role in the creation of Alba:

- the traditional story is that in c. AD 843 Kenneth MacAlpin invaded Pictland with an army of Scots and conquered the Picts
- it is possible that Kenneth had a claim to both thrones. His father, Alpin macEochaid, was allegedly a King of Dalriada, while his mother may have been a Pictish princess
- the **Prophecy of Berchan** claimed that Kenneth was the first King of the Scots to rule in the east and that he came to power 'after violent deaths, after violent slaughter'.

Counter arguments might include:

- many contemporary historians believe it is far too simplistic to claim that Alba was the product of a straightforward Scottish conquest of the Picts
- **Dauvit Broun** notes the 'extreme weakness in the evidential basis' for a Scottish conquest of the Picts, while **Stephen Driscoll** observes that even the earliest medieval accounts were written some 150 years after Kenneth's supposed conquest
- **Sally Foster** observes that the legend of 'MacAlpin's Treason' – in which the surviving Pictish earls were slaughtered at a banquet – is likely to be fictitious, although Kenneth's accession is likely to have involved some degree of violence
- contemporary historians such as **Foster** have observed that Kenneth's origins are obscure at best. **Alex Woolf** has recently argued that Ailpin and Ciniod are Pictish names which had been 'borrowed' into Gaelic, and that Kenneth may therefore have been a Pict
- many historians now argue that Kenneth was not the creator of Alba – a term which was first recorded in c. AD 900, decades after his death. His real achievement was to establish Scotland's first royal dynasty, which endured until 1034.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors led to the creation of Alba:

Increasingly close relationship between the Picts and the Scots:

- although they sometimes fought one another, the Picts and Scots also had a long history of political cooperation, for example, they joined forces to attack Roman Britain during the 'Barbarian Conspiracy' of AD 367
- there had been centuries of intermarriage between the ruling elites of Pictland and Dalriada. **Sally Foster** believes that Gartnait, a King of the Picts in the late 6th century, may have been a Gael. **Michael Lynch** views any political disagreements between the two peoples as 'the quarrels of an extended family'
- there had been joint kings of both peoples since the late 8th century. Historians debate which kingdom was the dominant force – **Marjorie Anderson** and **Alfred Smyth** believed Oengus son of Fergus (Onuist son of Uurguist in Pictish; d. AD 761) was a Scot who also ruled over the Picts, whereas more recently **Dauvit Broun** and **Alex Woolf** have posited that he was a Pict who also ruled over the Scots
- either way, as **Anderson** notes, 'such dual kingship . . . may show that by the early 9th century integration between the peoples of west and east had already gone pretty far'
- **Smyth** believes that the essentially Celtic make-up of Northern Britain in the Dark Ages helps explain how a united medieval Kingdom of Scotland came to be formed. Both peoples spoke Celtic languages, and **Woolf** believes that the Gaelic and Pictish languages converged over a long period of time to form a single 'Albanian' language

- **David Allan** calls this a process of ‘acculturation . . . the steady seepage of one group’s culture into another’s, gradually eroding existing differences and encouraging greater homeogeneity’
- the influence of the Christian Church probably played a key role in the gradual ‘Gaelicisation’ of Pictland. **Bede** noted that Iona exercised supervision over monasteries in Pictland as well as Dal Riata, and **Smyth** agrees that ‘Iona provided the parent culture for Pictish Christianity’
- **Neil Oliver** observes that Christianity ‘acted as a glue, bringing together disparate peoples’ and helping to forge ever-closer bonds between the Picts and Scots.

Contribution of the Picts:

- many contemporary historians now stress that there was in fact a great deal of continuity from Pictland into Alba. **Driscoll** observes that ‘In some ways, the most interesting point is the degree to which Pictish institutions persisted, even as the Pictish language disappeared’
- Kenneth and his immediate successors continued to be called *rex Pictorum* – Kings of the Picts
- Pictish titles such as *mormaer* (earl) and *toiseach* continued to be used in the later medieval Kingdom of Alba. This suggests a degree of political continuity
- **Foster** notes that the continuation of Pictish forms of land organisation suggests considerable continuity in the population as a whole
- **Driscoll** observes that the ancient Pictish site at Scone became the ‘ceremonial centre’ of Alba while St Andrews, the head church of Pictland, continued to be the chief centre of Christianity
- **Woolf** argues that although the Pictish kingdom was taken over by a Gaelic-speaking group, it retained its integrity – much as England remained England after the Norman Conquest.

Role of the Vikings:

- **Sally Foster** and **Anna Richie** both regard the arrival of the Vikings as the ‘decisive factor’ in the creation of Alba
- a devastating battle between the ‘gentiles’ (Vikings) and the ‘men of Fortriu’ (Picts) in 839 seems to have crucially weakened the Pictish kingdom and created a political and cultural vacuum (**Crawford and Clancy**). **Driscoll** observes that the destruction of the royal houses of both Pictland and Dal Riata may have allowed ‘political opportunists’ such as Kenneth macAlpin to rise to power
- at the same time, Viking attacks on Dalriada meant that by the mid-9th century, ‘Argyll had been relegated to the status of a dangerous frontier region’ (**Smyth**)
- **Crawford and Clancy** believe that the ‘displacement of the Gaelic political structures’ may have forced the Gaels east, into Pictish territory
- the two peoples may have been encouraged to come together to repel the Viking onslaught. **Neil Oliver** argues that the Picts and Scots were ‘fused together in the fires of adversity’.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
AAM Duncan	Offers a traditional view, that Kenneth was ‘the leader of a war band’ from Dal Riata who ‘won his way by his abilities as a warrior’ and conquered Pictland by force.
Fiona Watson	Believes that a royal dynasty from Dal Riata had ruled over Pictland since 789. When this dynasty collapsed under Viking pressure, Kenneth macAlpin seized his opportunity to become king of the Scots and Picts in c. AD 843.
Ian Walker	Argues that the creation of Alba resulted not from a single cataclysmic event, but rather that it was the product of ‘a slow fusion of two cultural groups over a long period of time’.
Alex Woolf	Contends that the Picts and Scots ‘shared far more than held them apart’. Their shared Christian faith, in particular, was a force for unity at a time when they both faced the ‘onslaught of pagan warriors whose presumptions and prejudices were entirely alien’.

Section 1 – Northern Britain: from the Iron Age to 1034

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 6 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of Iron Age society in Northern Britain?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
All the sources indicate that the basis of Celtic society by the end of the first millennium BC was tribal.	Suggests that many different tribes lived in Scotland during the Iron Age.
Tribal territories may have depended on the success or otherwise in battle of ruling elites from particular centres, with expansion of the tribe being achieved through conquest of neighbouring territories and the absorption of the indigenous population into the ranks of the victors.	Suggests that Iron Age society was very warlike – tribes invaded one another's territories and fought one another over land and resources.
Rule over the tribe lay in the hands of a king or chieftain whose role seems to have been as much symbolic as functional, with his principal duty being as war-leader.	Suggests that tribes were ruled by a warrior aristocracy and that the primary function of tribal rulers was to lead their tribes in war.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- **Ptolemy** recorded 16 different tribes living in Scotland in the late 1st/early 2nd century AD. A second Contextual Point might be that four of these were south of the Forth-Clyde isthmus (for example the Votadini and Selgovae) and 12 to the north (including the Caledonii and Epidii)
- Roman writers painted a picture of frequent conflict between native Celtic tribes, for example, **Tacitus** referred to 'the warring factions of rival chiefs'. A second Contextual Point might be that **Cassius Dio** claimed that the native peoples had 'a great liking for plunder', suggesting raiding was common
- **Caesar** observed that the tribes in Gaul were ruled by warrior aristocracies. A second Contextual Point might be that **Dio** claimed that the tribes of Northern Britain 'choose their boldest men to be their leaders' – suggesting that above all else, kings and chieftains were selected for their abilities in war.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
It has been suggested that souterrains served some ritual purpose, although this seems to be based largely on the lack of other convincing explanations, rather than on anything positive. However, nothing in the Iron Age seems to have been entirely without a ritual dimension.	Suggests that ritual was an important influence on Iron Age societies.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The interpretation with the widest applicability, though, is that they were used for storage of agricultural products: the cool, dry conditions and easily controlled access would have made them secure cellars for grain, milk and cheese.	Suggests that agriculture played an important role in shaping society (the primary use of souterrains was for storing food).
There is a dense concentration of these monuments in Angus and Perthshire, and it is possible that they were used by communities supplying grain and other products to the Roman military based at various times on the Gask Ridge frontier and the Antonine Wall.	Suggests that the native peoples of the Scottish lowlands may have traded agricultural produce with the occupying Roman forces during the Roman Iron Age.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Ritual clearly played an important role in shaping Iron Age societies – **Ian Armit** argues that ‘Religion, ritual and superstition permeated all aspects of life, from building a house or ploughing a field to making a journey or exchanging gifts.’ A second Contextual Development point might be that up to 400 different gods are known to have been worshipped across ‘Celtic’ Europe
- **Charles Thomas** believes souterrains were essentially storage cellars for preserving surplus crops and other perishable goods – in effect, the Iron Age equivalent of a modern refrigerator. A second Contextual Development point might be that souterrains are often associated with substantial roundhouses, which may imply that local tribal leaders gathered surplus food as taxation in kind and controlled access to agricultural resources
- the Roman army needed hides for leather, and meat and grain for food – where possible, these are likely to have been sourced from local farmers. A second Contextual Development point might be that pollen analysis suggests an intensification of agriculture in central Scotland during periods of Roman occupation.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- artefactual evidence suggests that society was warlike to an extent, for example, the Deskford carnyx was a war-trumpet. Warrior burials such as Alloa and Dunbar further suggest that warriors held high status in Iron Age Scotland
- many Iron Age settlements also reflect the need for defence in a warlike society – brochs, for example, Mousa had thick, high stone walls, no windows and only a single entrance. Multivallate hillforts had several layers of defences, for example, Eildon Hill North, Traprain Law
- however, it is also possible to interpret ‘warlike’ objects such as the Mortonhall sword scabbard as symbols of power in a hierarchical society. Similarly, **Ian Armit** argues that defensive considerations may have been ‘of secondary importance’ when constructing settlements such as hillforts and that they were primarily designed as symbols of power
- **Cassius Dio** stated that the northern tribes lived ‘on their flocks’. In other words they were pastoral farmers. Cattle seem to have been of particular importance in the Iron Age economy, hence the existence of upland cattle ranches and the fact that some smaller ‘hillforts’ show no signs of human habitation at all, suggesting they were in fact used as animal pens
- **Dio** also claimed that the native peoples of Scotland possessed ‘no cultivated land’ ie did not grow crops. In fact, there is abundant archaeological evidence of arable farming in Iron Age Scotland, for example, the widespread discovery of both saddle and rotary querns on Iron Age sites across Scotland. The existence of Iron Age field systems, for example, Castlesteads near Edinburgh, proves that the Iron Age peoples practised a mixed rural economy – these helped separate animals and crops
- evidence of a hierarchical society comes through the discovery of prestige objects such as the Balmaclellan mirror, the Torrs pony cap and the Blair Drummond torcs – demonstrating that the Celtic aristocracy liked to flaunt its wealth. The ownership of animals such as horses (which could be used to pull chariots and for hunting) was a sign of an individual’s wealth and status

- Dio claimed that ‘they share their womenfolk and raise all their offspring in common’, suggesting that people lived in extended family groups. This is supported by the fact that many Iron Age roundhouses are substantial in size
- the Iron Age tribes practised a polytheistic religion and worship seems to have been practised in liminal places such as woodland groves and marshy areas, between water and land. Votive offerings often seem to have been placed in bodies of water, for example, the Ballachulish figure, the Carlingwark hoard.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Kamm	Offers a traditional perspective, arguing that ‘Whether or not there was a separate warrior class among the Celts, war and fighting were inherent in their culture’ and that there was ‘a tradition of fighting as a sport, in the same league as hunting, despite the risk of death’.
Lloyd Laing	Contends that the extended family was the basic unit of Iron Age Celtic societies: ‘it is clear that the family unit was large, not the nuclear group of father, mother and children, but the four generations of descendants from a common great-grandfather. This was known as the <i>derbfine</i> and had its own identity in law.’
Richard Hingley	Argues that farming was the mainstay of the Iron Age economy and that a mixture of pastoral and arable farming was practised throughout Scotland. ‘It is likely that almost all families at this time were involved in farming.’
Nicholas Dixon	Similarly notes the importance of agriculture at sites such as Oakbank crannog. Such settlements are usually found near areas of cultivated land and their inhabitants were successful farmers who were ‘making a statement of strength and authority, standing up to be counted in the face of possible hostility. It is unlikely that any small-scale bandits and robbers would be prepared to attack groups who were demonstrably so powerful and organised.’

Question 7 **How fully does Source C explain the impact of the Severan campaigns in Northern Britain?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
With the destruction of the regional economy, the ability of the Maeatae and Caledonians to cause trouble south of the border was significantly depleted.	States that the Severan invasions weakened the northern tribes and prevented them from launching attacks on the Roman province to the south.
We have other hard evidence to back up the view that lowland Scotland was significantly depopulated after the campaigns of AD 209 and 210 (and particularly the latter).	States that the Severan campaigns left lowland Scotland largely free of people (thereby further reducing the native tribes' ability to attack the Roman province to the south).
Those comparatively few Maeatae and Caledonians left after peace was settled, faced the prospect of enforced conscription and removal to the Rhine or Danube frontiers.	States that following the Severan campaigns, native males of fighting age were forced to join the Roman army and shipped off elsewhere in the Empire.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- an extended period of relative peace does seem to have followed the Severan campaigns – there is little evidence of major unrest on the northern frontier for most of the rest of the 3rd century, although this may simply reflect gaps in our sources. A second Contextual Development point might be – **Hanson and Maxwell** observe that there was 'an apparently undisturbed age of tranquillity' in the north
- archaeological evidence does indeed suggest widespread depopulation in lowland Scotland after the Severan campaigns, with settlements being abandoned, farmland going uncultivated and woodland regenerating. A second Contextual Development point might be – **John Reid** suggests that the deliberate destruction of souterrains in Angus around this time may reflect Severan attempts to starve the natives into submission
- excavations of the Severan-era fort at Vindolanda revealed the remains of around 300 circular, native-style huts. A second Contextual Development point might be that it has been suggested that these could have held up to 2000 prisoners of war, suggesting that the forced removal of native populations may have helped Severus control the north.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- **Dio** and **Herodian** both record that Severus faced challenges in his northern campaigns, for example, **Dio** claims that Severus experienced 'untold difficulties in cutting down the forests, levelling the high ground, filling in the swamps, and bridging the rivers'. Coins issued by Caracalla suggest the Roman forces may have used pontoon bridges to cross the Forth and/or the Tay
- Severus was unable to force the native tribes into open battle – **Herodian** records that there were 'frequent encounters and skirmishes' but that the natives' knowledge of the local terrain and their ability to disappear into the woods and marshes 'hampered the Romans and dragged the war out considerably'. According to **Dio**, the natives' use of guerilla tactics led to the deaths of 50,000 Roman soldiers – which is clearly exaggerated yet may accurately reflect heavy Roman losses
- in the short term, the brutality of Severus' campaigns seems only to have united the northern tribes (the Caledonii and Maeatae) against Rome. **Dio** observes that 'the inhabitants of the island rose again in rebellion' following Severus' withdrawal to York at the end of the first campaign
- Roman coins certainly claimed victories and Severus took the title *Britannicus* (Conqueror of Britain). However, such claims may have been premature, and Severus died at York in February 211 with the tribes still in open revolt and without gaining the final great victory he had hoped for – his 'swan song'

- if Severus intended a permanent occupation of Scotland – or even merely southern Scotland and Fife, as seems more likely – his invasions cannot be considered to have been successful since the Severan occupation was the shortest-lived of any Roman occupation of Scotland. Most historians believe that all the main Severan forts, including Carpow, Cramond and possibly Newstead, were abandoned by c. AD 215
- Caracalla swiftly abandoned the conquests in the north and made peace with the natives so he could return to Rome with his brother Geta to claim the imperial throne. Caracalla then swiftly murdered Geta so that he could rule as sole Emperor
- evidence of Severan-era marching camps as far north as Aberdeenshire shows that Severus' army advanced far beyond the Forth-Clyde isthmus. Severus also carried out an extensive programme of reconstruction further south on Hadrian's Wall, which strengthened the frontier against further attacks from the northern tribes.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Colin Martin	Argues that during Caracalla's campaign, Roman marching camps were deliberately placed in the heart of the most fertile farmlands in the Eastern Lowlands and that the Roman army systematically laid waste to the surrounding area, enacting a policy of genocide through mass starvation.
Nicholas Reed	Contends that Severus' 'brutal policy' of genocide backfired. He comments that 'three years of campaigning had in practice merely worsened the situation' and that after Caracalla's withdrawal, 'Severus' attempt to solve the Scottish problem once and for all was forgotten'. The northern frontier was re-established at Hadrian's Wall, where it stayed until the end of the Roman occupation.
David Breeze	Observes that the Romans were able to maintain closer control over southern Scotland after the Severan period through the occupation of outpost forts such as Risingham and Netherby. He claims it is possible that a fort as far north as Cramond on the Forth may have continued to be occupied until AD 235. Caracalla's settlement of the northern frontier appears to have been successful, and there are no references to trouble in the north for than 75 years after the Roman withdrawal.
John Reid	Argues that Severus' punitive campaigns hit the northern tribes like a 'sledgehammer'. He argues that Severus left a 'post-invasion wasteland' and that the lasting peace of the 3 rd century was the product of 'post-traumatic stress' among the native tribes.

Question 8 Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the Viking conversion to Christianity after c. AD 900.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Unknown, but probably an Icelander.	Although the author is likely to have been well connected to people from Orkney, he was not an eyewitness to the events he describes.
Purpose	To record the history of the Orkney earldom, up to the author's own time.	The author was relying on oral traditions which had been passed down through many generations. Saga writers were interested in 'telling a good story' rather than writing purely factual history and details such as the dialogue between Harald and Sigurd are likely to be highly fictionalised.
Timing	c. 1200.	Written hundreds of years after the events it purports to describe – it is not a true primary source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
'I want you and all your subjects to be baptised,' he said when they met. 'If you refuse, I'll have you killed on the spot, and I swear that I'll ravage every island with fire and steel.'	Takes the view that Earl Sigurd the Stout was forcibly converted to Christianity by Olaf Tryggvason, the future King of Norway. Emphasised by 'killed', 'ravage'.
He was baptised and Olaf took his son, called Hvelp or Hundi, as a hostage and had him baptised too under the name of Hlodvir.	Takes the view that Olaf took Sigurd's son and heir as a hostage to ensure his future cooperation and that he would not renege on his promises. Emphasised by 'hostage'.
After that, all Orkney embraced the faith.	Takes the view that following Sigurd's conversion, all the people of Orkney became Christian. Emphasised by 'embraced', 'faith'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the traditional date for Earl Sigurd's conversion is c. AD 995. A second Contextual Development point might be – **Orkneyinga Saga's** version of events suggests Olaf used religious conversion as a political tool to assert his authority over the Earldom of Orkney (by accepting baptism with Olaf as his sponsor, Sigurd was also forced to accept Olaf as his overlord)
- Hvelp/Hundi clearly died young, but Sigurd was survived by three sons. The youngest of these, Thorfinn, was the product of his marriage to a daughter of Malcolm II, the King of Scotland. A second Contextual Development point might be – Thorfinn 'the Mighty' was raised at the Scottish court and was a devout Christian, and under his rule during the mid-11th century Christianity became firmly established in the Northern Isles
- the Saga presents a classic story of 'top-down' conversion: missionaries targeted the ruling elites for conversion and they in turn converted their subjects through mass baptisms.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- although from this time Christianity was the official religion of the Norse inhabitants of the Northern Isles, it is likely that it took many decades for pagan beliefs and practices to die out altogether. Earl Sigurd's conversion was clearly superficial since he died fighting under a raven banner (the symbol of Odin) at the Battle of Clontarf in 1014
- however, some Norse settlers may have adopted Christianity long before the traditional date for Sigurd's conversion: many male settlers are likely to have married native women (certainly in the Western Isles and quite probably in the Northern Isles as well), which may have sped up the process of conversion. The existence of '*papa*' – placenames in the Northern and Western Isles suggests that Christian priests may have been tolerated by the Scandinavian incomers
- the Vikings were polytheistic; this may have allowed the Christian God to be added to the Norse pantheon and ultimately to replace the Norse gods altogether through an extended process of syncretism. The Kiloran Bay boat burial is classically Viking yet contains two stones carved with Christian crosses – this suggests that although the occupant was essentially a pagan, he at least had an awareness of the Christian faith
- the process of combining Christian beliefs with Norse mythology can also be seen in the sculpture which was produced by Norse settlers in Scotland, for example, hogback tombstones or the Kilmore cross (which seems to draw a direct parallel between Christ and Sigurd the dragon-slayer). The Christian devil could be equated with the Norse dragon and the Christian cross resembled Thor's hammer, which many Scandinavians wore as an amulet around their neck.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Barbara Crawford	Contends that Orkneyinga Saga's account of Sigurd's conversion probably has a basis in fact, and notes that 'As far as the king was concerned the temporal submission of the earl was no doubt just as valuable an achievement as his conversion; the taking of the earl's son as hostage for his good and loyal behaviour was an inevitable part of such royal visits to the earldom.'
Alfred Smyth	Believes that contact with native Christian communities and the efforts of local missionaries would have sped up the process of conversion: 'It was inevitable that barbarian Vikings . . . would be greatly influenced by the higher Christian civilization which they encountered at such close quarters in the Scottish Isles.'
Anna Ritchie	Suggests that intermarriage with natives would have facilitated the early conversion of some Scandinavian settlers to Christianity: 'It is likely that not every Norse immigrant had a Norwegian wife to bring to the new colony and that local Pictish girls became wives to the incomers, or nurses to their children, and that Christianity would soon become absorbed by the Norse population.'
Olwyn Owen	Argues that a desire to trade with native populations might have encouraged some Vikings to adopt Christianity since 'they were pragmatists with clear priorities. If accepting Christianity was the price of being allowed to trade, then so be it.'

Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249-1334

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 9 **How important was Alexander III's inability to secure his succession in undermining the success of his adult reign between 1260 and 1286?**

Aim of the question To explore the adult reign of Alexander III to determine how successful his reign was. Did he rule over a 'Golden Age'? Was his entire reign unsuccessful because he failed to leave an adult, male successor to rule his kingdom? Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Alexander III's inability to secure his succession undermined the success of his reign:

- had Alexander remarried sooner after his first wife's death, his succession crisis might never have arisen
- the 1284 tailzie failed to establish a clear line of succession should he fail to provide a new heir or his granddaughter died
- the tailzie also lacked clarity over the system to be used to determine the Scottish succession
- Alexander could have used male primogeniture to secure the succession on one of the adult male heirs, rather than on his infant granddaughter
- Alexander failed to establish guardians to rule in the likely event of a minor succeeding to the throne upon his death
- Alexander failed to resolve the issue of English overlordship, allowing Edward I to resurrect his claims once Alexander had died because of the lack of an adult male monarch
- Alexander acted rashly with his second marriage, directly leading to his early death before he was able to provide any new heirs for his throne.

Evidence that Alexander III had other problems which affected his reign:

- Alexander had little personal authority and had to rely on his nobles to enforce his laws, especially the Comyns, Stewarts and Morays
- Alexander failed to create a lasting solution for factionalism and disputes resurfaced after his death
- the new sheriffdom of Argyll was never functional during his reign
- the Treaty of Perth was a huge financial burden on Scotland, paying 4000 marks in 4 instalments and 100 marks per year in perpetuity
- Alexander's reign coincided with a period of poor harvests, famine and price inflation
- Alexander's control over the newly regained Western Isles remained nominal throughout the remainder of his reign
- Alexander failed to diversify his political community sufficiently – it remained Comyn-dominated.

Evidence that Alexander III's reign was a success:

- Alexander effectively ended the factionalism of his minority once he took control over Scotland
- Alexander successfully resolved legal disputes, such as the case of John Comyn Lord of Badenoch against the Earl of Atholl in 1269
- between 1261 and 1264, the king and his nobility led forces to defend and extend his royal authority, successfully defending the kingdom against the Norwegians
- when a crisis arose in England in 1264, Alexander aided his father-in-law, Henry III, rather than aiding the enemies of the English king
- Alexander successfully resisted English demands to recognise their overlordship over Scotland
- Alexander used crown money to maintain household knights for his defence, strengthen his castles, purchase new weapons and pay for their defence
- Alexander paid for war against Norway through crown revenues rather than an expensive tax
- Alexander successfully married two of his children into European families (Norway and Flanders)

- when his eldest son and heir died, Alexander responded immediately, calling a parliament at Scone to settle his succession
- Alexander was able to negotiate with his political community over his succession, promising to remarry in return for their acceptance of his granddaughter as his immediate heir.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Alan Young	Contends that the king was dependent on his nobility to wield royal authority.
Norman H Reid	Argues that Alexander had a good record, but it was an unspectacular reign.
Michael Penman	Suggests that while Alexander tried to present the resumption of factionalism in 1284, his actions were insufficient.
David Santiuste	Contends that Alexander was able to establish himself as one of medieval Scotland's most effective kings.

Question 10 **‘Political rivalries prevented the Guardians from ruling Scotland effectively between 1286 and 1290’.**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To explore whether the Scottish political community was able to rule effectively or not. If not, how far was this due to the rivalries and factionalism which had existed across the minority and adult reign of Alexander III which resumed upon the death of the previous monarch? Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that political rivalries prevented the Guardians from ruling Scotland effectively:

- most of the Guardians were Comyns or related to the Comyns, largely excluding the Bruces and their allies from government
- the Guardians could not prevent the resumption of factionalism, such as the Turnberry meeting of Bruce and Stewart in 1286
- the murder of the earl of Fife, one of the Guardians, highlights the chronic factionalism in Scotland
- the political community were unable to agree how to replace the Guardians who died across this period
- in 1290, upon the death of the Maid of Norway, claims were made to Edward I for both major claimants to the throne (Balliol and Bruce)
- when Bishop Fraser wrote to Edward I asking for aid, he did so without the knowledge or support of the other remaining Guardians
- the Bruces felt excluded from government and force to raise a force and threaten the guardians twice, in 1286 and 1290
- the ambiguity of the 1284 tailzie ensured that the Scottish political community could not rely on their promises to the former king to prevent factionalism.

Evidence which supports the view that political rivalries did not prevent the Guardians from ruling Scotland effectively:

Evidence to suggest other factors prevented the Guardians from ruling effectively:

- Edward I was determined to gain more control in Scotland
- they were unable to prevent Edward from taking control over areas such as Mann
- The Treaty of Salisbury gave away control over who the Maid would marry to her uncle and father
- by agreeing to send the Maid to England, they handed physical control of their monarch to the English king
- two of the guardians died from old age, weakening the strength of them as rulers
- they had to delay deciding on an heir for a considerable time, to wait and see if Yolande was pregnant
- the Guardians failed to stand up to Edward I when they discovered he had applied for papal dispensation to marry the Maid to his son.

Evidence to suggest that the Guardians did rule Scotland effectively:

- they prudently created a Guardianship to represent the different classes and geographical areas of Scotland
- the Guardians successfully ended the Bruce rebellion in 1286-1287
- the Comyn-led government successfully negotiated two treaties to protect their future independence
- the Treaty of Birgham was a significant effort to protect Scottish independence
- they dispensed justice successfully after the murder of the earl of Fife
- they successfully maintained the regular business of government, including collecting rents and paying fees
- the Guardians arrested the sheriff of Northumberland for interfering in Scottish affairs in 1290

- the Scottish political community agreed to uphold their oath to Alexander III and crown the Maid of Norway as their next heir
- they successfully negotiated with the King of Norway to get the Maid sent to Scotland and with the King of England over a suitable marriage for their Queen.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Marc Morris	Argues that the Guardians recognised that their options were limited and accepted that England would be the dominant partner.
Michael Brown	Argues that cracks in the Guardians' authority were soon showing as they lacked the stature of a king in the vital job of ruling.
ELG Stones	Suggests that it was remarkable how little feeling of crisis seems to have arisen after Alexander III's death.
Fiona Watson	Argues that while the nobility were not united, they did maintain control of the situation in Scotland.

Question 11

To what extent has William Wallace's role in Scottish resistance between 1297 and 1305 been exaggerated?

Aim of the question To explore the contribution of William Wallace to Scottish resistance. Was he able to resurrect the Scottish political community and lead the country? How successful were his attempts to resist the English using military means? How far was Wallace successful as the leader of Scottish resistance against English overlordship? Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Wallace's role has been exaggerated:

- Wallace was unable to unite the Scottish political leadership behind his guardianship
- Wallace showed poor military leadership, failing to attack places like Berwick, Newcastle or Carlisle
- Wallace failed to take the chance to attack weakly defended places, like Newcastle
- Wallace failed to initiate key strategies like raiding northern England
- Wallace tried and failed to control the reactions of the Scottish people after Stirling Bridge, which led to the invasions of England
- Wallace led an army of outlaws rather than trained soldiers
- Wallace was unable to keep the cavalry on the field at Falkirk
- Wallace failed to retreat from the English army before Falkirk
- Wallace left Scotland after resigning as Guardian, against the orders of the new Guardians, forfeiting his lands as a consequence
- Key leaders of Scottish resistance were still nobles – Stewart, Bruce, Murray – and churchmen like Wishart
- Wallace was second in command until Murray died, working under knights like Douglas or Lundie
- Wallace needed the help of men like Wishart and Bruce, as well as them distracting the English with protracted negotiations at Irvine to facilitate his early rebellion
- Wallace was unable to replicate Murray's success in the north against English opposition in the south of Scotland
- Wallace failed to consolidate success at Stirling Bridge with further campaigns across Scotland to remove English control entirely
- Wallace was unable to keep control over his army when in the north of England, leading to his men violating his promises of safe conduct
- Wallace led the Scottish army to defeat and annihilation at Falkirk, with poor tactics and unable to keep the cavalry on the field
- Wallace's schiltrons were static and unable to adapt to attack from English longbowmen at Falkirk.

Evidence which supports the view that Wallace's role has not been exaggerated:

- Wallace was prepared to use scorched earth tactics against his enemies before Falkirk
- Wallace used guerilla tactics successfully when attacking the north of England, including raiding lands, besieging cities, etc
- Wallace continued to aid Scottish independence when he returned from Europe, fighting for resistance in 1303-1304. Wallace was the sole military leader after Murray's death
- Wallace was knighted and allowed to rule alone
- Wallace made key political decisions accepted by the political community, including appointing Lamberton to the Bishopric of St Andrews over the Comyn-preferred candidate
- there is no evidence of opposition to Wallace's decisions when ruling Scotland
- Wallace was able to resurrect the guardianship, which would be sustained after he resigned his position
- Wallace led political meetings and made decisions about governing, including re-opening trade
- Wallace always governed in the name of the exiled king
- Wallace had key aspects of government, including a chancellery which issued charters
- Wallace gathered and led a significant force in the south-west during the early rebellions
- Wallace was able to lead successful hit and run attacks on English supply trains from his base in Selkirk

- Wallace successfully attacked Hazelrig and almost captured Ormsby
- Wallace was co-leader of military attacks in Scone and Dundee before joining with Murray at Stirling Bridge
- Wallace was able to consolidate Scottish control over their kingdom, removing English influence in all castles except Berwick and Roxburgh
- Wallace was ruthless, willing to force men to join his army, including imprisoning men until they submitted or hanging deserters
- Wallace used the landscape to help his army, from the forest at Selkirk to the river at Stirling.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Fiona Watson	Argues that Wallace's tactics at Falkirk suggest a shocking disregard for reconnaissance, and that he could have avoided the battle.
ADM Barrell	Argues that the Battle of Falkirk was a shattering defeat for William Wallace.
Edward Cowan	Contends that the cause of Wallace's downfall was his humble background, as such a man had no business leading armies or directing government policy.
GWS Barrow	Contends that Wallace was more conservative than the greater magnates and lacking in imagination, although had an extraordinary singleness of mind and purpose.

Question 12

‘His campaign in Ireland meant Robert I was unable to win his war against England between 1310 and 1323.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To explore reasons why Robert I was unable to win an outright victory over Edward II in the war between Scotland and England. Was this because the Scots were overextended when they opened another front in Ireland? How likely were they to ever have been able to pressurise the English king into acknowledging Scottish independence from English overlordship? Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Robert was unable to win with war because of opening the front in Ireland:

- the Scots were distracted by the campaign in Ireland, 1315-1319
- King Robert joined his brother fighting in Ireland on at least 2 occasions – putting the king and his heir in danger and removing both from Scottish government
- the Irish campaign used up vital supplies and soldiers the Scots could not spare, reducing their ability to fight successfully for control on other fronts
- Scottish attacks in Ireland only reached as far as Munster and Limerick
- famine and a lack of local support in Ireland left the Scottish army in Ireland isolated and starving, meaning they needed more support from Scotland instead
- the Irish campaign cost Robert his last surviving brother, when he was killed at the Battle of Faughart. This threatened Robert’s position, leaving him with another succession crisis
- the Scots were unable to convince the Irish people to fight with them against the English in sufficient numbers, especially when they only offered to replace English rule with Scots, rather than giving Ireland independence.

Evidence which supports the view that other reasons prevented Robert from winning the war against England:

- Scots’ raids into northern England only reached as far as York – they did not significantly threaten Edward II’s safety in London
- Edward II showed little concern when the Scots devastated his 6 northern counties. His priorities were focused on his cousin, Thomas of Lancaster
- Scottish attempts to create a pan-Celtic alliance with Wales and Ireland against the English were unsuccessful
- although the Scots had defeated Edward II in battle, this did not pose a significant problem for the English king
- the Scots were able to use the hostages from Bannockburn to exchange for their prisoners in England. However, failure to capture Edward II meant they had no ability to leverage for Scottish independence
- after 1314, the Scots were unable to force anything beyond truces from the English king
- Edward II was stubborn and unwilling to abandon his claims to Scotland, even after Berwick fell in 1318
- the Scots tactics against opponents within Scotland used scorched earth techniques and destruction of castles – continuing problems inside Scotland
- retaining Berwick castle gave the English a clear target near their border to attack
- the Scots were unable to garner significant international aid to increase pressure on the English king to find a lasting truce
- Robert’s attempts to harry English supporters in Scotland did not significantly increase his support in Scotland
- although Robert was able to gain local truces in northern England and the support of some Englishmen for his cause, Andrew Harclay of Carlisle was charged with treason and executed for dealing with the Scottish king

- Bannockburn was not a decisive victory against the English – Edward II was able to rebuild his army and invade again in 1319 and 1322
- despite victory at Bannockburn, Robert reverted back to avoiding pitched battles and the English were able to withdraw from Scotland.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
David Cornell	Contends that by November 1313, Scotland was on the verge of being lost by the English king.
Colm McNamee	Argues that Robert hoped raiding northern England would force Edward II to negotiate, but this hope was ill founded.
Fiona Watson	Suggests that the campaigns in Ireland proved that the Bruces were not invincible.
Alexander Grant	Suggests that Bannockburn was relatively unimportant, its main impact to make Robert's opponents recognise that his power in Scotland was now irresistible.

Question 13

How important was English weakness in Robert I's ability to regain Scottish independence in 1328?

Aim of the question To explore the reasons why the Scots were able to gain recognition of their independence from England in the 1328 treaty. Responses may choose to argue that this was due to the weak position of the English after the deposition of Edward II, rather than the strength of the Scottish king. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the weakness of the English was key:

- ongoing truces highlighted the desire on both sides to end the fighting
- Edward II was deposed and replaced by Isabella and Mortimer, who became very unpopular
- the removal of Edward II meant the loss of a key block against a settlement as Edward had been unwilling to give up his claim over Scotland
- Isabella and Mortimer were almost bankrupt and needed the compensation on offer in the treaty
- Politically, Isabella and Mortimer needed peace with the Scots to end the raids and enable them to focus on securing control over Scotland
- with Edward II no longer in power, the Anglo-Scottish truce was cancelled. Robert was able to raid northern England and re-open the front in Ireland
- Scots and English subjects had little appetite for continuing or resurrecting the war
- the Scots were able to raid 100 miles south of their border into England
- the Scots came very close to capturing the young King Edward III, whom they could have ransomed for Scottish independence, which scared Isabella and Mortimer
- War weariness on both sides made a lasting peace seem positive for both sides in 1328
- Robert was willing to make major concessions to regain independence, including paying the English £20,000 for Scottish independence and sovereignty.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors led to the creation of the treaty:

- Robert had gained considerable support in northern England from magnates unhappy at the English king's failure and unwillingness to protect them from the Scots
- Harclay, earl of Carlisle had been so exasperated with Edward II's refusal to make peace with Robert that he had made a separate truce with Robert in 1323
- symbolically, Robert resumed hostilities with England on the day of Edward III's coronations
- Robert was openly talking about annexing Northumberland due to the success of his lieutenants' raids into these areas. Berwick fell to the Scots in 1319, ensuring the English had no areas of control inside Scotland
- Robert had survived the plot to overthrow/kill him in 1320 with the aid of magnates newly within his peace
- the Black Parliament allowed Robert to show his clemency while still providing a key deterrent for anyone contemplating further revolts
- Robert had sent out the Declaration of Arbroath to the papacy to highlight the support he had as king of Scots
- Robert was able to get Scotsmen elected to Scottish bishoprics, against the wishes of the English
- Robert secured his succession with the birth of two sons in 1324. He was able to create another tailzie to secure the succession and establish a guardianship for a possible minority rule
- Robert re-gained support from the French king in the Treaty of Corbeil (1326)
- the French offered far more support for the Scots than before, providing aid and counsel in an Anglo-Scottish war
- Robert developed Aberdeen into a major port due to the loss of Berwick
- Aberdeen enabled the Scots to import key resources, including wool, leather, timber, food and manufacturing goods
- Papal attitudes to the Scots changed in 1324 when Robert was recognised as king
- the pope was pressurising both sides to end the conflict by the mid-1320s
- in 1329 Robert was given the right that Scottish kings should have a coronation.

Historian	Perspective on the issue
Michael Penman	Argues that the Franco-Scottish Treaty was a sufficient threat to Edward II to force action.
Ranald Nicholson	Argues that the Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton was the pragmatic recognition of the relationship which had existed between the two countries for some time.
Chris Brown	Suggests that the deposition of Edward II provided the key change in circumstances for Robert to act upon.
Fiona Watson	Suggests that despite profound ill health, Robert was still able to threaten the English in Ireland and in the north of England.

Section 2 – Scotland: independence and kingship, 1249-1334

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 14 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the way in which a new king was chosen to rule Scotland between 1291 and 1292.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Written by clerics on behalf of the competitors for the Scottish Crown.	The clerics would have been educated churchmen who recorded the responses of the competitors to English demands. Valuable as it records the Scottish version of events at Norham.
Purpose	Competitors' response to Edward's demand for overlordship.	Formal response to the English king made at his council at Norham, northern England, to recognise English overlordship over Scotland and ensure the English King would hear the Great Cause and decide who would be the next King of Scots.
Timing	5 June 1291.	This came 3 weeks after the first meeting at Norham on 10 May 1291 when Edward had asked the Guardians for overlordship. It came 3 days after Edward asked the claimants for the recognition not given by the Guardians.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The noble King Edward has shown us, by good and sufficient reasons, that the sovereign lordship of the kingdom of Scotland and the authority for hearing and determining who shall be our next monarch belongs to him.	Takes the view that Edward had proven his right to overlordship over Scotland. The extent emphasised by 'good and sufficient reasons'.
As such, we, by our own free will, without any kind of constraint or compulsion grant that we should receive justice before Edward, as our sovereign lord of Scotland.	Takes the view that the candidates were freely acknowledging Edward's authority over the kingdom and his right to decide the next king of Scots. Emphasised by 'without any constraint or compulsion'.
We agree moreover and we promise that we shall uphold and support his decision without dispute, and whoever justice awards the kingdom to in his presence shall have it.	Takes the view that the candidates were promising to abide by Edward's decision over who would become the next king. Emphasised by 'without dispute'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Edward is considered the only person who could keep the peace between the rival claimants
- shows mutual trust and co-operation by the Scottish Guardians who were then reappointed under Edward I's authority. A second contextual point is that Edward had threatened that anyone who did not agree to his overlordship would not be considered for the vacant Scottish throne having agreed Edward's overlordship they would abide by his decision to appoint the new king. A second contextual point might be that he had his army at Norham, while speaking with Scots regarding his claims to overlordship.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Great Cause was held in Scotland at Berwick to abide by the terms of the Treaty of Birgham-Northampton (1328)
- Edward consulted with Paris lawyers to gain advice on the trial
- Edward delayed proceedings to allow the Count of Holland to return home to seek documents supporting his claim
- Bruce and Balliol were allowed to appoint 40 auditors each and Edward I appointed the remainder. They advised the English king on matters during the court case.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Prestwich	Argues that Edward was determined to use the opportunity of the succession crisis in Scotland to establish his overlordship over Scotland.
FM Powicke	Argues that Edward I was determined, as sovereign lord, to maintain order and justice in Scotland as he did in England.
Richard Oram	Suggests that Edward I exploited the divided Scots expertly at Norham and had fatally compromised Scottish royal authority by the end of the Great Cause.
Michael Penman	Argues that the Scots' divisions and lack of reserve played into Edward I's hands and continued to do so throughout the Great Cause.

Question 15 **How fully does Source B explain the reasons why Robert Bruce decided to usurp the Scottish throne in March 1306?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source:

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
Now head of his own family (since Robert's father's death in 1304), as earl of Carrick, possessor of estates in England and Scotland, he had never been more powerful.	States that Robert had become the head of his family and thus finally had the power and authority to make a bid for the Scottish throne.
a number of petty discontents with the English king (difficulty in reclaiming expenses, arguments over rights claimed in Annandale) may have rankled, leaving him feeling entitled to richer rewards than had been bestowed.	States that Robert may have acted out of anger regarding his poor treatment by Edward I, including missing pay and disputes over his rights as lord of Annandale.
As the fateful year 1306 opened, one fact must have been weighing heavily with the magnates that Edward I, now 67 years old and known to be very ill, was not expected to last much longer.	States that Robert might have acted as Edward I was elderly and increasingly infirm, unlikely to live much longer.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Robert lost the sheriffdoms of Ayr and Lanark in the 1305 Ordinance
- Edward ordered an investigation into Robert's position as lord of Annandale
- Edward's son, the future Edward II, did not have the same appetite for Scottish affairs as his father.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Robert had a pact with Lamberton, Bishop of St Andrews,
- many Scots did not receive fees or payments from England after 1304
- The Bishop of Glasgow, who absolved him of murder and gave him royal robes for the inauguration
- Robert was involved in the murder of John Comyn in Greyfriars Church, Dumfries
- the English crown was virtually bankrupt from the constant warfare of Edward I
- Robert may have feared a Comyn claim to the throne because it was higher than the Bruces if the Balliols had abdicated
- John Comyn was a popular and experienced political leader, unwavering in his support for Scottish independence
- Robert had repeatedly switched sides, supporting the English from 1302.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
GWS Barrow	Contends that when Robert Bruce acted, he was putting patriotism over his own interests.
Fiona Watson	Argues that Robert Bruce's actions in 1306 were of a man with nothing to lose.
Michael Penman	Suggests that Robert Bruce had been canvassing for support for his claim to the kingship and had reached the point by 1306 that he needed to ensure Comyn neutrality or his vested interest.
Michael Prestwich	Contends that resentment over how he was treated by Edward I must have played a part in Robert Bruce's decision to seize the throne.

Question 16. How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations of the ways in which King Robert was able to secure his kingship between 1309 and 1320?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretation given</i>
A dozen leading enemy magnates suffered forfeiture and disinheritance.	Suggests that Robert punished those who would not support him by removing their lands and exiling them from the country.
Robert combined their lands with his personal and crown estates, for redistribution, most of which went to about twenty close followers.	Suggests that Robert was able to reward those close to him with significant amounts of land, altering the balance of power in the political community.
The post-1314 forfeitures had left a partial vacuum within the Scottish nobility, however Robert I's patronage ensured that the higher nobility was radically changed.	Suggests that Robert used his patronage to radically alter the membership of the Scottish nobility to support him.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- in ending cross border land-holding many lords Robert also ended cross-border landholding
- Robert re-distributed these lands to any of his supporters such as, Randolph getting the province of Moray
- his brother Edward received the earldom of Carrick.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretations given</i>
Another Act of Succession was passed for unquestioned sealing [agreement] by his subjects this time recognising Robert's grandson, Robert Stewart (born in early 1316), as a stop-gap royal heir presumptive until King Robert had sons.	Suggests that Robert had to rewrite his succession to ensure his grandson became his heir to secure the Bruce/Stewart dynasty.
Robert's regime also issued statutes [laws] ordering skills in weaponry to be practised.	Suggests that Robert changed the feudal requirements of Scottish society with clearer rules on weapons needed and that everyone should receive basic training.
He also outlawed sedition [encouraging rebellion] and rumour-mongering against the Crown.	Suggests that Robert was so concerned about people plotting to overthrow him that he needed to outlaw the spreading of rumours or plots against him.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Robert's first tailzie was in 1314, when he bypassed his daughter Marjorie (his direct heir) for his brother, Edward
- in addition, Robert set up Guardians to help his young grandson rule, should he become king as a minor. The guardians were Thomas Randolph and James Douglas
- Sheriffs were to hold annual inspections of weapons and the ability to use them.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Robert held 19 councils and parliaments to ensure he ruled with his political community
- Robert's new supporters informed him of the Soules Conspiracy before it was enacted
- The Black Parliament harshly punished the leaders
- The Black Parliament was lenient on those involved due to feudalism
- Robert struggled to throw off the usurper status of how he became king, reducing his legitimacy
- Robert vilified the Balliol kingship in order to justify his own usurpation
- Robert released letters to the French king (1309) to justify his kingship
- Robert sent letters to the Papacy (1320) to convince them the Scots should be independent
- Robert rewarded Gordon with lands in the north-east
- taxation was rare and only issued for the lifetime of the king.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Robin Frame	Argues that even with the Declaration of Arbroath, Robert could not count on universal support, with signatories rising against the king before the year was out.
Michael Penman	Suggests that Robert's actions to secure his grandson as heir in 1318 were part of a reaction to growing resentment towards how he redistributed lands to supporters.
Michael Brown	Argues that the 1315 tailzie recognised the need for an adult male to rule, especially one proven in war.
Fiona Watson	Contends that King Robert was a usurper who suffered from an acute awareness of his own lack of legitimacy as king.

Section 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 17 **To what extent was the Treaty of Union successful in generating economic growth in Scotland between 1707 and 1815?**

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which the Treaty of Union generated economic growth in Scotland between 1707 and 1815. Responses might focus on the potential benefits of the Union compared with the danger of exposing a relatively weak Scottish economy to English competition. A consideration of specific industries, the regional variation and other factors associated with economic growth may also be considered. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Treaty of Union was successful in generating economic growth in Scotland between 1707-1815:

- tobacco – Article IV allowed Scottish interests to export into English domestic and colonial markets. Scottish merchants were able to legally trade in American commodities such as tobacco, rum and sugar within the biggest free trade zone in Europe. Article V – Scottish ships were now considered British within the Navigation Acts, thus providing the protection of the Royal Navy
- this was particularly important in the aftermath of the Darien disaster. Most spectacularly, the legal and illegal practices of the Glasgow tobacco merchants developed soon after 1707. By the early 1720's Scots controlled around 15% of the legal trade in American tobacco
- linen – demand from the English domestic market acted as a catalyst to key Scottish industries – increased competition for the Scottish linen industry forced increased quality control and more efficient production. Government aided economic growth of the textile and fishing industries through the establishment of the Board of Trustees for Manufactures and Fisheries in 1727
- engineering – Carron Ironworks, arguably Scotland's most important manufacturing facility of the 18th century just one example of many which benefitted directly from English capital and managerial expertise facilitated by the free trade zone created by the Treaty of Union
- agriculture – grain and meal exports more than doubled between 1707-1712 and 1717-1722 encouraging more efficient agricultural practices such as larger single tenancies and enclosure. Many innovations associated with the agrarian revolution were inspired from English husbandry, for example, Small's plough
- East India Company – Enormous range of opportunities for Scots through the British Empire. Employment in companies such as the East India Company in addition to the establishment of overseas markets for Scottish based industries.

Evidence which may not support the view that the Treaty of Union was successful in generating economic growth in Scotland between 1707 and 1815:

- tobacco – early success of the tobacco trade pre-dated the 1707 terms of the Union. Significant success was achieved by illegal means, primarily smuggling. The later expansion of the export trade was at least partly the result of efficient business practices and commercial methods, rather than an inevitable occurrence due to the Treaty of Union
- poor performance of all sectors of the Scottish economy aside from tobacco until the 1740's – weight of evidence appears to suggest that if the Union did benefit the wider Scottish economy it did so in a delayed manner
- following the lean years of the 1690's Scotland's economy was weak and dangerously exposed to direct competition from one of the most advanced economies in Europe. Specifically, Scotland's fledgling manufacturing sector was poorly equipped to compete with English industry. This was particularly in the case of textiles. For example, soon after 1707 the Scottish woollen industry was unable to cope with English competition
- in spite of the terms of the treaty duties were imposed upon key industries such as linen (1711 and 1715), salt (1711) and malt (1725). In the case of malt, serious riots resulted in Glasgow
- in the decade following Union demand for some Scottish manufactures in both England and the colonies remained sluggish while the immediate impact upon Scottish agriculture was regionalised. Aside from east Lothian most Scottish farming remained subsistence

- enforcement of the terms of the Union was subject to the vagaries of English party politics as, by definition, the Union had diluted Scottish parliamentary power
- impact of a wide range of other causal factors associated with economic growth, for example plentiful and accessible deposits of key raw materials including coal and iron within the central belt; numerous navigable rivers and a densely populated central belt provided a flexible, comparatively cheap labour force.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
TM Devine	Argues that the Union benefitted some key areas such as the linen industry, though he also states that the impact of the Treaty remained uncertain until after 1740. 'Union could well have been the political prelude to the 'development of underdevelopment' rather than the catalyst for a new age of progress and prosperity.'
TC Smout	Contends that the importation of English innovation facilitated by the Treaty of Union had a notable impact upon the development of Scottish industry and agriculture. 'English technology, enthusiastically borrowed in the first instance, and then still more enthusiastically adapted and advanced by native ingenuity . . . '
Rosalind Mitchison	Argues that the Union did eventually prove economically advantageous for the Scottish economy, however this came at a heavy political price. 'The Scots who had 'suspicions' that their country's views would be swamped in a largely English Parliament were proved right.'
Christopher Whatley	Maintains that the colonial trade opportunities afforded by the Treaty of the Union were important to the expansion of the Scottish economy, though he also emphasises the importance of the business acumen of Scotland's aristocrats and industrialists.

Question 18 **To what extent was the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1715 due to the Hanoverian response?**

Aim of the question To assess the relative importance of factors which resulted in the defeat of the 1715 rising. Responses might compare the importance of the Hanoverian response with the quality of the Jacobite leadership and the extent of support the rising achieved in Scotland, England and Europe. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1715 was due to the Hanoverian response:

- the broad strength of the Whigs, in terms of their control or influence over the Kirk, economy and aristocracy, all of which ensured access to formidable military resources
- the Hanoverian army was led by John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll – an able commander, thorough effective and open to his officers' advice
- a veteran of the War of Spanish Succession, the Duke of Argyll's military experience ensured he was the tactical superior of Mar, as demonstrated by his forcing of a stalemate at Sheriffmuir despite being outnumbered by three to one
- although an indecisive outcome, it favoured the government strategically, halting the Jacobite advance south. Also, reached Edinburgh quickly enough to prevent its capture by Mackintosh of Borlum
- Campbell arrested or closely supervised known Jacobites such as Lockhart of Carnwath
- the Duke of Argyll captured the Jacobite capital of Perth in December 1715
- the Hanoverian troops were an army in the modern European sense – they were most often paid, provisioned and relatively well equipped. They were also subject to recognised command and discipline in a way which the Jacobite Highland army was not.

Evidence which may not support the view that the defeat of the Jacobite rising of 1715 was due to the Hanoverian response:

Leadership of James VIII:

- distant, unattractive and lacking charisma
- barely present during the rising. Landed on 22 December, two months after Sheriffmuir by which time effective momentum had been lost. Sailed to France on 4 February having contributed little to the cause
- lack of presence throughout ensured rebellion lacked effective leadership, ending in fiasco.

Leadership of the Earl of Mar:

- a self-interested and opportunistic politician with no military experience. Mar may have envisaged the rising to be a political movement rather than a military rebellion. He squandered numerical and strategic advantage before and after Sheriffmuir
- the rising was characterised by abortive, unsuccessful strategies and continual hesitation. A pre-emptive seizure of Edinburgh castle stalled and was then hastily abandoned, while the planned western advance on Glasgow collapsed due to poor organisation
- details of events at the battle of Sheriffmuir – stalemate and effective if not actual defeat though military operations did continue until February 1716.

Support within Scotland:

- 1715 was easily the largest and most threatening Jacobite rising, partly as a result of widespread economic and political opposition to the Treaty of Union. 70% of Mar's army were Highland clansmen – the only Jacobites within Great Britain that retained an armed capacity. However, few western clans played an active role and no Highland chief gave the rising unqualified support
- majority of Scotland's population was anti-Catholic. Whig and Hanoverian propaganda successfully separated Protestantism and Jacobitism, as a result support for the Stuarts became synonymous with Catholicism
- Stuarts were inextricably linked with opposition to the Union, yet the Union guaranteed the Presbyterian Church. Thus, the Jacobites failed to gain the support of the Kirk which enjoyed a near total control of the lowland population in the early 18th century
- similarly, although the Jacobites committed themselves to the re-establishment of the Scottish parliament, the Stuarts had a record of hostility towards the institution as reigning monarchs.

English Support:

- the small force of Northumbrian Jacobites which joined with Jacobites from the Scottish borders represented the total English contingent, and was the only occasion when English Jacobites raised and led their own host in any rising
- lacking effective leadership and purpose, and suspicious of their Scottish allies, they were encircled and defeated at Preston on 12 November.

Foreign Support:

- Jacobitism allowed Britain's enemies an opportunity to gain military advantage during a period rivalry and continual warfare. French support was vital – France was the greatest military power of the age
- in 1702 Louis XIV recognised James VIII as the King of Great Britain, while in 1708 France committed substantial naval and military resources to support Scottish Jacobites. However, during 1715 support was not forthcoming as the Duke of Orleans inherited power from Louis XIV
- Spain did supply some financial assistance to the rising, but no military aid.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Bruce Lenman	Argues that the leadership of John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll, was vital in the defeat of the 1715 rising particular given the events at Sheriffmuir.
Michael Lynch	Contends that the outcome of the battle of Sheriffmuir effectively decided the outcome of the entire rising as momentum was lost. This, he argues, had a calamitous impact on support amongst sympathetic but non-committal Jacobites.
Christopher Whatley	Maintains that the rising was undermined by highly regionalised lack of support, as underlined by Glasgow's absence of Jacobite recruits coinciding with the economic buoyancy of the tobacco trade.
Murray Pittock	Argues that more than any other factor, Mar's leadership was critical in causing the failure of the 1715 rising. 'Mar was more interested in diluting his army's effectiveness than using it'.

Question 19 **‘Scottish agricultural underwent a revolution during the 18th century.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To assess the nature of agricultural change that took place in Scotland between 1715 and 1800. Response might discuss the pre-existing trends of change established in the 17th century and their relationship with trends of husbandry evident during the 18th century. In addition, responses might comment upon the pace of change, which was gradual until the 1740s, after which it accelerated, particularly during the 1760s and 1770s. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that Scottish agricultural underwent a revolution during the 18th century:

- revolution in this context would involve concepts such as a sudden or significant shift in terms of technology or organisation used
- examples of change which represented clear progression from previous practice, for example, abandonment of ‘paring and burning’, as a means to expand the area under cultivation, and the withdrawal of free grazing and run-rig
- many ‘improvements’ had a fundamental (revolutionary) impact upon the physical appearance of the land – draining, reforestation, walling etc
- establishment of new organisations – 1723 Honourable Society of the Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture and the impact of ‘improvers’ such as John Cockburn of Ormiston (though some, including Cockburn, went bankrupt)
- enclosure – present in the 17th century but limited to a limited few gentry. By the 18th century, although progress was varied, by 1790 69% of farms in Angus, Fife, Ayrshire and Lanarkshire had some enclosure activity, with more than a 1/3rd of them having completed enclosing. However, many irregular undivided fields remained
- the rising of ‘Levellers’ who destroyed fences in Galloway in 1724 was so violent it had to be suppressed by military intervention, in addition to low level resistance to change amongst tenants. This provides an interesting contemporary view on the nature of agricultural change
- 1760s as a watershed – newly available bank lending and expanding urban markets are linked to a rapid acceleration of agrarian innovation
- New techniques, such as James Small’s plough became widespread in the 1760s – as did an intensification of liming resulting in 300% increases in yields in some areas between 1750-1800
- rising prices at the end of the century provided further stimulus to landowners to improve
- tenants insufficiently committed to improving were removed under ‘improving’ leases, resulting in the complete dislocation of traditional lifestyles
- planned villages, such as Inveraray, represented economic and social reconstruction. Although construction was gradual during the 18th century, there was a tendency of these ‘colonies’ to house only ‘suitable’ tenants – Whatley describes this process as ‘social selection’.

Evidence which may not support the view that Scottish agricultural underwent a revolution during the 18th century:

Pre-existing patterns of change:

- many 18th century changes represented a continuation of earlier patterns beginning in the 17th century
- the reduction in the number of multiple tenancies, increasing use of longer, written leases and the expansion of land under cultivation through drainage of marsh and the removal of peat
- pace of change was particularly gradual prior to the 1740s
- 17th Scottish agriculture was already responding to commercialisation – eastern cereal growing areas such as the Lothians, Moray Firth and the Orkneys was exporting to Europe in addition to shipping produce to expanding market opportunities in the west of Scotland
- increased yields were already being achieved during the 17th century by liming, manuring and four-crop rotations. Tree planting introduced by some landed gentry

Regional variation:

- enormous variation between regions, neighbouring estates and even within estates. No single pattern of improvement
- highlands – replacement of the traditional agricultural as cash rents were paid directly to landlords. Wood leave and free access to seaware became tied to cash values. Prohibition of hand querns as tenants were obliged to take grain to estate mills for grinding. Clearance and the introduction of the black faced sheep
- dairy and fruit common in Ayrshire and Clydesdale – Lothians and Fife specialised in barley.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****TM Devine**

Argues that much of the agricultural change of the 18th century was simply a continuation of trends which had their origins in the 17th century. 'In most areas, outside the progressive south eastern counties the landscape had hardly changed at all. Enclosure had made little progress. . . and the 'improved' agricultural methods were rarely practised.'

TC Smout

Emphasises the scale of change in some areas of Scotland which he points out compared favourably to the continent – 'the farming system in many parts of Scotland became the envy of Europe'.

Christopher Whatley

Argues that the nature of agricultural change during the first half of the 17th century was gradual – 'The efforts of some ambitious landowners notwithstanding, the period prior to 1760 was not one of significant rural reorganisation, and changes in farming systems proceeded slowly.'

Michael Lynch

Argues that agricultural change was gradual to the point that it formed a significant barrier to general economic development – 'Agriculture was undoubtedly the most important bottleneck which had to be passed through before general economic growth could establish itself.'

Question 20

To what extent was the Patronage Act the main challenge to the Kirk's authority between 1707 and 1815?

Aim of the question To assess the relative impact of the Patronage Act upon the authority of the Presbyterian Kirk. Responses might compare the impact of the Patronage Act with the effect of religious dissent, patterns of migration, secularisation and the influence of principles associated with the Enlightenment. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may suggest that the challenge to the Kirk's authority was due to the Patronage Act:

- the authority of the re-established Presbyterian Kirk in 1690 by the Revolution Settlement was founded upon the rejection of any secular interference by the state or any monarch in perpetuity
- 'No bishops, no king' rejected the notion of Episcopalianism as the doctrine of the nation's church on the basis that the crown's representatives did not have the right to govern the Kirk
- the Patronage Act was also in breach of commitments made in the Treaty of Union, and specifically the Act of Security, which explicitly guaranteed the institutional independence of the Church of Scotland in 1707
- the Kirk's authority was based upon an independence of governance in accordance with a strict Calvinistic interpretation of Christianity, a governance not necessarily understood by English MPs nor Williamite monarchs in whose interests it was to achieve a degree of state control
- Patronage as defined by the Patronage Act pertained to the selection of candidates to be parish ministers. The Act allowed for the crown, Universities, burghs and heritors to choose their preferred candidate. Though technically the elders could object and appeal to the Presbytery, convention dictated that the Kirk's courts were unlikely to support the objection.
- fundamentally undermined the populist right of Presbyterian congregations to choose their own minister as indicated by notably strong opposition from a particularly vocal clergy
- the Kirk's Presbyterianism upheld discipline as a moral obligation which decreed the dividing line between the elect and the reprobate. The circumscribing of what was an established part of church governance by lay officials was in direct contravention to this moral code
- encouraged the advancement of more moderate ministers less inclined to adhere to puritanical Calvinism wed to principles of godly discipline. It was unlikely to be in the interests of the landowner to appoint dedicated puritans. Rather, successful candidates tended to be moderates likely to share the landowner's wider beliefs and aims
- medium term impact of the Patronage Act was to undermine the unity of the Kirk. From the 1730's onwards as patrons increasingly exercised their powers the Kirk suffered a series of schisms and splits between those willing to accept the principle of secular interference and those resolutely opposed to it. The Secession Church, founded in 1740, was established as a direct result of doctrinal dispute following this pattern
- the principle of secular patronage established by the Patronage Act laid the foundation for the 1732 General Assembly Act against the use of congregational elections.

Evidence which may not suggest that the challenge to the Kirk's authority was due to the Patronage Act:

The Toleration Act:

- dilution of the Kirk's authority pre-dated 1712. The Presbyterian Form of Process marked the start of a softening of Kirk discipline partly as a result of the state withdrawing their judicial support of crimes including lesser excommunication
- the Toleration Act (1712) lessened the authority of the Kirk to exercise church discipline by allowing the proliferation of religious dissent as the Episcopalian church's renewed ability to conduct its own services weakened the Kirk's court mechanism.

Population migration:

- increased rural migration further undermined the testificate system which monitored the morality of parishioners and controlled their ability to migrate between parishes
- rapidly expanding towns and cities weakened church authority as accelerating urbanisation rendered the Kirk's judicial system impracticable
- initial stages of secularisation further undermined the Kirk's authority, and was reflected in the increased use of fines rather than other forms of publicly made punishment
- the increased mobility of the general populace was contributed to by an expansion in the numbers of enlisted men who were largely unaffected by the Kirk's authority as they did not reside in any one parish.

Role of the landed gentry:

- the landed classes were increasingly outside the authority of the church's judiciary, generally escaping through the payment of fines as contributions to the poor fund
- poor relief was increasingly not the sole responsibility of the Kirk as landowners shared the financial burden.

Education:

- university trained clergy were subject to European influences and a modernised curriculum far removed from Calvinist doctrine
- the authority of the Kirk was subject to its minsters willingness to use it. The Enlightenment's concepts of a more liberal, rational, polite church moved a new generation of preachers away from puritanical admonishment.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****Ian Donnachie**

Maintains that the reinstatement of lay patronage by the Act of Patronage was of fundamental importance in weakening the Kirk's unity, and therefore authority. 'Dissatisfaction with the terms of this Act led to the First Secession'.

John Prebble

Argues that the impact of the Act of Patronage upon the fundamental principles of the Kirk's ability to preserve its authority and independence from secular intervention, noting that there was 'an outraged protest when the Parliament restored lay patronage to the Kirk, contrary to the Act of Security'.

Christopher Whatley

Contends that the decline in the authority of the Kirk should not be overstated and that the extent of social control exercised by the church remained considerable '... there were limits to godliness, but even so the church did continue thereafter to have a powerful effect on cultural life'.

TM Devine

Argues that the huge numbers who attended dissenting or Roman Catholic churches in the latter part of the 18th century suggests the early stages of secularisation were not responsible for the lessening of the Kirk's authority, but rather the proliferation of dissenting churches simply allowed the population to discard traditional church discipline which in turn undermined the Kirk's ability to control the population.

Question 21

‘It was Edinburgh’s rather than Scotland’s Enlightenment.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To ascertain the extent to which the terms of the Scottish Enlightenment should be re-interpreted specifically to Edinburgh rather than accepting a wider Scottish definition. Responses will likely interpret Enlightenment in its broadest sense, encapsulating theoretical discussion, artistic and literary achievement and practical application. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which may support the view that the Scottish Enlightenment was a largely Edinburgh based phenomenon:

- Scotland’s pre-eminent intellectual centre – the concentration of leading figures of the Enlightenment created opportunities to discuss and debate intellectual interests and the formation of cultural institutions such as the Select Society of Edinburgh, the Philosophical Society and the Cape Club
- other aspects of the Enlightenment established their own societies and institutions encouraging the further concentration of intellectuals and artists in Edinburgh. For example, the Edinburgh Musical Society attracted figures of international standing including Barsanti and Schetky
- specifically, the work of David Hume, whose *Treatise of Human Nature* became one of the most debated works of the age
- pre-eminence of Edinburgh’s educational institutions – growing reputation of Edinburgh University, particularly in medicine achieved partly by attracting talent from Glasgow. By the end of the 18th century it was regarded as the finest medical school in Europe
- the establishment Scotland’s first art institution, the Academy of St. Luke
- retention of the headquarters of Scotland’s two most important institutions, the Kirk and the Law, ensured the attraction of a disproportionate number of educated professionals
- James Craig’s New Town, ‘the Athens of the North,’ houses designed by the Adam family became the physical embodiment of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Evidence which may not support the view that the Scottish Enlightenment was a largely Edinburgh based phenomenon:

Education:

- work of leading figures at Glasgow University such as Francis Hutcheson, chair of Moral Philosophy, who attained a Europe wide reputation for his writing; Adam Smith (moral philosophy) Gershom Carmichael (science and philosophy)
- increasing profile of and curricular development of Scottish Universities. Glasgow established a medical school while at Aberdeen Reid and Beattie found repute in philosophy
- intellectual clubs were not confined to Edinburgh. Glasgow’s Literary Society and Aberdeen’s Philosophical Society providing venues for enlightened discussion
- maturation of Mercantile Glasgow – massive expansion of service industries supported the Enlightenment’s ‘Glasgow scene’.

Enlightenment Literature:

- although undoubtedly texts of the Enlightenment, MacPherson’s translations embraced a tradition at odds with an Edinburgh elite eager to refine their Scottish dialect
- similarly, the Scots verse of Ayrshire born Burns, though at times lauded by Edinburgh society, stands distinct from the modes, language and style of the more anglicized literature produced by contemporary Edinburgh based writers.

Agricultural and Industrial Innovation:

- the Enlightenment was as much a movement of practical application as academic theorising
- James Watt's steam engine is credited as a key catalyst that preceded the industrial revolution
- belief in rational improvement helped to encourage agricultural improvement across Scotland through the recognition that the natural world can be adapted by the application of logic and reason, as described in Kames' *The Gentleman Farmer*
- in practical terms this manifested itself in the transformation of significant swathes of Scotland's countryside through drainage, enclosure and the cultivation of new crops.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Arthur Herman	Argues that although Edinburgh's luminaries were a key component of the Scottish Enlightenment, the achievements associated with the city should be seen as complementing rather than eclipsing Glasgow. 'They complemented each other. Glasgow was more innovative and practical . . . Edinburgh was more artistic and literary, more intellectual.'
Tom Devine	Argues that the Enlightenment was a broad movement affecting more than simply an elite – 'The Scottish Enlightenment was much more than a period of unparalleled creativity by a small number of 'great men' . . . Nor was reason confined to the lecture theatre or the scholarly textbook. It affected all aspects of human behaviour.'
James Buchan	Stresses the specific importance of Edinburgh and those associated with the city – 'For a period of half a century . . . the small city of Edinburgh ruled the Western intellect. For near fifty years, the city . . . laid the mental foundations for the modern world.'
Charles McKean	Maintains that the concentration of Enlightenment glitterati in Edinburgh was due to the vacuum created by the emigration of Edinburgh's nobility following the Treaty of Union.

SECTION 3 – Scotland: from the Treaty of Union to the Enlightenment, 1707–1815

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 22 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons for the failure of the 1745 Jacobite rising.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Lord George Murray	Lord George Murray led a faction of the war council. As such, he was ideally placed to comment on the reasons for failure of 1745 the rising.
Purpose	Letter to Charles Edward Stuart	Lord George Murray was seeking to influence the direction of the Prince's campaign strategy because Murray's tactics tended to be more conservative than those adopted by the Prince.
Timing	29 January 1746	Written after the battle of Falkirk Muir, after which the Jacobites began the retreat north.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
We are now certain that a vast number of soldiers from your Royal Highness's army are gone home since the Battle of Falkirk, and that despite all the efforts of your commanders we are sure this evil of desertion is continuing.	Takes the view that Jacobite officers were powerless to prevent desertion which was having a significant and ongoing impact on the Jacobite army. Emphasised by the phrase 'the evil of desertion is continuing.'
In comparison with the enemy, your army lacks their experience, and if they should march upon us now, we can only see the utter destruction of your men.	Takes the view that the Jacobite army compared so unfavourably with the Hanoverian force in terms of size and quality that any imminent battle could destroy the Jacobites. Emphasised by the phrase 'utter destruction of your men.'
This move north is all the more pressing as we now have little artillery and as your Royal Highness knows, we had no option but to throw much of it into the river Forth, including our heavy cannon.	Takes the view that the Jacobite hosts ability to fight has been further compromised by the necessity of abandoning much of their artillery in the Forth – this would ensure the Hanoverians would be unable to requisition it. Emphasised by the phrase 'no option but to throw much of it into the river Forth'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- desertion was a significant problem throughout the 1745 rising. This was the result of the peculiarly Highland nature of much of Charles's army, and a prolonged campaign much of which was far from the Highlands. A second Contextual Development point might be, Charles suffered from a constant dearth of finance and struggled to pay and feed his soldiers. All these factors led to further desertion
- at Culloden Charles commanded around five thousand men, compared with Cumberland's nine thousand
- the Jacobite army lacked artillery, skilled crews and, crucially, compatible ammunition. A second Contextual Development point might be, the Jacobite army lacked a developed infrastructure comparable to contemporary European armed forces.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the inadequate size of Charles's army was a direct result of recruitment, or lack of – support in Scotland and even in the Highlands was highly regionalised. There was patchy support in some parts of the Lowlands, including outright opposition in Glasgow and the west. Infamously, there was only 200 men raised from England – the 'Manchester regiment'. Thus, the 1745 rebellion could never accurately have been described as a national
- Charles Edward Stuart's leadership has been widely linked to the failure of the rising. In addition to his inability to quell the factionalism amongst his senior advisers, he has been accused of being petulant and arrogant. His authority has been further questioned by unfulfilled assurances of a French invasion, and his refusal to participate in the command of his army during the retreat from Derby
- the Hanoverian response to the Jacobite rising was central to its failure. The Royal Navy operated a successful sea blockade starving the Jacobites of resources, whilst the effectiveness of Cumberland's army at Culloden is well documented and widely acknowledged.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****Murray Pittock**

Argues that not all of 'the Scots' preferred tactics were necessarily better than those favoured by Charles. For example, the 'fortress Scotland' policy favoured by some of the clan chiefs, including Lochiel, was not, he maintains, strategically sound as the rapid capture of London would have become impossible.

Daniel Szechi

Contends that Charles's tactics and leadership throughout the rising were directly responsible for the failure of the rebellion – 'his strategic vision was poor'.

Michael Lynch

Maintains that Charles's assurances of a French landing had been rendered redundant following the abandonment of a pre-emptive strike in March 1744. The violent storm that wrecked French ships off Dunkirk, he argues, led to the replacement of an invasion strategy with a focus on war against the British at Flanders.

Tom Devine

Argues that the small size of the Jacobite army was critical in the eventual defeat of the Jacobites. 'Scottish backing during the rising was remarkably thin on the ground long before the crushing defeat of Culloden; it was this together with the virtual disappearance of support in England rather than force of arms in itself which ultimately ended the last hopes of restoration'.

Question 23 **How fully does Source B explain the methods used by Henry Dundas to manage Scotland on behalf of the government?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
His political success was partly based upon his ability to reassure the aristocracy against any loss of influence due to electoral reform by declaring ‘it would be easier to reform hell’.	States that Dundas successfully assuaged the concerns aristocrats held regarding electoral reform, and the possible reduction this might have on their political influence.
In Scotland, Dundas was the patronage broker for jobs in the universities and in this way, he gained further power, as providing jobs was the essential lubricant of the political system.	States that Dundas used patronage to allocate jobs in Scottish universities to increase his political power.
As Treasurer of the Navy from 1782 and President of the Board of Control after 1793, he became the main provider of employment for the sons of the landed classes in the British Empire.	States that Dundas manipulated his various appointments within government to facilitate further patronage – in this case providing jobs in the British Empire to sons of the aristocracy.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the landed gentry held considerable political power over what was a corrupt system, for example, the splitting of superiorities by landowners creating ‘faggot’ votes and pocket counties which they controlled, for example, Sutherland, Buccleuch and Argyll. A second Contextual Development point might be, that they had much to lose as a result of any mooted electoral reform and were quick to commit their support to Dundas as a result of his publicly stated opposition to it
- Dundas used his positions as Keeper of the Signet, Solicitor General and Lord Advocate to expand his power of patronage by providing numerous legal, political and administrative opportunities in return for political loyalty
- increasingly from the 1760’s onwards, jobs were available in various departments of the British state and Empire and Dundas’s use of patronage ensured Scots became the most prominent element in the administration of India.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Dundas took advantage of the endemic corruption within Scottish politics, such as the creation of ‘parchment barons’ which lent itself to ‘management’, the technique of sourcing and distributing patronage, as used by the Earl of Islay prior to the ascendancy of Dundas
- his appointment as Commissioner of the Board of Control (1784) then President (1793) of the Dutch East India company gave him access to vast patronage opportunities for Scots to benefit from Asian trading opportunities
- Dundas’s political skills and connectedness ensured he was favoured by many political masters – in 1782-1783 he was a leading member of 3 different governments
- Dundas secured further power through his close relationship with Pitt the Younger. This relationship greatly increased his power of patronage still further. By 1800 Scotland had obtained more than a quarter of all state pensions and a third of government sinecures whilst accounting for only a sixth of England’s population
- Dundas’s methods were not universally popular – although his opposition to reform gained him aristocratic allies, it also contributed to public disorder and the burning of ‘Old Corruption’ – Dundas effigies, as a mob stoned his house during the King’s birthday celebrations in 1792
- Henry Cockburn labelled Dundas ‘the absolute dictator of Scotland whom had the means of rewarding submission and of suppressing opposition beyond what were ever exercised in modern times by one person in any part of the Empire’. ‘Zeno’, the campaign for reform by liberal advocates was also ignored by Dundas

- in response to the revolutionary era of the late 1790s Dundas cracked down upon political reformers, suspending Wrongous Imprisonment, and thus increasing his popularity amongst the electorate. Resultantly, in 1796, his control over parliamentary and burgh seats reached its peak.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tom Devine	Maintains that an important aspect of Dundas's ability to wield the influence he did was the political strategies he deployed in parliament which ensured MPs were left with little choice but to vote in support of the government – in 1780 Dundas controlled 12 of 41 Scottish constituencies, by 1784 22 and by 1790 34.
Christopher Smout	Argues that an important aspect of Dundas's power was his extensive local networking which ensured his influence was felt throughout Scottish society beyond the immediate sphere of politics – 'he was the past master of gentlemanly management. . . his influence extended beyond politics to business and the church.'
Michael Lynch	Maintains that Dundas management of Scottish affairs also included his securing of overseas positions for Scots, arguing that he was almost solely responsible for Scottish candidates being successful in securing employment in what Lynch describes as Dundas's 'Imperial Vision.'
John Prebble	Argues that a significant reason for Dundas's ability to manage so effectively was his use of patronage to secure favour amongst not only the aristocracy but also the emerging middle classes, gaining 'the unqualified support of most of the landed gentry and middle classes.'

Question 24 **How much does Source C and Source D reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of Scottish education in the 18th century?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Scotland's parish schools were established by an Act of Parliament in 1696 which meant children paid a small fee to attend, and directed the Kirk to support the very poor to ensure they attended, a mechanism which ensured that most rural Scots received some elementary education.	Suggests that the majority of rural Scots received a basic, affordable education through the parish school system.
Overseen by town councils and the parish clergy, many burghs established 'grammar schools', some of which had medieval origins, and delivered not only an elementary but a more advanced Latin-based education to boys in preparation for university and the traditional professions.	Suggests that most burghs established grammar schools which delivered a more advanced, Latin based education in preparation for university.
Edinburgh was distinct in that it had endowed institutions such as Watson's, Heriot's and the Merchant Maiden Hospitals and these schools provided schooling for the children of poor burgesses.	Suggests that some of Edinburgh's schools differed from Other Scottish schools as they were endowed and therefore could provide the urban poor with an education.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the building of the school and the salary of the teacher was to be met by a tax levied upon the parishes' heritors
- whilst burgh schools were an important aspect of the conventional provision of schooling population expansion through mass migration to urban centres placed a significant and increasing burden on them
- similar to Edinburgh's endowed charity schools, 'Adventure schools' were an additional type of fee-paying private school which emerged in response to the increasing disposable income amongst the emerging urban middle classes.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Curricular innovation continued during the 18 th century as lowland burgh schools began teaching subjects in new ways, including teaching French as a foreign language.	Suggests that the school curriculum was evolving both in terms of teaching practise and new subjects, which included French, being delivered.
Another notable aspect of education during the Enlightenment period was the strength with which the emerging middle classes continued to vigorously support their local burgh, grammar schools and universities, largely as an appreciable number directly benefitted from the parochial school and university system.	Suggests that the nature of education was closely linked to the support of the middle classes who were primarily motivated by benefiting from schools and universities.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
Separately, the development of the discipline today known as English took shape in Scotland's universities, notably at St Andrews and Edinburgh, where Hugh Blair, Regius Professor of Rhetoric and Letters from 1762 was arguably the first chair in the subject of English anywhere in the world.	Suggests that the curriculum in Scottish universities was changing. Specifically, the delivery of English as an academic subject was pioneered by the University of Edinburgh.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- curricular innovation was most notable as an aspect of the impact of the Academy movement – Perth was the first (1760). A second Contextual Development point might be, by 1800 Dundee, Inverness, Ayr and Elgin all had town academies characterised by a vocational curriculum which included navigation, bookkeeping and surveying
- Glasgow University developed particularly strong links with the middle class merchant community, by 1790 half the students enrolled were sons of 'industry and commerce' in comparison with less than 8% percent at Cambridge. A second Contextual Development point might be, Burgh schools and academies were similarly affordable, helping to foster close links with local populations
- Scottish universities were evolving rapidly during the 18th century – as early as 1708 saw the introduction of a new system of specialised professors replacing the antiquated regenting structure at Edinburgh University. A second Contextual Development point might be lecturers no longer taught students the entire curriculum.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- demographic change was applying increasing pressure to the parish school system as the 18th century progressed. Population increase created larger classes, whilst early urbanisation placed unsustainable pressures on urban parish schools
- Sunday schools, imported from England from the 1780's, were run by interdenominational organisations. These were partially successful in circumnavigating absenteeism due to children's weekly manual employment
- impact of the SSPCK which established 116 schools by 1755, and 149 by 1792, though the majority were in the southern Highlands, Moray and Easter Ross the organisation also established schools in Fife and Edinburgh. This was just one aspect of the strong influence the Kirk had over Scottish education
- expansion of private tutoring amongst middle classes and nobility – celebrated examples of leading scholars educating sons of the aristocracy, for example, Adam Smith accompanied a young 3rd Duke of Buccleuch during his grand tour of Europe
- female education was expanded by 'Finishing schools' which taught French and sewing to daughters of the middle and upper classes, whilst some workplaces used 'spinning schools' which taught basic numeracy and literacy
- examples of the impact of individual reformers and specific institutional university reform such as the expansion of the curriculum eg the establishment of new institutions such as the School for the Art of Design (1753)
- new professorships were gradually created in faculties such as history, philosophy, law and medicine, enabling the parallel development of both science and the humanities
- individual universities gained international recognition in specific fields of excellence. Aberdeen gained prominence in the fields of moral philosophy and political economy while Edinburgh's medical faculty, established in 1726 as the first faculty of medicine in Britain, became the pre-eminent place to study anatomy in Europe.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
TM Devine	Argues that an important aspect of Scottish education during the 18 th century was the growing academic credentials of Scotland's universities and their influence on the Enlightenment. 'the Scottish universities would be at the heart of the enlightenment, with many of the leading thinkers drawn from the professoriate'.
TC Smout	In recognition of its expansion and rate of change Smout argues that Scottish education in the 18 th century was 'a growth industry'. He goes on to state that the changing nature of education reflected its changing purpose which was largely due to the demands of the emerging middle classes.
Michael Lynch	Maintains that the emergence of grammar and burgh schools were important in developing distinctively Scottish paths towards qualifying in the professions.
Donald Withrington	Argues that the strength of the partnership between the state and Kirk in developing Scottish schools during the 18 th century was of pivotal importance – 'the state. . . gave parliamentary backing for the funding of a parochial school system and the church acted as managers for the whole enterprise'.

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850-1865

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 25 To what extent was the USA divided into an ‘agricultural’ South and an ‘industrial’ North in the 1850s?

Aim of the question To assess the differences between North and South in the 1850s and the extent to which they were divided into an agricultural South and industrial North. Responses might consider the differences in the economic approaches and may wish to extend and/or link the analysis to consider the differences that existed between North and South, for example, in culture and ideology. Indeed, it may also provide evidence to show that they had as much in common as divided them. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the North was more ‘Industrial’:

- greater industrial development in the North than the South. There were approx. 140,000 factories in the USA in 1850, of which there were approximately just 20,000 in the South
- by 1860, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had nearly \$100 million each invested in manufacturing industries. The most industrialised of the Southern states, Virginia, had invested less than \$20 million. The other states in the South had less than \$5 million invested in manufacturing industries
- the value of goods manufactured in these states also supports the argument that the North was industrial as the production in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania was valued at more than \$150 million. Virginia was valued at less than \$30 million. Alabama was valued at less than \$5 million
- the North had greater economic development in railroad investment with railway mileage and journey times significantly shorter in the North which also enhanced trade and economic development. The South tended to rely on their river network more than railways
- the North was arguably not industrialised but Industrialising. For example, only four northern manufacturing industries employed more than 50,000 people
- the Northwest was known as ‘the larder of the USA’ producing food crops and was far from an industrial economy.

Evidence which supports the view that the South was more agricultural:

- while there was some industrial development in the Upper South, the Southern economy was dominated by agriculture
- there was limited urbanisation in the South. By 1860, only 20 towns had more than 5000 inhabitants. Charleston and Richmond only had a population of 40,000. Supporting the argument of a rural, agrarian based economy
- the South had 35% of US population but produced only 10% of manufactured output
- Southern crops made up three-fifths of total American exports. Cotton was by far the country’s largest export accounting for 50% of American exports
- the production of cotton in the South in the 1850s had accounted for 77% of the 800 million pounds of cotton used in Britain demonstrating significant enterprise in this aspect of the economy
- there were many other forms of agriculture in the South including tobacco, rice and sugar
- the economy of the Upper South was diversifying and arguably similar to the North although perhaps not industrialising at the same rate as the North. The Tredegar Iron Works was a significant industry in the Upper South
- there was economic development in the Southern railroad construction also with Southern investment to ensure the construction of the trans-continental railroad which would bring trade between the east coast and the markets of Asia.

Evidence which supports the view that there were cultural differences:

- the differing developments in the economies of North and South had a significant impact on their respective cultural development
- the majority of immigrants arrived and stayed in the North with very few immigrants moving South leading to a more diverse Northern population that was responsive to new developments and initiatives
- Northerners were open to education to ensure the development of their industrial economy and to ensure that the population was better educated and able to compete with foreign competition, enslaved labour led to a limited freedom of speech in the South and a more violent society
- there was less demand for education in the South as they did not have to adapt to competition from abroad – ‘Cotton is King’ argument.

Evidence which supports the view that there were Ideological Differences:

- there were contrasting attitudes to abolitionism, the Fugitive Slave Laws introduced in 1850, and this shaped the political and ideological outlook of North and South
- Southerners increasingly believed in the idea that enslaved labour could only be protected out with the Federal Union
- the South argued strongly for States’ Rights and protection from interference from Federal Government
- the Tariff became a focal point for North and South as a high tariff would protect the Northern economy but harmed Southern profits. The southerners feared a reactionary tariff would be imposed by the USA’s trading partners, for example, Britain.

Historians**Perspective on the issue**

Charles and Mary Beard	Take the view that the sections were divided into an agricultural South and an industrial North.
David Potter	Takes the view that there was no economic gulf between North and South and therefore rejects the views of Charles and Mary Beard.
Richard Bense	Takes the view that tariff protection was for industry and the reason it was for industry and not agriculture is because the US was exporting, not importing, agricultural products, so the tariff was no use for those in the South.
James McPherson	Takes the view that that the North were superior in economic enterprise as the proportion of Northerners in business was three times greater than the South, and among engineers and inventors it was six times as large.

Question 26

‘Lincoln was slow to grasp the depth of the crisis after his election as President in 1860.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To assess the impact of Lincoln’s reactions to the events after the 1860 Presidential Election. Responses might consider whether Lincoln was at fault for the escalating crisis in 1860 by assessing, for example, the speed of Lincoln’s reactions and whether Lincoln did enough to reassure Southern perceptions of him and the Republican Party as a whole. Responses might consider that Lincoln did take sufficient action with discussion of, for example, the Crittenden Proposals and Lincoln’s handling of the Border States. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Lincoln was slow to grasp the depth of the crisis:

- the Nashville Convention had declared that a Republican victory in the election would result in Southern secession. Lincoln was aware of this
- in 1860, Lincoln had run on a platform to prevent the further extension of enslaved labour, many in the South interpreted this as anti-slavery and the Southern Press made their views on Lincoln very clear during the election campaign
- Lincoln and the Republican Party; sectional, northern party and candidate and offered little to the South. As a sectional candidate, Lincoln only represented Northern views and had to do more to appease the South
- Republican Party very much pro Northern with little reference to Southern interests/issues, particularly in the 1860 campaign
- Lincoln did not win any of the southern states; therefore, he would have been a sectional president. The South would find this hard to accept him as President
- the Republican platform was almost entirely focused on Northern issues Lincoln only achieved votes in Northern states. His name did not appear on the ballot paper of a single Southern state which should have been a clear sign that Lincoln was required to do more to appeal to the South
- Southern press was increasingly hostile to all northern actions and portrayed Lincoln as an Abolitionist and as a direct threat to the social and economic status of the South. This justified immediate secession if he were to be elected and as the movement for secession had gathered pace before Lincoln was elected, he should have been quicker to react to the crisis
- the movement for secession gained momentum after Lincoln’s election – as far as secessionists were concerned, Lincoln was capable of anything! There are criticisms of Lincoln in this period as he appeared to delay; suggestions of indecision between the election and inauguration
- Lincoln/Douglas debates; Lincoln’s theme was not just enslaved labour’s immorality but the danger of a malignant conspiracy against the North. This fuelled the divide
- Lincoln was aware that, regardless of his views, as a Republican he was perceived as being in favour of reversing the Dred Scott decision
- ‘House-Divided’ speech widened the gap between the sections and the parties. Lincoln needed to be more decisive in this period to reassure the South
- Lincoln’s declaration that enslaved labour was a ‘monstrous injustice’ that should be ‘placed in the course of ultimate extinction.’ This was a serious threat to the South and southern honour
- confederacy had taken control of Federal property, but some, including Fort Sumter, remained in Federal control. Lincoln declared that he would retain control of the forts and informed the Confederate government that he intended to resupply the fort. This decision may have provoked the South or may even have been intended to provoke them.

Evidence which supports the view that Lincoln did take action to address the crisis:

- although seven lower southern states seceded, eight upper south states did not secede immediately
- compromise was still possible. It had been achieved in 1820, 1850 and to an extent in 1854
- Buchanan, the outgoing President, regarded secession as illegal Lincoln's declaration in his inaugural speech that he was determined to retain the Union
- the Crittenden Proposals offered the potential for a compromise
- in 1860 Lincoln denounced John Brown's raid of 1859 in order to appease the South
- Lincoln's election was the culmination of decades of sectional tension; this was outwith Lincoln's control
- fall-out from Kansas and the 1858 Congressional elections meant that there was little Lincoln could have done
- the Dred Scott decision re-emphasised the 'slave power conspiracy' concerns therefore enhanced the Democrat/Republican division with little Lincoln could do
- extremists in the South had hastened the split in the Democrat Party, hastening the southern emphasis in the party which advocated secession regardless of Lincoln's election. Secessionists insisted that the only protection of southern rights was withdrawal from the Union before Lincoln's inauguration
- South Carolina ordinances consisted of a list of the ways in which the free states had violated the rights of enslavers. This was regardless of Lincoln's election.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****Brian Holden Reid**

Takes the view that most of the major decisions had been taken before Lincoln came into office by the 'lame-duck' president, Buchanan. Mishaps, miscalculations and misfortunes characterised the manoeuvres that prefaced the Civil War. Conciliation could not work when it was treated by one party with contempt.

Kenneth Stamp

Takes the view that Lincoln's chief concern was the maintenance of the Union. He did take action to re-assert and vindicate federal authority in the South. By March 1861, it was clear his policy was one of the preservation of the Union through a defensive strategy.

David Potter

Takes the view that compromise was unlikely from the outset, given the momentum of secession and the fundamental philosophy of the Republican Party.

Richard Current

Takes the view that Lincoln was not responsible for provoking the Civil War. He argues that one could readily reverse the charge and allege that the Confederacy was motivated to provoke the war. Fort Sumter provided Jefferson Davis with an opportunity to unify the Confederacy, uphold southern honour and prestige, and drag the upper South out of the Union, despite Lincoln's best efforts to avoid conflict! It was Jefferson Davis who ordered the attack on Sumter before the arrival of the expedition.

Question 27

‘Military operations in the Western Theatre were crucial in determining the course of the Civil War.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To analyse the importance of the Western Theatre to Union military strategy. Responses might analyse the issue as part of the debate over ‘East versus West.’ The response could consider the extent to which Confederate Strategy appeared to ignore the importance of the Western Theatre in favour of the Virginian Theatre thus allowing the response to reach a balanced conclusion regarding the importance of military operations in the Western Theatre to eventual Union victory in the Civil War. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Western Theatre was important to military strategy:

- potential for Union victory in the West was great due to its sheer size, its lack of natural defence lines and rivers flowing into the heart of the Confederacy
- Grant’s successes in February 1862 opened up the South’s ‘soft underbelly’
- battle of Shiloh prevented the Confederacy regaining the initiative in the west
- the capture of Vicksburg opened up the Mississippi to Union shipping and split the confederacy in two
- Key Union military victories dealt severe blows to Confederate morale, for example, Battle of Murfreesboro forcing Bragg’s army into retreat, Battles of Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge forcing Confederate forces to retreat into Georgia in disarray
- the experiences on the battlefield in the Western theatre would be critical for generals such as Grant and Halleck when they came to fight in the East
- Union successes in the West ultimately opened up the route for Sherman’s march on Atlanta in summer 1864.

Evidence which supports the view that there were difficulties for Union strategy in the western theatre:

- key problems organising its Western forces
- problems of command and control
- difficulties in communication and therefore coordinating a strategy
- Union had to police areas conquered, therefore tying up men that could have been used to fight elsewhere
- difficulties in guarding an extremely long supply line.

Evidence which supports the view that the Eastern Theatre was important to military strategy:

- ‘Forward to Richmond’ from the Northern press encouraged victory by capturing the Confederate capital and therefore focused on the Virginian/Eastern Theatre
- this is where the most decisive battles took place
- Grant versus Lee and Army of Potomac versus Army of Northern Virginia was the focal point of operations in the Eastern/Virginian Theatre
- the Naval Blockade restricted trade and supplies entering and leaving the Confederacy
- the ‘Anaconda Plan’ was critical to eventual Union victory allowing the Union land forces to enforce its superior ‘manpower and resources.’

Evidence which supports the view that there were difficulties for Union strategy in the Eastern Theatre:

- Union forces faced real difficulty in the Virginian theatre with determined defence of Virginia eg ‘Stonewall’ Jackson at First Manassas/Bull Run in July 1861
- earlier victories gave the Confederate forces in Virginia an ‘esprit de corps’ and allowed the Confederates to ensure reinforcements to defend the line along the Potomac River
- the Confederacy with its defence of Virginia would struggle even more than Union forces to fight in the Western theatre.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hugh Tulloch	Takes the view that Grant realised the importance of grasping the details of ammunition, supplies and transport. Whilst victory in the West was a necessary prerequisite for Northern victory, it did not guarantee it per se; Fuller: critical of Lee for ignoring Western theatre.
Thomas Connelly	Takes the view that the North's most able commanders began duty in the West.
Peter Parish	Takes the view that after February 1862, the South lost much of its confidence in its ability to defend its western front.
Jonathan Jones	Is critical of Lee for depriving the West of men and reinforcements. The Union had to rely on supplies brought by river and rail to supplement what they could find in the area.

Question 28

To what extent did political pressure within the Republican Party force Lincoln into issuing the Emancipation Proclamation?

Aim of the question To assess Lincoln's motivation for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. Responses should discuss the importance of political pressures in the Republican Party on Lincoln's decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. Responses might discuss the other pressures and reasons for Lincoln's decision, for example, the military pressures and Lincoln's own personal views on ending enslaved Labour. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Lincoln forced into issuing the Emancipation Proclamation due to political pressure within the Republican Party:

- by December 1861 most Republican Congressmen had rejected Crittenden's Resolutions and favoured direct action to end enslaved labour. Some began using the phrase 'Emancipation' from this point forward
- pressure from abolitionists. Radical abolitionists were convinced that emancipating enslaved people would weaken the southern war effort. Frederick Douglass noted that the Emancipation Proclamation would act as a 'moral bombshell' to the Confederacy. Horace Greeley also pressured Lincoln in writing
- pressure from Frederick Douglass in particular who argued that the Union were fighting with one hand rather than two by failing to enlist African American soldiers into the Union army. His case was strengthened by the fact that African Americans were already serving in the Union navy
- actions of individuals like Sumner ('state suicide' theory) and Horace Greeley ('the prayer of twenty millions')
- pressure to transform Union war aims from 'Union as it was' to 'Union as it should be'
- congressional action against enslaved labour, First and Second Confiscation Acts, Militia Act
- Lincoln didn't have the constitutional power to abolish enslaved labour therefore he had to do it as a war measure and members of the Republican Party continued to stress this fact to Lincoln.
- the actions of enslaved people crossing into Union lines challenged the Fugitive Slave Law. The law stated that they should have been returned to the South. Lincoln was pressured into making a decision on the future of these people
- General Butler took the decision to confiscate all enslaved people as 'contraband of war.' and General Fremont took the decision to free the enslaved people of Confederate supporters in Missouri. This put pressure on Lincoln to ensure there was a single Union approach to enslaved people as the war evolved.

Evidence which supports the view Lincoln was forced into issuing the Emancipation Proclamation due to military pressure:

- Lincoln's policy evolved from the first message to Congress in December 1861, first draft plan on emancipation of March 1862 and attempts to persuade the Border States to take the lead, use of presidential war powers since emancipation was a vital military necessity to win the war
- volunteers were less willing to sign up therefore emancipation would make allow the Union army to recruit African American soldiers. Lincoln argued that they were 'a resource if vigorously applied . . . will soon close the contest'
- by 1864 100,000 original volunteers did not re-enlist. Spring/Summer offensives would not have been possible without the 120,000 African American soldiers. An eighth of Union troops around Petersburg were African American
- African Americans were ready and willing to fight to achieve emancipation which Frederick Douglass emphasised to Lincoln
- Seward advised Lincoln to delay any announcement until some military success had been achieved
- the timing gave a psychological and ideological boost to the Union and was a blow to the morale into the South
- foreign involvement, the Proclamation meant war would stay domestic and now a war of attrition.

Evidence which supports the view that Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation due his own personal views on ending enslaved labour:

- Lincoln personally against enslaved labour but could not be described as an abolitionist
- Lincoln emphasised his opposition to the expansion of enslaved labour in the 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hugh Tulloch	Takes the view that Lincoln's actions were those of a politician having to change tack due to the evolving nature of the conflict. In this case, Lincoln's actions are viewed not only as necessary but also as just.
Kenneth Stamp	Takes the view that Lincoln was reluctant to emancipate enslaved people, but the war demanded such drastic action.
Barbara Fields	Takes the view that the actions of African Americans themselves in both North and South put pressure on Lincoln leaving him with no option but to issue a proclamation in effect recognising the legality of the existing circumstances.
La Wanda Cox	Takes the view that Lincoln's actions looked towards long-term racial equality.

Question 29

To what extent were the failings of the Democrats during the Presidential Election critical to Lincoln's success in 1864?

Aim of the question To assess the significance of the failings of the Democrats during the Presidential Election in Lincoln's success in 1864. Responses might also include an analysis of other reasons for Lincoln's success in 1865, for example, the strengths of the Republican Party and Union military victories. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the failings of the Democrat Party during 1864 Presidential Election were critical to Lincoln's re-election:

- democrats chose McClellan as their candidate but could not agree on a platform for election being divided by peace and continuation of the war effort
- democratic campaign lacked serious political challenge, resorting to calling Lincoln names
- Copperheads continued to emphasise the themes that did little to persuade voters: The financial and human costs of the war, the suspension of habeas corpus, the presence of the draft, the fact that this had become a war about emancipation, Lincoln was a tyrant who had contempt for the Constitution.

Evidence which supports the view that Union military victories were critical to Lincoln's re-election:

- siege and capture of Atlanta by Sherman and the capture of Mobile by Farragut reduced casualties and placed Union troops closer to success
- capture of Atlanta was a significant morale boost to Northern morale and Lincoln's campaign since military success eventually reduced problems on the home front
- Grant's perseverance resulted in a change of fortunes from June 1864 threatening Petersburg and Richmond forcing Lee and the Confederates into a defensive formation
- success of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley.

However:

- Union forces enjoyed limited success in Western and Eastern Theatre at start of the year eg Grant's Wilderness Campaign, Sigel in Shenandoah, Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain
- army of the Potomac had mixed degree of success in early 1864 despite superior manpower, for example, Grant's Wilderness Campaign, May/June 1864 and Cold Harbor, June 1864
- casualty figures very high, 32,000: 5 to 12 May 1864 – 'Butcher' Grant and apparent failure of Total War Tactics
- enlistment difficulties and use of 'green' black troops.

Evidence which supports the view that the strengths of the Republican Party in 1864 were critical to Lincoln's re-election:

- Lincoln did have the support of the Republican Party and the Republican voters on the whole. Chase and Fremont, the challengers for nomination failed to mount any serious challenge
- renaming the Republican Party, the National Union or Union League enhanced the potential for re-election as it presented a united front
- Republican radicals that were opposed to Lincoln's nomination began to actively support Lincoln's re-election following McClellan's nomination as Democrat candidate. As Charles Sumner put it privately 'Lincoln's election would be a disaster, but McLellan's damnation.' Thaddeus Stevens played an important role in quietly persuading Carl Schurz to repair the split in the Republican Party by swinging the Fremont Radicals to Lincoln's side
- Grant made great efforts to make it easier for soldiers to vote in the election. This proved critical to Lincoln's victory as the soldiers voted overwhelmingly in favour of Lincoln's re-election.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
James McPherson	Takes the view that Northern domestic gloom in May 1864 was changing to optimism by September 1864 as a result of Union military victories.
Reid Mitchell	Takes the view that the failure to capture Atlanta would probably have led to Lincoln and pro-war party defeat.
Stephen Sears	Takes the view that McClellan devoted most of his campaign efforts to the army vote however, no other segment of the electorate rejected his candidacy so strongly.
Timothy P Townsend	Takes the view that a vote for McClellan would invalidate all of the sacrifices that the soldiers and their comrades had made. He supports this with reference to a soldier who said, 'I cannot vote for one thing and fight for another.' Another wrote saying, 'I do not see how any soldier can vote for such a man, nominated on a platform which acknowledges that we are whipped'.

Section 4 – USA: ‘a house divided’, 1850-1865

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 30 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the conditions experienced by enslaved people in the 1850s.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians’ views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source’s value.

Aspect of Source B		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Frederick Douglass.	Formerly enslaved, Douglass escaped from enslavement and became one of the leading abolitionists of the period.
Purpose	Autobiography.	To record his experiences in enslavement which was published in support of the Abolitionist movement.
Timing	1855.	The second autobiography published in 1855 and shortly after the divisive Kansas Nebraska Act was passed by Congress in 1855. The book was published in the same year as ‘Bleeding Kansas’ began following the fraudulent elections in Kansas in 1855. Published shortly after Harriet Beecher Stowe’s ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’ and at a time when there was growing support for the Abolitionist movement in the North.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
At the end of each month my grandparents received a monthly allowance of food which consisted of either eight pounds of pickled pork, which was often tainted, or an equivalent amount of very poor-quality fish, and less than a bushel of cornmeal.	Takes the view that enslaved people received their food once a month which was limited and of an inferior standard. Emphasised by the use of the word/phrase ‘poor quality, which was often tainted. . .’
Their yearly allowance of clothing consisted of two linen shirts, one pair of trousers, one pair of stockings, and one pair of shoes, all of which were made of cheap coarse material and could not have cost more than the lowly sum of 8 dollars per year, this would not have been a big outlay for plantation owners.	Takes the view that enslaved people received a limited amount of poor-quality clothing once a year. Emphasised by the use of the word/phrase ‘cheap, coarse material . . .’

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The sleeping apartments had little regard to comfort or decency because old and young, male and female, married and single, drop down upon the common clay floor, each covering up with his or her blanket, the only protection they have from cold or exposure.	Takes the view that enslaved people often slept on the floor and in living accommodation that was poor and offered limited protection from the elements. Emphasised by the use of the word/phrase 'had little regard for comfort . . . '

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- enslaved people often had a monotonous diet leading to vitamin deficiencies and food was often limited to bread and corn porridge for many enslaved people
- clothing was not appropriate for the heat of summer and the cold of winter and clothing was rarely replaced if worn, damaged or became too small for enslaved people
- living conditions were basic and poor with wooden houses unsuitable for the climate in summer or winter.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- enslaved people were forced to work extremely long hours and this increased during the peak harvest season. Any free time was strictly controlled
- firm discipline was the norm. Enslaved people considered to be disobedient were flogged or branded
- enslaved people could be sold, punished, sexually exploited and even killed by their owners
- 'Sold down the river' was a significant and real threat to enslaved people. A developed contextualisation of this point might consider that up to 25% of enslaved family units were broken by forced separation which meant that enslaved people lived in a constant state of insecurity.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Kenneth Stampp

Takes the view that the cruelty was endemic in all communities with enslaved labour. Fear among enslaved peoples of being sold on by their master. Enslaved people unhappiness as shown by acts of resistance and sabotage, but not open rebellion. The typical plantation was an area of persistent conflict between master and enslaved people.

David Blight

Takes the view that a lack of hard evidence led Fogel and Engelman to speculate and over generalise in their work on enslaved labour, for example, he criticises their statistics related the whipping of enslaved people.

Stanley Elkins

Takes the view that enslaved people were dependent on the mood of an authoritarian enslaver.

Eugene Genovese

Discusses the ideology of Paternalism in his work where he examines the argument that enslavers took care of enslaved people, and this explains why enslaved people did not revolt en masse.

Question 31 **How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the impact of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given
The Kansas-Nebraska Act shattered party loyalties in the North with the old Whig Party suffering a mortal blow, because never again would it put forward a presidential candidate.	Suggests that the Kansas-Nebraska Act led to the collapse of the Whig Party.
many Northern Democrats abandoned the old party, dividing the party along Northern and Southern sectional lines.	Suggests that the Democrat Party split as a consequence of the Kansas Nebraska Act and became divided into northern and southern factions.
The collapse of the Whigs left an opening for the emergence of one of two new political movements to oppose the Democrats one of which was the Republican Party.	Suggests that the Kansas-Nebraska Act led to the emergence of the Republican Party.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Whigs had been divided over sectional lines, but the Kansas Nebraska Act was the final event in leading to the split and collapse of the Whig Party
- the North perceived the Kansas Nebraska Act as a plot to ensure that the remaining territories become states that permitted enslaved labour. Kansas and Nebraska territory opened up to popular sovereignty following the repeal of 1820 Missouri Compromise. Potential for enslaved labour in the territory despite the 36 30 agreement
- the American Party or 'Know Nothings' were established at the time of the Kansas Nebraska Act taking advantage of the void left in Northern politics by the collapse of the Whig Party. They emphasised the sectional divide representing the politics of Nativism in the North.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
the persuasive argument for popular sovereignty was drowned by the conviction that this was a great betrayal, fuelling Northern claims of a 'slave power conspiracy'.	Suggests that the Kansas Nebraska Act led to northern suspicions of a 'slave power conspiracy' despite the support for popular sovereignty.
Pierce and then Buchanan held that the action of the territorial legislature in permitting 'slavery' must bind the territory despite a growing number of 'anti-slavery' settlers.	Suggests that successive Presidents argued that decision of the territorial legislature to permit enslaved labour in Kansas should remain despite the calls to overturn the decision.
Civil war broke out in Kansas between pro-slave and free, with the free settlers setting up their own illegal government, but when the 'pro-slavery' men presented a 'pro-slave' constitution for admission as a state Buchanan attempted to force it upon Congress.	Suggests that fighting broke out in Kansas, followed by two rival governments, both claiming to be legitimate. President Buchanan tried to ensure that the 'pro-slave' constitution was admitted to Congress which would have ensured the legal status of enslaved labour in Kansas.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Kansas-Nebraska Act fuelled Northern claims of a 'slave power conspiracy' to allow the South to dominate and spread enslaved labour into the territories. Northerners were outraged
- the first ballot in Kansas led to fraudulent results as 'border ruffians' crossed over into Kansas to vote illegally and return a pro slave constitution. There was disagreement if this or the subsequent unofficial election result should stand
- 'Bleeding Kansas' led to violence on both sides, for example, the Lawrence raid and the raid at Potawatomie Creek. A second Contextual Development might be Buchanan added to the slave power conspiracy by attempting to force the pro-enslaved labour constitution of the Lecompton state legislature through Congress. This would have ensured Kansas status as a state that permitted enslaved labour.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- anti-enslaved labour Democrats, Whigs and Free Soilers had already met in Ripon, Wisconsin to propose the formation of a new political party based on opposition to the spread of enslaved labour. The early movement had no leader, no real national organisation and little direction. The name anti-Nebraska was suggested but also Opposition and The People's Party. The Republican Party emerged as a rainbow coalition of differing views across the North
- Emigrant Aid societies were established to support the movement of free settlers to the region to impact on the vote in the territories. Bleeding Kansas followed as a result
- Douglas believed the Kansas-Nebraska Act would provide the absolute solution to the issue of enslaved labour in the territories as he believed that the Act offered something to both North and South as a means of providing a compromise on the organisation of the territories
- Douglas hoped that the Act would heal the divisions within the Democratic Party and unite them as a national party, but this was a significant miscalculation
- Douglas admitted that repealing the Missouri Compromise and introducing popular sovereignty may 'cause a hell of a storm'
- nativist concerns in the North which had led to the rise of the 'Know Nothings' were increasingly overshadowed by the debate over enslaved labour and concerns over events in Kansas and Nebraska
- events in Kansas led to violence in Congress, for example 'Bleeding Sumner.' This also fuelled the 'slave power conspiracy'
- the Kansas Nebraska Act would have an impact on and become a focal point in subsequent elections campaign. The 1856 Presidential Election emphasised the North/South divide as the Democrats faced the newly formed Republican Party and their candidate Fremont. The Act also became a focus for the Lincoln-Douglas debates 1858.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hugh Tulloch	Takes the view that the Kansas-Nebraska Act erased the stability of the Missouri Compromise. The Republican Party, born as a result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act attracted those opposed to Southern determination to maintain enslaved labour.
James McPherson	Takes the view that 'Even more important than the Fugitive Slave issue in arousing Northern militancy was the Kansas-Nebraska Act which was passed by Congress in May 1854. Coming at the same time as the Anthony Burns case, this law may have been the most important single event pushing the nation toward civil war'.
Brian Holden Reid	Takes the view that enslaved labour was central to the sense of cultural divergence between the North and the South. Rise of a sectional northern party dedicated to restriction of enslaved labour signalled an end to a desire for compromise.
William Gienapp	Takes the view that the Republicans emerged as a result of the Kansas Nebraska Act and were united in opposition to the 'slave power' taking advantage of the Know-Nothings erosion into previous party loyalties.

Question 32 **How fully does Source D explain the effectiveness of the leadership of Jefferson Davis during the Civil War?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
In contrast to Lincoln, Davis was sensitive to criticism and lacked the safety valve of a keen and relaxing sense of humour.	States that the personality of Jefferson Davis was not well suited to the position that he held.
But he rarely was able to boost the morale of his people, for he did not have the power of his rival to write great speeches.	States that the communication skills of Jefferson Davis were lacking. A more effective orator may have boosted southern morale and inspired the southern fight.
His quarrels with some of his leading generals, such as Joseph E. Johnston and Pierre G. T. Beauregard, produced discord and harmed the course of the war for the Confederacy.	States that Davis argued with some of his military generals and this division disrupted the war effort.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Davis was impatient with people that disagreed with him, indecisive, rigid and lacked good judgement, particularly in terms of appointments
- while Lincoln is known for his great speeches and oratory skills, Davis lacked this ability and is often criticised for failing to clearly define and express his war aims
- Davis disagreed with the tactics and strategies of Beauregard and Johnston which disrupted the military campaigns of the Confederacy. Both Generals blamed Davis for the military failure of the Confederacy.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Davis was criticised by his own war department staff for his lack of knowledge and interference. Vice President Stephens called Davis 'My poor blind and deaf dog'
- Davis struggled to control state governors which cost him and the Confederate cause dearly, for example, Vance and Brown
- Davis struggled to establish good working relations with many of his colleagues. His personality seems to have made him more enemies than friends. Constant feuds in his government undermined the Confederate war effort, for example, during the war he appointed four Secretaries of State and six Secretaries of War
- the economy of the Confederacy was a disaster and essentially collapsed during the war. As Confederate President, Davis arguably should have prevented the economic failings of the Confederacy
- Davis left foreign policy to others in his government. He failed to ensure a proactive diplomatic effort, rather expecting events during the Civil War to achieve his diplomatic aims. He also relied too heavily on the importance of cotton on achieving his diplomatic aims
- Davis did not deal effectively with the problems facing the Confederacy which resulted from the length of the war eg morale and food shortages
- Davis did make difficult and bold decisions, for example, imposing martial law on areas threatened by Union invasion or higher taxation on land, cotton and enslaved people.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Gary Gallagher	Takes the view that Davis did do well but lacked the support of capable subordinates.
David Potter	Takes the view that if the Union and the Confederacy had exchanged presidents with one another, the Confederacy might have won its independence.
Frank Vandiver	Takes the view that Davis had many failings, but Davis did have 'nerve'.
Philip Katcher	Takes the view that Davis was narrow-minded, vindictive to imagined slights, not prepared to compromise.

Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840-1920

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 33 **To what extent was the growth of nationalism the key domestic reason for the collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu?**

Aim of the question To examine the extent to which nationalist schools of thought (mainly Shinto revivalism, but also progressivism) undermined the Tokugawa regime enough to become the main agents of its demise. The question is focused on domestic issues, so external factors (such as the incursion of the Americans) are not salient unless contextualising these internal factors. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that nationalism was a significant factor.

- the rise of nationalism emerged through the Shinto Revivalist movement, which fostered an emperor-centred loyalty and a growing belief that the Shogun had unjustly taken power from the Emperor
- Shinto, the native Japanese religion, had been suppressed by the Tokugawa regime, which prioritised Neo-Confucianism because it reinforced the caste system, thus nationalism undermined the social structure
- Shinto Revivalism was ultra-nationalist – Motoori Norinaga, a key figure in the School of National Learning, rejected the worship of Chinese philosophy in a search for a purely Japanese cultural identity
- the movement was characterised by the Sonnō Jōi movement, which was populated by shishi (Men of Spirit) led by nationalists such as Yoshida Shōin
- in the spring of 1860 Ii Naosuke, the most able of the Bakufu ministers, was assassinated by men from Mito and Satsuma. This was part of a growing culture of political violence that was undermining the Bakufu
- after 1853, there was the growth of a progressive nationalist movement headed by Sakuma Shōzan, who under the slogan 'Eastern Ethics; Western Science' proposed engagement with the West, whilst retaining Japanese values
- the Tokugawa Shoguns' decision to keep the Emperor as a symbolic figurehead in the caste system ultimately weakened their rule, as the Emperor became a unifying symbol for Shinto Revivalists
- many Choshu and Satsuma activists, key players in the downfall of the Tokugawa Shogunate, were heavily influenced by Shinto Revivalism.

Evidence to support the importance of other domestic factors in the collapse of the regime:

Blurring of caste structure and socio-economic changes:

- the caste system was a vital control mechanism that ensured predictable behaviour across the various Hans (domains) within Japan
- this rigid structure was designed to prevent social mobility and was based on reciprocal relationships of loyalty and filial piety
- the Daimyo governed their territories, the Samurai enforced control, and peasants produced staple foods, acted as a currency source, and paid taxes
- by the end of the Tokugawa period, caste members began to deviate from their expected roles, making behaviour less predictable and harder to manage
- peasants, particularly those near castle towns, were increasingly unwilling to stay on the land and started diversifying their activities beyond agriculture
- Merchants, originally part of the lower caste, were growing wealthier and shifting the social hierarchy
- Samurai began selling their privileges to merchants, weakening their status
- a divide grew between upper and lower Samurai, with the lower ranks expressing dissatisfaction.

Other relevant factors:

- the decentralised nature of Tokugawa governance posed a problem, as the Shogunate only directly controlled 25% of Japan's land, as evidenced by the failure of the Tempō Reforms
- the Tempō Reforms inadvertently strengthened other influential clans, especially the Chōshū and Satsuma
- the Sakoku policy of isolation, which restricted foreign access and Japanese travel, contributed to a long period of stability. This peace boosted the economy, allowing farmers to focus on producing cotton, silk and handcrafted goods
- the absence of a standing army posed a weakness; the Samurai, as individual warriors tied to lords, were not organised as a national military force, making it difficult to face external threats
- the alternate attendance system, which had once been a mechanism of control, began to lose its effectiveness
- by the 1860s, the Southern clans had begun to modernise their own armies, and in 1866 the combined Chōshū-Satsuma forces formed an alliance that was to defeat the Bakufu forces in the Boshin War.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Storry	Argues 'as scholars examined the concept of loyalty, a corner-stone of Neo-Confucianism so firmly endorsed by the Bakufu, they began to think that after all perhaps the Japanese owed loyalty not so much to the Tokugawa Shogun as to the rather neglected line of emperors. . . Thus, among the educated. . . there was already, by the 1850s, a mental climate prepared for a return of the emperors to the centre of the stage.'
Andrew Gordon	Considers ' . . . They (nationalist thinkers) formed part of a climate of opinion that made great upheaval and change – on behalf of a national entity that transcended the Tokugawa system – more likely and easier to achieve.'
Janet Hunter	Contends 'the dynamic forces within society and in the economy eventually came into conflict with a national polity which sought to avoid change.'
Mikiso Hane	Argues ' . . . Economic difficulties that the Bakufu and Daimyo domains were experiencing weakened the feudal order and caused discontent among the lower-level Samurai and commoners.'

Question 34 **How far can it be argued that the political structure of Japan remained largely unchanged after 1868?**

Aim of the question To assess the degree of real change between the political structures in the Tokugawa and Meiji periods. The real debate here is about whether there was genuine institutional change, or whether this was superficial, designed to concentrate power in a new oligarchy and to impress the West with Japan's 'modernisation'. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence supporting the view that the political system remained unchanged:

- power remained concentrated in the hands of a few leading clans, with Choshu and Satsuma leaders largely replacing the authority of the Tokugawa
- the aim was never to establish a truly democratic state, as the vast majority of the population remained disenfranchised
- the new political system reinforced the influence of Japan's traditional ruling class, rather than representing a complete shift in power
- although the Emperor was positioned as the central figure, his role remained largely symbolic, and he continued to be seen as a figure of divine descent rather than a practical ruler
- the franchise was so limited that it arguably had little real political impact on the broader population
- political opposition from newly formed political parties was not tolerated and was actively suppressed
- the 1874 Safety Preservation Law banned political opponents or critics from Tokyo for three years, clearly targeting political opposition and undermining democratic principles
- the 1900 Peace Preservation Law further suppressed freedom of speech and the press, limiting political expression
- Neo-Confucian moral codes continued to underpin the system, maintaining a link with traditional values
- women were entirely excluded from political participation
- the political lives of many peasants remained largely unchanged, with limited access to political power or representation.

Evidence which supports the view that there was genuine change to the system:

- the overthrow of the Shogunate led to the establishment of a centralised government, replacing the previously decentralised Tokugawa Bakufu
- political centralisation was achieved by replacing the Hans with Prefectures, which were answerable to a central regime
- the Emperor was restored as the central figure of authority, with all government edicts issued in his name
- from 1885 onwards, major decisions were taken by a Cabinet, marking a shift towards a more modern governance structure
- the 1889 Constitution, influenced by Western models (particularly the German monarchy), was introduced to present a democratic façade and gain Western respect
- the Constitution was granted by the Emperor, who was positioned as the head of government, theoretically holding significant executive, legislative, and military powers, though his role was somewhat ambiguous
- a bicameral parliament was established, with a House of Peers composed of nobility and a Diet with a highly restricted franchise – only about 1% of the population could vote
- despite the centralised regime, committees, including the armed forces, operated independently of each other, with military leaders having direct access to the Emperor
- the Emperor appointed Cabinets, which were not always drawn from the majority party in the Diet
- propaganda and education were used to instil loyalty to the nation and the Emperor, rather than regional Han loyalty, promoting patriotism as a core virtue for the first time, political parties were established in Japan.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
John Benson and Takao Matsumura	Argue that ‘This was no western-style liberal democracy. As Article 3 of the Constitution implied, the basic aim of those drawing up the Meiji Constitution was to retain theoretically absolute (if symbolic) sovereign power in the hands of the emperor, and actual political power in the hands of the ruling elite who acted as his advisors.’
Conrad Totman	Suggests that the Restoration was less about creating a completely new system and more about reorganising and consolidating power in a way that reflected trends already underway.
Janet Hunter	Argues that the Meiji Constitution did not create a unified nation under an absolute emperor, nor a parliamentary democracy, but a series of major groupings, each of which could utilise the imperial position to impose its policies on the rest of the population
Mikiso Hane	Claims that ‘the oligarchs encircled the Emperor and exercised power in his name. Anyone who challenged the existing order was condemned as a disloyal traitor.’

Question 35

How accurate is it to say that the primary aim of Meiji educational reform was to create a nation of patriots?

Aim of the question To evaluate the degree to which the educational reforms were introduced to develop a nationalistic allegiance to the Meiji state. As well as examining the nationalistic aims, responses might identify and evaluate reasons other than the inculcation of patriotism behind the reforms. These might include: the practical need for an educated workforce; a reaction to perceived over-Westernisation; the desire to create a compliant population to stabilise the regime; and/or the aim to portray an enlightened impression to the West in order to end the Ansei Treaties. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which suggests that the reforms were primarily aimed at creating a ‘nation of patriots’:

- following the Meiji Restoration and the Iwakura Mission, Japan underwent a process of westernising its education system to align with modern practices observed in the West
- however, this westernisation sparked a backlash, as many believed it threatened Japan’s cultural heritage and national identity
- in response, the government redefined its approach to education in the late 1880s, centring it on the imperial institution and a distinctly Japanese sense of identity
- this shift culminated in the introduction of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1889, which marked a more traditional direction for the curriculum
- the Rescript emphasised moral education, combining traditional cultural values with modern nationalism to form the core of the primary school curriculum
- strongly influenced by Neo-Confucian principles, the Rescript promoted ideals such as loyalty, filial piety, and devotion to the Emperor
- the divine status of the Emperor was heavily exploited, using his position as a living deity to instil obedience and a sense of duty towards the Japanese state
- classrooms displayed portraits of the Emperor to reinforce his authority and symbolic role in shaping national identity
- according to the Rescript, Japanese citizens were framed as subjects of an absolute monarch, rather than participants in a democratic society
- to ensure consistency, the centralised education system and standardised curriculum spread these ideals across the entire country, fostering emperor worship and a uniform sense of nationalism.

Evidence which considers other aims of the educational reforms:

Legitimise the regime:

- the Imperial Rescript aimed to legitimise the regime by defining Japanese people as subjects of an absolute monarch, rather than citizens of a democratic state
- it promoted Confucian values such as loyalty, filial piety, moderation, and benevolence, aligning these traditional ideals with the needs of the modern nation-state
- the Rescript emphasised the importance of upholding the Constitution and the law, alongside a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the welfare of the state
- women’s roles were clearly defined, with female education focusing on their responsibilities as wives and mothers, reinforcing their position within the family and the broader national framework.

Create an educated workforce:

- the Meiji government recognised that industrialisation required an educated and compliant workforce, prompting significant reforms to the education system
- standardisation and centralisation of the education system helped reduce regional and class-based inequalities in schooling, creating a more uniform system nationwide
- access to education expanded significantly, with initial attendance fees limiting participation. However, their abolition in 1900 allowed broader access, leading to near-universal attendance for both boys and girls by 1910
- the proportion of commoners in middle schools and universities rose to over 50%, reflecting progress in educational accessibility across social classes
- the introduction of civil service exams in the 1890s facilitated recruitment into government positions based on merit, further promoting an educated workforce
- despite these advancements, the path to upward social and economic mobility remained narrow, limiting opportunities for significant societal change.

Desire to impress the West:

- the Charter Oath, the first official document of the new regime, declared Japan's intention to seek knowledge worldwide and bring it back to advance the nation
- the desire to adopt Western traits in education was closely tied to Japan's goal of challenging the Unequal Treaties and appearing more aligned with Western powers
- Mori Arinori, who visited America from 1871 to 1873, was deeply influenced by the American education model, particularly its role in unifying a diverse society
- inspired by Western ideals of meritocracy, Japan recognised that social mobility required significant reforms to the education system
- the school system introduced in 1872 was centralised and followed a French model, but it allowed for considerable diversity within its structure
- western-styled universities and specialised commercial institutes were established, reflecting the broader adoption of Western educational principles.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Jerry Fisher	Suggests that 'Mori saw in the American system a possible model for Japan which could weld together a nation of well-educated men and women dedicated to serving their country.'
Peter Storry	Argues that 'the progress of education moulded the people into a nation of patriots. . . The government needed literate soldiers, factory workers, business employees and government employees to achieve its goal of enriching the nation and challenging the Unequal Treaties.'
Janet Hunter	Believes that 'the prime objective of the (education) structure was the needs of the state and its main goals were the provision of skills and patriotic morality among the many to produce a literate and pliable workforce.'
Elise Tipton	Contends that 'The Government viewed education as a primary means of developing a sense of nation.'

Question 36

To what extent was concern over Korean sovereignty the main cause of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894?

Aim of the question To establish the relative importance of Korean independence in determining the causes of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/5. Responses might identify and compare short-term factors that caused increased tension with China, for example, the Formosa Incident or the Tonghak Rebellion; and long-term factors, including Japan's desire for regional hegemony and access to raw materials, as well as wider foreign policy ambitions in regard to her relationship with the West. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence supporting the idea that Korean sovereignty was the primary reason for war with China:

- Japan was deeply concerned about Korea's strategic importance due to its proximity to the Japanese mainland, making it a potential launch point for an attack
- Korea was often referred to as a 'dagger pointed at the heart of Japan,' highlighting its perceived threat
- China exerted considerable influence over Korea, which unsettled Japan, as Korea was only semi-autonomous
- early in the Meiji period, Saigo Takamori had advocated for a military campaign against Korea, indicating Japan's imperialistic ambitions
- in 1876, Japan successfully pressured Korea into opening diplomatic relations, securing an unequal treaty that granted equal rights for Japanese citizens in Korea. This led to China's involvement when Korea sought Chinese intervention
- both Japan and China had agreed to notify each other before dispatching troops to Korea, and the violation of this agreement ultimately sparked the Sino-Japanese War
- Japan was eager to ensure that Korea became entirely independent from any foreign influence, aside from its own.

Evidence challenging the idea that Korea was the main reason for war with China:

- Japan's desire to build an overseas empire, inspired by Western imperialism, was a key factor in the war. This ambition was also aimed at overturning the Unequal Treaties imposed by the West
- the scarcity of natural resources in Japan necessitated a more aggressive foreign policy to secure access to these resources abroad
- Japan was motivated by the need to find new overseas markets to support its growing economy
- an expanding population prompted Japan to seek additional territories abroad for settlement
- Japan sought to supplant China as the dominant power in Asia, viewing the war as an opportunity to achieve this goal
- the Formosa Incident had already demonstrated that China's influence in the region was weakening, which emboldened Japan to challenge China more directly
- this event boosted Japan's confidence in risking war with China, believing it could establish itself as the leading Asian nation
- there was also growing concern about Russia's increasing influence in Asia, and Japan saw securing Korea as a way to block Russian expansion in the region.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Peter Duus	Argues 'The Japanese government might not have been so concerned about Chinese domination of Korea had China itself been strong, but as the disintegration of Chinese influence in Indochina made clear, China was basically weak. A backward and weak Korea under the control of an equally backward and weak China seemed to invite the seizure of Korea by one of the Western powers.'
SCM Paine	Contends 'Long-term Chinese decline undermined the ability of the original guarantor of the Asian order to uphold its end of its suzerain – tributary relationship with Korea. . . given this situation, foreign policy gave the Meiji reformers the opportunity to legitimise their highly controversial domestic westernisation program with vindicating foreign-policy successes.'
WG Beasley	Argues- 'Japanese leaders of almost all shades wanted to draw Korea into the Japanese orbit.'
Edward McCord	Contends that the War was driven by domestic, rather than imperialistic aims, 'Japan's leaders were primarily focused on domestic reforms during the Meiji era, and the war with China emerged as a consequence of their efforts to modernise.'

Question 37 **‘Her involvement in World War I confirmed Japan as a Great Power.’**
How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To assess the economic and diplomatic impact World War I had on Japan’s global standing. Responses might comment on the advantages Japan gained through her decision to side with the Allied powers. Her invitation to the Paris Peace Conference would suggest that she was now a ‘Great Power’ but the Conference also exposed the limits of her progress in the eyes of the Western Powers. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence supporting the view that Japan's actions during World War I contributed to it being seen as a world power:

- Japan’s involvement in the war led to significant expansion in industry, particularly in shipbuilding and heavy engineering
- after joining the war on the victorious side, Japan acquired Germany’s sphere of influence in Shantung, boosting its control over Manchuria and China
- the Taisho period saw Japan adopting a more aggressive and calculated approach to imperial expansion, exemplified by the 21 Demands of 1915, which aimed at increasing control over China – evidence of Japan’s growing confidence on the global stage
- from 1915, Japanese industry flourished by capturing markets previously dominated by European powers, such as India's textile markets, which had been led by Lancashire before 1914
- between 1914 and 1918, domestic manufacturing increased by 54% in inflation adjusted terms; exports increased by three times in money terms and by 47% in value.
- Japan took over trade routes in Asia that had been controlled by Western nations, and the number of Japanese merchant ships surged during the war years, from 488 in 1900 to nearly 3000 by 1920, boosting perceptions of Japan as an economic powerhouse
- Japan became a creditor nation for the first time, lending money to Western powers and reducing her trade deficits with them
- military modernisation: Japan's participation in the war provided an opportunity to modernise her military and gain valuable experience in modern warfare. This helped to further cement Japan's status as a major military power in the region
- despite minimal combat involvement, Japan ended the war as a victorious nation, unscathed by the financial burdens that Britain and America faced, and thus emerged in a strong position to compete globally.

Japan’s participation in the Paris Peace Conference:

- Japan’s involvement in the Paris Peace Conference marked an important moment in its rise as an international political player, as it was recognised as a significant power
- Japan secured a seat on the council of the newly formed League of Nations, further cementing its role in global diplomacy
- Japan’s leaders were pleased with their position among the major global powers, affirming Japan’s status as a key player on the international stage.

Evidence which supports the view that Japan made only limited progress towards ‘Great Power’ status during and after World War I:

- the growth in Japanese industry during the war was largely due to a lack of competition, and when peace returned, Japanese industry experienced significant disruption
- western intervention forced Japan to retract the most ambitious parts of its 21 Demands, revealing the limits of Japan's global influence and the West's attitude towards Japan's imperialist ambitions
- Japan did not play a direct military role in the war, and international reactions to their participation were therefore somewhat muted
- the global economy remained highly unstable after the war, making it challenging for Japan to maintain steady trade
- not all Japanese workers benefited equally from the economic boom, as wages failed to keep pace with rising prices, leading to social unrest, such as the 1918 Rice Riots.

Negative aspects of the Paris Peace Conference:

- Japan's push for a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Charter was rejected, causing disappointment and reinforcing the perception that Japan was still not treated as an equal by Western powers
- Japan retained control over the former German Mariana Islands, but only under a League mandate, rather than gaining outright ownership, leaving Japan frustrated
- Japan's leadership felt snubbed by some of their other claims being rejected during the talks, which contributed to a widespread sentiment among the Japanese public that they were still seen as second-class citizens in global diplomacy.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
James B Crowley	Argues ‘(World War I) propelled Japan into the ranks of the world’s great powers, not through military exploits but through strategic diplomacy and economic gains.’
Kenneth Pyle	Argues the war was pivotal, ‘The outbreak of World War I in Europe in the summer of 1914 provided (Japan) extraordinary opportunities to advance the twin objectives of empire and industry.’
Akira Iriye	Contends Japan’s gains from World War I were a ‘double-edged sword.’ On the one hand, they established Japan as a major player in East Asia, but on the other, they created ‘new frictions’ with Western powers, particularly the United States, which began to see Japan’s ambitions in China as a threat to the international order.
Yong Kwon	Asserts ‘The war in 1914 played a critical role in informing the nascent Japanese Empire about its strategic limitations in the modern era.’

Section 5 – Japan: the modernisation of a nation, 1840-1920

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 38 **How fully does Source A explain the influence of belief systems in Tokugawa society?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given
Rather than a religion, Neo-Confucianism constituted an ethical code, linking proper behaviour in social life to proper conduct of government because it asserted that a good government is ruled by ethical, cultured men and a benevolent paternalistic ruler.	States that Neo-Confucianism brought political stability by promoting ethical governance and a symbiotic paternalism between the rulers and their subjects.
Neo-Confucianism could also be used to help transform the samurai class into a civilian bureaucratic class in a time of peace.	States that the principles of order and deference to authority instilled by Neo-Confucianism meant that the educated warrior class could also serve as administrators for the Shogunate.
In its assumption of a natural hierarchical order in society, it underpinned the status system that ranked the four main status groups – samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants – in order of their presumed usefulness to society.	States that Neo-Confucianism also acted as the foundation for the strict hierarchical caste system in the Edo period.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- there were more than 250 years of relative peace under the Tokugawa Shogunate, primarily because of the Confucian-influenced governing and social systems, which prevented widespread dissatisfaction or rebellion
- the Samurai increasingly took on the roles of bureaucrats and civil servants as their military role became obsolete. A second point of Contextual Development might be: However, these positions were not evenly distributed, and caused resentment from lower Samurai without patronage whose income didn't match their expenditure
- the hierarchy reinforced by neo-Confucianism was (in theory) immutable, as well as the layers mentioned in the source, there were also the Daimyo at the top; and the Eta at the bottom.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the state actively promoted Neo-Confucianism over other religions, particularly as a means of controlling the population and reinforcing loyalty to the Shogunate with its values of filial piety, loyalty and respect for hierarchy, which were integral to the moral and social fabric of Tokugawa Japan
- Shinto, Japan's only indigenous religion, has its roots in the nature worship of prehistoric periods. A second point of wider contextual development might be: It was a loose collection of beliefs centred around the worship of Kami (spirits), with shrines dedicated to the spirits of the land or prominent families in almost every region
- Shintoism was suppressed during the Tokugawa period, as it was perceived as a threat to the Shogunate's power. A second point of wider contextual development might be: However, there was a resurgence of Shintoism towards the end of the Tokugawa period, with some intellectuals criticising the Shogun for usurping the emperor's rightful power

- Buddhism played a crucial role in Tokugawa society, offering rituals associated with life and death. A second point of wider contextual development might be: It was also used as a tool for social control, with the population required to register at local Buddhist temples
- many families had both Shinto and Buddhist shrines in their homes, reflecting the syncretic nature of Japanese religious life, where it was common for individuals to follow practices from more than one religion, preventing any single belief system from dominating
- Samurai adhered to the moral code of Bushido, which was heavily influenced by Neo-Confucian ideals and was akin to a spiritual guide for them, further embedding the role of Neo-Confucianism in shaping Japan's warrior class and society
- the Tokugawa Shogunate banned Christianity during their rule, further securing Neo-Confucianism's prominence and suppressing competing religious ideologies.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tetsuo Najita	Contends that 'Confucianism provided scripted and classical authority to what the Japanese already believed to be good and true.'
Shelton Woods	Takes the view that during Tokugawa times, Zen Buddhism was most popular among the samurai. The emphasis on discipline and a contemplative life played well with a military class known for its dedication to physical and mental toughness.
Wai-Ming Ng	Claims that 'During the second half of the Tokugawa period, Shinto distanced itself from Confucianism and established its status as Japan's indigenous religion.'
George Elison	Argues that the Tokugawa government viewed Christianity as a threat to its authority due to its exclusive nature and perceived connection to Western imperialism.

Question 39 **How much do Sources B and C reveal about the differing interpretations of the impact of the Meiji economic reforms on ordinary Japanese people?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
The women who were recruited to the factories were typically required to live in company-owned dormitories that were locked at night and when fires occasionally broke out, these literally became death traps.	Suggests that conditions in the factory dormitories were illiberal and dangerous. Women were at risk of injury and death due to these conditions.
This meant that women worked 12 to 14 hours a day or more, compared to about 12 hours per day on average for males in industries such as machine manufacturing.	Suggests that women working in factories were subjected to longer working hours than men.
Women's wages were 50% to 70% of those paid to men in the same industry.	Suggests that women's wages were significantly lower than those of their male counterparts.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the dormitory system was designed to control workers' lives. A second point of Contextual Development might be: Women were often restricted in their movements, with some dormitories implementing curfews and strict surveillance to limit contact with the outside world
- many of these workers were also bound by contracts, making it difficult for them to leave without paying hefty fines
- despite the wages being low, female textile workers did receive higher pay than they would have if they had stayed in the countryside.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
Many of the Meiji entrepreneurs emerged from the gōnō, the wealthy peasant class in the villages.	Suggests that the Meiji period saw the growth of an entrepreneurial class, many of whom were enterprising peasants, keen to make their fortunes.
They were rendered both ambitious and frustrated by their position in the Tokugawa class structure and were keen to take advantage of the new opportunities afforded by the Emancipation Edict in 1871.	Suggests that the 1871 Edict abolished the Bakuhan caste system which allowed all Japanese to pursue a career beyond the traditional confines of their class.
An excellent example of this phenomenon is Shibusawa Eiichi, who rose from peasant origins to become the founder of several of Japan's impressive modern companies.	Suggests that some peasants even went on to become major business and commercial magnates in the new industrial Japan.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- some peasants had already begun to diversify in the late Tokugawa period, moving to the urban centres where they started their own business. A second point of Contextual Development might be: These predominantly came from the *gōnō* class, who had benefited from the move to a money economy, and were already fairly wealthy.
- in 1871, one of the first major Meiji reforms was to abolish the feudal system in order to meet the Charter Oath aim of uniting the classes, and allowing all classes to ‘ . . . be allowed to pursue his own calling’
- Shibusawa Eiichi is often referred to as the ‘father of Japanese capitalism’, and helped found the Japanese stock exchange. A second point of Contextual Development might be: Another example would be Iwasaki Yatarō, who founded Mitsubishi.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- some large industrial conglomerates (Zaibatsu) took an interest in worker welfare, with welfare funds being established to support workers during sickness or retirement
- trade unions began to develop, but loyalty to the company was often emphasised by the government and employers. A second point of wider contextual development might be: However, trade union activity was strongly repressed through laws such as the Peace Preservation Law
- lifetime employment was common, with workers generally staying in the same firm until retirement
- new technology improved work efficiency and eased working conditions
- women gained access to new fields, with many finding employment as secretaries, telephone operators, teachers, nurses, and clerks, especially after 1890
- however, women in the textile sector, a crucial part of the workforce, were frequently affected by diseases like tuberculosis due to harsh working conditions. Young, unmarried women were often sold into contracts for factory work, leaving them little choice in employment
- some former Samurai invested large financial settlements from the government into industry, contributing to the growth of the Zaibatsu and becoming successful businessmen
- many people in rural communities saw little change in their lives, remaining relatively unaffected by new job opportunities, and the introduction of conscription limited the job market for men.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Yasuzo Horie	Argues that ‘Local merchants made such remarkable headway that commercial capitalists, enjoying the full benefits of free economic activity, were about to attain the position of industrial capitalist.’
WJ MacPherson	Contends that ‘There were acute labour shortages, fierce competitive employer recruiting, sweatshops and suppression of labour movements.’
Sharon Sievers	Contends that ‘These ‘excess’ daughters of Japan's countryside, born in a predominantly patrilineal, patrilocal society, where their value was always tempered by the expectation that they would eventually marry and become workers in someone else's household, soon became the backbone of the country's economy.’
Ann Waswo	Argues that ‘Many felt liberated by the Meiji Restoration and the lifting of restrictions on their personal and occupational mobility. Encountering new opportunities, they set about to improve their lives and the lives of their families.’

Question 40 Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence for the reasons why Japan was victorious in the war with Russia between 1904 and 1905.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	General Aleksey Kuropatkin.	Russian Imperial Minister of War 1898-1904, then a commander in the field during the war. Kuropatkin had advised against a conflict with Japan before the war began.
Purpose	An explanation of why Russia was defeated.	Many blamed Kuropatkin's caution and indecision for Russian land defeats such as Liaoyang and Mukden. This address can be seen as an attempt to protect his reputation and shift the blame. The address is largely a self-exculpatory statement.
Timing	February 1906.	January 1906 is just four months after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth marking the end of the war.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The material defects for the Russian forces are known to all of us – the small number of rifles in the firing line per company, the lack of high explosive shells, of machine guns, and of technical stores of all sorts.	Takes the view that Russia's military hardware was outdated and in short supply. They were especially short of modern artillery. Emphasised by 'defects' 'small number' 'lack of' 'of all sorts'.
Despite the best efforts of our strategists and commanders, we also suffered much from inadequate reconnaissance of the enemy's position before a battle, and the resulting vagueness as to how to conduct the action (particularly in the attack).	Takes the view that Russian battle tactics were poorly executed, based on weak intelligence and reconnaissance. Emphasised by 'inadequate reconnaissance' 'vagueness'.
Men of strong individuality are with us, unfortunately, often passed over, while others, who possess neither force of character nor convictions, but who are subservient, and always ready to agree with their superiors, are promoted.	Takes the view that the Russian high command and promotion was based almost entirely on family status and class, rather than merit, and this resulted in a high level of inexperience and incompetence amongst the generals. Emphasised by 'often passed over' 'subservient'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- not only were the Russians short of modern artillery, but their troops had virtually no training with modern technology. A second point of Contextual Development might be: This applied to the navy as well as the army, with Russian ships being largely obsolete when compared to the Japanese fleet
- the Russians adopted poor military tactics, notably taking position in open ground at the Battle of Mukden, where they were picked off by well-protected Japanese machine guns. A second point of Contextual Development might be: This was also the first modern war where it became clear that cavalry was no longer the preeminent force it had been in the 19th century
- the Russians had several commanders who proved to be substandard. Apart from the Tsar, and in addition to Kuropatkin, there was Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky, whose disastrous command of the Russian fleet began with a comically inept voyage to the Pacific, and ended with one of the most comprehensive naval defeats in history. A second point of Contextual Development might be: Other examples of poor leadership include Viceroy Yevgeni Alekseyev, with whom Kuropatkin had a very poor relationship. All underestimated Japan's capability.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Russia's reliance on the incomplete Trans-Siberian Railway meant that they struggled to supply their forces adequately in the distant Far East. The railway had only one track, limiting the movement of troops and equipment and making it difficult to sustain a long war
- Japan had undergone rapid modernisation during the Meiji Restoration, adopting Western military tactics and technology. Their military was better organised and disciplined, with modern equipment and effective leadership from generals like Togo and Ōyama
- Japan's surprise attack on Port Arthur in February 1904 caught the Russians off guard and shifted the early momentum of the war in Japan's favour
- Russia lacked strong international allies during the conflict. On the other hand, Japan received tacit support from Britain, due to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which allowed Japan to prevent Russian reinforcements from moving through key regions.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
SCM Paine	Asserts that 'In addition to flawed institutions and practices, the Russian officer corps was overaged and undereducated. Senior officers served until they died. The higher the rank, the greater the percentage of hereditary nobility.'
Geoffrey Jukes	Claims that 'Russian soldiers shared their superiors' belief that defeating the Japanese would be easy. . . That belief evaporated after the first encounters.'
James Huffman	Argues that 'The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a critical factor in Japan's victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, providing the country with the diplomatic support and military assistance it needed to secure victory on the battlefield.'
Janet Hunter	Contends that 'Japan had for several years been building up her armed forces in anticipation of conflict with Russia. . . '

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918-1939

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 41 To what extent were Germans justified in their view of the Treaty of Versailles as ‘an unfair burden’?

Aim of the question To examine the degree to which Germans were justified, or not, in their view of the Treaty of Versailles as an unfair burden. Responses may choose to look at the various terms of the Treaty (military, war guilt, reparations and territorial). Responses should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Germans were justified in their view of the Treaty of Versailles as an unfair burden:

Military:

- the military terms of the treaty were regarded as an unfair burden by Germans because this left the country vulnerable to attack and wholly unable to defend itself – Memel was seized by Lithuania in 1920
- the army was reduced to 100,000 men and conscription was banned. Germans felt this was an unfair burden as the country was now surrounded by hostile nations. In addition, the navy was stripped of ships and was only allowed 12 small vessels, barely enough to defend itself. Germany was allowed no air force, no tanks and no submarines. In 1919, Europe was still heavily militarised, and this was felt to be an unfair burden by Germans.

War Guilt:

- Article 231 – the ‘War Guilt’ Clause – was regarded by Germans as an unfair burden. They believed that the causes of the war were international and that no one country was to blame. Singling Germany out as the architect of the war was unfair. War guilt was also viewed as an unfair burden since it meant German troops, sailors, and airmen had died in vain and were dishonoured
- acceptance of the Treaty was felt to be an unfair burden because the newly elected democratic government was blamed for Germany’s humiliation and war guilt. Perhaps more than any aspect of the treaty, this became a focal point for opposition to the republic and to democracy itself. Right-wing Germans regarded the Treaty as an unfair burden, and this became a rallying point for nationalist opposition to the republic during the 1920s and early 1930s.

Reparations:

- Clause 232 – Reparations. By accepting Clause 231, there was a legal basis for imposing reparations payments. Germans felt this was vindictively inserted to justify reparations and was an unfair burden. Germany’s economic crisis in 1923 was also blamed directly on the Treaty and reparations were viewed as little more than an attempt to destroy Germany
- the terms of reparations had not been agreed in 1919 and Germans felt it was unfair to make them wait two years, until the Inter-Allied Conference in London in 1921, to discover the financial penalties. Compared with previous reparations payments, the 132,000 million Marks to be paid were unfair and disproportionate and would have a significant impact on the German economy.

Territory:

- Germany lost 10% of its land and c.13% of its territory. 12.5% of its citizens were also lost. (c.6.5 million Germans). Alsace-Lorraine was lost to France and the creation of a Polish Corridor divided Germany. The corridor also left Germans trapped in what became Polish territory government and large numbers of Sudeten Germans immediately became citizens of the new Czechoslovakia
- Germany lost all its overseas colonies. Clause 80 was inserted into the Treaty to prevent Germany from uniting with Austria (the Austrians had voted for this on 12 Nov 1918.) This was felt to be vindictive and an unfair burden
- the Saar industrial region was to be controlled by the League of Nations (until 1935 when it voted to re-join the greater Germany). The loss of this territory resulted in Germany losing 48% of its iron ore capacity, 16% of its coal production capacity and 15% of its agricultural capacity and this was felt to be an unfair burden
- Germans complained bitterly that they had not been accorded 'equal power' status at the peace conference. What emerged was not negotiated, but an unfair 'Diktat'.

Evidence which supports the view that Germans were not justified in their view of the Treaty of Versailles as an unfair burden:

Military:

- although the German military was stripped back by Versailles, an army of 100,000 was sufficient and fair for peacetime use. The same could be argued for naval and air force limitations
- there was never any real prospect of Germany being invaded. Indeed, the chaos caused by the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 meant that the French were unlikely to do something similar again without the support of other European powers, especially Britain
- after the war and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, central and eastern Europe was a jumble of politically weak states, none of which posed a threat to Germany.

War Guilt:

- the war guilt clause may have been viewed as an unfair burden by Germans, but German actions were one of the main causes of the war. Germany had encouraged Austria-Hungary to seek revenge after Sarajevo in June 1914, they had soured relations with France over the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine in the war of 1870 to 1871 (and imposed reparations for that war) and they had actively engaged in an arms race with Britain in building Dreadnoughts after 1908
- the war guilt clause was not an unfair burden. Germany was expecting to pay reparations (having themselves imposed these on France and Russia). Signing the war guilt clause legalised reparations.

Reparations:

- although the final figure for reparations was a large sum (132,000 million marks), it was certainly not an unfair burden. It was comparatively much less severe a fine than that imposed on France by Germany in 1871 (with a far shorter timescale for repayments – 5000 million Francs to be paid back in five years). Germany was supposed to pay about 7% of its annual income per annum, but in fact never paid more than 3%. German industry had been left wholly undamaged by the war and it was fair that they pay for the damage caused
- reparations were fair and did not have a huge economic impact. By 1927, the Gross National Product (GNP) of the Weimar Republic (with its reduced resources and population) exceeded that of the larger German Reich of 1913.

Territory:

- most Germans accepted the return of land they had taken in the west, including Alsace-Lorraine. Although the Polish Corridor was felt to be unfair, most inhabitants who lived there were Polish speakers who had a right to be part of Poland. In any case, Germany had imposed harsh terms on Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 – Russia lost territory which amounted to 27% of their farmland, the loss of 62 million people to Germany, 26% of its railways and 74% of its iron ore and coal production. Could Germany expect lenient treatment after this?

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Colin Storer	Argues that Germans of all political persuasions saw Versailles as vengeful, unreasonable and unacceptable. The terms of the treaty were considered by the population as a whole as not only unfair but also insulting: an affront to national honour.
Richard J Evans	Argues that that Treaty was greeted with incredulous horror by the majority of Germans. The sense of outrage and disbelief that swept through the upper and middle classes like a shockwave was almost universal.
Stephen J Lee	Argues that: 'Objectively, the terms of the Treaty of Versailles can largely be seen as justified by the need to safeguard against the very real threat posed by Germany and to give viability to the new democracies of Europe.' However, because the Allies excluded Germany from the peace negotiating process, 'Germany came to see itself as a victim without actually being destroyed.'
Anthony J Nicholls	Argues that the terms of the Treaty were justified and stated that 'On the whole, the German vision of the peace would have left their country rather more powerful vis-a vis its European neighbours than when it entered the war.'

Question 42 **How successfully did the Weimar Republic deal with the threats it faced between 1919 and 1923?**

Aim of the question To allow candidates to examine the threats, both political and economic, which faced the Republic between 1919 and 1923 and to examine the extent to which the Republic was successful in dealing with these threats. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Weimar Republic successfully dealt with the threats it faced between 1919 and 1923:

Political threats:

- the new Ebert government faced its first test in January 1919 – the Spartacist Revolt. Using the army and *Freikorps*, (as per the 10 November 1918, Ebert-Gröner Pact), Ebert ruthlessly crushed the putsch. Over 1,200 Spartacists were killed including the Spartacists' leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and the Republic survived this early challenge
- by May 1919, the *Räterepublik* (originally established by Kurt Eisner) continued to rule Bavaria. The government decided to put an end to this challenge to its authority and legitimacy. The Bavarian Socialist Republic was suppressed, again using the *Freikorps*
- in the spring of 1919, the industrial areas of Germany were swept by a wave of strikes and unrest. The strikers demanded shorter hours, the nationalisation of industry, and government based on soviets. A mixture of government promises, and the use of the *Freikorps* and the army quelled the unrest and the challenge to its legitimacy
- the Kapp Putsch of March 1920. Headed by Captain Hermann Erhardt, General von Lüttwitz and Wolfgang Kapp (leader of the Fatherland Party), the putschists marched on Berlin and proclaimed a new republic. A general strike paralysed Berlin and after four days, the putsch failed. The Ruhr Army which had been organised to resist Kapp was then suppressed using the army and *Freikorps*
- in October 1923, Ebert ordered the suppression of a KPD-led government in Saxony using Article 48 powers. During his time in office, Ebert used Article 48 powers on 136 occasions to ensure the safety and continuation of the republic
- Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch of 8 to 9 November 1923. Although less successful than the Kapp Putsch, it showed that although the army were reluctant to suppress uprisings within their own ranks, they were willing to generally abide by the terms of the pact and support the republic by dealing successfully with right-wing nationalists such as Hitler.

Economic threats:

- most Germans blamed the hyperinflation crisis of 1923 on French and British demands for reparations payments
- the hyperinflation crisis was a crisis of capitalism, rather than one caused by the Republic through its decisions. The crisis was more the consequence of events in 1923 itself than of decisions made by the government in the early weeks and months of the Republic
- Ebert's decision to allow Stresemann to abandon Cuno's policy of non-cooperation in the Ruhr allowed Stresemann to recruit Hjalmar Schacht and introduce a new currency – the *Rentenmark*. This dealt with the financial crisis and stabilised the German economy within a few months.

Evidence which supports the view that the Weimar Republic did not successfully deal with the threats it faced between 1919 and 1923:

Political threats:

- the officer corps of the German army and the civil service remained broadly unreformed. As a result, the army's loyalty to Republic was questionable. During the Kapp Putsch, the army refused to act against fellow army officers – General Hans von Seeckt stated: 'Reichswehr does not fire on Reichswehr'. For their parts in the Kapp Putsch, the ringleaders faced lenient punishment for an attempted coup d'état, whereas leaders of the Spartacist Revolt and other left-wing revolts faced a far more serious fate. This led to a suspicion of the republic from those on the far left of the political spectrum
- the assassinations of Matthias Erzberger in August 1921 and of Walther Rathenau in June 1922 were carried out by the Organisation Consul – a right-wing ultra nationalist group. When banned in 1922 (their leaders escaping punishment for the assassinations), the group reinvented itself as the Viking League without any further consequences and the republic's actions cannot be considered as successfully dealing with this threat
- questions of fairness and political bias were never fully solved between 1919 and 1923 and led to simmering resentment from the left of institutional political bias in the republic. 354 of the 376 assassinations between 1919 and 1923 were carried out by right-wing extremists. Of the 22 murders carried out by the left, ten of these crimes were solved. Of the 354 assassinations carried out by right-wing extremists, 326 were never solved and out this total of 354, only 1 right-wing criminal was sent to prison
- the republic's continued use of the paramilitary *Freikorps* against left-wing forces permanently alienated the KPD from working with the SPD. This had serious consequences in the later 1920s and early 1930s when right-wing forces were in the ascendancy and was a threat not dealt with by the Republic
- few punishments were meted out in the wake of Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923. Hitler was sentenced to five years on 1 April 1924 but was released on 20 December 1924. Röhm and Frick were released after being found guilty, and Ludendorff was acquitted. Hitler emerged from prison in a stronger position than before and became a rallying point for right-wing extremists
- the growth of violent political paramilitary groups was not dealt with by the Republic – for example, the KPD's Red Front Fighting League and the right-wing *Stahlhelm*, or the Nazis' S.A.

Economic threats:

- Ebert's decision not to nationalise the economy and instead to work with industrialists may have been as pragmatic as his other decisions, but it also meant that capitalism was never seriously threatened or reformed, and it would only be a matter of time until the industrialists reasserted their power
- the Republic's decision to pursue a policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr was the root cause of the hyperinflation crisis. Ultimately, with the German economy at a standstill, the Republic had to pay wages, pensions and benefits to striking workers in the Ruhr, and compensation to those who lost land under Versailles. They resorted to printing larger denominations of currency. This was a conscious decision rather than borrowing money from international markets or raising taxes. People with savings or fixed incomes were ruined and many voters lost faith in the Republic. The Republic did not effectively deal with the financial crisis.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
William Carr	Argues that the leaders of the Republic were successful in dealing with the Left and Right, but little was done to deal with the paramilitary formations of either Left or Right.
Stephen J Lee	Argues that that praise is due to the Republic's leaders such as Ebert for steering the Republic towards parliamentary democracy and who were not afraid to use military action against extremists to achieve this.
Mary Fulbrook	Argues that: 'The savings, hopes, plans and assumptions and aspirations of huge numbers of people were swept away in a chaotic whirlwind . . . even when the worst material impact was over, the psychological shock of the experience was to have longer lasting effects.'
Alan Bullock	Argues that: 'the inflation was to undermine Germany society in a way which war, nor the revolution of 1918, nor the Treaty of Versailles had never done.'

Question 43 ‘Stresemann’s actions in foreign policy between 1924 and 1929 were primarily those of a German nationalist.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the degree to which Stresemann’s foreign policies were motivated by German interest or by genuine interest in the lasting peace of Europe. Responses may wish to examine different aspects of foreign policy in detail. Responses should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Stresemann actions were primarily those of a German nationalist:

- in a private letter to the Kaiser’s son, Crown Prince Wilhelm on 7 September 1925, Stresemann laid out his strategy – to settle the issue of reparations, to protect the 10 to 12 million Germans now living under a ‘foreign yoke’ and lastly, to re-adjust Germany’s eastern borders. He also noted these could be achieved by military force which Germany did not possess due to the conditions imposed on them at Versailles. In the same letter, he noted that that German policy ‘must be one of scheming’ and that while he could say this in private to someone he regarded warmly, he had to exercise ‘the utmost restraint in his public utterances’
- this tone contrasts sharply with his public speech to the League of Nations on 10 September 1926, when Germany gained entry to the League. In his speech, he stated he wished for ‘mutual understanding and mutual respect.’ However, this was only achieved when Stresemann insisted on Germany gaining ‘Great Power’ status and the power of veto as a condition of joining
- Stresemann pursued a policy of *erfüllungspolitik* (fulfilment) in which he complied with the terms of Versailles to deceive Britain and France about Germany’s real intentions and so encourage them to agree to a revision of the Treaty
- in the Locarno Pact of October 1925, Stresemann accepted Germany’s western borders as fixed and final to reassure France. He failed to make similar commitments to Poland and Czechoslovakia and did not regard Germany’s eastern borders as such
- prior to Germany’s admittance to the League, Stresemann concluded the Treaty of Berlin with the USSR in April 1923. The treaty enabled Stresemann to exert subtle pressure on the Allies to improve their relations with his country to stop Germany moving closer to the USSR. The Treaty contained secret clauses that enabled the *Reichswehr* to try out new weapons and to train in Soviet territory. This pleased the *Reichswehr* and symbolised Stresemann’s determination to highlight his nationalist credentials to powerful right-wing forces within Germany
- by accepting the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929, Stresemann hoped to build Germany’s economic power and gain revisions both to the terms of Versailles and foreign occupation of Germany. He partially succeeded – Allied forces left Zone 1 around Cologne by December 1925 and shortly after Stresemann’s death, all Allied forces withdrew from Germany by June 1930
- in 1926 he managed to negotiate the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission that monitored Germany’s compliance with the military terms of Versailles so he could begin the process of strengthening Germany’s military. As Chancellor between August and November 1923, Stresemann had called off passive resistance in the Ruhr and persuaded French and Belgian forces to withdraw from the Ruhr by 1925. In an earlier letter to Crown Prince Wilhelm on 23 April 1923, relating to French and Belgian occupation, he stated that ‘first, we have to remove the strangler from our throat.’

Evidence which supports the view Stresemann's actions were not primarily those of a German nationalist:

- *Erfüllungspolitik* meant accepting the humiliating 'Diktat' of the Allies, which Stresemann did in the interests of maintaining European peace. By pursuing this policy, Stresemann was willing to face hostile, powerful nationalist forces within Germany
- Stresemann did not achieve any revisions of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. In addition, although they gained 'Great Power' status when admitted to the League, Germany was expressly forbidden from undertaking in any future joint military operations. Stresemann accepted this as the price of joining the League
- although the question of Germany's eastern borders was left open, Germany did not possess the military might to revise these. Should any disputes arise, Germany agreed to arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia to settle any disputes
- in return for accepting the Dawes Plan of 1924, Germany was to receive an 800 million Mark loan. However, this was conditional upon Germany accepting Allied control of Germany's railways, customs duties and the Reichsbank. Stresemann duly accepted this
- the Young Plan of 1929 caused huge controversy and became a rallying point for right-wing elements. Progress in advancing relations never reached a point where the Allies were willing to cancel reparations payments. Although reparations were scaled back to 37,000 million Marks, payments were extended for a period of 58 years, up to 1988. Stresemann was willing to face these challenges in the interests of European peace
- Stresemann did not pursue a revision of reparations vigorously enough to satisfy the Right and indeed, by pursuing a policy of fulfilment at all, he ensured that opposition to the Republic continued unabated and that Versailles was a major focus of that opposition, but he accepted this as the price of maintaining European peace
- recognition of Germany's great power status with a permanent seat on the League of Nations Council had less to do with Stresemann's supposedly covert nationalism and more to do with the fact that he understood that the international system could not work effectively without Germany's involvement. America saw Germany as an opportunity for investment, France required German coal and Britain saw Germany as a market for their goods. Ultimately, when Stresemann died in 1929, there had been no revision to the terms of Versailles, no real revisions to the principle that Germany should continue to pay reparations, Germany's military was still too restricted to revise any of this by force, and Allied boots were still on parts of German soil. Stresemann accepted these terms as a European.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Sally Marks	Argues that Stresemann was 'a superlative liar, dispensing total untruths to the Entente . . . a 'good European' (who was in fact a great German nationalist).'
Richard J Evans	Argues that Stresemann was 'the Republic's most skilled, most subtle and most realistic politician. On one level he pursued <i>erfüllungspolitik</i> , including the payment of reparations, while behind the scenes he lobbied for them to be changed.'
Stephen J Lee	Argues that Stresemann was neither a covert nationalist nor a Good European, but a pragmatist who adapted to changed times and circumstances and, where he could, created new opportunities.
Ruth Henig	Argues that Stresemann was realistic about Germany's diplomatic situation in Europe and the need to win the trust and respect of her former enemies before revision of Versailles could be secured. But he was also as much of a nationalist as his right-wing opponents and shared many of their aspirations.

Question 44 'In his control of Germany between 1933 and 1939 Hitler's decision-making showed him to be a weak leader.'

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To examine the nature of Hitler's rule in Germany between 1933 and 1939. Responses may choose to examine Hitler's leadership and assess whether Hitler was a weak or a strong leader, or they may choose to examine whether in fact Hitler could be more accurately described as a dictator in the way Nazi Germany was governed. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Hitler was a weak leader in his decision-making:

- the view of Hitler as a strong leader was merely the result of Nazi propaganda; it was part of the 'Hitler Myth' carefully propagated by Goebbels
- Hitler's style of leadership was lazy and haphazard. With work rarely commencing before lunchtime, allied to long walks and extended breaks at the *Berghof*, Hitler did not regularly involve himself in the business of state
- these habits caused confusion and resulted in contradictory policies and a chaotic system of government. Key government ministers were often kept waiting for hours for a brief audience with the Führer
- in reality, Hitler was not interested in the details of policy, or the processes of government and allowed others to make key decisions because he was unwilling to make decisions himself
- what appeared to be a divide and rule policy towards his underlings disguised the fact that Hitler relied on them, not they on him
- people such as Göring or Himmler were able to build up personal power bases as a result of this weak leadership and weak decision making. They were engaged in a constant struggle for influence and position, and Hitler's tendency to wait to see who came out on top and then to support the winner, resulted in him rubber stamping others' decisions rather than initiating policy by himself
- at one stage, five different offices in the Chancellery claimed to speak for Hitler. A strong leader would have streamlined this confusing array of offices
- thousands of small empires emerged, with Nazi officials enacting policy claiming they were 'working towards the Führer', while simultaneously gathering huge levels of personal power.

Evidence which supports the view that Hitler was not a weak leader in his decision making:

- the competing and overlapping centres of power within the regime meant that Hitler as leader was the final arbiter in disputes between his subordinates and thus the final authority in the Reich. By creating offices and roles with overlapping areas of responsibility, Hitler ensured that subordinates would expend their energies challenging each other, rather than challenging up the chain of command. This was a deliberate choice and marks Hitler as a strong leader in his decision making. Hitler was so conscious about his image that he distanced himself from day-to-day decision making, so that he could maintain his popularity upon which the notion of his 'strong leadership' rested. As a result, all major policy successes became attributable to Hitler, and to Hitler alone. All failures could therefore be attributed to minor party leaders and functionaries. This was a conscious decision in establishing the party and government structures. By the late 1930s, it is estimated that 90% of Germans admired and appreciated Hitler
- the decision making and policy initiatives that sprang from the process of 'working towards the Führer' indicates that Hitler had enormous personal authority and a hold over his subordinates which stimulated them to act without the need for his specific orders. Hitler did not object to Himmler and Göring building power bases – he saw their personal loyalty to him as more significant. In this sense, the willing delegation of substantial powers marks Hitler as a strong leader in his decision making
- Hitler's broad 'worldview' (*Weltanschauung*) set the tone and the aims of the regime, and his method of working meant that he could operate as the supreme leader at the centre of a polycratic state.

Evidence which supports the view that Hitler was more a dictator than leader:

- the Nazi party was based entirely on the *Führerprinzip*, with Hitler at the very centre of decision making. Hitler moved quickly after his appointment as Chancellor in January 1933 and within 18 months, the Nazi dictatorship in a one-party state had been established. By the summer of 1934, he had destroyed opponents within the party, had merged the offices of Chancellor and President into the office of Führer and had gained the support of the army
- although Hitler's style of leadership created fierce rivalry among his underlings, this was a calculated policy of divide and rule. Underlings were dependent on Hitler's approval and so his intentions were decisive. This marks him as a dictator
- consistent in Hitler's writings was his anti-Semitism. Events such as the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and *Kristallnacht* of November 1938 were enacted on Hitler's personal orders. Similarly, the *Aktion T4* euthanasia programme of 1938 received Hitler's direct approval
- in foreign policy, Hitler directly orchestrated events; he ordered the successful remilitarisation of the Rhineland (March 1936) and ordered the Anschluss of Austria (March 1938) and the destruction of Czechoslovakia (September 1939) before invading Poland.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hans Mommsen	Argues that that Hitler was personally insecure, and he was unwilling to make decisions. Hitler was unwilling to act, frequently uncertain, exclusively concerned with upholding his prestige and personal authority, influenced in the strongest fashion by his current entourage.
Edward Peterson	Argues that: 'the view of Hitler – the man who does not decide – would help explain the eternal confusion of the men working for him. . . law had been replaced by Hitler's will, which was largely a mirage.'
Karl Dietrich Bracher	Argues that: 'the omnipotent power of the Führer breaking all state and legal norms and sanctioning all deeds, was the basic rule of the Third Reich.'
Ian Kershaw	Argues that Hitler's influence in Nazi politics was such that calling him weak is difficult to accept; there are no examples of major policy decisions by Hitler being successfully opposed by subordinates or the party.

Question 45

How valid is the claim that Nazi economic policies mainly benefited German industrialists between 1933 and 1939?

Aim of the question To examine key aspects of Nazi economic policy between 1933 and 1939 and determine the extent to which economic policies primarily benefited big business, or whether other sectors of the economy benefited more. Responses may choose to examine the two distinct phases of Nazi economic policy – the period of recovery between 1933 and 1936 and the drive for rearmament between 1936 and 1939. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Nazi economic policies mainly benefited industrialists:

- Hitler's initial aim was to reduce unemployment. Big business benefited from the extension of public works schemes in building roads and homes and won lucrative contracts. Private companies benefitted from tax breaks by hiring more workers, and unemployment fell to 1.6 million by 1936, and to 200,000 by 1938
- the new motorways also stimulated motor car manufacture and car plants expanded providing more employment opportunities. Other new industries such as chemicals and aircraft manufacture also flourished
- the introduction in June 1935 of the Reich Labour Service provided an abundant supply of young workers on low pay. This benefitted businesses, particularly big businesses with government contracts
- industry was brought under state supervision and big businesses became members of the '*Reichsgruppe*' for industry. The state controlled most resources, but industry remained largely privately owned
- larger firms were forced to join cartels which expanded to meet government requirements
- Nazi control over the economy and big business was extended and projects such as the *Reichswerke Hermann Goering* (RWHG) and IG Farben were created. By 1939, RWHG was the largest industrial firm in Europe and was involved in the production of coal, military equipment, synthetic fuels and steel
- from 1936, under the Four-Year Plan, rearmament became the central focus of the economy. Rearmament enormously benefited big business. Firms like Krupps, I G Farben and Daimler-Benz all expanded. Heavy industry expanded almost 200% over the period 1933 to 1938
- Germany's big businesses also benefitted from the destruction of trade unions in 1933. Wages were more closely regulated (and strikes became illegal). Real wages for workers rose, but workers were only marginally better off since the average hours of work increased from 43 in 1933 to 47 in 1939
- the policy of autarky benefitted those industries supplying domestic goods such as food, synthetic oils, steel and coal. Farmers benefitted from the curtailment of imports of foreign food supplies
- the income for big business increased by 116% between 1933 and 1938.

Evidence which supports the view that Nazi economic policies mainly benefited groups other than industrialists:

- from 1936 to 1939, rearmament needs dominated priorities as Hitler geared the economy for war – the 'Guns versus Butter' debate. The focus on rearmament meant that the military gained from the increased production of tanks, artillery, rifles, advanced weaponry, aircraft, ships and submarines
- although Hitler was not able to subordinate all areas of the economy in the rearmament drive, there is no doubt that the military also hugely benefited. Military expenditure went from 1% of GNP in 1929 to 6% in 1934, 13% in 1936 and 17% in 1938. By 1940 it had reached 38% of GNP
- the government took measures soon after taking power which helped peasant farmers. The Reich Food Estate of September 1939 aimed to increase production whilst controlling prices, and this benefitted farmers. Some were aided by the cancellation of farm debts
- the Reich Entailed Farm Law of 1933 aimed to protect German farmers with smaller holdings. Family farms (between 18 and 30 acres) could not be sold or mortgaged and had to be passed on to one person. Although this did not hugely benefit farmers, it was symbolic of the Nazis' ideological commitment to farmers as the backbone of German society – '*Blut und Boden*'

- the Four-Year Plan helped to increase production by reducing fertiliser prices, providing subsidies for mechanisation and giving grants for the cultivation of new land
- although traditional unions were banned from May 1933, the D.A.F and its associated organisations – the KdF and the Beauty of Labour – aimed to increase worker satisfaction. Conditions in factories improved for some, and workers had the chance to take KdF holidays on cruise ships, or at Prora on Rugen Island
- the wages for industrial workers rose by 25% between 1933 and 1938. Prices for goods rose too, but by a lesser amount. Workers were generally better off in 1939 than in 1933
- by 1936, the average wage for a worker was 35 marks per week – ten times more than the dole money which over six million had been receiving in 1932. Average paid holidays rose from three days per year in 1933 to between six and twelve days per year in 1939
- the Nazi government also attempted to protect small traders. The Law to Protect Retail Trade of 1933 placed special taxes on large stores and banned new department stores. This aimed to protect the *Mittelstand* – small farmers, shopkeepers and traders
- there was little unemployment in Germany from the mid-1930s and workers benefited from increased employment. By 1939 only 35,000 of 25 million male workers were officially unemployed.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Tim Kirk	Argues that the Nazis could not afford to alienate the industrial workers and so were careful to express respect for the dignity of labour and to back up this rhetoric with conciliatory gestures and symbolism.
Roderick Stackelberg	Argues that business enjoyed a privileged position, handsome profits and a considerable degree of self-management in the Third Reich on condition that it serve the political objectives of the Nazi leadership. The 'primacy of politics' was the guiding principle of Nazi economic theory and practice.
Ian Kershaw	Argues that the crushing of the left, the free hand accorded to industry, the reordering of industrial relations, and in general the new political climate that 'formed the basis of a positive relationship between the Nazi government and big business – a relationship which became cemented by the stimulus to the economy through the work creation programme and then in growing measure by the massive profits to be derived from the armaments boom.'
Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham	Argue that the Nazis imposed a massive rearmament burden on the population but avoided large-scale opposition because 'there had been a distinct improvement in most people's circumstances since 1933.'

Section 6 – Germany: from democracy to dictatorship, 1918-1939

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 46 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons for Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Hermann Göring.	Göring was in Hitler's first cabinet as Minister without Portfolio and Prussian Minister of the Interior. He was regarded as the second most important figure in government.
Purpose	A broadcast to the nation.	The author is appealing for popular support from the German people.
Timing	30 January 1933.	The speech was delivered on the very day Hitler was appointed Chancellor.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
By voting for the NSDAP, you have swept aside all the anguish and shame of the last fourteen years of the Weimar Republic.	Takes the view that the new government will sweep away the tainted legacy of the Weimar Republic. Emphasised by the view that this caused 'anguish and shame'.
Our new NSDAP government will keep our promise of providing jobs for the unemployed masses.	Takes the view that the new government will solve the problem of mass unemployment. Emphasised by the view that they will create employment for the 'unemployed masses.'
Like me, they are inspired by what all of us have fought for in vain for a long time, the crushing of the threat of communism through the actions of our leader, Adolf Hitler.	Takes the view that the threat of communism had been defeated. Emphasised by the view that the 'crushing of communism' has occurred.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- long before the Depression of 1929 and mass unemployment of the early 1930s, support for, and confidence in, the Republic was being eroded because of the continuing resentment of issues such as the Treaty of Versailles, the 1923 hyperinflation crisis and the frequent changes of government and Chancellors
- in the July 1932 election, the Nazis gained 37.4% of the vote. This decreased to 33.1% of the vote in the November 1932 election and it seemed that their moment had passed when Hindenburg offered the Chancellorship to von Papen, with Hitler only offered the role of Vice Chancellor. A second contextual point might be that the KPD vote share also rose to 14.5% in the July 1932 election, and rose further to 16.9% in the November 1932 election
- the effects of the worldwide economic depression hit Germany especially hard, and unemployment peaked at just over 6 million in early 1932 and millions abandoned the Republic at the polls. A second contextual point might be that the situation worsened in 1931 with the collapse of five major German banks which heightened the unemployment crisis.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- Brüning's chancellorship had failed to resolve the crisis quickly enough. Arguably, his policies made matters worse and strengthened opposition to the Republic among extremists like the Nazis, but also among industrialists, the army, and large landowners in the east (the *Junkers*)
- with the resignations of Brüning on 30 May 1932, von Papen on 3 December 1932, and of General Kurt von Schleicher at the end of January 1933, Hindenburg, who had been reluctant to appoint Hitler as Chancellor, had run out of options. A second contextual point might be that industrialists petitioned Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. This gave Hindenburg the impression of a far wider base of support among business elites than the Nazis had
- from the late 1930s, the Nazis developed a strong propaganda presence – local individuals were won over. These individuals then converted others in their area, and by the 1932 elections they were well-placed to capitalise on this. A second contextual point might be the role that propaganda played in the 1932 presidential election and the Nazis' use of aircraft which enabled Hitler to visit as many as five cities per day – the 'Hitler over Germany' campaign
- Hitler's charismatic leadership, the presence of the S.A on the streets., and the organisational structure of the Nazis at regional and local levels (the *Gauleiter to Blocksleiter* structure) meant that the Nazis were well-placed to capitalise on a range of grievances during 1932.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Stephen J. Lee	Argues that the Nazis' success depended on the vulnerability of the republic caused by the economic crisis from 1929. Hitler succeeded in collecting much of the electorate that had become disillusioned with the republic.
Richard J. Evans	Argues that the Depression helped to make the Nazis, 'a catch all party of social protest, appealing to a greater or lesser degree to virtually every social group in the land.' The Nazis, 'succeeded in transcending social boundaries and uniting highly disparate groups on the basis of a common ideology. . . as no other party in Germany had managed to do before.'
Mary Fulbrook	Argues that by late January 1933, 'the elites were not prepared to uphold democracy at any cost; most wanted some form of authoritarian government'. The NSDAP no longer seemed dangerous, and, in these circumstances, Hindenburg was persuaded, by a small group including his son and von Papen, to appoint Hitler as Chancellor.
Klaus Fischer	Argues that it is true that millions of middle class Germans sought deliverance by the Nazi movement from Marxism, but the presence also of millions of working class Germans was unmistakable. Although the Nazis benefited from the Weimar Republic's recurrent crises this is not to say that their success was either straightforward or inevitable.

Question 47 **How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the nature of Nazi consolidation of power between 1933 and the end of 1934?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
A few hours after the Reichstag fire, police squads began to dig out lists of Communists which had been prepared some months, or even years beforehand, and set off in cars and vans to arrest them.	Suggests that anti-Communist police officers had already identified leading Communist leaders well before the events of the Reichstag fire and swiftly acted to arrest them immediately after the fire.
Presenting the Reichstag Fire Decree to the Cabinet at 11am the following morning, Hitler made plain his intention of proceeding ruthlessly and with little regard for the usual legal procedures.	Suggests that Hitler intended using the Reichstag fire as a way of circumventing due legal process.
The decree suspended several sections of the Weimar constitution, particularly those governing freedom of expression, freedom of the press and allowed the police to detain people indefinitely in protective custody and without a court order.	Suggests that key freedoms enshrined in the Weimar constitution were to be abandoned.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Nazis were determined to use the fire as proof that a Communist revolution was about to take place
- by the end of March 1933, 20,000 Communists were in prison. A second contextual point might be by the summer of 1933, 100,000 Communists, Social Democrats and trade unionists were in a similar position
- the rights of assembly and the privacy of postal and telephone communications were abolished. A second contextual point might be the Reichstag Fire Decree allowed the federal government to take over the German states if public order was threatened.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
Hitler allowed rumours to spread of a conspiracy that the SA leadership were staging a coup and authorised the SS the responsibility of dealing with this threat in order to protect his authority over Germany.	Suggests that that the Hitler gave the SS the authority to deal with the SA to enable Hitler to secure his position.
On that night, as well as Röhm, potential threats to Hitler's position from opponents, such as former Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher and his supporters, were also arrested and executed.	Suggests that Hitler used the opportunity to rid himself of other potential threats and rivals to his position.
However, the army High Command expressed its support for the actions against the SA and agreed to the merging of the offices of President and Chancellor when Hindenburg died in August 1934, allowing Hitler to become 'Führer' of Germany.	Suggests that the army supported the actions against the SA and consented to allow Hitler to become 'Führer' of Germany through taking over both offices of Chancellor and President.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- tensions had been building between the leadership of the Reichswehr (army) and Röhm's Sturmabteilung (SA) for some months. A second contextual point might be that the army regarded Röhm's attempts to integrate the SA into the German army as dangerous
- Himmler and Heydrich (aided by Göring) convinced Hitler that Röhm was about to launch a putsch and Hitler ordered Operation Hummingbird (The Night of the Long Knives), and the arrest and execution of SA leaders. A second contextual point might be that others whom Hitler distrusted, such as Nazi party rivals, Gregor Strasser and Gustav von Kahr were also executed
- upon Hindenburg's death, the question of the combined office of Führer and Chancellor was put to the German people in a plebiscite on 19 August 1934. A second contextual point might be that shortly afterwards, it became compulsory for both members of the armed forces and civil service to swear an oath of loyalty to Hitler.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- on 13 March 1933, Goebbels was appointed as Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment. The Nazis took complete control of the press, radio, cinema and all artistic output which consolidated their hold on power
- the 'Day of Potsdam' on 21 March 1933 (shortly before the Enabling Act) marked the marriage between the old and new Reichs. Hindenburg and Crown Prince Wilhelm attended. It helped win over more conservative and army elements in Germany
- Hitler argued for and gained sweeping powers in the Enabling Act (the Law for Terminating the Suffering of the People and the Nation) which was passed on 24 March 1933. It became the de-facto constitution of the new Reich. A second contextual point might be that only the SPD voted against the Enabling Act (the KPD were excluded from the vote) and it was passed by 444 votes to 94
- the establishment of the 'People's Court' in April 1934 ensured that 'treasonable offences' were dealt with harshly. The range of treasonable offences was extended and acted as a deterrent, further consolidating Nazi power
- trade unions were abolished on 2 May 1933 and replaced shortly after with the German Labour Front (DAF), headed by Dr Robert Ley. A second contextual point might be that as an element of the policy of *gleichschaltung* (coordination), the KdF (*Kraft durch Freude*) – Strength through Joy-organisation was created by the DAF. It aimed to win over workers by improving their leisure facilities and was important in the overall consolidation of power for the regime by appeasing workers
- on 22 June 1933, the SPD were banned and shortly after, other political parties dissolved themselves. A second contextual point might be that on 14 July 1933, The Law Against the Formation of New Parties was passed. With parties now either banned or having declared themselves defunct, Germany effectively became a one-party state
- the Reichstag was dissolved on 14 October 1933 and in the subsequent elections on 12 November, the Nazis achieved 92% of the vote
- the Nazis also consolidated their power through popular policies. For example, in October 1933, Hitler withdrew Germany from both a Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. Germans had resented the discriminatory nature of armament levels since Versailles.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Geary	Argues that the events of the Night of the Long Knives stood Hitler 'in good stead with both the elites and the German public'. It showed that the Nazi state 'would brook no opposition.'
Jeremy Noakes	Argues that: 'The fire came very conveniently for the Nazis who used it to claim the Communists were plotting revolution and so justifying wholesale arrests.'
Roderick Stackelberg	Argues that the Enabling Act furnished the legal basis for Hitler's dictatorship by conferring full legislative powers upon the chancellor for four years. In essence, the Reichstag now became a rubber stamp.
David Welch	Argues that the Nazi consolidation of power essentially consisted of three elements – using the legal authority of the state, through terror and coercion and through propaganda.

Question 48 **How fully does Source D explain the aims of Volksgemeinschaft between 1933 and 1939?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given
The basic aim of the German state after 1933 was that a healthy Aryan of good character was always more valuable to the national community than a weakling, no matter how high their intelligence may be.	States that the Nazis valued physical and racial superiority above academic achievements.
After 1933, the regime carried out a purge of the entire teaching profession, and teachers were sacked or forced into early retirement who had political views that the Nazis disagreed with or who were Jewish.	States that those opposed to the regime by political affiliation or by religion, were quickly removed from their jobs once the Nazis were in power.
The teachers and lecturers who replaced those who were sacked were good at being Nazis, but they were generally poor teachers and exam results began to suffer.	States that those appointed as teachers and lecturers gained these jobs due to being loyal Nazis, rather than for their teaching proficiency.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Nazis attempted to use education to indoctrinate young people. A second contextual point might be that the curriculum was revised to ensure that all subjects were organised around racial ideology in the Nazification of the curriculum, for instance, History and Biology became vehicles for the inculcation of nationalism and racism
- there was a process of ‘coordination’ of schoolteachers and by 1937, 97% of teachers had joined the National Socialist Teachers’ League and had to attend one month training courses that stressed Nazi racial ideology and physical fitness
- the impact of Nazi policies weakened the German teaching profession with parents making complaints over the standards of education their children were receiving, and the limited subjects being offered due to the lack of specialists in some subject areas, such as science.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the overarching aim of the Volksgemeinschaft was to control a population of healthy Aryans who were committed to the state. This vision was accompanied by hostility to elements that threatened the ‘supremacy’ of the German people
- in April 1933, Bernhard Rust announced the creation of NAPOLAS – leadership schools for boys aged 10-18. A second contextual point might be that this was followed in 1937 when Hitler Youth (H.J.) leader, Baldur von Schirach and D.A.F. leader, Robert Ley, announced the creation of ‘Adolf Hitler Schools’
- on 10 May 1933, Robert Ley announced the creation of the Women’s Front. All 230 of Germany’s women’s organisations had to expel Jewish members and integrate into the Women’s Front or be disbanded. Gertrude Scholz-Klink was appointed as its head in July 1934. A second contextual point might be that in 1933, marriage loans of up to 1000 RM were offered to newlyweds on the grounds that the wife would not work outside the home – with each child born, 25% of the loan was reduced and after four children, the loan was cancelled in its entirety
- Nazi ideology stressed that women should be confined to the domestic sphere and that their duty was to produce healthy Aryan children, uphold conservative family values and comfort their husbands in their service to the state, based on *Kinder, Kirche, Küche*, (Children, Church, Kitchen). A second contextual point might be that the number of women in employment rose from 11 million in 1933, to 14 million by 1939

- another aim of the Volksgemeinschaft was the destruction of the existing working class loyalties to trade unions and socialist parties, replacing these with the German Labour Front (D.A.F.) in May 1933
- the Volksgemeinschaft aimed to cement the place of farmers and small craft industries as the backbone of traditional German society. However, the policy of rearmament after 1936 favoured big business and the small craft industries could not compete
- the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service, April 7, 1933, banned all Jewish people from employment and the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 also forbade marriage between Jewish people and 'Aryans' and deprived Jews of citizenship. A second contextual point might be the '*Kristallnacht*' pogrom of November 1938, or the Decrees for the Exclusion of Jews from Economic Life in November 1938 which furthered their exclusion from German society. Only in the policies of exclusion, were the aims of Nazi policies broadly successful.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Klaus Fischer	Argues that: 'Nazi educational efforts, as a whole, turned out to be poorly thought-out and lacking in substance. . . However, Nazi education was able to miseducate and misuse a whole generation of young people.'
Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz	Argue that: 'Through the training of young men and women, the Nazis procured a most impressionable group of individuals. . . What National Socialist training produced were duller and stupider; though healthier, individuals.'
Jill Stephenson	Argues that the creation of a national community was an aspiration of the Nazi leadership that remained at best only partially fulfilled. In fact, the social classes, urban and rural, persisted, as did their members' attitudes towards themselves and to others.
Ian Kershaw	Argues that one aspect of the attempt to create the Volksgemeinschaft was the removal of the Jewish people from participation in German society. In this the Nazis were completely successful. Otherwise, the attempt to create the Volksgemeinschaft was not successful.

Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902–1984

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 49 **To what extent was Afrikaner resentment towards the British the main obstacle to the 1910 Union of South Africa?**

Aim of the question To assess the extent to which Afrikaner resentment towards the British, not least in the aftermath of the Boer War, was the greatest obstacle to the unification of the four British colonies (including two former Boer Republics until 1902) in 1910. Responses might examine a range of factors that were obstacles to union which may include attitudes to race, the economy and British imperialism and policies in South Africa after the Boer War. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Afrikaner resentment towards the British was the main obstacle to Union in 1910:

- human costs of Boer War including 94% deaths in concentration camps mostly women and children
- 7000 Boer fighters killed
- division between the ‘Bitterenders’, who contested the Treaty of Vereeniging, and ‘Handsappers’ deemed to be working with the British Empire increased divisions in Afrikanerdom
- deep-rooted hatred of the British, made worse by the scorched earth policy and concentration camps. How could they ever co-operate?
- the language issue as Afrikaans, not recognised as an official language after the war which led to Christian National Schools developing in former republics
- unpopularity of Milner’s immigration policy and aim for the Anglicisation of the region
- ethnic differences between British and Afrikaners including language, religion and culture.

Evidence which supports the view that the obstacles to Union were due to other factors.

Socio-economic factors:

- socio-economic impact of Boer War including the destruction of 30,000 farms
- failure of Milner’s policy of Reconstruction to bolster the region’s economy after the Treaty of Vereeniging
- Milner’s protestations that union would give ‘All power to the Boers’ and that it would remain with them
- many (especially in Natal) were worried that ‘responsible government’ would be anything but – it would be a re-run of Afrikaner dominance as seen before the war
- divisions within Afrikanerdom – wartime generals (and national heroes) Louis Botha/Jan Smuts pro-union, Christiaan de Wet/Koos de la Rey fiercely anti-union
- no uniform race policy existed between the four colonies. The Lagden Commission was just that – a report on paper. Many Afrikaners were worried that British attitudes would be given free rein in their areas. The Bambatha Rebellion in Natal didn’t help
- simmering resentment to both white communities from Blacks – who had been armed, organised and politicised by the war
- in spite of Milner’s reconstruction, unified customs and rail networks saw a backlash from the former republics who sought to challenge ‘British capitalism.’

Political factors

- Cape Colony, Orange River Colony, Transvaal and Natal were totally separate entities with different systems of government and laws
- the emergence of party politics, especially Het Volk and Oranje Unie had the potential to make the problem of governance and union more complex
- early elections in self-government states saw Afrikaner victories in three territories, with just Natal electing a pro-British party in 1907
- resentment of Milner's 'Kindergarten' of Oxford graduate civil servants
- impact of the Liberal Party victory in Britain in 1906 on changing policy in the region.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Denis Judd and Keith Surridge

Contend that Afrikaners were 'not a beaten army' in 1902, therefore Union, within the British Empire, remained too unpalatable to many 'Bitterenders'.

Albert Grundlingh

Argues that the 'bitter legacy of the Boer War' entrenched a bitterness between Afrikaners and the British which remained decades later. This meant foundations for Union were rocky.

Nigel Worden

Suggests that Milner was known for his 'hawkish expansionist goals' which antagonised Afrikaners who saw policies of reconstruction as in the interests of the Empire and not Afrikaners.

James Barber

Argues that by 1908 'the political balance across South Africa had swung against the old imperialism' and acknowledges the role of Afrikaner parties including Het Volk in the Boer Republics in increasing opposition to British rule.

Question 50 **‘Government policies between 1910 and 1924 were determined by attitudes to race.’**

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To evaluate the view that government policies immediately after Union until the South African Party (SAP) were defeated in the 1924 election, were driven by attitudes to race. Responses might include the influence of the economy (mining and agriculture), relations with the British Empire, pressure from poor whites, and foreign affairs, to reach a conclusion as to the main driving force behind segregation in South Africa. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that attitudes to race determined government policies between 1910 and 1924:

- sanitation syndrome of the early 20th century
- the growing fear of ‘the black peril’ in the post-First World War depression
- fears of ‘miscegenation’ and ‘white degeneration’ – development of a laager mentality
- the views of ‘liberal segregationists’ and the desire to protect Africans from the dangers of over-rapid urbanisation
- 1918 Status Quo Act establishes colour bar
- increase in number of urban poor, including Blacks, partly as a result of legislation
- Africans could live outside of Reserves only if employed by whites
- 1922 Apprenticeship Act gave unionised white workers a secure position by introducing educational qualifications for apprenticeships – Africans unlikely to have met conditions due to lack of educational opportunities
- 1913 Land Act prohibited Africans from owning or renting land outside designated Reserves
- White Africans increasingly took skilled and supervisory roles following legislation including the Mines and Works Act and the 1918 Status Quo Act (establishing the ‘colour bar’), promoting white economic supremacy
- 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act – Black workers not allowed Trade Unions so lack bargaining power
- 1911 Native Regulation Act – Strikes by African workers hired under contract became criminal offence
- 1920 Native Affairs Act – administrative segregation established Tribal Councils for the administration of Reserves and Advisory Councils for Africans in urban areas – all under control of the Native Affairs Department
- Native representation in Parliament equated to four white representatives.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were responsible for determining government policies from 1910 to 1924.

The economy:

- ways in which segregation met the needs of the mining industry (1913 Land Act and migrant labour)
- creation of Native reserves
- 1914 Riotous Assemblies Act introduced to limit violence of white worker protests
- strikes throughout period including 1914 general strike, 1919 Dock workers strike, 1920 Rand workers strike and 1922 Rand Revolt in response to the impact of legislation
- SAP legislation alienates many white workers as Botha and Smuts accused of working in collaboration with capitalism.
- after the Rand Revolt many former SAP supporters change allegiance to the NP or Labour Party resulting in defeat for the SAP in 1924, suggesting the SAP had not addressed demands of poor whites
- 1911 Native Labour Registration Act set conditions for African employment, recruited Africans rurally. If job contracts were broken it could result in 2 months hard labour.

Other factors including poor whites:

- impact of the Mines and Works Act 1911 in recognising Unions and imposing an 8-hour day
- establishment of the colour bar maintained racial divisions and higher wages for white workers
- higher inflation after the First World War led to pressure on white jobs and wages
- attempt to reduce white mine employment led to strikes
- whites able to assert pressure on mine owners through the ballot box arguably limits scope and therefore impact of government legislation
- 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act legalised bargaining power of trade unions
- Reserves allocated 7.5% of land in South Africa initially (extended to 13% by 1936)
- 1923 – Natives (Urban Areas) Act – Africans residing in cities carry passes or are liable to arrest/be expelled to the Reserves.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****Saul Dubow**

Contends that social eugenics and attitudes to race whereby whites were deemed superior were a primary influence in determining early government policy in South Africa.

Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido

Argue that a 'union of gold and maize' were the lifeblood of the South African economy and therefore legislation was designed to support both mining and agriculture.

Leonard Thompson

Presents a traditional view that emphasises Afrikaner values and preservation of white minority rule in determining government policy.

Nigel Worden

Argues that legislation passed was for commercial interests and as a result of the developing towns rather than in the interests of the white labour force. The desire of white workers to maintain supremacy in the workplace and beyond and the fear of Black workers provides the Ideological argument for segregation.

Question 51

‘Growing white disunity was the most significant impact of South Africa’s participation in World War Two’.

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To evaluate how far growing white disunity between English speakers and Afrikaners including, capitalists and non-capitalists, United Party supporters and National Party supporters, rural and urban demographics, pro and anti-imperialism, was the greatest impact of the experience of the war years. Responses may link this directly to the outcome of the subsequent 1948 election. Other factors may include social, economic and political consequences of the Second World War including the growth of African resistance. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that growing white disunity was the most significant impact of World War Two on South Africa:

- split over UP and Smuts’ support of ‘England’s war’ as many Afrikaners wanted to align with Hitler and the Germans or remain neutral
- war years saw Hertzog and Malan reunify the party with Hertzog speaking of ‘cooperation between the two parts of national minded Afrikanerdom’
- factions in Reunified National Party as many profoundly distrusted Hertzog
- National Party rejects Hertzog’s proposal that in any new constitution English and Afrikaners should be given equal rights. Hertzog left parliament convinced his brand of nationalism no longer had a future resulting in formation of the breakaway Afrikaner Party subsequently dividing the NP
- war measures Act (1940) increases division between industrialists and workers as legislation designed in part to curb industrial unrest/control work force
- Ossewa Brandweg anti English, sympathetic to National Socialism
- Malan rejected the Ossewa Brandweg as a ‘foreign ideology’, further dividing Afrikanerdom given the OB had 250,000 members by 1942 (a quarter of Afrikaners)
- Smuts – pro maintenance of white control but relaxation of segregation, while supported by liberal whites, increased resentment from Afrikaners/those fearful of the influx of Black people
- NP Sauer Report seen as Afrikaner retaliation to the ‘liberalism’ of the UP Fagan Report
- division over language – NP and supporters increasingly pro bilingual teachers
- increasing division during war years over relations with Britain as Malan promotes his republican message. Subsequently moderated in 1948 to aid attraction of 20% of the English-speaking electorate
- struggles to reabsorb returning troops into society along with acute housing shortage resulted in growing divisions between whites, most notably about race. Views became entrenched
- Malan’s rhetoric including ‘the perception that Afrikaners had been discriminated against by the Smuts’ administration’ (Dubow)
- rural producers (mostly Afrikaner) alienated by Smuts’ price control policy
- Smuts increasingly criticised by Nationalists as an ‘apostle of the kaffir state.’

Evidence which supports the view that there were other more significant impacts of the war on South Africa:

The socio-economic impact:

- fear over strikes, squatter camps and increasing crime rates in the cities
- high inflation
- increased use of Black labour – skilled men had joined the forces
- white employment rose by 20% in war years, Black employment by 74%
- increase in demand led to post war industrial boom
- 1939-1945 gross output doubled
- increasing racism in the workplace
- all races aid the war effort (though Blacks in restricted roles)

- ANC development as Xuma reorganises finances and extension of membership. Barber argues that during the war, Xuma 'reshaped a small ramshackle organisation'
- relaxation of Pass Laws
- emergence of Black representation in trade unionism
- White workers in skilled and semi-skilled positions in industry felt threatened by the breaches in the colour bar
- consequences of urbanisation for South Africa's farmers
- rent strikes and bus boycotts – Increasing protest of Black people including the Alexandria bus boycotts (1940-45) and mineworkers strikes (1946)
- post-war immigration schemes to attract European workers (1946). Nationalists felt this would 'plough the Afrikaner under'
- 1943 election, with Malan's NP forming the official opposition
- commissioning of the Sauer Report and recommendations including physical separation of the races.

The political impact:

- white South Africans felt threatened by Black or political aspiration of Black peoples
- Smuts increasingly criticised by Nationalists as an 'apostle of the kaffir state'
- Fagan Commission appointed to assess urban Blacks/labour provisions
- Militant attacks
- defeat of the United Party in the 1948 election by the National Party
- Smuts' government appeared to favour profitability of the mines over the interests of the working class.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
James Barber	'The war exposed the very questions that Hertzog and Smuts had pushed aside: neutrality and loyalty to the crown'. He argues that Afrikaner nationalism was deeply divided.
Nigel Worden	Describes the economic impact of war on South Africa. 'During the war South African industry had faced a major challenge. Demand increased especially in the manufacturing sector, both in the country itself and in terms of the war effort'.
Albert Grundlingh	Contends that the solidarity engendered by common wartime experiences was not translated into a common post war consciousness.
Dan O'Meara	Argues that the socio-economic impact of war as part of a lengthier process. The war accelerated what was already happening in terms of the drift to towns. Many factories were already employing Blacks by the mid-1930s.

Question 52

How far was the resurgence in the resistance movement in the 1970s a result of the Soweto Uprising?

Aim of the question To determine the extent to which the resurgence in resistance in the 1970s was a result of the Soweto Uprising. Other factors may include the development and impact of the Black Consciousness Movement and the role of Steve Biko, the militant campaigns of POQO and MK, the growth of Inkatha and Trade Unionism and the growing support from anti-apartheid campaigns out with South Africa. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Soweto Uprising drove the resurgence of 1970s resistance:

- the role of the Black Consciousness Movement as a source of inspiration for the Soweto students
- the Soweto Uprising originated with a small group of BCM affiliated High School students
- 1975 SASO banned
- demonstrations after Soweto continued in various forms until the end of apartheid in 1994
- most demonstrations after Soweto localised and spontaneous rather than being directed centrally. This was a new feature of anti-apartheid protests
- ANC and PAC beneficiaries of Soweto as it enhanced sympathy for the armed struggle as a result of the revulsion at the brutal response of the security forces
- widespread international condemnation of Soweto bolstered international support for the anti-apartheid campaign from publicly organised events. India and Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, provided aid and support
- Soweto uprising and death of Biko in police custody (1977) marked the end of a point at which many considered the chance of a peaceful solution to problems caused by apartheid. Increasing militancy
- the Cillie Commission report blamed the Soweto riots on outside 'agitators' and ANC activists later claimed that the ANC had played a major part in organising the revolt.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors best explain the resurgence of 1970s resistance:

Black Consciousness and Steve Biko:

- the role of the South African Students Movement (SASM) and discontent resulting from twenty years of 'Bantu' education
- Biko helped set up the Black Communities Programme in 1970, establishing Black self-help groups for Black communities
- the influence of the BCM in strikes and protests of 1972-1973
- spread of Black Consciousness ideas among the ANC in exile as large numbers of activists joined ANC training camps
- Black Consciousness failed to penetrate the working class or peasant communities
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness
- role of Biko forming SASO, as president of the Black People's Convention and death in 1977 in police custody
- poor living conditions and reaction to oppression, contributed to BCM objectives
- Biko rejected policies of violence adopted by ANC/PAC in the 1960s
- the BCM did not develop a coherent political strategy which limited its effectiveness.

Other organisations and external factors:

- by the late 1970s the ANC was increasingly focusing on urban areas and building mass organisations
- vague and undefined political and economic policies
- traditional leaders of opposition to apartheid seemingly becoming less relevant
- Government Total Strategy a response to the 'Total Onslaught' or fear of co-ordinated attack orchestrated by Communists to destroy apartheid following Soweto. Total Strategy saw an escalation in the response from MK and POQO
- thousands of young people slipped away to join the armed struggle
- many joined the ANC/MK training camps in Tanzania, Angola and elsewhere
- increasing resentment of government integrationist policies saw many more prepared to see all whites as enemies
- Mandela and others comment on the contacts between ANC prisoners on Robben Island and the student leaders sent there after 1976
- the Azanian People's Organisation in 1978 bringing together BPC, BCP and SASO, all organisations which had been banned in 1977 after the Soweto riots
- the organisation of the ANC in exile and tenuous links with South Africa
- in 1978, the ANC and SACP set up a small group to ensure greater co-operation with internal political meetings, although the armed section was still envisaged as forming the cutting edge. This amounted to recognition that they failed to take full advantage of Soweto
- increased worker militancy from c. 1973; 160 strikes in March alone. Between January and September 1973 more than 70,000 workers involved in industrial action
- 'the labour troubles of 1973 were forerunners of a revival of militant African political activity' (Barber)
- developments in other African countries, especially the liberation of Angola and Mozambique and their subsequent support of the armed struggle
- increased size of the African urban workforce, including skilled and semi-skilled workers. Rebirth of African trade unions
- growing unpopularity of the homelands policy of the National Party
- decline of the ANC in the early 1970s, focus on winning external legitimacy in Africa and wider world.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Saul Dubow	Sees the Soweto Uprising as a key event in the fight against apartheid. He argues that it far exceeded the scale and intensity of the 1960 insurrection, heralding the demise of white supremacy and made real the possibility of liberation, perhaps for the first time.
Tom Lodge	Contends that the wider generational conflict in the aftermath of Soweto was key for the development of resistance as it was young people who had taken the initiative in Soweto and driven the protests in response to Education legislation rather than BCM initiatives.
Francis Meli	Relates the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement to the international student protest of the late 1960s/early 1970s, as well as to the process of decolonisation.
James Barber	Argues that the labour troubles of 1973 were forerunners of a revival of militant African political activity.

Question 53 **How significant was pressure from the worldwide Anti-Apartheid Movement in shaping South Africa's relationships with the international community between 1960 and 1984?**

Aim of the question To examine the importance of the pressure from the worldwide Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) on South African foreign relations between 1960 and 1984. Responses may include the impact of the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, continued African resistance and international political pressure on the regime. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that pressure from the AAM shaped South African foreign relations:

- anti-apartheid movements in the United Kingdom (UK), Holland and the United States of America (USA) mounted the most serious challenges to the apartheid state, the UK's perhaps being the most effective of all such organisations throughout the world
- by the late 1980s the UK's Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) had unleashed a wide range of campaigns and established branches throughout the country
- AAM had to contend with new forces in the liberation movement and re-emergence of the trade union movement, especially after 1975
- AAM contribution to Biko's memorial services, for example, St Paul's Cathedral
- AAM exposed NATO collaboration with apartheid government in Project Advokaat (secret underground naval surveillance system)
- linked up with Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in a drive to 'Stop the Apartheid Bomb' after the regime exploded a nuclear bomb in the South Atlantic, October 1979
- AAM compiled list of those who broke sporting boycott and campaigned against the 1980s British Lions tour that went ahead in South Africa
- Cultural boycott, endorsed by UN resolution in 1980 was reinforced by the AAM drawing up register of entertainers who had performed in South Africa (Tom Jones, Shirley Bassey etc. had performed in Sun City and pledged not to return)
- Campaigns against Banks including Barclays Bank resulted in them pulling out of South Africa due to customer pressure (students encouraged to close accounts by the AAM)
- free Mandela Campaign taken up by AAM. Produced film *South Africa's Other Leader*, watched by millions during P W Botha's visit to the UK
- 1983 Special AKA recorded *Free Nelson Mandela* song, supported by AAM.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors shaped South African foreign relations:

Internal threats driving foreign relations:

- economic problems such as the falling price of gold, rising price of oil, the balance of payment crisis and rising inflation
- changes within the SA economy leading to demands for a more stable urbanised workforce
- rapid growth of the African urban population in squatter camps
- unrest in townships: Soweto
- the growth of powerful Trade Unions
- the impact of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commission reports
- hostility to the Black Local Authorities Act and Tri-Cameral Constitution (1984)
- the formation of the National Forum (NF) and the UDF in 1983
- the split within the NP, leading to the formation of Treunicht's Conservative Party
- introduction of National Service
- Black resistance increasingly dominated by the non-racialism of the ANC/SACP in the 1980s.

The impact of other external pressures including the Cold War and collapse of the Portuguese empire:

- Black majority rule in front line states meant South Africa faced ‘total onslaught’ from neighbouring African states. Loss of ‘buffer zone’ of friendly neighbours Angola and Mozambique
- the impact of liberation movements elsewhere in southern Africa
- the ANC set up guerrilla bases within easy reach of Johannesburg and Pretoria – MK organised raids from Mozambique in the early 1980s
- establishment of MK training grounds and supply routes through former Portuguese colonies
- fear of Communist influence over neighbouring Black states and consequent communist support of Black resistance movements operating in South Africa
- continued support from West as South Africa seen as a bastion against Communism and the requirement to maintain trade of uranium for nuclear weapons
- churches and Christian based organisations significant in spreading awareness and fostered links with the ANC, SACP or PAC
- pressure from the United Nations including 1968 – General Assembly requested all States and organisations to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid
- withdrawal of South African police force from supporting Smith’s minority white government in Rhodesia in 1974. Mugabe wins election – strongly anti-South African
- influence of Cold War in limiting Western pressure on South African government – failure of arms embargoes related to Cold War
- British government dropped veto at the UN and voted for mandatory arms embargo on South Africa
- the USSR was supplying arms to resistance movements but her involvement may have been exaggerated as a result of Cold War paranoia
- between 1965 and 1980 British governments were preoccupied with Rhodesia. Even under Thatcher Britain continued to oppose sanctions
- Under Reagan, South Africa was seen as a key player in the struggle against the USSR. The US government sought ‘constructive engagement’ with the South African government
- only in the mid-1980s, during the latter stages of détente, did coverage of township violence and the brutality of security forces result in significant change from the West. The South African government fought hard to prevent Western disinvestment by starting to moderate the regime – Botha’s ‘Adapt or Die’.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Adrian Guelke	Claims changes in the region of Southern Africa, and the end of the Portuguese empire in Africa, had weakened the position of the South African government.
Merle Lipton	Argues that ‘The trend (among capitalists) is towards increasing opposition (to apartheid) and it has been accelerating’. Capitalist interests were already working to undermine apartheid by the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Tom Lodge	Argues that by the 1970s disinvestment by the west was ‘critical leverage’.
Saul Dubow	Identifies the arrival of the Cold War on South Africa’s ‘doorstep’ which created ‘the spectre of the country being surrounded by hostile states directed by Moscow’.

Section 7 – South Africa: race and power, 1902-1984

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 54 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for developments in Afrikaner nationalism between 1924 and 1939?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
Only with the vigorous promotion of Afrikaans, as a standard written acceptable language, distinct from Dutch, and its official recognition in 1925, that it became increasingly possible to reach the masses.	Suggests that the growth of Afrikaner nationalism was only possible once Afrikaans, and not just Dutch, was used to reach the <i>volk</i> to articulate the nationalist message.
Accounts of the trials and tribulations of the conflict started to appear in Afrikaans in popular magazines, as Gustav Preller established himself as a prolific populariser of history.	Suggests that the promotion of Boer War heroes in Afrikaner language publications developed the increasing cultural identity of Afrikaners with a shared heritage.
As opposed to English, which was considered the foreign and unyielding commercial language of the world.	Suggests that the use of English was oppressive to Afrikaners.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Eventual success of the campaign to recognise Afrikaans as an official language in 1925
- Gustav Preller as the ‘populariser of history’ translating works into Afrikaans. A second Contextual Development point might be Afrikaner magazines including *Die Huisgenoot* and *Die Burger* intended to reach all, including isolated farms
- perceived martyrs and Boer War heroes written into music and literature.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
The outcome of the Afrikaner’s struggle in the economic field would be decisive in determining whether they would see themselves primarily as an ethnic group or as a class.	Suggests that the development of a sense of ethnic identity was a class struggle rather than a cultural one.
Viewed from a Nationalist perspective, the dominant feature of the South African economy was the vast gap between the Afrikaner and English wealth.	Suggests that poorer white Afrikaners grew a cohesive identity due to the ‘them and us’ feeling of English capitalism and the English controlling the wealth.
More important than abstract racism was the existence of a split labour market in which White Africans, who were expected to maintain a distinctive standard of living, had to compete with Black Africans, who did not meet with such expectations.	Suggests that Afrikaners could not compete in the wage market with Blacks unless willing to concede white superiority in society.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- impact of Great Depression and devaluation crisis 1931-1932. A second Contextual Development point might be the falling demand for South African exports led to overcrowding in reserves and Black squatter communities on the edge of towns heightening white fears of 'the black peril'
- new financial institutions to support Afrikaners including SANTAM and SANLAM
- Volkskongres of 1939 organised by FAK for the investigate Afrikaner poverty levels.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- half of Afrikaners urbanised by 1936
- 1932 Carnegie Commission findings revealed extent of urban poverty
- establishment of the National Party under Hertzog in 1914, then the Purified National Party under Malan in 1933
- role of the Dutch Reformed Church and Christian National Education – attitudes to race and neo-Calvinist theology
- establishment and influence of the Afrikaner Broederbond, 1919 and continuing influence
- Afrikaner nationalism as a political force with appeal to 'poor whites' and the white working class
- significance of Malan's Purified National Party including growing awareness the inequality of poor Afrikaners and Malan's commitment to the poor white question
- celebrations for the centenary of the Great Trek and Malan's 'Blood River' speech. A second Contextual Development point may be the role of the FAK in organising the celebrations.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
William Vatcher	Identifies the development of a laager mentality amongst Afrikaners as they seek to protect their cultural identity.
Rob Skinner	Contends that the development of Afrikaner nationalism was most deeply connected to the formation of class identities in an urbanising and industrialising South Africa.
T Dunbar Moodie	Contends that cultural and religious factors contributed to the development of a 'Civil Religion' that mobilised Afrikaners, developing a sense of 'volk'.
Hermann Giliomee	Emphasises the importance of 'language manipulators' in the development of Afrikaner nationalism and cites the importance of the print media, literature and music in Afrikaans as fostering greater unity amongst Afrikaners, describing their ethnic mobilisation. Giliomee emphasises ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners.

Question 55 Evaluate the usefulness of Source C as evidence of the aims of Apartheid before 1959.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source C		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Hendrik Verwoerd.	Minister of Native Affairs in 1954 in Malan's government. Referred to as 'The Architect of Apartheid' as he was instrumental in shaping early apartheid in leading the Native Affairs Department. An ideologist so presents an ideological rather than practical perspective on the development of apartheid.
Purpose	Statement to the South African Parliament.	A declaration of his unwillingness to accept that Blacks will be educated to the same degree as white South Africans. Verwoerd displays his frustrations with factions seeking to justify a practical rather than ideological approach to apartheid.
Timing	7 June 1954.	Reflects the ideological drive of early apartheid after the National Party victory in the 1948 election and a few months prior to Malan's resignation in November 1954.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
He must not learn to feel above his community, with a consequent desire to become integrated into the life of the Europeans living here and their community, and he becomes frustrated when this does not take place, and he tries to make his community dissatisfied because of such misdirected ambitions.	Takes the view that Blacks are not, nor should they aspire to be equal to whites and the Bantu Education Act was designed to prevent this. Emphasised by must not learn to feel above his community.
There is no place for the Bantu in the European community (white) above the level of certain forms of labour.	Takes the view that the place of Blacks under apartheid was as cheap labour to bolster the economy and the economic supremacy of whites. Emphasised by no place for the Bantu.
For that very reason, there is no purpose for them to receive training which has as its aim absorption into the European community, where they cannot be absorbed; therefore, the school must equip them (the Bantu pupils) to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose upon them.	Takes the view that apartheid developed to educate Blacks sufficiently, though no more than, their role in the economy prescribed. Education was certainly not to be aspirational to allow for the upward mobility of black Africans. Emphasised by no purpose for them to receive training and economic life of South Africa will impose upon them.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- economic or practical reasons for the development of apartheid including Bantu Education Act 1953 giving state control over education and skill level of African workers. A second Contextual Development Point may be Apartheid as a means of extending the benefits of the migrant labour system to manufacturing
- grand apartheid's overall strategy of keeping the races separated as much as possible
- belief in white supremacy at the heart of ideology – that social miscegenation would lead to racial decline (Immorality Act and Mixed Marriages Act).

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- decentralisation of industry would enable manufacturers to exploit cheap labour from the reserves – gradual relocation of industry to the fringes of reserves
- Territorial segregation through the Bantu Self-Governing Act 1952 which set up eight 'self-governing' homelands for Africans
- in 1946 Black Africans or Black South Africans made up 79% of the population. By 1970 it was 89% resulting in an increased fear of '*die swart gevaar*' (black menace) A second Wider Contextual Development may be that influx control legislation would restrict the process of black urbanisation and therefore the development of a black urban proletariat
- the theology of the Dutch Reformed Church and views of Afrikaner academics such as Cronje who advocated complete racial separation in order to secure the long-term survival of the Afrikaner people. A second Contextual Development point may be the Population Registration Act 1950 registered everyone according to race.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Hermann Giliomee	Afrikaner historian who argues apartheid was a 'radical survival plan' rooted in the Dutch Reformed Church.
Tom Lodge	Argues that the 1940s as a 'watershed in African Politics' whereby African resistance in the aftermath of the Second World war brought greater pressure on the White governing minority.
Deborah Posel	Argues that apartheid was more practical in response to changing socio-economic demands. However, apartheid was initially to preserve the dominance of the white race, primarily the Afrikaners themselves.
T Dunbar Moodie	Emphasises the negative aspects of apartheid ideology whereby racial integration was seen as sinful since it defied God's will, whereas racial separation represented the Divine Will.

Question 56 **How fully does Source D explain the reasons for the growth of African nationalism in the 1950s?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretation given</i>
This was after insisting that the ANC return to its nationalist fundamentals.	States that after a period of increased inclusivity, the ANC returned to more tradition Africanist roots.
Africanists, excluded from the proceedings, broke with the ANC and its multi-racial Alliance.	States that growing discontent with the collaborative and multi-racial membership of the ANC led to members leaving its ranks.
In April 1959, the Pan-African Congress (PAC) was formally constituted under the leadership of Robert Sobukwe, who was already highly respected.	States that a new Africanist resistance group, the PAC, formed out of those alienated by the ANC.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- opposition organisations still divided in terms of ideology such as readiness to work with other groups, disagreements over aims and the Freedom Charter
- pressure for violent action coming from across political spectrum
- frustration over limits of resistance/ANC in the 1950s. Evidence of growing factions within the ANC throughout the 1950s – resulting in ANC/PAC split.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- number of Youth League advocated a move to militancy in the 1950s. Mandela and Sisulu had discussed prospect of an armed struggle as early as 1952
- role of the CYL in the Congress and writing of the powerful 10-point Freedom Charter in 1955
- platform and publicity for CYL leaders including Mandela to promote their ideas during the Treason Trial of 1956
- rise to prominence of Mandela and the Youth League – ideas of mass and increasingly militant action
- ANC membership grew rapidly in the 1950s from approximately 5000 in 1948 to more than 100,000 by the end of the 1950s
- as the 1950s progressed, and especially after the adoption of the Freedom Charter, the PAC provided a clear alternative to the ANC aiming – like the ANC – at the creation of a mass movement for Africans
- 1 May 1950 – National Stay Away. Violent clashes in Transvaal. First example of combined worker action/country-wide. A second Contextual Development point may be the 1952 Defiance Campaign – jointly organised with Communist Party – established the impetus for a mass campaign. 8000 arrested.

Historians Perspective on the issue

John Pampallis Argued that the ANC, working alongside the labour movements, created a political base for which a new class consciousness would emerge in the 1950s.

Nigel Worden Describes the 1950s as a decade of heightened defiance but of lost opportunities.

Saul Dubow Argues that the schisms that developed in the ANC in the 1950s could not be contained, resulting in the formation of the PAC. However, the challenge represented by the PAC to the ANC and Congress Alliance did nothing to weaken the liberation movement.

Francis Meli Argues that the more radical ANC of the 1950s was vital in mobilising the masses to resist apartheid.

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914–1945

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES:

Question 57 **How far can it be argued that working class discontent was the main cause of the February Revolution?**

Aim of the question To consider the significant role played by the urban factory workers in the events of the February Revolution in 1917. Factory workers from the radicalised Vyborg district were at the centre of the initial protests which led to the eventual abdication of Nicholas II. Other factors may include the role of the elites, both political and military, the impact of the Great War on the wider society as well as on Petrograd's economy and army garrison and the inability of the Tsar to make meaningful political reform which alienated the bourgeoisie. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that working class discontent caused the February Revolution:

- factory Workers had been engaging in political strikes in 1916. Anti-war sentiment was apparent in the demands of the workers as well as economic grievances
- workers and their families were experiencing a serious decline in their living standards as inflation reached 300% while wages had on average increased only by 200% since the outbreak of war in August, 1914
- Bolshevik presence was strong in the metal workers unions in the large plants, shipyards and factories – Shop Stewards were aware of the imperialist nature of the war. Menshevik and SRs too were present in the class-conscious workers of the settled proletariat in Petrograd
- women workers were instrumental in encouraging the men to come out on strike at the beginning of the events of the revolution – International Women's Day
- conscripted, skilled factory workers from such units as the 1st Machinegun regiment were important in leading the revolt of the Army garrison. These men were not considered suitable for military service in the pre-war army due to their perceived political unreliability
- living conditions in working class areas were over-crowded due to the increase in refugees from the front and the increase in the workforce due to wartime expansion of industry
- workers were the first to begin attacking police patrols when the marchers began to walk over bridges and frozen canals to get into Nevsky Prospekt area
- women from working class areas were forced to queue in bread queues for 18 hours per day – 'it began in the bread queues' – these queues become politically disloyal as the demand for bread is coupled to political change
- pre-Great War history of working class militancy in Petrograd, for example, January-July 1914 saw 246 strikes in the city. July 1914 saw a general strike with street fighting with gendarmes and barricades in the Vyborg district. Rioting occurred in the fashionable shopping districts with working class gangs raiding gun shops, jewellers and banks
- unskilled workers, newly arrived from the countryside were more easily radicalised as they were most impacted with low wages, high prices and grossly overcrowded living conditions in barracks.

Evidence which supports the view that military discontent caused the February Revolution:

- 170,000 troops in the greater Petrograd garrison and military district. Mostly raw peasant conscripts and recovering wounded veterans who were aware of the disorganised nature of the war effort at the front. Barracks over-crowded and food supplies were 'irregular'
- soldiers treated badly in Tsarist society: low pay, harsh discipline from officers and subject to petty humiliations – refused entry to parks, cinemas and public transport in while in uniform
- Don Cossack cavalry in the garrison were recruited from the poorer areas of the Don region and were likely to show some sympathy to the workers – 'comrade Cossack'
- Junior Officers in the non-Guards army units more likely from promoted NCOs, students and 2/3 from peasant backgrounds. These men were more likely to be sympathetic to the demands for reform and a more equal society than the pre-war officer corps. By 1917 pre-war officer corps had suffered massive losses in the fighting on the battlefields

- disaffection had reached even the Imperial Guards – Preobrazhensky Regiment defected from the regime on 25 February followed by the Naval Guard regiment and the Finland regiment
- soldiers' rifles made the strikes and riots into a revolution – power slipped away from the regime as the army garrison went over to the people – the strongest pillar of tsarism had collapsed.

Evidence which supports the view that political discontent among elites was a significant factor in causing the February Revolution:

- late 1916 coups being planned by politicians were being listened to by Army generals such as Alekseev and Brusilov sympathetically. Nicholas II had lost the confidence of the elites in the military as evidenced by the telegrams from admirals and generals urging him to abdicate in 15 March, 1917
- Duma politicians from the 'Progressive Bloc' and even the nationalist right had lost patience with the tsarist government for failures to prosecute the war effectively and to engage in meaningful political reforms. Duma speech of Milyukov where he called the government's policies 'Treason or Stupidity' of 14 November, 1916. Kadet leadership signaling alienation from the regime
- masonic links between political, industrial and military leaders who would play important roles, for example, Alexander Kerensky and Guchkov were members of the Grand Orient lodge in Petrograd
- Tsar's own nephew Prince Yusupov led conspiracy in the murder of Rasputin in a vain attempt to save the dynasty from the 'influence of dark forces.'

Other factors which influenced the events of the February Revolution:

- peasant discontent due to a lack of consumer goods from factories. War production in metal working industries had been taken up with military contracts. Peasants refusing to market grain in 1916 onwards as commune turned toward self-reliance for manufactured goods
- railway problems as there was a lack of serviceable rolling-stock due to excessive use of trains by the military. Trains taking supplies westwards to the front and not enough taking food and fuel supplies from the agricultural south to the northern cities such as Petrograd and Moscow
- Russification policies were still resented by the national minorities
- refugee influx in Petrograd worsened living conditions and caused fears of contagions from Typhus. Jewish merchants/refugees were accused of raising food prices in the urban areas of the empire. Antisemitism was widespread in Russia
- urban violence against German/Austrian business and national concerns in 1914-1916 demonstrated the propensity to use violence for political ends in Moscow, Petrograd and Kiev.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Michael Paterson	Contends that elites in Russian society were alienated from the Tsar. They blamed him personally for the failures of the war effort to bring victory to a hard-pressed people.
Orlando Figes	Takes the view that the demand for increased food supplies was crucial in the development of the disaffection of the populace in Petrograd.
Peter Kenez	Contends that the military revolt was more important than the workers strikes as the Army was the vital support for the tsarist regime to remain in power.
Antony Beevor	Considers that the reserve battalions of recovering veterans in Petrograd were resentful, dispirited and determined not to be sent to the front again.

Question 58

How important was the Kornilov Affair in September 1917 in undermining support for the Provisional Government?

Aim of the question Responses might also include that the moderate left-wing parties such as the Mensheviks and the SRs lost support to the more radical Bolsheviks. To allow responses to consider the impotence of the events of the Kornilov Affair from 10-13 September, 1917 in undermining support for the Provisional Government. Responses might consider the subsequent victories of the Bolsheviks in city Duma elections in Riga, Moscow and Petrograd. Responses might also include that the moderate left-wing parties such as Mensheviks and the SRs lost support to the more radical Bolsheviks. Other factors which led to increased Bolshevik support as the impact of the Great War, economic crises and the peasant demand for land continued to grow, might be considered. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the Kornilov Affair was crucial in undermining support for the Provisional Government:

- Kornilov was appointed as Commander in Chief of the Army by Prime Minister Kerensky on the 24 July on the understanding that he would be free to re-establish order in the Army – both at the Front, rear garrisons and the civilian war economy
- Kornilov had become the hope of those who sought to restore discipline and order before the attempted coup – in the Moscow State Conference in mid-August, Kornilov was feted by officers and industrialists as their hope to save Russia from chaos. His speech was a call for restoration of discipline to keep hopes of victory in the war. Kerensky was already aware that General Kornilov was the hero of the political Right
- he sought to tame the soviet in Petrograd and restore the fighting spirit of the Army and people to win the war – seen as seeking to re-impose the old tsarist order by the socialist parties
- Kerensky was humiliated as the army commander he appointed led a coup against the Provisional Government. Both Left and Right were abandoning Kerensky and the Provisional Government
- Kerensky denounced by the Bolsheviks as being a ‘counterrevolutionary’ seeking to return the old order. Support for the Provisional Government declined in Petrograd as Kornilov advanced
- Kerensky was viewed in army garrisons as selling out of soldier’s rights, and this led to disciplinary breakdown in reserve and garrisons in the urban areas of the Empire
- Kadet politicians denounced the Provisional Government for their action to arrest Kornilov – they began to move rightwards with appeals for patriotism and increase Law and order appeal to middle classes, industrialists and Army officers
- City Duma elections from September in Moscow and Petrograd Kadets gain 31% of the votes as urban middle classes abandon the Provisional Government in a move rightwards
- Kerensky supporting moderate socialists losing heavily in working class districts eg Mensheviks gain only 10% of votes down from 35% in aftermath of the February Revolution
- soviet in Petrograd in aftermath of the Kornilov Affair loses moderate majority as does the soviet in Riga and Moscow
- officer class deserting the Provisional Government as they claim Kerensky is leading the Army to defeat and Russia into chaos
- soldiers lost all trust in their officers as they believe that Kornilov had their support to roll back the gains made by them – Order No.1 Soldiers Committees, loosening of discipline and deference
- demands grow for an all-party socialist government to take power on behalf of Workers and Soldiers following the Kornilov Affair.

Evidence which supports the view that the Provisional Government was becoming unpopular by the autumn of 1917:

- nature of the Provisional Government as being unelected and a 'hold-over' from the imperial Duma elected on a restricted franchise and so lacks legitimacy in time of mass politics
- all over the Empire disorder, strikes, land seizures were increasing as the old tsarist order of police, regional governors and the Okhrana were dissolved. Lenin's statement of 'Power lying in the gutter'
- increasing demands for national autonomy – Ukraine, Finland – pointed to the dissolution of centralised control from the Provisional Government
- land reform left by the Provisional Government for the proposed Constituent Assembly to settle. Peasants now taking land from the gentry and split in the SRs developing over this issue leading to Bolshevik adopting the popular SR land policy
- summer offensive ends in disastrous defeats for the Russian Army as the soldiers refuse to advance after the first day of fighting and discipline deteriorates as Officers are disobeyed and desertions increase as the harvest approaches and land seizures increase in countryside
- SRs and Mensheviks are losing credibility as they are involved in the Provisional Government and are losing their working class/soldier support. Left SRs breaking away from more moderate section of the party
- Kadets leave the Provisional Government after the Kornilov Affair – middle class support drifts away from Kerensky's government as does working class supporters.

Bolshevik Party strengths:

- Lenin's leadership was crucial for the success of the Bolshevik party in 1917 – April Theses, All Power to the soviets! He was determined to lead the Bolshevik party into power and rule on their own with no other socialist party in tandem
- Bolshevik agitators were sent to intercept the troops heading towards Petrograd to enforce Kornilov's scheme – the party gained support as being active in defending the freedoms won in the February revolution as they persuaded the troops to refuse orders to advance
- Bolshevik party untainted by being members of the Provisional Government unlike SRs and Mensheviks who are blamed for the decline of the economy and the continuance of the war. Votes migrate *en masse* to the Bolsheviks in working class districts
- propaganda very effective as newspapers target soldiers, workers and peasants – German money paid for the printing presses and distribution of anti-war propaganda
- by eve of October revolution party strength at 250,000 – up from 15,000 in February
- Trotsky joins the Bolsheviks in July 1917 – effective orator and chair of the MRC in the Petrograd soviet who organises the coup on 25 October 1917
- Bolshevik support located in strategic cities – Moscow and Petrograd – and the Northern Front troops heavily influenced by propaganda
- Kronstadt naval base radicalised and supports October coup as the sailors seek a socialist regime
- urban workers looking to the Bolsheviks for solution to increased unemployment, rising prices and falling wages in late summer and autumn 1917.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Richard Pipes

Takes the view that the Bolsheviks were not representative of the people but a highly disciplined revolutionary party seeking power for themselves.

Dimitri Volkogonov

Considers that Lenin offered the alternative to Kornilov and Kerensky. He would tell the people what they wanted to hear and cynically exploit division and want.

Helen Rappaport

Contends that following the Kornilov Affair the authority of the Provisional Government collapsed completely.

Christopher Read

Considers that Lenin's drive for seizing power was the most important factor in the decline of the Provisional Government in the lead to the October 25 coup.

Question 59

How valid is the view that Bolshevik foreign policy between 1917 and 1924 succeeded in its objectives?

Aim of the question To analyse the impact of Bolshevik foreign policy from the seizure of power to the death of Lenin in 1924. Initially foreign policy objectives were to secure the existence of the nascent soviet state and to promote the export of the October Revolution abroad. Responses might evaluate the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the National Minority question and the 1920 war with Poland. The Comintern too might be analysed in terms of its failures and successes. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that soviet foreign policy was successful in terms of the factors below:

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 1918 – success in foreign policy aims:

- this treaty was punitive for the newly-formed Bolshevik regime, but it did allow for the full demobilisation of the Army inherited from the Provisional Government, to secure the revolution in the heart of Russia – ‘Sovdepia’ – and to secure peace with the Central Powers at the expense of vast loss of land, people and resources
- this treaty was widely unpopular inside Russia – the Left SRs left sovnarkom and sought to begin the struggle against the Central Powers
- White movement now starts to gain support as the terms of the treaty are viewed as treason and selling Russia to her enemies
- Lenin had to use his personal authority to ensure the Central Committee voted to finally accept the German offer – there was no army left to effectively defend Russia if hostilities recommenced
- Trotsky refused to travel to sign the treaty – he was not going to sign his name to this onerous peace. It was left to Sokolnikov to sign on behalf of the Bolshevik government
- Bolshevik hoped for revolution in Berlin, Budapest and Vienna did not happen and the occupation of former Russian lands went ahead. This failed to materialise as the forces of counter-revolution successfully repressed attempts at insurrection
- Bolshevik regime did gain the necessary ‘breathing space’ to allow them to stay in power and then fight the Civil War. This was the reason Lenin wanted to sign the treaty as the regime needed to be free of Central Power’s military occupation of the Bolshevik areas of control.

National Minorities – success of foreign policy aims:

- National Minorities had seceded from the decaying Russian empire in late 1917 – Finland and Ukraine sought freedom and Baltic states were recognised as independent states after the German withdrawal post November 1918 – the British and the French backed the Baltic States militarily which defeated the Red Army and native Bolsheviks in seeking to incorporate them into the new state
- 1918 Finnish Civil War where Marshal Mannerheim an ex-Tsarist general, led the Finnish Whites to defeat the Finnish Reds who were supported and supplied from the Russian garrison and from Petrograd. Germany landed the 27th Finnish Jaegers who were crucial in supporting Mannerheim’s campaign in central and southern Finland
- by 1922 all the other former territories which had been part of the tsarist empire were now ruled from Moscow and were incorporated into the USSR
- Stalin helped the Red Army to invade and conquer his Georgian homeland which had been run by the Mensheviks. The Caucasus was now re-incorporated into the USSR by 1924.

1920 – war with Poland – failure of foreign policy aims:

- Lenin and Trotsky sought to export the revolution to Western Europe via a successful invasion of Poland in 1920. Polish army defeated the Bolsheviks on 15 August 1920 at the 'Miracle of the Vistula' where with French help the Red Army was routed and Poland was saved
- 1921 – Treaty of Riga – parts of western Ukraine and Belorussia were annexed to the victorious Poles
- Polish nationalism and the strong Catholic religion were too strong for class warfare propaganda of the invading Red Army
- Lvov for example was lost to 'bourgeois Poland' and would only be annexed again in 1939 with the Nazi-Soviet invasion of Poland.

1919 Comintern established in Moscow – failure of foreign policy aims:

- Bolshevik ideology was one of spreading revolution abroad to establish revolutionary government to liberate the working class from capitalism
- focus on promoting revolution in the colonies of the western powers eg Jihad among the Moslem subjects of the British Raj instead of class struggle led to the American John Reed severing ties with the Comintern
- efforts to support revolutions in Europe fail as the Hungarian revolution led by Bela Kun, the Munich Räterepublik as well as the Spartacist risings are defeated by 'bourgeois' forces. Russian equipment and financial support are wasted in these failed enterprises
- comintern policies and agendas are fully controlled by the Bolshevik party and seek to further Russian interests
- difficult to distinguish any difference from Comintern policies from those of the Russian Bolshevik government
- by 1924 there were no successful Communist revolutions abroad in Europe or North America.

Relations with capitalist nations from 1917-1924 – success and failure of foreign policy aims:

- initial hopes for the spread of revolution were dashed as the rest of Europe saw the failure of communists to seize power for any length of time
- European governments saw the Bolsheviks as a danger to their internal security and stability. Communist parties generally were oppressed, shunned by moderate socialist parties and subject to repression by regimes in Europe and North America
- Bolsheviks did encourage internal revolt in 'bourgeois' western nations. This hostile attitude led to the Bolsheviks not being given representation at the Versailles peace conference in 1919. Denied *de jure* recognition of Bolshevik regime by victorious Allies
- 1922-1924 sees a change in the Soviet attitude towards the Western powers. Civil War ended and Bolsheviks are victorious
- trade agreements are signed with Great Britain in 1921 and France 1924
- Soviet regime seeking to normalise relations with foreign states to allow for help in reconstruction and recovery following 6 years of war
- NEP allows for cooperation and trade with capitalist powers who are now given concessions inside Soviet Russia economy. German engineering companies set up concessions in Russia to help Red Army modernise
- Lenin announced that 'We have now entered a period in which we won our right to international existence in the network of capitalist powers' – not seeking to overthrow them but to live amongst them
- Chicherin as Foreign Commissar was important as he sought to normalise relations abroad to allow for recovery at home in the Soviet state
- Soviet Union recognised as the *de jure* government of Russia by Germany in 1922, Britain and France in 1924.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Ronald Suny	Argues 'Ideology swerved as a prism, a prism through which the world was viewed, and a rationalisation for actions taken by the Bolsheviks government.
Orlando Figes	Contends that the peace of Brest-Litovsk was the completion of the October Revolution . . . it was the culmination of October!.
Norman Davies	Takes the view that the soviet invasion of Poland was seen as a catalyst for the fermenting of revolution in Europe – 'To Berlin through Warsaw!'.
Robert Davies	Considers that Zinoviev as chair of the Comintern stated in the spring of 1920 that 'in a year the whole of Europe will be communist' – failed to achieve this goal.

Question 60

‘Lenin’s domestic policies had betrayed Bolshevik ideals by the time of his death in January 1924’.

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To consider the extent to which the domestic ideals of the October Revolution had been carried out successfully by the time of Lenin’s death. The initial Bolshevik political policies as outlined in Lenin’s April Theses were, ‘All power to the Soviets! And ‘. . . Bread and Land’. Responses might explore the various economic, social and political aspects of this question. The reality might also be considered that Bolshevik power was maintained by violence, oppression, propaganda and an appeal to class warfare to overcome opponents. By 1924 the Bolsheviks had betrayed some ideas but had fulfilled others to keep themselves. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view there was a betrayal of the ideals of the October Revolution by 1924:

Political freedoms given by the Provisional Government were abolished as the dictatorship was enforced:

- **‘Tsar Vlad’** – Power lay at the top of the Party and the leader of the party was leading the nation. Lenin was the undisputed leader
- **opposition parties** were made illegal – the Kadets, SRs and Mensheviks – persecuted and imprisoned. Opposition press closed down in October 1917
- **soviets** were losing control as the Sovnarkom and Party were now leading the regime as soviets were sidelined as organs of power
- **legal system** inherited from the pre-revolutionary regime was replaced by ‘revolutionary justice’ where class-based judges were presiding over trials. Those from bourgeois backgrounds were discriminated against by the new soviet judiciary
- **franchise** – Working class were now effectively disenfranchised as they were only allowed to vote for the Communist Party and their unions are effectively a branch of the Communist Party.

Civil liberties:

- **religion** – Attacks on religion especially the Orthodox Church led to the deaths of innocent parishioners, clergy and closing of monasteries, convents and parishes. Famine relief used to attack and smear the Orthodox Church in 1921
- Believers were attacked in the press and soviet institutions discriminated against those who believed in God
- **terror** was widely used against ‘class enemies’ – Cheka terror, labour camps and Red Terror during the Civil War led to the deaths of many thousands of people
- **Cheka** violence liberally used against Peasants – ‘Kulaks – and Workers who went on strike or demanded open elections where other socialist parties might freely stand for election. Class terror waged against members of the Proletariat and Peasantry
- 1921 Kronstadt rising shows alienation of the former supporters of the regime as they object to the oppression of Workers and Peasants by the regime – brutally crushed and leaders shot as Tuchachevsky leads 45,000 Red Army and Cheka units to crush the rebellious sailors.

Economy:

- War Communism in 1918-1921 saw the theft of Peasant grain and the oppression of the peasantry by the Cheka requisitioning squads sent into the village to secure food supplies for the city and the Red Army
- food rations in the War Communism years were deliberately designed to starve those from non-Proletarian backgrounds as they were given a third-class ration book which was below the minimum calorie intake to keep a person alive
- NEP introduction albeit borne of pragmatism of private sector.

Evidence which supports the view that there was not a betrayal of the ideals of the October Revolution by 1924:

Working conditions:

- Bolshevik policies such as 8-hour day for factory workers was one of their first decrees when they took power in October 1917. This had been abrogated in the Civil War years but by 1923 the 8-hour working day was the norm in soviet industry
- workers' control over industry had been sanctioned in November, 1917, factory committees and union representatives were given the right to oversee production and finance. This was scaled back in 1918 but by 1924 workers were still represented on the running of the factories by their trade unions.

Peasants:

- the peasantry were now in control over the land they worked as the landlord, nobles and the Church land had been expropriated in October, 1917 and this still remained in force when Lenin died in 1924.

Women:

- women were declared to be legally equal to Men in 1917 and by 1924 this was still in force. Women by 1924 were given the right to abortion and divorce as well as having their own section in the Communist Party to campaign on their rights
- women were given the right to initiate divorce and abortion in the 1918 Family Law code and were now legally equal with men in law
- the First Congress of the Communist International
- Aleksandra Kollontai activist in the newly-formed Women's Section of the Communist Party (the zhenskii otdel, or 'Zhenotdel' for short), in which she, Inessa Armand and Nadezhda Krupskaya played major roles in founding.

Class:

- all distinctions on class and former privileges had been abolished in November 1917 – the old aristocracy, capitalists were dead, fled or were living as discriminated 'former persons. Everyone was either called 'Comrade' or 'Citizen.'

National Minorities:

- 'Rights of the Peoples of Russia' decree in November, 1917, had given them the right to secede from the empire – Finland and the Baltic states were still free and independent nations
- Constituent Assembly elections did go ahead in November 1917 as promised by Lenin when he took power in October, 1917.

Education:

- mass literacy promoted by the new soviet regime as the Red Army men were given compulsory literacy lessons and working class children were given legal right to both free primary and secondary education
- the state sought to educate all members of the USSR and both boys and girls were given this right to equal education. Fees for Higher education were waived for the children of working class backgrounds.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Edward Acton	Contends that no Russian government has ever been more responsive to pressure from below or less able to impose its will upon society.
Richard Pipes	Considers that Lenin had only one agenda and that was a one-party dictatorship.
Mikhail Shishkin	Takes the view that the Bolsheviks were destructive demagogues seeking to rule over the masses.
Ronald Kowalski	Contends that the Bolsheviks lost any legitimacy they had in October 1917 and clung to power by dictatorial means by 1921. . . what we call Stalinism was already laid in its foundations by 1924.

Question 61

To what extent can it be argued that the Great Terror was caused by fear of internal enemies?

Aim of the question To demonstrate an awareness of the debate over the reasons for the Great Terror of the 1930s. The reasons for the Terror which tore through Soviet society has been argued as due factors such as Stalin's paranoia, the fear of Nazi/Japanese invasion or that the Purges spiralled out of control. The official view is that they were due to internal enemies who sought to return the Soviet Union to capitalism. Responses may address these different reasons and seek to display their research/understanding of this time demonstrating their viewpoint. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that fear of internal enemies was the main cause of the Great Terror:

- there were inside Soviet Russia numerous groups of people who had been actively engaged in action against the Bolshevik regime since its foundation in 1917. Those such as former White Guards, Greens and central Asian rebels were supplemented by those who had been expelled from the Communist Party, were described as 'Kulaks', religious believers who had been persecuted by the regime
- Stalin believed that the danger from the exiled Trotsky was real and that his supporters were still largely unmasked inside the Party, the government and Red Army
- Trotsky did form a bloc and he was in possession of relevant and current information that was being sent to him from inside the Soviet Union
- the NKVD commanded by Nikolai Yezhov especially made great play that they had uncovered plots from those inside the regime and Party members who were in league with foreign intelligence agencies
- Molotov in being interviewed in the 1980s still justified the Terror as being 'terrible' and 'necessary' due to the fact that when war had arrived in 1941 there were no internal enemies who undermined the regime – as compared to the Tsarist/Provisional Government which fell due to internal rebellions
- the Terror widened due to fears from ordinary people that there were wreckers and saboteurs who were operating inside the state. Show Trials gave credence to this as the defendants save from Bukharin confessed to working with and for foreign enemies
- Stalin was determined to remove anyone whom he thought might be capable of forming an alternative from of government to him if there was a war
- in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) the followers of Trotsky were prominent in the Spanish Left and Stalinist repression was implemented there – Red Army specialists, pilots, advisors were heavily repressed as it was feared they had been infected with contact with Trotskyites during their service in aiding the republicans
- Stalin was 'paranoid' that enemies were everywhere' and that these enemies threatened him, the rule of the Party and were seeking a return to capitalism
- Kulaks, speculators were eradicated from economy as they were 'class enemies' who were a danger to the victory of socialism in the 1930s as both Collectivisation and Industrialisation were pursued in the 'revolution from above'
- economic failure due to the nature of forced and rapid changes in the economy were blamed on those who were internal enemies – there was a need for scapegoats and wreckers
- 'Disloyal' national minorities such as the Finns, Koreans, Poles were heavily over-represented as the victim of the Terror as they were considered to be more open to subversion by enemies abroad or were actively working with foreign spy agencies
- Jewish citizens were as a proportion of the total population heavily persecuted – the latent antisemitism of the population was activated – Trotsky was Jewish and there was a suspicion of the Jewish people having divided loyalties especially if they had relatives who lived abroad
- Jewish people as a well-educated minority were over-represented in the administrative, Party leadership and so were purged in the Terror to make way for the more ethnically Russian, proletarian elites coming to rule in the late 1930s eg the Foreign Ministry was purged of Jews who were associated with Chicherin and Litvinov. Molotov spoke of 'clearing out the synagogue' when he took control of foreign affairs in May 1939.

Evidence which supports the view Stalin was the main source of the Terror:

- Stalin was a brutal figure who believed that violence was necessary to destroy enemies and potential enemies – ‘get rid of the man. . . get rid of the problem’. His fragile ego and inferiority complex meant he knew that the Old Bolsheviks would never accept his propaganda and that he was not the ‘hero of the revolution’
- Yagoda was replaced by Yezhov as head of the NKVD as he would increase the use of violence and oppression to root out enemies as Stalin was determined to destroy those in power who were ‘hidden enemies’
- Stalin believed that his actions of increasing the tempo of the terror in 1938 on institutions such as the Red Army were saving the Worker’s state from internal danger from spies and saboteurs
- leading members of the Party and government had to be removed from the potential of replacing Stalin – Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tomsy, Bukharin etc were too dangerous to be left alive as they were as in the past able to form factions to work against him
- 1932 – suicide of his second wife, Nadia – she killed herself as a protest against him and his policy of collectivisation of agriculture – ‘she went away as an enemy!’ He could not trust even those closest to him.

Evidence which supports the view that international events were driving the Terror:

- rise of Nazis in Germany – 1933 – Hitler’s anti-communist regime established and begins to re-arm as there is now the danger of war against the Soviet Union
- Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935 – western imperialist powers now co-operating with the Nazis to re-arm and increased threat of them all attacking the Soviet Union. Nothing done by Britain or France to stop Hitler in rearming or re-occupying the Rhineland in 1936
- 1936 – Spanish Civil War breaks out – Nazis and Fascist powers aid the Nationalist rebels. Soviet Russia arms the Republicans. Proxy war already waging in Europe
- 1937 – Militarist Japan invades China – threat to the eastern frontier and memories of Japanese occupation of the soviet far east only ended in 1922
- 1938 – border clashes between Red Army troops and Japanese/Manchurian forces at Lake Khasan battle. Defection of NKVD Major-General Lyushkov to Japanese with secrets, list of spies and soviet defences in June 1938
- danger of fascist encirclement of the Soviet Union – Japan, Italy and Nazi Germany sign the Anti-Comintern Pact to counter the spread of communist ideology in 1936
- Munich Agreement of 1938 demonstrates that the western powers are seeking an accommodation with Hitler and are excluding the Soviet Union from defence discussions to stop the spread of Nazi rule in Europe.

Historians

Perspective on the issue

Peter Kenez

Argues that these were murderous times and Stalinism was a murderous system of control.

J Arch Getty

Contends that the terror was unplanned – Stalin had no long-term plan to destroy his enemies -responding to the chaos of the soviet society traumatised by the policies of Collectivisation and Industrialisation.

Sheila Fitzpatrick

Considers the view that the people took an active participatory role in the terror of the 1930s – this was not imposed ‘top down.’

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Takes the view that that the Terror was ‘generalised, random and irrational.’

Section 8 – Russia: from Tsarism to Stalinism, 1914-1945

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 62 Evaluate the usefulness of Source A as evidence of the reasons for the outcome of the Russian Civil War.

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source A		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Leon Trotsky.	Commissar for War appointed after signing of Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, responsible for constructing (with Lenin) and delivering policy. His role was pivotal in securing a strong Red Army which he built the basis of strict discipline to achieve victory – a traditional, mass army was built to defeat the Whites and foreign invaders.
Purpose	Fifth Congress of Soviets.	Trotsky outlining the rationale for the new policies towards the military to party members and defending the use of 'class enemies' in leadership roles in the Red Army.
Timing	10 July 1918.	The Left SRs revolt had been repressed on July 6-8 in Petrograd. They wanted a 'partisan' army along revolutionary lines to fight the Germans and end the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
In order to create a centralised, trained and equipped army we need to make use of the experience and knowledge of many 'Military Specialists' from among the officers of the former army who must be registered and obliged to take up posts assigned to them by the soviet power.	Takes the view that a disciplined army is needed who will have former tsarist army officers employed as 'Military Specialists'. Emphasised by 'must be registered and obliged to take up posts assigned to them by the soviet power.'
Only dedicated revolutionaries, staunch champions of the cause of the proletariat, must be appointed to the posts of Military Commissars to whom the fate of the army and fleet is entrusted, as they work to ensure loyalty and co-operation of former bourgeois officers.	Takes the view that there must be Military Commissars to ensure the loyalty of the former tsarist army officers and these men must be dedicated communists. Emphasised by 'dedicated revolutionaries.'

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
With a view to beginning compulsory military training and service, the Council of Peoples Commissars has set up military administration at local and regional levels, where peasants and workers will be conscripted into service for the Red Army and Fleet.	Takes the view that there will be conscription of peasant and workers into the military which will be organised throughout the areas controlled by the Reds during the Civil War. Emphasised by 'compulsory military training and service.'

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- former Imperial Army officers were to be forced into service with the Red Army 54,000 served in the Civil War Red Army. They were mostly loyal to the Bolshevik regime. A second Contextual Development point might be – General Staff officers such as Kamenev and frontline generals such as Alexi Brusilov joined the Red Army
- the role of the Military Commissar ensured that the military did not become a breeding ground for counter revolution. A second Contextual Development point might be – The Military Commissar participated in all the activities of the military commanders, receiving reports, dispatches and countersigning orders
- compulsory military service was introduced in March 1918, to conscript mostly peasants into the Red Army. A second Contextual Point might be that the army rose to 5 million in 1920 which made it a formidable force by comparison to the Whites 250,000.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- geography: the Red heartland of 'Sovpedita' contained the main industrial and population centres of Russia, which gave access to munitions and most of the railway network, along with a supply of army recruits and conscripts
- military: the White armies were scattered geographically, lacking effective communication and coordination in attacking the Reds. This allowed the Reds to pick off the White armies separately
- leadership: the Whites did not possess a Lenin or Trotsky figure to unify their cause
- foreign intervention: This was limited, but allowed the Reds to present themselves as defending the revolution and portray the Whites as agents of foreign imperialism.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Laura Engelstein	Suggests that the Reds won the civil war because they had the largest army and could supply it with enough equipment and arms to win.
Orlando Figes	Contends that the Whites were too few to ever hope to defeat the Reds who had the popular claim they were supporting the gains made by the October revolution.
Richard Pipes	Argues that the Whites were able to fight on for so long as they were motivated to defeat the Bolsheviks who had carried out a coup in 1917.
Robert Service	Contends that the outcome of the Civil War was due to Trotsky's excellent leadership of the Red Army – a conventional, hierarchical force that was built from nothing.

Question 63 **How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for Stalin's victory in the leadership struggle?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
Lenin placed Stalin in charge of the Secretariat of the party in 1922 and Stalin's consequent impact on the party machine was immediate – in the spring and summer of 1922 he brought energetic people from the provinces to Moscow and obliged local party organisations to send bi-monthly reports in the form of two-page letters – thereby tightening central control over provincial party organisations.	Suggests that Stalin was given increased administrative power by Lenin when he was made General Secretary of the Party in 1922. He was able to bring in effective personnel to the capital and was gaining control over the provincial party organisations due to his new role.
After Politburo or Central Committee meetings, Stalin was able to decide, no matter what was decided there, because he went back to his office and chose which decisions to implement or not, and he had this crucial power before Lenin died, which would develop even further in the later 1920s.	Suggests that Stalin has the ability to decide what policies to implement or ignore after Politburo and Central Committee meetings. He was deciding the policies of the soviet government himself. This was a source of great power even before Lenin died.
Stalin also began to co-opt members of the military into his orbit of power through the appointment of Voroshilov to replace Frunze as Commissar of War in 1925.	Suggests that the Red Army was also placed under Stalin's control due to his ally Voroshilov being appointed Commissar of War. The Red Army was now under Stalinist leadership after the death of Mikhail Frunze.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- by being appointed to the post of General Secretary by Lenin in 1922 Stalin gained enormous administrative power as he could now influence and control the provincial party leadership and Appoint those who were loyal to him. This would give him majorities in Party Congresses in the 1920s when the leadership struggle was raging
- Stalin could decide on his own what policies were to be implemented before Lenin died as he was ill and incapacitated by strokes
- the military which had been Trotsky's source of power was by the late 1920s under Stalin's control via the leadership of the incompetent Voroshilov who had served with Stalin at Tsaritsyn in 1918 in the Civil War and was a close ally from then on.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
His first weapon was to appropriate the legacy of the dead Lenin, when he gave a series of lectures on Lenin's contribution to Marxist theory at the Sverdlov University in Moscow, which were subsequently published as 'Foundations of Leninism' and gave shape to Lenin's thought, thereby showing Stalin as the one party leader who claimed to understand it fully.	Suggests that Stalin was able to portray himself as the only one of the leadership rivals who was fit to succeed Lenin as he knew his ideas the best. He was trying to be the logical heir to Lenin who would lead the party and country into the future.
Stalin made the attack on factions a central plank in securing his dominance in the party.	Suggests that Stalin was labelling those who opposed him as a 'faction' and who were attacked in his speeches and articles as a 'faction' which implies they are destroying unity in the party. He was then portrayed as the unifier of the party.
Above all, Stalin identified with the party rank-and-file members, which meant that Stalin had the advantage of a genuinely working-class background, as he could appeal to them as one of their own.	Suggests that Stalin was from a genuinely working-class family and this gave him a link with the lower-ranking party members.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the Source C:

- Stalin sought to be portrayed as the 'Lenin for today' as he took the leading role as pall-bearer and gave the main speech at Lenin's funeral
- those whose authority he undermined in the 1920s were charged with 'factionalism' as Stalin introduced his articles and speeches to isolate rivals. A second Contextual development point might be that party unity was paramount for Stalin's attack on both the Left and the Right in the power struggle from 1924-1929 Opponents were described as 'splitters' seeking to undermine the unity of the party and destroy the soviet regime
- Stalin's background was from a Georgian working-class family. A second Contextual Development point might be that he did not come from a bourgeois, intellectual background such as Lenin and Trotsky came from and could make a connection with the ordinary party members.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the sources:

- Stalin's institutional powers as General Secretary from 1922 crucial for control over the Politburo meetings, agendas and minutes made of decisions. 'Comrade card index' had amassed huge administrative power
- Commissar for Nationalities gave him contact with different national groups in the new state. High status as member of Lenin's government
- control of party membership – supervised 'Lenin Enrolment' of 1924-1925 which saw mainly less-educated working-class persons enrolled into the ranks of the Party. These people were more likely to support Stalin and his policies. 500,000 new members added to the Party
- 5500 Nomenklatura posts depended on Stalin's patrimony – those appointed owed their positions directly to Stalin and reciprocated loyalty
- Orgburo and Secretariat positions gave Stalin control over appointment of key positions within the Communist Party as regional and provincial party secretaries were appointed directly by Stalin
- key appointments from Ukraine for example were able to dominate their own regions and decided who would attend the yearly Party Congress in Moscow. These loyalists for Stalin would ensure victories in Congress votes from 1925 onwards
- Stalin ensured loyalists such as Molotov, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov were elected to the Central Committee and that policies were decided that Stalin wanted. These men were loyal Stalinists who never deviated from his plans in the 1920s and later in the 1930s.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
E H Carr	Contends that Stalin's victory was one of 'triumph not of reason but organisation.'
Stephen Kotkin	Considers that by 1924 Stalin was already the victor in the leadership struggle as his institutional power within the Party made him unassailable.
Isaac Deutscher	Argues that Trotsky was unable to recognise that Stalin was a major opponent in the struggle to succeed Lenin — 'that shabby, inarticulate man'.
Robert Conquest	Contends that Stalin was a supremely skilled politician who out-manoeuvred his opponents.

Question 64 **How fully does Source D explain the impact of the Cultural Revolution in Soviet society in the 1930s?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
Following articles that began to appear in soviet newspapers written by medical authorities explaining the harm which abortion, especially repeated abortions, inflicted upon the woman, the law of 27 June 1936 formally abolished freedom of abortion.	States that abortion was outlawed by a new law which ended the right that women had to end their pregnancy.
Children had to recognise the authority of their parents once more. Beginning in the spring of 1935 the Komsomol newspaper stated, ‘Young people should respect their parents; one must respect and love his parents even if they are old-fashioned and do not like the Komsomol.’	States that the traditional family was now given more status by the state as the Komsomol newspaper was instructing their young readers to obey their older relatives. Parental status was promoted officially.
Divorce became more difficult to obtain because, according to the law of September 1935, the fees for divorce were increased from 3 roubles, and now the first divorce was 50 roubles, the second divorce was 150 roubles and the third was 300 roubles.	States that divorce was made much more expensive by the new law which made the parties pay hugely increased fees for divorce and subsequent divorces became more expensive.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- women with large families were awarded higher maintenance payments as the state now sought to increase in population. A second Contextual Point might be that sexual mores became very traditional, looking backwards to tsarist times when relations between the sexes were more formal and purity was emphasised
- children read, and learned by heart, standard texts about Stalin’s superhuman courage and wisdom. A second Contextual Point might be that ‘Thanking’ ceremonies took place in schools and nursery schools on important occasions and ‘Thank You Comrade Stalin for a Happy and Joyful Childhood!’ was the slogan which was embedded in young minds, placing state above family. Therefore, in direct contradiction to the 1920s, the Soviet government sought to promote radical change in the child-parent relationship
- easy and cheap divorce meant that during the mid-1920s Russia had the largest divorce rate in Europe, but this law caused a decline in divorce, so that by 1934 divorces declined to 37 divorces for every 100 marriages. A second Contextual Point might be birth rate increased although marriage rates declined which might be linked to the fact that divorcing couples were now forced to attend court and men were forced to pay a maintenance allowance and if they did not pay might face imprisonment of up to 2 years.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the 1936 Family Law Code provisions did appear to signal a more conservative approach to marriage, the role of the family and the rights of women in the Soviet Union
- abortion had been legalised in the 1920 Family Law, and this was the first nation on earth to legalise the procedure. The new law in 1936 ended this right in search of increased birth rate to supply future workers and soldiers
- the role of the traditional family was recognised in law as the basis for soviet society. Experimental 'free love' associated with Alexandra Kollontai and feminist intellectuals in the 1920s was now abandoned
- by the mid-1930s there had been a widespread retreat on equality of wages in the economy with large increases for trained engineers, technicians and skilled workers
- elites had access to cars, dachas, servants, nannies for their children and extra food, clothing. A very distinct social/economic hierarchy developed as the Stalinist system became established. Trotsky criticised this from exile as the elites sought to protect their position of privilege and comfort and gave Stalin their loyalty
- women working 8-hour day in factories were also working 5 hours per day on domestic chores. Russian male chauvinism not challenged by propaganda, education or in the Komsomol
- cultural reaction – Art, literature and music became more traditional as *avantgarde* forms were banned/criticised under the imposition of 'socialist realism'. Stalinist Writers union and RAPP promoted accessible works that workers can understand. Russian classical music, dance and literature given prominence in the mid-1930s.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Evan Mawdsley	Argues that there was no retreat from socialism in the 1930s as the state was still seeking to build a socialist society.
Beryl Williams	Contends that traditional gender roles were maintained as 'it was a macho world. . . men-built socialism.'
Sheila Fitzpatrick	Takes the view that the new message in the mid-1930s was that the family came first.
Sarah Davies	Argues that Women were likely to be lower paid and to be illiterate compared to men.

Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923-1945

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 65 To what extent did the *dictadura* of Miguel Primo de Rivera address the economic problems of Spain in the 1920s?

Aim of the question To examine the extent to which the economic problems facing Spain in the 1920s were addressed under the leadership of Primo de Rivera during the *dictadura*. Responses might consider the initial economic progress, the cooperation of many in the regime at the start and the infrastructure improvements brought about by state funded projects. Responses may also look at the social conservatism and suppression of regional identities. Further they might consider the lack of progress in the agrarian sector, the insensitivity towards Catalan industrialists and culture and the repression of some trade unions and industrial action. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the social and economic problems of Spain in the 1920s were addressed by Primo:

- the *dictadura* started well for Primo. The economies of Europe were finally reviving after WWI and trade increased. Coupled with good harvests, many felt that there was a chance of economic progress and modernisation
- Primo began a number of infrastructure projects which in time would greatly aid the country. The expanded Barcelona metro, under construction for a long time, opened, and other public work schemes boosted employment
- among these, dams were built to provide better water supplies for towns and irrigation for agriculture
- these were largely financed by loans negotiated by Primo's Minister of Finance, Jose Sotelo. There were fewer strikes and less unrest, initially. Primo struck a deal with the UGT to be on joint boards for each industry along with the employers and arbitrated by Primo's appointees. In the first couple of years the country was relatively prosperous and seemed to be slowly modernising – economically at least
- between 1923 and 1930 industrial production increased threefold
- economic nationalism meant protectionist policies. This was welcomed by many of the country's producers worried by cheaper imports from abroad
- Primo enjoyed some popularity for ending the war in Morocco, which had caused much strife in working class areas because of the deaths of conscripts
- Primo collaborated successfully with the UGT and suppressed the CNT. Primo wanted cooperation to replace industrial strife and established employer and worker representation on tri-partite boards with government. Initially Largo Caballero went along with this
- by 1929 the peseta began to fall in value, but the economy was not the reason for his resignation.

Evidence which supports the view that the social and economic problems of Spain in the 1920s were not addressed by Primo:

- complicated bureaucracy in industry was disliked by the capitalists after 1926
- there was a growing anti clerical movement in Spain which existed among both the middle class who wanted social and political reform and who viewed the Church as a barrier to this; and the working class who resented the oppressive role the Church played in conjunction with the State authorities. Primo did not successfully challenge the power of the Church within society, despite its decline in terms of attendance, especially among the poor and educated middle class
- there was widespread hatred of Primo's centralisation, particularly in Catalonia. This cut across social classes as his restrictions were seen as an attack on Catalan language and culture
- there was similar resentment in the Basque country, which had traditionally enjoyed some degree of autonomy

- there was unrest at the continued lack of democracy, as Primo swept aside even the sham of democratic choice which had existed before and replaced it with authoritarian rule
- the deficit doubled between 1925 and 1929 and there was a flight of capital. By 1931, the peseta had lost half of its value
- aristocrats who owned the latifundia were highly reactionary and the agrarian oligarchy still dominated the Spanish ruling class
- the nature of the Spanish agricultural system meant the land was unproductive. The problem, at its simplest, was Spain's inability to feed and nurture its population due to an inefficient, unfairly maintained rural economy. Primo's modest attempts at agrarian reform were resisted and dropped
- Spain did not have a large industry except for Bilbao which had iron works and Barcelona textiles
- Basques and Catalans paying a high proportion of Spain's tax but had little say in a government dominated by the agrarian oligarchy. Primo's centralism made this worse
- most of the peasant class lived an existence which was below subsistence due to under employment. Most were day labourers, hired when there was work to be done but with no obligation on the part of the landowners to relieve their poverty when there was no work. Primo failed to address this
- the lack of industrialisation elsewhere in Spain meant there had not been the same rural to urban migration that had occurred in many other countries. Many historians have pointed to this as the greatest block to progress in Spain. The push and pull effects of an overpopulated countryside and a need for workers in factories which had fed industrialisation elsewhere was lacking in Spain
- the landed aristocracy were part of the Spanish establishment and their power in the countryside was supported by the forces of the State, including the Guardia Civil
- the growing resentment at their plight led to many rural workers joining the agrarian arms of the trade unions which had blossomed in the urban areas, although some of these were repressed by Primo de Rivera which often led to more countryside unrest
- the dictadura meant an entrenching of the centralist nature of Spain, which led to regional pressures being suppressed and along with those for other social progress.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Contents that Primo took a spiteful pleasure in attacking Catalan nationalism by suppressing language and culture, which alienated Catalan industrialists.
Gerald Brenan	Suggests unlike England and France there was no upward movement from one class to another. This led to the corruption of all the upper layers of society.
Paul Preston	Argues that 'Repression had intensified the hatred of the braceros for the big landowners and their estate managers.'
Martin Blinkhorn	Considers that Carlists initially cooperated wholeheartedly with Primo's regime. . . were soon disillusioned.

Question 66

To what extent was the collaboration shown in the Pact of San Sebastián the main reason for the downfall of the monarchy in 1931?

Aim of the question To allow an assessment of the reasons for the downfall of the monarchy in Spain in 1931. The Pact of San Sebastián in 1930 was a collaboration of disparate groups and individuals with the common purpose of deposing the monarchy and establishing a republic in Spain. Other factors can be considered as contributing however, including Alfonso's personal shortcomings, the political crisis caused by the ending of the dictadura and the dictablanda, the lack of support from the army and the municipal elections which were the spark for departure. Other longer-term grievances may also be considered. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the collaboration shown in the Pact of San Sebastián was the main reason for the downfall of the monarchy in 1931:

- the Pact of San Sebastián was a triumph of political cooperation which brought together a wide range of political opinion with the common goal of getting rid of the monarchy and creating a Republic. This was achieved in 1931
- the municipal elections which ushered in the new regime showed that the aims of the Pact were supported by the people, particularly in the urban areas where the election was fairer
- the Pact of San Sebastián in 1930 coalesced the Republican forces into a coherent force. Now all of those who wanted reform of virtually any type in Spain were united and the Monarchy was left increasingly on the other side
- one of the great strengths of the Pact of San Sebastián was the diversity of its membership. There were politicians of virtually all shades from conservatives to socialists, army officers and others who helped to galvanise what had previously only been an idea
- the Pact of San Sebastián formed a revolutionary committee who were effectively a republican government in waiting. When the moment was right, they were able to assume control of the country in a remarkably peaceful transition.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were the main reason for the fall of the monarchy in 1931:

- one of the few outlets was the support for Republican candidates in the municipal elections of 1931 and the result was a victory for Republicans which Alfonso could not withstand
- the army was a massively powerful force in Spain and could put down any rebellion, as happened in the failed coup of December 1930, but they failed to provide support to Alfonso in the end which meant he could not continue. The Monarchy could not continue because the Army had decided that it should not. This showed that yet again it was the Army who was effectively deciding the course of events in Spanish politics
- Alfonso was 'His Most Catholic Majesty' and had become linked to an increasingly anti-liberal institution, now dominated more than ever by the large landowners. Those who were anticlerical were therefore anti-Monarchy
- the Monarchy had failed to act on fundamental problems in Spanish society, including agrarian reform, regional tension and the power of the church. Alfonso appeared increasingly aloof. Alfonso was viewed as someone completely out of touch with the Spanish people. Almost anyone who wanted reform in any sphere of Spanish life, increasingly saw Alfonso as an obstacle due to his detachment
- the actions of Alfonso in his private life meant that he was perceived as being incompetent and unworthy as a leader and out of touch with his people. His adulterous, playboy lifestyle showed both his own hypocrisy and that of his position as Spain's most Catholic Majesty
- decline of the church and loss of faith in the clergy amongst many of the poor. The church had been declining in active membership for a number of years, with priests sometimes saying Mass to no congregation. The secularisation of Spanish society went hand-in-hand with the growth of republicanism and Alfonso's downfall was therefore as much a result of the tide of events as anything else.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Considers 'Alfonso treated the ruling of Spain as little more than a fascinating hobby. The Spanish Church was said to have owned up to one-third of the total wealth of Spain. (The Latifundias') subjects were treated almost as a subject race.'
Raymond Carr	Explains 'the Republicans rejected monarchy as an illegitimate and outmoded form of government; the Carlists rejected the Alfonsine branch . . . The Socialists considered (it) reactionary . . . The anarchists rejected it. To the regionalists it . . . strangled local interests . . . the radical regenerationists believed (in) root and branch reform . . . (it was) the personal unpopularity of the king himself (which brought down the monarchy). The conservative classes, during 1930, lost confidence in the monarchy.'
Paul Preston	Suggests 'loss of Imperial power coincided with emergence of left wing movements. (The monarchy) had fallen into disrepute by the time Primo seized power.'
Gerald Brennan	Argues that 'the ease with which the dictator had been brought down encouraged the middle classes . . . to think that Alfonso could be got rid of too. Since 1788 not a single Spanish sovereign had had a natural reign. The Army had become increasingly sensitive to any criticisms. . . '

Question 67

How important was the backing of Germany and Italy in Franco's rise to power among the Nationalists?

Aim of the question To examine the reasons for Franco's rise to power among the Nationalists and in particular the importance of the backing provided by Germany and Italy to that. In the early stages of the Civil War, the support of Germany and Italy was vital, not only to the Nationalists hopes of avoiding defeat for their coup and establishing a peninsula conflict, but also to Franco's own ambitions to seize the opportunity left by the leadership vacuum at the head of the Nationalist movement. Responses may also consider there were other reasons for his rise to power, including his own military and political cleverness in manipulating people and situations, the timely (for Franco) death of so many of his rivals for leadership of the Right and his military tactics. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates may refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the backing of Germany and Italy were important in Franco's rise to power among the Nationalists:

- from the outset, the Germans in particular refused to deal with anyone except Franco, giving him prominence at home and abroad. This gave Franco an unassailable position in negotiations with other Generals over tactics and command. The Condor legion was directly responsible to Franco. Having strategic leadership over foreign troops meant that Franco could effectively lead the direction of the war. He could deploy troops to suit his strategy, making him the leading General. This was crucial in his quest to be the leader of the Nationalists, firstly as the Generalissimo and then as Caudillo
- Germany had a unified central command; the political head was also the effective head of the armed forces: it seemed logical that once Franco had assumed military leadership, thanks to his allies, he would also become the political head of the Right. Ideologically the Right in Spain were predisposed to having one leader. These mitigated towards Franco assuming control of the Nationalists as both a military force and a political one
- the international dimension was crucial during the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, especially in shaping the view that others took of the events. Franco emerged as the de facto leader in the court of international public opinion due to his links with Germany and Italy before he actually took complete control. This was important for Franco, giving him the international credibility and recognition that he craved and needed if he was to assume control of the Nationalists
- Italy and Germany had shown reluctance to be involved directly in the Spanish conflict initially; it was only through Franco and his emissaries that they came on board. This raised him up in the eyes of the other conspirators. Mola had tried and failed to gain support from the two powers. Franco's approach to the leaders meant that his overtures were not lost in a sea of bureaucracy as Mola's were
- even though he considered Mola a better general, Hitler still only dealt with Franco. This meant that Franco could usurp Mola as leader of the coup long before the latter's death.

Evidence which supports the view that other factors were important in Franco's rise to power among the Nationalists:

Good fortune:

- Sanjurjo's death at the beginning of the War, when he was due to fly to Spain to take over the Nationalist uprising no doubt paved the way for another leader to emerge. Mola's death was similarly well timed for Franco. The fate of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, first imprisoned and then killed also suited Franco as it meant another contender for leadership was eliminated
- during Jose Antonio's absence, Franco kept the Falange leaderless and with the death of Sanjurjo and the defeat of Gil-Robles' tactics, there was a political vacuum on the Right which could realistically only be filled by a General during the conflict
- Franco cleverly manipulated the remaining Falangist would-be successors to Primo, using and then imprisoning Hedilla. Hedilla had thought that he would be the de facto head of the Government with Franco a symbolic head of state. Franco used him to eliminate his rivals before arresting him for doing this. Hedilla's miscalculations played into Franco's hands
- Mola was more concerned with the successful conclusion of the war than with personal aggrandisement. He wanted to establish a Directory which would eventually oversee fresh elections. However, Mola was considering establishing himself as the political leader (with Franco the military one) shortly before his death. Mola being killed in a plane crash in 1937 was another piece of good fortune for Franco the lack of an effective rival was an extreme piece of good fortune for Franco.

Franco's military leadership:

- Franco was beloved by the Army of Africa due to his previous service with them. He led them during the coup and brought them to the Peninsula. The reputation they enjoyed for both brilliance and brutality gave Franco's views more weight and he could begin to gain the upper hand in negotiations with other Generals
- he had risen through the ranks on merit. He had become the youngest General thanks to his bravery and leadership skills in North Africa
- Franco was meticulous, although some criticised him for this, it meant that he always secured the areas he had taken thoroughly. He was in undisputed control of his zone which helped him when looking to lead although he was criticised for making a detour to relieve the Alcazar at Toledo, it was a terrific propaganda coup which gained Franco both international recognition and made him even more popular with his troops and others on the Nationalist side Franco was the only one through whom Hitler and Mussolini wanted to channel their aid. This gave Franco a prestige and made him the natural leader of the Nationalists. Franco was chosen because of his leadership of the Army of Africa.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Argues that 'Within a month of the rising, Franco had received 48 Italian and 41 German aircraft. These were supplied exclusively to Franco.'
Julian Casanova	Asserts that 'Franco, with Sanjurjo dead, used his privileged position as commander of the Morocco garrison to prepare the ground for (becoming). a Generalissimo'.
Paul Preston	Considers that 'Italian and German assistance would be channelled exclusively to Franco' 'With his major political rivals all dead, Franco was free to control. . . the political direction of the Nationalists'.
Raymond Carr	Argues that 'Franco's claims (to be leader) were outstanding. . . he was in charge of the best Nationalist army'.

Question 68

To what extent did divisions within the Republican side hinder their war effort?

Aim of the question To examine the extent to which the divisions within the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War were detrimental to their efforts to wage war. In doing so, responses might consider the fragmented nature of the Republican side and the often competing aims of those fighting against the Nationalists. Responses may also consider the influence of the Communist Party and the need for the Soviet Union to portray Spain in a certain way along with the exporting of the paranoia and purges from the Soviet Union to Spain. Further it might consider the war or revolution debate and the extent to which it polarised the Republicans and hampered their effectiveness. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the divisions within the Republican side did hinder their war effort:

- the initial reluctance of Quiroga to arm the working class at the outbreak of the coup showed a fundamental distrust among different parts of the Republican government. The centre-left liberals were opposed to anything that might mean that the workers took control. This clash with the leadership of the PSOE and the UGT meant that a chance to stop the Generals uprising at the very beginning was lost
- under Caballero government, there was an acknowledgement that in the war or revolution debate, the war must come first. This meant that the revolutionary fervour of the anarchists and POUM, among others, which followed their counter insurgency, would be lost. Those who had been fighting in defence of their revolution now had one less thing to fight for
- the intervention of the Soviet Union led to an increase in importance for the PCE within the Republican side. This led to a change in the command structure of the army and the submersion of the militias into a new Republican army. This was at the expense of the Durruti column and other militia who had helped prevent the victory of the coup
- the May Days of 1937 in Barcelona meant that troops were diverted from the front lines to intervene in the open fighting between the anarchists/POUM and the Republican government. This was detrimental to the war effort at this time
- the subsequent persecution of the anarchists and especially the POUM led to the imprisonment of many would otherwise be fighting for the Republic.

Evidence which supports the divisions in the Republican side were not responsible for hindering the war effort:

- the professionalisation of the Republican army, which took place in the winter of 1936/37, was a necessary step. It could be argued that the existence of the militias may have been good for morale but less good for fighting a modern war against professional soldiers
- virtually all of the Republican government were in favour of the formation of a new Republican army. While the anarchist (and other) militia were opposed to it, the government were united in the need to organise the army in order to preserve the Republic. Anarchists were in the government from November 1936 to May 1937 and supported the formation of the new army
- without the intervention of the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1936, Madrid would probably have fallen to the Nationalists and the International Brigades would not have been organised as they were. Soviet planes and tanks were vital to the Republican war effort and any debate on the divisions must take this into account
- the events of the May Days were short lived, and the anarchists ended them because they did not want to take men away from fighting at the front. While the repression which followed, especially of the POUM, was detrimental, they were relatively small in number
- the Republican war effort was hindered by other factors much more than it was by internal division

- the intervention of Germany and Italy was crucial to the Nationalist victory and makes any argument about division among Republicans hindering the war effort moot. No matter how united they could not have defeated them
- the duplicity of Britain and to a lesser extent France also had a more detrimental effect, depriving the Republican side of the means to purchase arms, therefore not only greatly hindering their war effort but pushing the government more towards the Soviet Union as their only source of assistance. The consequences of this could be said to be caused by the actions of the Western democracies
- it can be argued that the Nationalists were equally divided, between the Falange and the Carlists, among others. Franco put down all internal opposition ruthlessly. The only reason the Republican divisions are highlighted is because they lost, not because they were worse.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Harry Browne	Suggests that 'The May Days led directly to central government control over Catalonia and to the fall of the Largo Caballero regime.'
Raymond Carr	Believes the mass reaction which helped to defeat the Generals' rising weakened, if it did not destroy, the conventional structures of command in the Republican zone.
Julián Casanova	Contends that 'The setting up of a regular army, controlling the home front and the reconstruction of the State were tackled in the midst of bitter disputes and political tensions between the factions in the government coalition.'
Paul Preston	Argues that 'Communist efforts against the revolutionists had let their own control in the war effort slip. Their efforts led to a second civil war within the Civil War.'

Question 69**‘Franco was still at war in Spain between 1939 and 1945’****How valid is this view?**

Aim of the question To assess the validity of the statement that Franco was still at war within Spain after the Nationalists’ victory in the Spanish Civil War. Responses might consider the evidence of oppression which was present in the aftermath and years ahead. This might include the killings, hard labour, imprisonment, child abduction and persecution which was present in Spain under Franco. Responses might also want to consider that although times were hard, most people suffered and this was in large part due to the aftermath of the Civil War and the start of the Second World War. Although Franco’s economic policies contributed to this, it was not his intentions. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Franco was still at war within Spain after the victory of the Nationalists:

- during the first three post-Civil War years, the regular Spanish (Francoist) army, including the Foreign Legion and artillery units fought against groups of resistance fighters loyal to the old Republic in many parts of Spain
- Spanish Maquis, fighting in France with the resistance targeted Francoists as well as Nazis. In 1944 a group of around 6000 of them invaded Spain from France
- after 1944 the resistance in Spain was reinforced by those Spaniards who were fighting with the French resistance. The guerrilla war carried out by them lasted until 1952
- there were tens of thousands of killings committed by the regime after the end of the war. The true figures are difficult to determine as records were deliberately destroyed in the 1960s and 1970s
- the killings were carried out by both pseudo-judicial means and by armed groups
- there were mass imprisonments often in concentration camps, which led to more deaths. There was forced labour for prisoners which continued for many years
- even top Nazis visiting Spain during 1940 were appalled by the brutality with which Franco treated his own people
- the Francoist regime wanted to eliminate the opposition, including anyone pro-republican or pro-democracy. Franco stated that they were vermin to be exterminated
- the Church gave a legitimacy to Franco’s reign, including the persecution. The Church was openly complicit in the removal of children from suspected republican families and the imprisonment, torture and execution of others.

Evidence which supports the view that Franco was not still at war within Spain after the victory of the Nationalists:

- for many in Spain, although life was difficult, there was no armed conflict going on. War as they had known it for almost three years, was over. Most people wanted to live in peace
- schools and most of civic life returned to ‘normal’ albeit a regression from the social gains of the 1930s. There was a gradual increase in economic activity
- there was little armed opposition to the regime. Most of the guerrilla conflict was sporadic and uncoordinated. This was not so much a war as an anti-terrorist campaign, which was successful
- even as World War II raged on around them, Spain maintained superficial neutrality which meant that the vast majority of the population lived in peace. As the fortunes of the Franco’s erstwhile allies waned, Franco was able to solidify his regime against the possible threat from US and British intervention. This demonstrates a more unified country emerging in the 1940s
- the Spanish Government was not denounced by the Allies, which gave Franco a legitimacy at home. Although Franco backed Hitler in the early stages, he never entered the war and the country was too weak to fight. Franco’s domestic position was therefore relatively secure and he went about building his idea of Spain. At no point was there a credible threat from outside and without foreign aid there was no real hope of his overthrow. Therefore, Franco had no need to be at war within Spain, only vigilant and cunning in his foreign policy strategy

- regardless of which side had won the Civil War there would have been reprisals and blame apportioned to the other side. The behaviour of Franco and his regime may be despicable but were on a par with other dictators. This was the nature of the regime, not signs of a war
- when the Maquis invaded in 1944, they were easily repelled, and they failed to gain popular support for any uprising against Franco or re-ignition of the Civil War. The Spanish people were tired of war and its hardships regardless of what they thought of Franco.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Believes that the post war years would have been desperate, whatever government was in power. Franco expected the priesthood to act as another arm of the state.
Raymond Carr	Takes the view that from 1939 until Franco's death, Spain was governed as if it were a country occupied by a victorious foreign army. Franco's aim was 'to destroy the 19 th century', that is, parliamentary liberalism.
Shelagh Ellwood	Suggests that plurality and diversity were replaced in every sphere . . . acts of individual cruelty, however brutal, were easily surpassed by the collective cruelty of the Dictatorship.
Paul Preston	Contends that every effort was made to maintain the division between the victors and the vanquished.

Section 9 – The Spanish Civil War: causes, conflict and consequences, 1923-1945

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 70 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the effectiveness of Azaña's reforms between 1931-1933?

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to information given</i>
Nearly half of the generals and 40% of the officers accepted his offer of retirement on full pensions.	Suggests that the army reforms cut the number of officers but did not fully address the problem.
Nevertheless, the army remained lopsided.	Suggests that the problem of too many officers was not cured by the reforms.
Azaña's 'Black Cabinet' of military advisers fell into the error of politicising promotions and thus disrupted 'the harmony of the military family.'	Suggests that changing the criteria for promotions disturbed army traditions.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the army had too many officers for its size, however many good officers took early retirement under this scheme, and it created a group who were hostile to the Republic with time on their hands
- Azaña clearly disliked the army, creating friction. He said, 'No one now speaks for the army, nor does the army speak for itself'
- there was an attempt to 'Republicanize' the army, ending traditional promotion routes and investigating promotions granted. This upset many of the officers.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to information given</i>
The compromise, which emerged as the Catalan Statute, bitterly offended those who saw it as 'the dismemberment of the country.'	Suggests that the granting of the Statute was opposed by those who wanted a centralist Spain.
The Statute gave Catalans their own parliament and granted equality to Castilian and Catalan as 'national' languages.	Suggests that the Statute allowed Catalan language and traditions to flourish.
perhaps the most important was local control of public order.	Suggests that the ability to police demonstrations etc themselves was big change for Catalonia.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the Catalan nationalists had participated in the Pact of San Sebastian on the promise of devolved control. A Catalan state had been declared at the same time as the Republic and the Statute of Autonomy was a compromise
- the Catalan language had been persecuted under Primo, much to the concern of all sections of Catalan society
- many strikes and protests had been brutally opposed previously by central military and paramilitary forces from outside Catalonia, such as during the anti-conscription demonstrations.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the religious clause of the constitution led to even greater polarisation of Spanish society and loss of working class support from the 'faithful'
- restrictions on teaching removed the Catholic Church's ability to exert influence over the minds of the young
- the Church reforms led many Catholics to oppose the government and helped bring about the formation of CEDA
- opposition to the reforms led to the attempted coup by Sanjurjo in 1932
- obligatory cultivation and confiscation of land which was given over to the landless peasants had some impact but was not widespread enough
- Law of Municipal Boundaries (May 1931) required landowners to offer jobs to those living within their municipality before importing migrant workers. This prevented the undercutting of agricultural wages
- made eviction almost impossible and blocked rent rises
- rural wages rose dramatically and the bargaining power of the FNTT in wage disputes was vastly strengthened
- women gained many more freedoms, including divorce and the right to vote, this brought about a rise in interest in women's issues in many parts of Spain.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Martin Blinkhorn	Argues, 'By 1933, it was evident how successful the holders of local socio-economic power had been in retaining it and in evading or openly flouting unwelcome legislation.'
Raymond Carr	Contends 'The Agrarian Reform Bill) seriously threatened the strongest economic class in Spain . . . and awakened the hopes of the impoverished peasantry.'
George Richard Esenwein and Adrian Shubert	Suggest that, 'even this moderate reform led the landowners, with Gil Robles' encouragement, to declare all-out war on the republic.'
Gabriel Jackson	Considers that, 'No serious revision could be accomplished without attacking some of the most powerful vested interests in the country.'

Question 71 **How fully does Source C explain the planning for a military rising in 1936?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) <i>in regard to interpretation given</i>
Gil Robles's role in the preparation of the coup was considerable as he made an incalculable contribution to the creation of mass right-wing militancy.	States that Gil Robles had a significant role in the plotting.
The assistance Robles gave, which he later tried to deny, consisted of 500,000 pesetas given to General Mola.	States that the rising was partly financed by money from Gil Robles.
The Falangist terror squads worked hard to accelerate the spiral of mindless violence which rendered impossible rational discussion.	States that the Falange were working to create an atmosphere where force would be needed to restore order.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- once Gil Robles' 'accidentalists' tactics were defeated by the election of the Popular Front, he went over to the 'catastrophist' side
- Robles gave CEDA's money to Mola's uprising, which was also financed by Juan March
- the Falange were responsible for hundreds of acts of violence designed to undermine the Popular Front. It was in reprisal for a Falange murder that Calvo Sotelo was killed.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Director of the plot was General Mola from his base in Pamplona
- as well as army Generals, civilian politicians sympathetic to the uprising were also involved
- the plotting began as soon as the Popular Front were elected, this was not a spontaneous uprising
- each major city and area had a General responsible for securing it for the uprising
- Franco knew about the plot but was reluctant to join and only committed after the murder of Calvo Sotelo
- there was involvement by members of British Intelligence, whether formally sanctioned or not, with the plane sent to transport Franco setting off before Sotelo was killed and financed by Juan March
- Sanjurjo, then in exile in Portugal, was intended to be the new head of state until he died in a plane crash at the beginning of the coup.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	States that no group on the Right did more to cause disorder and therefore provoke a coup than the Falange.
Raymond Carr	Suggests 'The organisation of the military conspiracy proved a difficult business, not least because the army itself was divided between those who accepted the Republic loyally and those who, like Mola, believed the politicians were bent on destroying the army'.
David Boyd Hancock	Contends that having failed at the ballot box, both Gil Robles and the Falange abandoned the democratic process in favour of bullets.
Paul Preston	Argues 'The elections meant that henceforth the right would be more concerned with destroying the Republic than taking it over. Military plotting began in earnest'.

Question 72 **Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the impact of the contribution of the International Brigades to the Republican war effort.**

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Bill Alexander.	A Scottish member of the International Brigades. A leading member of the Communist Party.
Purpose	To document his memories of his participation in the International Brigade.	To show the importance of the International Brigades. Emphasising the positive contribution of the British workers to the International Brigades.
Timing	1996.	60 years after the start of the Civil War.

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
Nonetheless, around 2400 volunteered from the British Isles and the then British Empire, so while numerically only a small part of the International Brigades, many already knew how to lead in the trade unions, demonstrations and people's organisations, and understood the need to set an example and lead from the front if necessary.	Takes the view that although numerically small they made an important contribution due to their organisational experience in trade unions, demonstrations and organisations so they knew how to lead. Emphasised by 'lead from the front.'
The International Brigades provided a shock force while the Republic trained and organised an army from a group of individuals who had never met before.	Takes the view that the presence of the International Brigades provided a ready-made solution enabling the Republican forces to organise. Emphasised by 'shock force.'
The Spanish people were profoundly boosted by the knowledge that they were not fighting alone.	Takes the view that there was a positive impact on morale on the Republican side in Spain. Emphasised by 'profoundly boosted.'

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- numerically of reasonable importance with around 35,000 in total though not all at one time
- the International Brigades helped to bridge the gap in the Republican forces until the People's Army was ready in Spring 1937
- the International Brigades were important as a propaganda tool and brought exposure of the plight of the Republic to a wider audience.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- their importance to the defence of Madrid in 1936 has sometimes been exaggerated as Spanish troops, militia, paramilitaries and civilians also fought in defence of the capital
- the International Brigades took part in most of the important battles of the war, including Jarama, Guadalajara, Brunete and the Ebro
- the International Brigades were not as numerically significant as the CTV were to the Nationalists
- the International Brigades did not come with any equipment and therefore were a drain on Republican supplies, unlike the Condor Legion or the Italians for the Nationalists.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Antony Beevor	Argues that ‘So successful was the Comintern propaganda that the British Ambassador was convinced that only foreigners defended Madrid.’
Paul Preston	Considers that their part in the defence of Madrid should not be exaggerated; it was part of a heroic effort.
Fraser Raeburn	Suggests ‘Though only ever a minority of the Republic’s soldiers, these foreign volunteers became a defining feature of the conflict.’
Giles Tremlett	Contends, ‘For the Republic, the battle of Guadalajara had been a resounding success. The men of the Garibaldi battalion had won their miniature civil war.’

Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938-1951

PART A – HISTORICAL ISSUES

Question 73 ‘A completely unprepared Britain declared war in September 1939.’
How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To evaluate the statement that Britain was completely unprepared when war was declared in 1939. Responses might consider different aspects of Britain’s preparedness in meeting the challenge of total war and include an assessment of the military (examining the separate branches of the armed forces), the state of the economy and industrial capacity, the diplomatic efforts to secure allies and civil defence preparations. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Britain was completely unprepared for war:

Military preparedness:

- although the Royal Navy was the largest in the world in 1939 only about half had been modernised and the rest were deficient in horizontal armour needed for protection against modern, long-range shellfire
- September 1939 Bomber Command consisted of 55 squadrons (920 aircraft). However, only about 350 of these were suitable for long-range operations
- Fighter Command had 39 squadrons (600 aircraft) but the RAF only had 96 reconnaissance aircraft
- coastal Command was not sufficiently prepared in 1939 to locate and destroy U-boats
- the Army was given the lowest priority of the three services
- the degree to which the Norway campaign and the evacuation at Dunkirk showed up exactly how unprepared the armed forces were.

The economy and industrial capacity:

- Chamberlain’s hope of ‘playing the long game’
- the extent to which Chamberlain’s ideological opposition to government intervention in the economy led to failings in economic planning
- allocations to industry allowed too many inessential goods to continue to be made
- inessential goods could be imported only under licence, but licences were not difficult to obtain
- Chamberlain’s unwillingness to consult with the trade unions over mobilisation of labour and production targets
- one and a quarter million people were still unemployed by January 1940
- spare industrial capacity in the economy still existed into 1940
- ration books had been ready since 1938, were issued at the end of September but food rationing did not begin until January 1940.

Diplomatic preparedness:

- Chamberlain’s adherence to the policy of appeasement and his desire to avoid war with Nazi Germany culminating in the Munich Agreement of September 1938, which ultimately failed to prevent war
- Chamberlain’s extreme reluctance to engage in any meaningful negotiations with the USSR over a possible alliance against Hitler and his distrust of the French as allies
- the isolationist policy of the USA during the 1930s and the failure of the British to exert more influence over this
- the debate over Churchill’s assertion that Britain could have been instrumental in creating a Grand Alliance against Germany in the late 1930s and whether such an outcome was ever possible.

Civil Defence preparations:

- shortage of ARP volunteers prior to the outbreak of war
- disagreement between the Government and local authorities over who should pay for the cost of Civil Defence Precautions
- historical debate over the question of whether there were sufficient shelters and whether they were of sufficient quality
- a 'Morrison Sandwich' was the popular name given to badly built shelters which had to be torn down and replaced as they were unstable due to the poor materials used
- Government's belief in the possibility of the public developing a 'Deep Shelter Mentality' delayed the use of the London Underground for sheltering. Many civilians took the initiative by simply buying a ticket and not getting on the train.

Evidence which refutes the view that Britain was completely unprepared for war:**Military preparedness:**

- British peacetime rearmament was implemented under 'Scheme F'. This involved expansion of production within munitions and component parts industries through the creation of 'shadow factories'
- German annexation of Austria necessitated the approval of 'Scheme L' which made provisions for 12,000 aircraft over two years
- Impressive new RAF fighters (which replaced biplanes) Spitfires and Hurricanes were introduced, which were a match for the Luftwaffe
- the Chain Home and Chain Home Low early warning radar systems were fully operational in 1939 and able to detect incoming aircraft to 120 miles providing roughly 20 minutes warning
- the Military Training Act of 27 April 1939 forced all British men aged 20 and 21 who were fit and able to undertake six months' military training
- the National Service (Armed Forces) Act made all able men between the ages of 18 and 41 liable for conscription
- by the end of 1939 more than 1.5 million men had been conscripted into the armed forces.

Civil Defence preparations:

- in 1935 the Government made it the responsibility of the local authorities to set up ARP services in their area and train local volunteers
- ARP Act of 1937 made the taking of ARP measures mandatory by the local authority and that the Government would pay for most of the costs incurred
- after the Munich Crisis of September 1938, the Government distributed 38 million gas masks. Exercises took place to deal with the possible effects of a poison gas attack
- In 1939 new hospitals opened to deal with potential bombing casualties. 140,000 patients sent home from hospitals to make way for expected air raid casualties
- the Government sent every household in the country a leaflet outlining methods to cope with air raids, 'How to Prepare Your Home for. . . '
- blackout procedures and the role of the ARP wardens
- women's Voluntary Service for Civil Defence. (February 1939) Did a variety of jobs including medical support and staffing public kitchens
- Anderson and Morrison shelters. Numbers, affordability and effectiveness of these
- plans for Evacuation in September 1939. Within three days 1.5 million children were evacuated. Codename Operation Pied Piper.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Paul Addison	Argues that Chamberlain's failure to gear the economy for war was due to both his deep-seated desire not to let the trade unions have any say in manpower distribution or to upset market forces in the economy.
Robert Mackay	Contends that it is not an attainable ideal for any democracy to effectively prepare for total war.
Nick Tiratsoo	Argues that the government failed in its provision of deep shelters, particularly in the East End of London, an obvious target.
Andrew Roberts	Contends that civil defence was as effective as it could have been under the circumstances.

Question 74

How important was the political diplomacy of the Grand Alliance in achieving Britain's war aims by 1945?

Aim of the question To evaluate the importance of the political diplomacy of the Grand Alliance to Britain in achieving her war aims by 1945. The three great Allied powers-Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union-formed a Grand Alliance that was the key to victory. But the alliance partners did not share common political aims, and did not always agree on how the war should be fought. Responses might demonstrate an understanding of the relationship between the Big Three and the effectiveness with which diplomatic efforts allowed Britain to pursue her war aims up to 1945. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that the political diplomacy of the Grand Alliance was crucial to the achievement of Britain's war aims:

- Britain's war aims were 'to defend the balance of power in Europe and to protect its empire and position in the world'
- Britain went to war in 1939 after Germany invaded Poland, believing that German aggression needed to be confronted with force
- the Grand Alliance was formed as a result of the failure of the original Anglo-French coalition against Nazi Germany due to the military defeat and surrender of France in 1940, followed by Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union and his later declaration of war against the United States a few days after his axis ally Japan attacked the US fleet at Pearl harbour
- Churchill believed that Britain's victory against Nazi Germany would not be possible without American assistance
- Churchill said, 'The only thing worse than having allies is not having them'
- the Big Three faced considerable challenges in coordinating their efforts. Thousands of miles separated their capitals, which meant important decisions often had to be made by telephone or telegraph
- the Alliance brought together countries with different political and economic ideologies, with Britain and the USA as capitalists and the Soviet Union as communist
- the result of this was that there was a great deal of suspicion, on the part of Joseph Stalin, that had to be overcome if Britain were to achieve her war aims
- in private Churchill and Roosevelt referred to Stalin as 'Uncle Joe', a term of endearment
- they viewed him as a patriot rather than a communist and this cult of Stalin's personality underpinned Churchill and Roosevelt's confidence in the Grand Alliance
- convergence: during the war the advanced capitalist countries became more state socialist. Churchill and Roosevelt personified these trends leading Stalin to believe he could work with them
- the correspondence between the three leaders provides a unique insight into the relationship and strategy of the Grand Alliance; Stalin exchanged more than 600 letters with Churchill and Roosevelt
- the Big Three leaders regularly relied on their trusted ministers to lay the groundwork for their meetings. For example, Moscow (1941) negotiations were conducted by Anthony Eden and similarly his Soviet counter-part, Molotov's shuttle negotiations between London, Washington and Moscow during in May and June 1942 to discuss an Anglo-Soviet treaty and plans for a 'second front'
- representatives of all three nations signed the United Nations Declaration, pledging to work together to defeat the Axis powers on New Years Day, 1942
- Casablanca (January 1943): Roosevelt conciliated Churchill, agreeing to put off opening a second front in France in favour of more modest operations against Sicily, Italy, and the 'soft underbelly' of Europe after the liberation of North Africa
- Stalin signalled his good intentions when he engineered the abolition of the Comintern in May 1943

- Trident Conference, Washington (May, 1943): Churchill and Roosevelt projected a 29-division invasion of France for May 1944. The long delay was the consequence of the need to build up troop strength, landing craft, and supplies, and to ensure complete command of air and sea the Quebec Conference (August, 1943): Plans were made for a US landing in Italy; the plan for the Allied landings in France was approved; and the UK and USA agreed there would be no nuclear attacks without mutual consent
- Tehran (November/December, 1943): The first meeting of all three leaders together. Stalin and Roosevelt ganged up on Churchill and pressed him for a definite commitment and date for the invasion of France. Churchill resisted at first, but later conceded the date of May 1944. Churchill managed to negotiate that
- 'Tolstoy' Conference (October 1944): Churchill was party, with Stalin, to the Percentages Agreement which decided the fate of several East European countries. It was called the 'Naughty Document' by Churchill as he feared that the US would disapprove of the imperialist undertones of the agreement. Churchill managed to secure for Britain dominance in Greece and the eastern mediterranean
- Yalta Conference (February, 1945): The allies reiterated their intention to pursue Germany's unconditional surrender and to divide the country into zones of occupation afterwards.

Evidence which supports the view that political diplomacy was not always important in the achievement of Britain's war aims:

- Churchill's insistence on the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers at the Casablanca Conference, which was designed to allay the fears of Stalin, prolonged the war claimed his critics Churchill has been accused of having sold Britain out to the Americans, ultimately diminishing Britain's position of power within Europe
- Churchill has been accused of being responsible for the decline of the British Empire
- by the end-of-war conferences, Churchill's influence within the Grand Alliance was severely diminished and Stalin and Roosevelt dominated therefore limiting Britain's ability to pursue the aim of securing a balance of power within Europe
- the Allied Bombing of Dresden on 13-14 February 1945, was allegedly to destroy a key communications centre for Germans facing the Red Army to reassure Stalin of Allied support for the defeat of Germany. The two-day incendiary raid created a firestorm, however, that consumed the medieval city and killed up to 25,000 civilians, to virtually no military purpose for Britain and serious cost in terms of men lost and holding a position of moral superiority
- the need to maintain a positive relationship with Stalin led the Allies to hold back on a race to Berlin, ultimately gifting the Soviets the upper hand in the region
- Yalta (1945): Churchill received much criticism for his seemingly passive acceptance of Soviet domination of Poland and Eastern Europe. In the House of Commons debate on Yalta, 21 Conservative MPs, including future Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home, tabled an amendment which regretted 'the transfer of the territory of an Ally to another power'. Junior minister George Strauss resigned in protest against the government's policy on Poland.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
John Charmley	Contends that Churchill betrayed his core values of British independence, Empire, and his anti-socialism for the sake of maintaining the Grand Alliance. He also argues that Churchill made Britain subservient to America.
Martin Folly	Argues that successful Red Army resistance (rather than Hitler's onslaught itself) forced British leaders to take the Soviet Union seriously and to formulate a clear policy, predicated on cautious confidence that the Soviets now wanted to co-operate with the Western allies. Co-operation remained the premise of British policy toward the Soviet Union right to the end of the Churchill wartime government.
David Reynolds	Contends that much of the political diplomacy between the Big Three was aimed at maintaining the support of Stalin, who never shook off fears that Britain and Germany would sign a compromise peace.
Geoffrey Roberts	Argues that the success of the Grand Alliance rested on the personal relationships between Churchill Roosevelt and Stalin and that the collapse of the Grand Alliance after the Second World War was due to the failure of the post-war leaders – Stalin, Truman, Attlee – to continue the personal collaboration of their wartime predecessors.

Question 75**How successful was the Allied bombing campaign against Germany during the Second World War?**

Aim of the question To evaluate the degree of success achieved by the Allied bombing campaign against Germany. Responses might demonstrate a clear understanding of the aims, achievements and limitations of the bombing campaign. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Aims of the Allied bombing campaign:

- the reasons for bombing Germany were to disrupt and reduce industrial production of weapons, to wear down German morale and to force the German Army and Air Force to defend against the bombing over a wide area
- Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State commented that, 'the objective of our bombing offensive in Germany is to destroy the capacity of Germany to make war'
- after the evacuation at Dunkirk, arguably bombing was the only feasible method of taking the war to Germany. In this sense, its purpose lay in maintaining the morale of the British people.

Evidence which supports the view that the Allied bombing of Germany was a success:

- Arthur Harris was appointed to lead Bomber Command in February 1942, he continued Churchill's policy of area bombing
- Sinclair supported Bomber Harris and believed that strategic bombing of Germany was an effective way of destroying Germany's war effort and morale. Sinclair argued that the targets were industrial rather than residential
- Harris stated that, 'They sowed the wind, and they are going to reap the whirlwind' May 1942
- Harris saw civilian death (or the 'dehousing' of the German workforce) as entirely necessary
- by the end of the war, 3.37 million German homes were destroyed
- 593,000 German civilians were killed by bombing
- he argued that 1000 bomber raids could destroy industrial cities in hours
- crucially Harris argued that area bombing would render the ground invasion of Europe unnecessary. He pointed to the Cologne raid of May 1942 as an example of what could be achieved: in one night, 1046 aircraft dropped more than 2000 tonnes of bombs on the city, reducing 13,000 houses to rubble
- the capabilities of RAF bombers improved during the war, the Lancaster heavy bomber was a very effective bomber
- Lancasters could also be used for precision bombing targets such as bridges using 10-ton Grand Slam bombs
- repeated attacks on Germany caused the diversion of industrial war production to defensive rather than offensive weapons
- as there was no Second Front until D-Day in June 1944, Churchill promised heavy bombing of Germany to placate Stalin
- US Army Air Force bombed German cities during the day. They attempted precision bombing, the RAF bombed at night
- in May 1943, the Dambusters raids against dams in the Ruhr Valley, in the German industrial heartland
- although the economic impact of the Dambusters raid was negligible, the operation had a great impact on public morale
- the defeat of the German Air Force coincided with improvements in accuracy making the combined bomber force a valuable asset against an expanding German war economy
- by 1945, the major cities of the Third Reich had been razed to rubble
- Churchill was very much committed to the Allied Bombing Campaign. However, Churchill's attitude towards the campaign changed after the destruction of Dresden, February 1945
- by the end of the war, RAF Bomber Command had dropped nearly one million tons of bombs in the course of 390,000 operations

- no major German city escaped bombing, and many German cities were more than half-destroyed, including Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Dresden
 - forcing the Germans onto the defensive through bombing was a critical factor in the liberation of Europe and the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945
 - Bombing was vital to British victory, 'bombing placed a ceiling on the expansion of German war potential'
 - German bomber production was cut back and one-third of the production of heavy guns, electrical and radar equipment went to anti-aircraft defences
 - seventy-five percent of German heavy anti-tank guns, manned by 900,000 soldiers, had to be used as anti-aircraft guns, scattered across the country
 - German factories had to concentrate on producing aircraft which were used in a defensive role
- Churchill, in the final volume of his memoirs said: 'In judging the contribution to victory of strategic air power. . . before the end, we and the US had developed striking forces so powerful that they played a major part in the economic collapse of Germany.'

Evidence which supports the view that the Allied bombing of Germany was limited in its success:

- by August 1941 'only about one in five of Bomber Command's aircraft was putting its bombs within five miles of its target'
- Bombers encountered serious difficulties flying in darkness and frequently in bad weather in autumn 1941 the decision was taken by Air Ministry planners to switch the order of target priority: Area bombing was to be the first priority and precision raids would be carried out when appropriate
- the bomber force needed more aircrews, bigger and better bombers and improved navigation equipment to be effective
- there is an argument that German morale may even have been strengthened rather than damaged
- wholesale defiance on the part of the German civilian population was not expected. British analysts thought the German population would capitulate, it did not
- politicians may have been arrogant to think that the reaction of the German civilian population would be any less patriotic than the reaction of Londoners during the Blitz
- German war production actually increased until 1944
- Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production of Germany, wrote: 'In the burning cities we daily experienced the direct impact of war. . . Neither did the bombings and the hardships that resulted from them weaken the morale of the populace. . . I carried away the impression of growing toughness'
- there was further criticism of the bombing strategy when economists looked at the amount of men and material involved. They surmised that the resources employed could have been better used elsewhere in the war effort at this time as the war came to an end, it became harder to argue that raids were saving the lives of Allied soldiers.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Basil Collier	Believed that destroying cathedrals and hospitals and killing non-combatants of all ages and both sexes, either in the course of impracticable attempts to bomb strictly military objectives. . . (was). . . both legitimate and sound.
Max Hastings	Argues that bombing failed in its attempt to destroy German morale as it never came near to collapse until the very end. If anything, the continuous bombings of German cities only strengthened morale.
Richard Overy	Argues that bombing was vital to British victory, bombing placed a ceiling on the expansion of German war potential. Germany mounted a huge effort to protect itself from Bomber Command and this, in turn, deprived their army and air force of men and equipment. Arguing the bombing campaign diverted a great deal of Germany's war effort away from the war at sea or the main fighting fronts.
Detlef Siebert	Suggests that area bombing had a much more limited impact on German war production and on the German population.

Question 76 **To what extent was there significant social change in Britain between 1939 and 1945?**

Aim of the question To evaluate the extent to which Britain experienced significant social change during the war. Responses may examine the state of British society in 1939 before analysing the extent of social change experienced in areas such as: employment; living standards; gender equality and family structure; and social legislation up to 1945. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which demonstrates the state of British society in 1939:

- high unemployment in the industrial North caused stagnation in social mobility; it allowed many to descend into poverty, especially those workers who were teetering around the breadline
- falling living standards for many resulted in a poor diet and subsequent decline in the population's health
- Britain's housing stock was mainly owned by private landlords and occupied by the working class. Housing conditions were often poor, rents were high, and overcrowding was common. These conditions influenced the overall health of the population
- unequal access to education; intelligent children from the working class found it difficult to access an academic education because of the element of payment needed
- Britain suffered under a deeply entrenched class system in the 1930s that resulted in little social mobility
- family structure was built around marriage and the concept of a male 'breadwinner', although in many working class families, women were necessitated to work
- Whilst legislation extended the grounds for divorce and equalised them between the sexes in 1937, the expense of divorce kept overall rates low
- welfare, although available, was means tested and uncomprehensive; described by Addison as 'a patchwork without overall design.'

Evidence which supports the view that Britain experienced significant social change:

- unemployment was virtually eliminated during the war and wage increases led to a material improvement in living standards for many
- the impact of the Blitz through the destruction of housing across Britain
- the experience of sheltering, particularly in London, led to a degree of social mixing that contributed to a sense of unity and reduction of class barriers
- the communal experience of grief and loss transcended class barriers leading to a sense of unity
- the rationing system ensured 'fair shares' for everyone and resulted in an improved diet for some of the poorest in society
- evacuation brought about a profound change in public values by making the privileged aware of the condition of the poor
- the education of many children was disrupted as rural schools could not cope with the influx of children from the cities
- Marwick's view is that war work was emancipating, drew women, traditionally housebound, into the world of work, giving them a financial independence and an enhanced sense of their status in society
- psychologically, women may have developed an alternative view of their subordinate role within marriage after having coped with their enforced position as head of the household, main breadwinner, disciplinarian and family decision maker, in the absence of the male figure in the home. Spiralling divorce rates tend to reinforce this notion
- the expansion of social welfare reform as seen in the Beveridge Report (1942) and the Education Act (1944).

Evidence which refutes the view that Britain experienced significant social change:

- rather than change, there is evidence to support the notion that there was a significant degree of continuity for many during the war
- revisionists would argue that war's impact on the hierarchical nature of Britain's class structure was limited
- employers still seen as class enemies by workers. Evidence of the increasing number of days lost to strike action during the war which increased as the war went on despite striking being made illegal
- social mixing in shelters was limited as class was used as a barrier for people to access air raid shelters in the more expensive London hotels, where only customers and guests were allowed to use the facilities
- home Intelligence reports reveal public outrage at the apparent inequities as the rich were seen to be less hit by rationing than ordinary people
- rather than 'pricking the middle class conscience', there is evidence that evacuation simply re-enforced notions of working class inferiority in the minds of the middle classes
- crime rates remained largely unaffected by war and in some areas rose
- many better-off women evaded conscription or negotiated their way into less burdensome work
- mass Observation surveys reinforce the view that war work was seen as a temporary phenomenon and that women expected to return to their more traditional roles in society once the conflict ended
- the Beveridge Report proved to be a socially conservative document in introducing Family Allowances as a 'reward' for childbearing and in making the retrieval of missed national insurance contributions for women, who took time out to have children, more difficult than for men who returned to work after a break
- the education reforms introduced through the 1944 Butler Education Act reinforced the notion of training for motherhood as a substantial part of the education of those who failed the eleven plus test/qualy, IQ test, in Scotland.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Arthur Marwick	Believes that the war had a profound social impact and that its effects were to be felt long after its conclusion.
John Macnicol	Suggests that far from pricking middle class conscience and promoting a sense of national unity, evacuation served only to reinforce existing class prejudice about lazy mothers and generally poor parenting. Echoes of this argument resounded around Whitehall.
Nick Tiratsoo and Stuart Hylton	Suggest that improved social cohesion during the war has been exaggerated, citing widespread panic and anger in the East End of London at inadequate shelter provision as well as the widespread incidence of industrial unrest especially on the Clyde where workers often saw their employers as a greater enemy than Hitler.
Penny Summerfield	Suggests that many women did have a different attitude toward marriage as a result of the war but rejects the idea of war work encouraging a feminist dawn.

Question 77

‘Britain had lost its status as a world power by 1951.’

How valid is this view?

Aim of the question To evaluate the validity of the statement that Britain had lost its status as a world power by 1951. Responses might make reference to Britain’s post-war economic, military and imperial decline as well as balancing that out with reference to more positive aspects such as relations with Dominions and creation of the Commonwealth, membership of NATO and the UN and the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent. Candidates should come to a reasoned conclusion.

Candidates might refer to:

Evidence which supports the view that Britain had lost its status as a world power:

- from being a great creditor nation with the world’s most powerful currency, Britain ended the war in debt to the tune of £3700 million, a huge balance of payments deficit and an enormous loss of overseas markets
- by July 1947, sterling was freely convertible to dollars, threatening to wipe out Britain’s dollar reserve and virtually destroying the pound as a trading currency
- faced with financial ruin, Britain was forced to reduce some of her overseas commitments, resulting in military withdrawal from Greece, Turkey and Palestine
- the loss of India was a staggering blow to Britain’s military and political presence east of Suez as was the passage of Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma
- after the financial crises of 1947, 1949 and 1951, Britain’s economic capacity to remain a world power, even with US aid was severely challenged by the fragility of her trading and financial position
- the onset of the Cold War and Britain’s alignment with the USA led many critics to suggest that the concept of an independent British foreign policy had been subverted by the necessity of following the lead of the USA, a notion which seemed to gain credence after Britain’s entry into the Korean War
- by 1951, Commonwealth relationships had undergone a fundamental transformation, the full effects of which were only just becoming apparent and in Malaya and Iran the emerging conflicts there clearly marked out some of the limits of British world power status in the post-war world.

Evidence which refutes the view that Britain had lost its status as a world power:

- despite the independence of India in 1947, Britain still retained control over substantial parts of Africa as well as the Caribbean, Hong Kong and interest in the Suez Canal
- the sterling area still accounted for over half the world’s trade in the immediate post-war years and Britain retained close commercial ties with her Dominions despite interference from the USA. Britain continued to see herself as the world’s third greatest power and to that end retained a military presence in significant and strategic areas of the world
- Britain was a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and as such wielded considerable influence in international affairs
- the formation of NATO and the securing of US membership was a considerable feather in the cap of Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Bevin and strengthened Britain’s position as a key element in a Western European security system
- the possession of an independent nuclear deterrent was a significant factor in allowing the British to see themselves as the third world power, and if nothing else, the gap between Britain’s status in the world and any other countries apart from the USA and USSR was enormous.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Correlli Barnett	Argues that Britain's status as a great power was nothing more than an illusion and cites the misguided pursuit of a seat at the top table as a primary cause of the country's decline as an industrial nation in the post-war decades.
John Darwin	Contends that Britain's continued influence on the development of world affairs was still considerable and is consequently unconvinced that Britain's status as a world power had been completely lost by 1951.
Peter Hennessey	Contends that there is value in considering Britain as the third superpower and that this position was maintained beyond 1951 until it was finally dispelled by the Suez debacle.
Stephen Fielding	Argues that Britain was forced into a subservient position between the two superpowers and thus diminished by slavishly following US foreign policy.

Section 10 – Britain: at war and peace, 1938-1951

PART B – HISTORICAL SOURCES

Question 78 How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for Chamberlain's resignation in May 1940?

Candidates may be awarded up to a maximum of 3 marks for interpreting points from an individual source.

Point in Source A	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretation given
However, his abhorrence of the deadly results of wartime decision-making led to his admission to an 'agony of mind to give directions that would bring death and mutilation and misery to so many' which undermined his leadership.	Suggests that Chamberlain's leadership was undermined as he himself admitted to experiencing difficulty in taking the decisions required of a war leader.
This led to loss of support due to Chamberlain's obsession with the chances of negotiating a peaceful settlement.	Suggests that Chamberlain's willingness to negotiate with Hitler, even by 1940, was not a popular position and lost him political support.
However, on 10 May, faced with the backlash as a result of Germany's offensive on the Western Front, he resigned.	Suggests that Chamberlain's resignation was ultimately brought about by the deteriorating military situation on the Western Front.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- Chamberlain never wanted to be a war leader, writing 'How I hate and loathe this war. I was never meant to be a war minister'
- Chamberlain's continued commitment to exploring all opportunities to end the state of war with Germany led many to question his suitability as a war leader
- Hitler's invasion of France raised considerable concern across the political spectrum about Chamberlain's military prosecution of the war.

Point in Source B	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to interpretations given
The Labour Party played a critical role in Chamberlain's downfall as the party forced a division [vote] on 8 May, only after it became clear that a change of mood had taken place on the Conservative benches.	Suggests that the Labour Party played an important role in Chamberlain's resignation by calling for the parliamentary vote on 8 May.
As for Chamberlain, he had never taken the trouble to consult party opinion and under the pressure of war he became increasingly remote from constructive criticism of respected Conservative loyalists led by Lord Salisbury.	Suggests that Chamberlain played a role in his own downfall by failing to listen to the views of those from within his own party.
In May 1940, the abstentionists, an anonymous group totalling more than thirty, helped to make the difference between a comfortable victory and the halving of the Prime Minister's majority.	Suggests that those who abstained in the vote played a significant role in damaging Chamberlain's political standing.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- the melodramatic performances of Conservatives such as Sir Roger Keyes and Leo Amery during the Norway Debate convinced Attlee to force a vote of 'no confidence' in Chamberlain
- the 'Watching Committee', led by Lord Salisbury was made up of a small group of respected Conservatives who were critical of the Prime Minister's prosecution of the war
- in the parliamentary vote that concluded the Norway Debate, Chamberlain's usual majority of over 200 was reduced to 81.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the transition from a peacetime economy to wartime economy was slow and uncoordinated. These issues exposed failings in Chamberlain as a wartime Prime Minister putting his leadership under increasing scrutiny
- arguably Chamberlain's overall failure in the management of the economy was his failure to appoint a Cabinet member with overall control who could take a holistic view of the economy
- when Chamberlain needed the Trades Unions' cooperation to fulfil his economic targets, they refused to work with the man that many believed was responsible for causing so much misery during the 1930s
- Chamberlain was closely associated with the failed policy of appeasement which was one of the main reasons for his unpopularity when war broke out
- Chamberlain's statement on the 4 April that Hitler had 'missed the bus' (3 days prior to the German invasion of Denmark and Norway) revealed a lack of good military judgement
- as prime Minister, Chamberlain held ultimate responsibility for the poorly planned and executed Norway Campaign which resulted in the Germans occupying Norway
- the Labour Party had a long-standing distrust and dislike of Chamberlain
- the Labour Party refused to serve in any coalition government led by Chamberlain.

Historians**Perspective on the issue****Tim Bouverie**

Argues that the move to oust Chamberlain was led by Tory anti-appeasement rebels. Even though Chamberlain won the vote of no confidence, such a large Tory defection was widely considered a resounding defeat.

Tony Corfield

Contends that Chamberlain was ultimately brought down by the Labour rank and file who refused any participation within a national government that had Chamberlain as PM.

Paul Addison

Argues that it is inaccurate to view Chamberlain as having been doomed from the start due to his association with appeasement. The major criticism of Chamberlain centred on his refusal to institute stronger coordination of the economy.

Roger Hermiston

Believes that the Labour Party resolution that it would enter coalition but only under a new prime minister left Chamberlain with no option but to resign.

Question 79 **How fully does Source C explain the reasons for Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?**

Candidates may be awarded up to a **maximum of 3 marks** for interpreting points from the source.

Point in Source C	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to the source content provenance
Following the loss, in late July 1943, of 17 U-boats and 6 invaluable U-tankers leaving French bases, Admiral Dönitz was obliged to reduce submarine operations in distant waters.	States that German U-boat losses sustained in July of 1943 reduced their capabilities and range of operations, limiting their ability to wage an effective war against the Allies.
However, by autumn the Allies regained the upper hand in intelligence as enemy operators had failed to exploit the full potential of the four-rotor machine.	States that Germany made mistakes in the intelligence war by failing to make the most of the advantage achieved from the four-rotor enigma machine.
During the four months to end of 1943, the enemy lost 109 U-boats, 25 of them to Coastal Command's saturation coverage of the Bay of Biscay.	States that Allied success can be attributed to significant losses inflicted on German U-boats which were in part due to the effective use of Coastal Command in the Bay of Biscay.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- U-tankers ('Milk Cows') were considered crucial to the U-boat fleet as they could carry 400 tonnes of fuel oil, 50 tonnes of provisions and personnel to replace injured crewmen
- the Germans placed too much faith in the security provided by the enigma machine, ignoring warnings that naval ciphers had been compromised
- Coastal Command launched an air campaign, using converted land-based aircraft such as the Vickers Wellington, to attack U-boats as they passed through the Bay of Biscay on their way to and from their French bases.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the Royal Canadian Navy grew enormously and played a crucial role in convoy protection
- the US Navy took over convoy protection in the western Atlantic and their naval strength eventually wore down the U-boats in this theatre
- the use of High Frequency Direction Finding equipment (Huff-Duff) on escort ships further improved U-boat detection on the convoys
- improved radio communication from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore helped significantly in avoiding lurking U-boats
- ASV (air to surface radar) radar helped detect surfaced U-boats at a far greater distance and aircraft could be directed towards them speedily
- the development of the 'hedgehog' multiple mortar system, fired from the front of escort vessels instead of the rear as depth charges were, was a big improvement in U-boat destruction
- the capture of the Enigma Code machine in March 1941 was a vital breakthrough in intelligence and the resulting 'Ultra' intelligence gave the British a priceless advantage
- code-breakers at Bletchley Park worked throughout the war to keep their information current. With advance notice of where the U-boats were operating, the British were able to divert convoys away from the wolf packs.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Richard Overy	Contends that the energy, drive and invention of Admiral Horton was a significant factor to Allied success.
David Syrett	Argues that the intelligence gained from cracking the Enigma code was critical in winning the Battle of the Atlantic.
Jim Lotz	Believes that the Canadian Navy played a significant contribution to the Allied victory.
John Keegan	Contends that the revamped convoy system was an integral part of the success against the U-boats.

Question 80 **Evaluate the usefulness of Source D as evidence of the challenges that the Labour government faced in the management of the economy between 1945 and 1951.**

Candidates may be awarded a **total of 6 marks** for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the source **AND** for their ability to establish the views of the source in regard to provenance and accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source. Provenance evaluation will be up to **3 marks** and source evaluation up to **3 marks**.

The remaining marks may be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context recall, including historians' views, that candidates provide in their overall interpretation of the source's value.

Aspect of Source D		Possible comment on the source rubric provenance
Author	Clement Attlee.	Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Government. Attlee was in a uniquely informed position with understanding of all aspects of the difficulties facing the Government at this time.
Purpose	To inform parliament of the steps taken by the Labour Government to deal with the coal crisis.	In speaking to Parliament, Attlee was duty bound to provide a full and accurate account of the issues as he saw them.
Timing	10 February 1947.	Two years into Labour's term of office following the landslide victory in 1945 and delivered during the winter crisis of 1947. Hugh Dalton later described 1947 as Labour's 'Annus Horrendus.'

Point in Source D	Possible comment which shows the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s) in regard to information given
Although there has been a steady increase in coal production, demand has increased beyond all expectations; in particular, the consumption of coal to meet the increased demand for electricity greatly exceeded the estimate of the Central Electricity Board.	Takes the view that the demand for coal had increased suddenly and beyond expectation creating challenges in meeting the supply needs for electricity production. Emphasised when Attlee states the scale of the problem was 'beyond all expectations'.
The present critical situation is due to the spell of hard weather which we are experiencing; loading coal at docks has been difficult and slow, with ships from the North-East Coast delayed by gales and fog, and railway traffic disorganised by the blocking of tunnels and lines with snow.	Takes the view that the crisis facing the government was the result of poor winter weather conditions which delayed coal supplies from being transported around the country efficiently. Emphasised by Attlee's use of the word 'critical' which highlights the seriousness of the situation.
However, if we are to maintain essential services, there must be a drastic restriction of consumption of electricity by the general public.	Takes the view that the situation had reached a critical point where the government needed to impose cuts in public consumption of electricity in order to prioritise supplies for essential services. Emphasising the severity of the cuts required by Attlee's use of the word 'drastic'.

Possible points of knowledge which develop and contextualise the points in the source:

- from early in 1946, government officials expressed concern that the coal supplies, upon which the nation's industries depended, were inadequate
- from late January to mid-March, Britain was hit by its severest spell of cold weather in over fifty years
- the country's outrage, in response to the imposed cuts, was directed firmly at Minister of Fuel and Power, Emmanuel Shinwell.

Possible points of knowledge which offer wider contextualisation of the source:

- the fuel crisis was followed by declining industrial production and heavy unemployment. A second point of wider contextual development would be that by February unemployment had reached over 2.5 million (approx. 15% of the total workforce)
- the balance of payments problem that emerged as exports fell to the value of £200 million whilst imports from the United States increased rapidly
- the balance of payments deficit had to be resolved using dollars from the American loan
- the Convertibility Crisis and subsequent imposition of emergency cuts on imports and government spending.

Historians	Perspective on the issue
Paul Adelman	Suggests that after the summer of 1947 things were never the same for the Labour Government.
David Dutton	Contends that Labour's six years in power were marked by continuous economic difficulties that not only determined their approach to the general management of the national economy, but also frustrated the hopes of much of the party's left wing.
Kevin Jeffreys	Argues that the winter of 1947 and the convertibility crisis that followed shook ministerial confidence and marked the transition to a new, more cautious phase in domestic policy.
Kenneth Morgan	Contends that the significance of 1947 lay in the political results of the crisis which ushered in what he calls 'The Cripps Era'.

(END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS)